​评论 | 马丁•雅克：应对疫情与经济挑战，中国的治理体系优于西方

Editor's note: Martin Jacques, a visiting professor at Tsinghua University, is the former senior fellow at the Department of Politics and International Studies in Cambridge University. This is an excerpt of his speech at the Understanding China Conference 2020, held in Guangzhou, China, in November. The article reflects the author's opinions, and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

2020 has been the most extraordinary year since 1945. The pandemic has, in an utterly new way, tested virtually every government in the world to the limit. Already, of course, it was taking place in the context of the growing divide between the U.S. and China. 

2020年是1945年以来最不寻常的一年。新冠疫情以一种前所未见的方式挑战着世界几乎所有政府的极限。当然，这一切还发生在中美分歧日益扩大的背景之下。

But we need to take a further step back to put the present tumult into context. The 2008 Western financial crisis was the biggest such crisis since 1931. It was bound to have profound implications over time. 

但我们需要再后退一步，以更广阔的时代视角去分析当前的动荡局面。2008年的西方金融危机是1931年以来最大的一次危机。随着时间的推移，它必然会造成深远的影响。

And it did, persuading a disgruntled and angry working class in the U.S., suffering from long-term stagnation in their incomes, to break their political moorings and vote for what proved to be a fundamental change in American politics: the election of Trump, the rejection of globalisation, the embrace of nationalism and a major shift in U.S.-China relations. 

而事实也的确如此。它令长期饱受收入增长停滞之苦、满怀愤懑的美国工人阶级打破了政治束缚，以投票的方式促成了美国政治的根本性改变：特朗普入主白宫、反对全球化、拥护民族主义、以及中美关系的重大转折。

The forces unleashed by 2008 are still in motion, with the changed politics of every European country, and especially the US, bearing continuing testimony to this. 

2008年金融危机的影响仍在，每个欧洲国家以及美国的政治变化都在不断印证着这一点。 

Meanwhile something on an even greater scale has intervened, an ongoing pandemic which is having a far bigger impact on the world than 2008.

与此同时，一场更大规模的事件发生了：新冠疫情对世界的影响已远超2008年金融危机。

It has already resulted in a bigger decline in global production, a much larger fall in global trade, and a fragmentation and balkanisation of globalisation far bigger than anything that happened before 2016. The disruption resulting from 2020 will be far greater than that from 2008 and so will the consequent changes. 

它导致了全球生产和贸易更大幅度的下降，全球化破裂和割裂化程度也都远超2016年之前的任何时候。2020年的破坏性以及随之而来的变化都将超过2008年。

The fact that the pandemic has taken place in the context of the 2008 financial crisis and the U.S.-China divide will only serve to intensify and accentuate its effects. 

新冠疫情发生在2008年金融危机和中美分歧的背景下，这只会加剧和凸显它的影响。

2008 was an economic crisis with political effects. The pandemic is a health crisis, a crisis of human existence if you like, an economic crisis and a political crisis all at the same time. The only parallel – and it is only a parallel – is war.   

2008年金融危机是一场具有政治影响的经济危机。而新冠疫情则是一场卫生危机，一场人类的生存危机，同时也是一场经济危机和政治危机。（从影响来看），这二者唯一可与之相比拟的就是战争。

The pandemic threatens to undermine the world order as we know it. There will be no return to the past: to the established hierarchies of nations with the United States at the top; to globalisation as it existed in the period 1980-2016; to liberal democracies in the way they have been since 1945; to the Western international order that emerged after 1945.

本次疫情可能将破坏我们所知的世界秩序，令一切不复从前：我们回不到以美国为首的既有国家层级体系，回不到1980-2016年的全球化时代，回不到1945年以来的自由民主，更回不到1945年之后形成的西方国际秩序。

I don’t mean by this that these will suddenly collapse in a cataclysmic fashion, but rather that the pandemic will greatly accelerate a process which was in a much more gradual manner already taking place. 

我不是在说，上述这些会突然以一种灾难性的方式崩溃，而是说这场疫情会大大加速一个原本就在缓慢发生的进程。

In normal times, most change is relatively gradual. In moments of crisis, the pace of change accelerates. At times of great national crisis or, as in the case of the pandemic, great national and international crisis, then change can take place at a phenomenal speed. Wars have, in the past, been the traditional exemplars of this, especially the two world wars.

在正常时期，大多数的变化都是相对缓慢的。在危机时刻，变革的步伐则会加快。在出现诸如此次新冠疫情等重大国家危机时，变革就会以惊人的速度发生。过去，战争一直是这种影响力的典型代表，尤其是两次世界大战。

Let us just remind ourselves of what we are witnessing and what is, broadly speaking, likely to happen. 

让我们提醒自己，我们正在目睹着什么，以及大体上可能将发生什么。

In the United States, up to 300,000, perhaps far more, will die. The country is utterly divided on how, or even whether, to fight the pandemic. 

在美国，疫情导致的死亡人数或将高达30万，甚至更多。在如何抗击疫情、乃至是否抗击疫情的问题上，美国内部存在严重分歧。

Western Europe is once again in lockdown, with the great majority confined to home. Western governments have failed in their fight against the virus, with the honourable exception of New Zealand and, to lesser extent, Germany. 

另一方面，西欧再度陷入封锁状态，绝大多数西欧人只能待在家里。西方各国政府在与病毒的斗争中大都以失败告终，只有新西兰和德国例外，它们的抗疫表现值得我们敬佩。

Unlike in East Asia, they have opted to live with the virus, constantly zig-zagging between the needs of the economy and saving lives. When the worst of the pandemic is finally over, Western societies will be confronted with huge unemployment, severely reduced living standards and a profound loss of confidence in their governments and political systems. 

与东亚不同的是，西方选择了与病毒共存，在经济需求和拯救生命之间不断摇摆。当疫情高峰最终过去后，西方社会将出现大量失业，人们生活水平严重下降，人们对政府和政治制度的信心将彻底丧失。

There will be a large contraction in the size of the Western economies in 2020, with the possibility of a subsequent double-dip recession and perhaps later even a depression. Contrast this with the situation in East Asia. 

2020年，西方经济规模将大幅萎缩，随后可能发生双底衰退，甚至出现萧条。这将与东亚的情况形成鲜明对比。

All these countries, most dramatically China, were clear on the need to eliminate the virus and have overwhelmingly succeeded. As a result, their economies are recovering rapidly with China the only country in the world forecast to grow this year. 

所有东亚国家，尤其是中国，都非常清楚消灭病毒的必要性，并取得了压倒性的成功。因此，这些国家的经济正在迅速复苏。中国是全球唯一预计今年将实现增长的国家。

East Asia’s handling of the epidemic has been a vindication of their governance systems and Confucian-based cultural values, above all in the case of China. The longer run consequence will be a major shift in the centre of gravity of global power, much bigger than that after 2008, from the United States to China, not just economically but also politically and culturally.

东亚，特别是中国的疫情应对方式，证明了其治理体系和儒家文化价值观的正确。从长远来看，全球权力重心将最终从美国向中国转移。转移程度会大大超过2008年之后的情形，而且不仅体现在经济方面，也将体现在政治和文化等领域。

Whether or not Trump wins the presidential election, there will be no return to the status quo before 2016. The U.S. will continue to treat China as a strategic rival. The U.S. is no longer the same country as it was at the turn of the century; in relative terms it is much weaker economically and politically deeply polarised and profoundly divided. 

无论特朗普是否赢得总统大选，一切都不会回到2016年之前。美国会继续把中国视为战略对手。当然，美国已不再是世纪之交时的模样；相对而言，其经济实力大为减弱，在政治上也存在着两极分化和分歧严重的问题。

The desire on the part of the U.S. to decouple from China will continue. But such is the nature of investment and supply chains that change will be slow rather than rapid for at least two decades.

美国还将继续追求与中国脱钩，但由于投资与供应链的特性，至少在20年内，相关变化将非常缓慢，无法一蹴而就。

Over the next twenty years there will be a major reconfiguration of the global economy and polity. Intense competition and rivalry between the U.S. and China will continue. 

同时，全球经济和政治格局将发生重大重组。中美之间的激烈竞争和对抗仍会持续。

A large and growing part of the world – East Asia (including South East Asia), Central Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa will increasingly orientate towards China. The distance that has opened up between Europe and the United States will continue to grow, with some European countries looking more and more towards China. 

世界上很大一部分地区——东亚（包括东南亚）、中亚和撒哈拉以南的非洲，将越来越多地倾向中国。欧洲与美国之间的裂痕将会继续拉大，一些欧洲国家也更多地将目光投向中国。

As the Chinese economy becomes the biggest in the world, and its domestic market similarly the largest, the gravitational pull of China will grow ever-greater, and this attraction will be considerably enhanced by its burgeoning technological prowess. 

随着中国成为全球最大的经济体，其国内市场便是全球最大市场，中国的吸引力将日益增强，而蓬勃发展的科技实力将显著提升这种吸引力。

The two most important single factors in this context will be China’s economic growth compared with that of the U.S. and the relative speed of its technological innovation. 

在此背景下，两项最为重要的因素分别是：（1）中国相对于美国的经济增长；（2）中国技术创新的相对速度。 

In the light of the pandemic, however, we must add two further factors. First, China’s governance system has proved far superior in handling the pandemic, and the subsequent economic challenge, than the governing systems in the West; and second, its culture has displayed remarkable resilience, cohesion and unity in the face of the pandemic compared with the United States and other Western societies. 

不过，在新冠疫情的影响下，我们必须再考虑两项新的因素。首先，事实证明中国的治理体系在应对疫情和随后的经济挑战方面，远远优于西方的治理体系；其次，与美国和其他西方社会相比，中国文化在面对疫情时表现出了极强的韧性、凝聚力和团结精神。

In other words, unlike 2008, which for the most part was an economic challenge, China’s handling of the pandemic has been superior in every respect, political, economic, cultural, social and, of course, in terms of public health.

换言之，2008年各国很大程度上面临的是经济挑战，而今时不同往日，中国应对疫情的能力，在政治、经济、文化、社会——当然还有公共卫生等各领域，都要更胜一筹。

These shifts in power and perception will be played out against a backdrop, in all likelihood, of great volatility, instability, tension and conflict. These next years threaten to be a very rough ride for humanity, certainly in the West. 

上述权力和观念转变的背景，极有可能是巨大的动荡、不稳定、紧张的关系和冲突。对人类而言，未来几年或许将是一段非常艰难的旅程，对西方来说更是如此。

We are indeed living through a Huge Shake Up which will dominate not just the next decade but several decades to come. To navigate these successfully will be a Big Test of governance and will require Great Cooperation between China and many countries around the world.

我们确实在经历一场大变局，它将主导未来十年、甚至几十年的发展进程。成功应对这些挑战，将是一场治国理政的大考验，需要中国和其他国家携手开展大合作。 

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