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魏尚进:如何避免中美贸易战

2018-03-25 金融读书会

编者语:

中国的钢铁和铝对美出口贸易已处在风口浪尖,又有中国稍显薄弱的知识产权保护被美国针锋相对,使得人们对贸易战的担忧加剧。然而如今美中贸易关系面临的最大威胁是近期美国的减税政策,这将导致双边贸易逆差每年扩大到多达1000亿美元。敬请阅读。

 

/魏尚进(美国哥伦比亚商学院金融学经济学教授)


特朗普政府宣布美国将制裁中国侵犯知识产权,这让两国间不断深化的贸易争端进入了白热化。此前,特朗普在3月8日决定对中国钢铁和铝征收更高的关税——有人就预测此举可能会对全球贸易体系造成严重负面的后果。尽管这些登上头条的惩罚措施已经令人恐慌,也让投资者感到不安,但美国国会最近通过的一项税收法案又进一步加剧美中两国之间的贸易紧张关系。除非能充分重视这一举措的影响,否则双边贸易关系在改善之前会更加恶化。


新税收政策将在未来10年将美国政府赤字扩大1-2万亿美元,国家储蓄的不足将不会被私人部门储蓄增加或私营部门投资减少所抵消。这对贸易、尤其是中美贸易至关重要。由于美国经常账户赤字是投资减去私营部门和政府储蓄的总和,因此美国经常账户赤字很可能在未来10年增加2万亿美元。对于美国的贸易逆差的增加,中国的年度双边贸易赤字可能会相应地增长500-1000亿美元。


当这种情况发生时,美国政界人士是需要承担责任的,但是中国可能被当作替罪羊。在这种情况下,新的美国税法——被特朗普誉为美国人民的胜利——将会被报以更加严重的贸易紧张局势。虽然税法与美国贸易逆差的增加之间的联系还没有得到充分印证,但它的影响将会在未来的几年里显现出来。


可以肯定的是,鉴于之前许多专利和商标侵权的案例,特朗普要求中国加强知识产权监管是合理的。在包括能源和电信在内的多个领域,中国要求外国公司与中国合作伙伴分享专利技术作为市场准入条件。然而,通过双边谈判或世界贸易组织的诉讼,中国可能在加强知识产权保护上让步。


中国格局的不断创新变化是人们对这一前景感到乐观的原因之一。简而言之,中国企业也将受益于更强大的知识产权制度。在过去,外国公司提供了创新思维,中国公司随之模仿国外设计,这使得保护知识产权在很大程度上是一条单行道——只有外国公司从中受益。但这已成历史。如今许多中国公司不仅在中国,而且在美国亦获得专利。像腾讯、大疆和华为这样的中国公司,和美国公司一样具有创新精神,中国的ceo们正在推动国内加强知识产权保护。由于跨国公司有转移技术的需要,加上中国企业正从知识产权保护中获益,基于此美国和中国可以更容易地找到共同点。


但这并不表明谈判会很容易。首先,中国认为此技术政策是对国内劳动力成本上升的必要响应,也是对美国限制高科技产品对华出口的一种手段。随着工资水平的提高,中国的劳动力成本已经超过印度、孟加拉国和越南。因此,转向技术含量更高的生产变得至关重要。如果中国企业不再能从美国购买尖端科技,他们反而更有动力发展自己的产品。


谈判的第二个挑战来自于美国企业界支持声音的减少。过去,波音、卡特彼勒、通用电气和思科等公司都代表温和派发声,他们认为自己是中国大市场和低成本劳动力的受益者。但商业环境已经发生了巨大的变化,如今这些公司更有可能把中国企业视为竞争对手——不只是在中国,在世界各地也是如此。如果管理不当,这些势力将引发恶性循环。美国对中国技术出口的限制越多,中国就越会促进国内技术的发展。相反,中国企业的创新能力越强,美国企业就越不愿意看到同行进入美国市场。不过,如果贸易难题得到妥善规划,就有可能在知识产权方面达成某种程度的妥协。加强中国的知识产权并不是一场零和游戏,更好的保护措施会达到双赢的局面。


但是最大的难题是,这个问题只有少数人在关注。如果中美两国在解决美国贸易逆差不断膨胀的问题上找不到共通点,那么看似在今天取得的进展可能在明天变得无关紧要。


中国的贸易顺差和美国的贸易逆差最终反映了储蓄和投资失衡。中美正在考虑的非市场“贸易补救措施”可能会导致两国之间的贸易不平衡,但代价是与世界其他地区发生更大的贸易失衡。这可能会使两国的消费者和企业,乃至世界各地的企业变得更糟。(完)


附:英文原文

 

How to Avoid a US-China Trade War


With the US targeting China's steel and aluminum exports, and now its weak intellectual property protection, fears of a trade war are mounting. But the biggest threat to US-China trade ties is the recent US tax cut, which will cause the bilateral deficit to widen by as much as $100 billion annually.

 

By SHANG-JIN WEI

 

The announcement by the Trump administration that the United States will sanction China for intellectual-property theft is the latest salvo in a deepening trade dispute between the two countries. It follows Trump’sMarch 8 pledge to place higher tariffs on Chinese steel and aluminum – a move some predict could have dire consequences for the global trading system.

 

But while these penalties are generating frightening headlines – and rattling investors – it is the recent tax bill passed by the US Congress that will do more to exacerbate trade tensions between the US and China. Unless the implications of that move are fully appreciated, bilateral trade ties could worsen much more before they improve.

 

The new tax legislation will widen the US government deficit by $1-2 trillion over the next decade, a shortfall in national saving that will not be offset by an increase in private-sector saving or reductions in private-sector investment.

 

What this means for trade, and particularly trade between the US and China, is key. Because the US current-account deficit is the sum of investment minus private sector and government saving, the US current-account deficit is likely to increase – again, by as much as $2 trillion over the next decade. The US trade deficit will surge accordingly, and the annual bilateral deficit with China could grow by $50-100 billion.

 

When this happens, US politicians will need to cast blame, and China will be the likely scapegoat. In that case, the new US tax law – hailed by Trump as a victory for the American people – will come home to roost in the form of even more serious trade tensions. While the connection between the tax law and an increase in the US trade deficit is not well understood, its impact will be felt for years to come.

 

To be sure, Trump’s demand for stronger intellectual-property rights in China is justified, given many cases of patent and trademark infringement. In several sectors, including energy and telecommunications, China requires foreign firms to share proprietary technology with their Chinese partners as a condition of market access. Yet Chinese officials could be persuaded to strengthen intellectual-property protections, possibly through bilateral negotiations or World Trade Organization litigation.

 

The changing innovation landscape in China is one reason for optimism on this front. Simply put, Chinese firms would also benefit from a stronger intellectual-property-rights regime. In the past, foreign firms provided the innovation, and Chinese firms imitated foreign design. Protecting intellectual property was largely a one-way street; only the foreign firms benefited.

That is no longer true. Many Chinese firms innovate and have obtained patents not only in China, but also in the US. Chinese firms like Tencent, DJI, and Huawei are as innovative as any US company, and Chinese CEOs are pushing for stronger intellectual-property protection at home. With the need to compel multinational firms to transfer technology waning, and Chinese firms standing to benefit from intellectual-property protection, the US and China can more easily find common ground.

 

This is not to say that negotiations would be easy. For starters, the Chinese view their policies on technology as a necessary response to rising labor costs at home, and as a hedge against US restrictions on high-tech exports to China. With a rising wage level, China’s labor costs now exceed those of India, Bangladesh, and Vietnam. As a result, a shift to more technically sophisticated production has become essential. If Chinese companies cannot buy high-tech products from the US, they are even more motivated to develop their own.

 

A second challenge to negotiations, if they occur, is dwindling support from corporate America. In the past, companies like Boeing, Caterpillar, General Electric, and Cisco were voices of moderation; they saw themselves as beneficiaries of China’s large markets and low-cost labor. But the business landscape has changed dramatically, and today these same companies are more likely to view Chinese firms as competitors – not only in China, but around the world as well.

 

If not properly managed, these forces will fuel a vicious cycle. The more restrictions the US places on technology exports to China, the more China will promote domestic technology. Conversely, the more Chinese firms innovate, the less enthusiastic US firms will be about helping their counterparts enter the US market.

 

Still, some form of grand bargain on intellectual-property rights is possible if the trade puzzle is properly mapped out. Strengthening intellectual-property rights in China is not a zero-sum game; better protections can benefit both countries.

 

But the biggest puzzle piece of all is one few are talking about. If the US and China can’t find common ground on how to address the ballooning US trade deficit, progress on the big issues of today may become irrelevant tomorrow.

 

China’s trade surplus and the US trade deficit ultimately reflect saving and investment imbalances. The non-market “trade remedies” being considered by the US and China might produce a smaller trade imbalance between the two economies, but at the cost of a larger imbalance with the rest of the world. This could leave consumers and companies in both countries, and around the world, worse off.


(End)


文章来源:《project-syndicate》2018年3月23日(本文仅代表作者观点)

本篇编辑:彭淳懿


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