Connecting the digital dots (I)
Connecting the digital dots
April 25, 2015
WUN Understanding Global Digital Cultures Conference
Hong Kong
25-26 April, 2015
The WUN (World Universities Network) Understanding Global Digital Cultures Conference took place on 25-26 April at the Chinese Universityof Hong Kong, bringing together speakers from the WUN network of universities around the world. The local focus on Hong Kong and Chinese digital culture provided a fascinating counterpoint to a range of local and global presentations.
In his opening plenary, Imagining the internet: The politics and poetics of China’s cyberspace, Hu Yong argued that the Chinese internet is a space where the government is not able to interferecompletely; its decentralisation and partial anonymity have allowed it to become an arena for citizens to exchange ideas and opinions. The people are increasingly trying to hold the government accountable according to the rights given them in the constitution. The internet has become a stand-in for face-to-face gatherings.
The government is now attempting to exert further controlover the freedom of the internet, with a ‘control first, develop later’strategy. The government considers people with different opinions as imaginary enemies. There have been new laws created and more arrests of verified users. Sometimes local government is sacrificed for the sake of the central government.
In fact, censorship is an intrinsic characteristic of the Chinese internet, as it is in all areas of Chinese life. It is not mentioned officially, but in private people will joke about censorship. The citizens havethus turned the internet into a platform for sarcastic spoofing of theauthorities – this can be seen as the ‘poetics’ of Chinese digital culture,much of it based on a play on words and sounds (see image below). Those who lack power have been empowered, and those with power have lost it; the more youtry to crack down on spoofing, the more it proliferates. But at the same time,this spoofing operates within a culture of fear. The use of this spoofing and the metaphors that underpin it have also reinforced the double think of Chinesec ulture, which is a culture of public lies and private truths.
The Chinese internet is not monolithic but rather the site of conflict between different levels of government, various departments, and between the impulse to block and the impulse to monitor citizens.
In his presentation, The urban/digital nexus: Participation, belonging and social media in Auckland, New Zealand, Jay Marlowe spoke about superdiversity as a diversification of diversity, which requires an analysis across different kinds of social differentiation. Participants in the reported Auckland study of migrants said that the digital environment augmented their existing social relationships and made new relationships possible. Different digital platforms provided different‘textures’, with Skype for example allowing synchronous contact, and messaging apps being used in local spaces. Participants reported a gradual normalisation of ‘platformed sociality’, with considerable pressure to participate online.There was also a sense that real-life experiences need to be presented and demonstrated on social media platforms.
Overall, there is a transition from a participatory culture to a culture of connectivity; existing networks are reinforced but relationships may have migrated from face-to-face to online interaction. Greater connectivity does not necessarily mean greater connection – but it can. The landscape of access also matters; digital illiteracy becomes a new kind of poverty. It was clear that the participants were digital learners and digitally distracted at the same time, which has implications for education.
In her presentation, Material-semiotic particularity and the ‘broken’ smart city, Rolien Hoyng used the example of Istanbul and the Gezi Park protests of 2013 to contrast the development of smart cities through digital technologies and the facilitation of protests through those same technologies. There is a struggle over data ownership between the state and protesters.
In the presentation Everydaymaking through Facebook: Young citizens’political interactions in Australia, UK and USA, Ariadne Vromen spoke about how young people use Facebook to engage in politics. She spoke of Henrik Bang’s concept of ‘everydaymaking’, suggesting that political engagement is increasingly local, DIY, ad hoc, fun, issues-driven and based on social change, but notnecessarily underpinned by traditional conceptions of such change. A study was conducted to compare young people’s usage of Facebook for political engagement in Australia, the UK and the USA. In all three countries, the greatest predictor of using Facebook to engage with politics was that young people were already engaged with politics. Everdaymaking norms were important, but pre-existing engagement was more important.
When asked about discussing politics on Facebook, most young people said they would avoid it in order to avoid conflict. In particular, they were afraid of disagreement, offending someone, or having the facts wrong. On the other hand, a small group of young people were more positive about their political engagement on Facebook. Often, they were comfortable with likes and shares, and obtaining information through political pages.
Overall, social media erodes dutiful citizen relationships with politics, but young people are wary of politics entering their social space. It is interesting to note that young people associate politics with (digital) conflict, while the like button on Facebook creates consensus.
Referring to the same research project, Brian Loader gave a presentation entitled Performing for the young networked citizen? Celebrity politics, social networking and the political engagement of young people, in which he addressed the notion of ‘celebrity politics’, where politicians use social media. There is an increase in both celebrity politicians and political celebrities, and an overall personalisation of politics.
When asked what they thought about politicians usingFacebook and Twitter, a minority of young people were negative, but most were open to it, though not uncritically so. It was very clear again, as in the preceding talk, that young people do not like aggression and negativity online. Generally the young people were also positive about celebrities using social media toraise important social issues, though there were concerns that they might lack expertise or unduly influence young fans.
Overall, social media will continue to be an important communication space for democratic politics. Politicians will need to share this space with celebrities who play an important role in opening up discussions. Social media also facilitate emotional evaluation of politicians, so they may need to show more of their human side. There would seem to be an indication that political use of social media is more inclusive for young people from lower SES (socio-economic status) backgrounds.
In her presentation, Affective space, affective politics: Understanding political emotion in cyber China, Yi Liu suggested that political participation in cyber China is highly charged with emotions, especially negative ones. Digital politics in China are extremely ambiguous –people have tactics to cope with constraints; there is a positive influence of commercial forces; there are conflicts within the state authority; and there is politicised but marginalised overseas deliberation alongside a vibrant but constrained local discussion. She is undertaking a study to investigate emotional discourse within the Tianya BBS, Kaidi BBS, and Qiangguo BBS.
On the second morning of the conference, there was a fascinating set of papers about Occupy Central and the Umbrella Movement. It was a privilege for the international audience to hear local voices on the events of last year.
In the paper, Social media and mode ofparticipation in a large-scale collective action: The case of the UmbrellaMovement in Hong Kong, Francis Lee showed that the number ofprotests in Hong Kong has been increasing annually, with protests having becomesome what normalised and therefore somewhat less effective. The Occupy Central movement was meant to be a short, disciplined intervention in this context. The Umbrella Movement that emerged in the wake of the police using tear gas against the Occupy Central movement was in many ways a networked movement which made extensive use of digital media, including the changing of social media profiles, dispelling rumours, etc. There were various ways of participating, with some 20% of Hong Kong adults saying they went to an occupied area to support themovement. He reported on an interview-based study of protesters, which revealed both their real-world activities and their digital media activities.
Some of the digital activities were expressive in nature and mainly involved showing support, but others were an important part of the dynamics of the movement in dispelling rumours and so on. Overall, the digital media activities were significant in the Umbrella Movement for extending participation from the physical urban space of the occupied areas to cyberspace. Mobile communication was particularly related to participation inoccupied areas. Individuals could thus be selectively engaged in digital media activities and construct their own distinctive forms of participation in themovement.
In their paper, Internet memes in socialmovement: How the mobilisation effects are facilitated and constrained in Hong Kong Umbrella Movement, Chan Ngai Keung and Su Chris Chao spoke of thethree key internet memes associated with the Umbrella Movement: the yellowribbon (mostly used as a logo, e.g., as a profile picture on Facebook), the yellow umbrella (suggestive of self-protection) and the slogan ‘I want realuniversal suffrage’ (which co-occurred with Lion Rock, and was widely reportedby the mass media). They reported on a study where they investigated the use ofthese memes on Facebook (see image). They showed numerous examples of remixes of the three key images with pictures of famous characters, superheros, artistsand politicians, and even gay-themed remixes (see image). Eventually there was a commodification of the images, which were available for purchase on clothing, umbrellas, and so on.
Overall, the memes primarily served the purpose of political persuasion and action. The commodification of internet memes cannot necessarily serve political purposes. While Facebook spread these memes, it also constrained them in some ways, because on Facebook it is difficult to use hashtags or search engines to find related materials. Internet memes are often related to humour, but not necessarily – here they were about positive mobilisation.
In her paper, ‘It happens here and now': Digital media documentation during the Umbrella Movement, Lisa Leung commente don the way in which Hong Kong people found their agency at the time of the tear gassing during Occupy Central. She noted the key role played by social media,not only in facilitating the protests, butcrucially also in archiving and remembering. Facebook, she suggested, also functions as a space within which Hong Kong people can imagine a better future.
In the last of the papers in this series, Education, media exposure and political position: Mainlanders in the Hong Kong Umbrella Movement, Zhao Mengyang noted that the Hong Kong protests had a spillover effecton the rest of the world. In Mainland China, some were supportive, and others were critical and saw the Hong Kong people as spoiled and disorderly. It was suggested that two crucial factors in the Mainlanders’ acceptance of the Umbrella Movement could be media exposure and education.
She reported on a Qualtrics survey of Mainlanders about the Hong Kong protests, which produced 2,184 valid responses. She found that: older people, males and non-CCP members were more supportive of the protests; more frequent use of newspapers, TV news and news websites was correlated with a lower level of support; more frequent use of social networking sites was correlated with a highe 62 21391 62 13352 0 0 5481 0 0:00:03 0:00:02 0:00:01 5481r level of support; higher use of foreign media was correlated with a higher level of support; and higher education and full-timestudy were correlated with a lower level of support.
A few key suggestions emerged. Although overall internetcensorship in China is strong, domestic social networking platforms might still allow moderate occurrence of alternative views. Full-time students might bemore exposed to state discourse, and Chinese universities are part of the Chinese political apparatus. All in all, the chance of a spillover mobilisation effect might be slim in China.
Mark Pegrum
公众号名称：胡泳
微信号：beingdigital
功能介绍：数字化时代的生活设计