耶鲁大学Stephen Roach：解决中美贸易冲突的三个方案
导 读
就不断升级的中美贸易摩擦问题，中国金融四十人论坛（CF40）和新经济思维研究院（INET）于3月24日共同组织了主题为“中美贸易冲突与合作前景”的国际交流晚餐会。
哈佛大学教授、美国总统经济顾问委员会前主席Martin Feldstein，耶鲁大学高级研究员Stephen Roach，英国《金融时报》首席经济评论员Martin Wolf，美国对外关系委员会特聘研究员、美国前贸易代表Michael Froman，CF40学术顾问、国际货币基金组织（IMF）原副总裁朱民，CF40学术委员、国务院发展研究中心副主任隆国强等进行了主题交流。CF40学术顾问、清华大学经济管理学院院长钱颖一主持了晚餐会。
今天推送的是Stephen Roach在此次交流会上的演讲。他认为，美国贸易赤字上升的重要原因在于美国的主要矛盾，即在没有储蓄的情况下追求增长。在这种情况下，美国要从国外进口资本，同时必须面对经常账户赤字和多边贸易不平衡。
Stephen Roach指出，美国的主要矛盾当前并没有一个很好的解决方案。“我们正在实行财政刺激，而现在并不是一个好的时点，因为美国经济表现良好，也接近充分就业。”他说，在国内储蓄率很低的情况下采取刺激措施，只会使美国储蓄率从2％下降到0％，推动经常账户赤字进一步上升，以及多边贸易失衡扩大。随着多边贸易赤字的增加，美国开始对贸易盈余国实施保护主义政策，而这些国家为美国经济提供了资本。
“我们的政治家不关心统计数字，指责中国是更容易的事。”Stephen Roach说。
Stephen Roach曾任摩根士丹利亚洲区主席和首席经济学家。他在摩根士丹利30年的职业生涯中，领导了一支来自全球的高水平经济学家团队。他在其著作《失衡：后经济危机时代的再平衡》中分析了21世纪最重要的中美经济关系面临的风险和挑战。
本文由CF40秘书处翻译，略有删减，后附英文原文供您参考。
Stephen Roach
习近平主席说目前中国的主要矛盾是人民日益增长的美好生活需要和不平衡不充分的发展之间的矛盾。这对于评估中国经济前景提供了一个有力的框架。解决这一主要矛盾对中国在2050年进入新时代是非常重要的。如果矛盾得不到解决，则会导致系统失败，在任何国家都是如此。
对于中国而言，解决策略是明确的，经济增长结构正在进行调整，从制造业转向服务业，从农村向城市转移，从出口转向消费。 但最重要的是，从剩余储蓄到吸收储蓄，同时提高对居民的社会保障，这在老龄化背景下尤其重要。中国认识到了主要矛盾，并提出一个解决方案的框架。
我想来讨论一下美国的主要矛盾。我们的主要矛盾在于在没有储蓄的情况下追求增长。与现代经济史上任何发达国家相比，我们拥有最低的国内储蓄率。我们来看净国民储蓄率这个指标，即企业储蓄，家庭储蓄和政府支出的净值。 2017年前三个季度美国的净储蓄率为1.9％，20世纪最后三十年的平均值为6.3％。所以现在的净国民储蓄率不到过去长期平均水平的三分之一。缺乏储蓄但还要增长，所以我们从国外进口资本，同时必须面对经常账户赤字和多边贸易不平衡。2017年，美国对102个国家是贸易赤字，其中中国占比最大。
去年美国的货物贸易逆差为7960亿美元，其中47％也就是3750亿美元左右是来自中国。 总统夸张说是5000亿美元。 47％中至少有40％来自于在中国以外制造但在中国组装的产品的供应链效应。 如果考虑来自中国以外的投入，使用经合组织和WTO提供的贸易和增值矩阵进行调整，则可以将47％份额降至28％。尽管这个数字远低于总统和美国财政部所用的数字，而且顺差是由于中国的比较优势导致，美国政界并不买账。我们的政治家不关心统计数字，指责中国是更容易的事。
在美国，我们有主要矛盾，但没有解决方案。我们正在实行财政刺激，而现在并不是一个好的时点。因为我们的经济表现良好，接近充分就业。 国内储蓄率很低的情况下采取刺激措施，只会使我们的储蓄率从2％下降到0％，推动经常账户赤字进一步上升，以及多边贸易失衡扩大。随着多边贸易赤字的增加，我们开始对贸易盈余国实施保护主义政策，而这些国家为美国经济提供了资本。
所以，对比两国，一个主要矛盾有解决方案，一个没有。 这显然会产生影响，并波及世界其他国家。 我希望自己能像Martin那样自信地说特朗普是个好说大话又事后收回的人。他的很多话没有兑现，但有些事情会触及他的核心原则，而长期以来他发表了很多反中国的言论。我自己的直觉是，他就这个话题说了这么多话，分贝这么高，再后退不可能不丢掉很多支持者。所以我觉得他不会这么做。
如何解决两国的贸易冲突？我认为没有简单的方法来解决这个问题，但有如下几点方案供参考。
第一，我们需要由两国政府高层人员就经济和战略关系的共同利益进行认真对话，但现在还没有有效的解决方案。 我们需要一个由专家组成的常设秘书机构，在有共同利益的领域，就风险和政策进行持续的讨论和交流。
第二点，我认为双边投资条约是进入对方市场的最佳机制。 美国跨国公司如果不在中国参与这个未来市场的竞争，是会很可惜的，但如果市场准入不公平，那么我们不能这样做。
第三是软问题，现在西方和新闻界都有这样的印象——中国让我们都失望了，中国加入世贸组织，但中国没有提供我们期望的机会。所以中国需要在舆论舞台上做得更好，讲述自己的故事，展开公关攻势。
总的来说，我非常担心两国冲突会升级。也许特朗普是虚张声势，我希望是这样。特朗普是完全不可预测的，我们不能忽视潜在的风险。因为对我们所有人来说，这样做风险太高了。
附英文全文：
As stated by President Xi Jinping, China’s principal contradiction between unbalanced and inadequate growth and the growing needs of the people provides us with a very powerful framework to assess the prospects for the Chinese economy. Its resolution is essential for China to reach the New Era by 2050. Unresolved, however, assures chaos and failure of the Chinese system. I believe this concept is also applicable to other systems – Marxist, non-Marxist, state driven or not.
Indeed, the Unites States has a principal contradiction of its own — growth without saving.
We have the lowest domestic savings rate of any leading country in the modern era. The place to start is with the net national savings rate — the sum total of business saving, household saving, and government dis-saving, all adjusted for depreciation. The depreciation adjustment is important because we want to know how much the nation saves after it’s done after replenishing its worn-out capital stock. The net national savings rate of the US was, in fact, 1.9% over the first three quarters of 2017, which is less than one-third the 6.3% average for the final three decades of the 20th century.
That leads us to America’s principal contradiction. Lacking in saving but wanting to grow, we import surplus savings from abroad and run massive current account deficits and multilateral trade imbalances to balance the inflows. Last year, the US multilateral trade deficit was distributed over 102 individual nations, including, of course, China, by far the largest piece of the overall trade deficit.
But it is important to have a clear understanding of the numbers in the contentious trade debate that is now boiling over. Of the approximately $796 billion total U.S. merchandise trade deficit in 2017, fully $375 billion, or 47%, was with China. President Trump claims this number was $500 billion but that is clearly another one of his exaggerations. However, at least 40% of the 47% reflects supply chain effects of components and parts that are for produced outside of China but are assembled inside China. So, if you do the supply chain adjustments using the trade and value-added matrices that have been put together by the OECD and WTO, you can cut the 47% share of the $800 billion deficit down to around 28%.
This is still a very big number. But it is far below that used by President Trump and well below the published figures of the US Department of Commerce, which does not make supply-chain, value added adjustments. While the international specialization of comparative advantage accounts for this outsize portion, that argument is not credible in a political arena looking for someone to blame. Politicians, have no patience for statistics — they find it much easier to point the finger at China.
But I have digressed. Significantly, the concept of the principal contradiction is especially useful because it is forward looking. For China the strategy for resolution is clear — it involves rebalancing, moving from manufacturing to services, rural to urban, exports to consumption. But most importantly, it also entails from surplus saving to saving absorption, reflecting a strengthening the social safety net for families to deal with the retirement and healthcare needs of an aging Chinese society. So for China, there is a principal contradiction, and there is a framework of resolution that goes with it.
In the US we have a principal contradiction, without a resolution. And it is going to get worse. We are opting for a poorly timed fiscal stimulus when the economy is doing better, and we are near full employment. We are also doing a fiscal stimulus with a low domestic savings rate, an action that will take our net domestic savings rate from 2%, at present, to possibly 0. That would then make our current account deficit even wider, with likely increases in the broad scale of the multilateral trade imbalances. The final ingredient of this contradiction is that just at the trade deficit gets wider, we are turning protectionist on the surplus economies that provide us with the surplus capital that we need to fund our economy.
So, there you have it: Two contradictions, one gets resolved and one doesn’t. There will obviously be consequences, across the board, especially for China and the US but also for the rest of the world. I wish I could be as confident as some and say that this is just the political bluster of a president who is well practiced in the “art of the deal.” I worry that view is too complacent. He’s backed off on a lot of things over the past year, but there are certain things that are core issues to his base, and his strident and long held anti-China rhetoric is a clear example of that. My own instinct is that he has emphasized this particular topic for so long and he has raised the decibel level so high that it will be extremely hard for him to get out of this position without losing considerable support from his base. I hope I am wrong here and the optimists are right, but there is a considerable risk that may not be the case.
I do not think there is a simple way to resolve this. I would recommend three actions to address these mounting risks. One, we need to reestablish ongoing serious level engagement between the experts in our two governments at the highest levels on the areas of mutual interest for our economic and strategic relationship. We’ve done it so many different ways in recent years, but the results have been disappointing, to say the least. A better option would be to establish a permanent secretariat that engages experts in both the US and China on an ongoing basis to examine areas of mutual interest — as well as the risks and policies that are required to address to these issues.
Second, I think a Bilateral Investment Treaty would be the best mechanism for both sides to gain access to each other’s markets. Shame on American multinationals if they are not actively engaged in China to compete in this rapidly growing market. But that won’t happen if market access isn’t fair. The political climate makes BIT negotiations exceedingly difficult right now. But I still think it would be worth the effort — especially in an adverse political climate.
Third, there’s the so-called soft issues. There’s an impression right now in the West that China has let us all down — that the enormous opportunity that was supposed to come after WTO accession in has simply not materialized the way the West was expecting. This opinion is expressed widely in the press, as well as in the National Security Strategy published by the Trump Administration last December. If China objects to this impression — and I am certain that is the case — then it needs to do a better job in the arena of public opinion to tell its side of the story. This is as much an image battle, as anything.
In sum, I am quite worried about the potential fort escalating trade conflict between the US and China. Maybe Trump is bluffing, and as I said, I very much hope that's the case. But let's face it, since the man is totally unpredictable, we can't afford to ignore the risks. The stakes are too high for all of us to take this hope for granted.
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