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关于AER，JPE，QJE等top5刊物，建议参看：1.AER, JPE, QJE, RES期刊最新一期, 又见毛咕噜大神在讨论机器人与劳动市场！2.AEA主席的老公Romer, 将来“置信区间”是AER的标配, 对置信区间CI的赞歌! 3.AER上用断点回归设计RDD的实证文章有哪些？含程序和code, 不看至少需要收藏一下！4.AER, AEJ上用准自然实验识别的实证文章有哪些？含程序和code, 不看至少需要收藏一下！5.AER和AEJ系列期刊最新一期, 有几篇关于中国的文章，6.AER史上最严关于论文数据和代码可得性政策，应对实证论文的复制性危机！7.机器学习方法出现在AER, JPE, QJE等顶刊上了！8.他们只有本硕学历, 却发过了AER, JPE, QJE, RES, ECM5大顶刊！9.这个外国人拿中国数据发了多篇AER, JPE, RES等五大顶刊！汗颜！10.过去10年AER上关于中国主题的Articles专辑！11.使用OLS回归发AER的Articles专辑！12.传销活动对经济发展影响, AER上截面数据分析经典文，13.AER上因果关系确立, 敏感性检验, 异质性分析和跨数据使用经典文章，14.AER上以DID, DDD为识别策略的劳动和健康经济学，15.一个使用截面数据的政策评估方法, 也可以发AER，16.统计显著与经济显著, 发AER和经济研究的标配，17.中国女学者与其日本同行在JPE上发文了！利用独特数据, 地理断点RDD和IV研究中国环境议题！18.JPE上19年以来10篇比较有意思且重要的文章！19.机制分析做到极致的JPE趣文, 身高与收入，20.携程梁建章的QJE合作者自己打脸了！在家工作于我简直就是一场灾难！21.QJE上处理内生性问题的必读作品细致解读, 非洲奴隶贸易的长远影响，22.从QJE的引用率事实，我们如何看出了经济文章价值？
正文
AER 2020年7月期
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JPE 2020年7月期
Calvi, R. (2020). "Why Are Older Women Missing in India? The Age Profile of Bargaining Power and Poverty." Journal of Political Economy 128(7): 2453-2501.Almost half of missing women in India are of postreproductive ages. Can intrahousehold gender inequality and asymmetry in poverty explain a portion of these missing women? Using a natural experiment, I link women?s intrahousehold bargaining power to their mortality risk. Using a structural household model, I estimate the age profile of women?s bargaining power and construct women?s relative poverty rates. I find that women?s bargaining power declines with age, with older women?s poverty rates closely matching their mortality rates by age. This suggests that many missing women might be accounted for by measuring poverty at the individual rather than the household level.Cappelen, A., et al. (2020). "The Effect of Early-Childhood Education on Social Preferences." Journal of Political Economy 128(7): 2739-2758.We present results from the first study to examine the causal impact of early-childhood education on the social preferences of children. We compare children who, at 3?4 years old, were randomized into either a full-time preschool, a parenting program, or a control group. We returned to the children when they reached 6?8 years of age and conducted a series of incentivized experiments to elicit their social preferences. We find that early-childhood education has a strong causal impact on social preferences. Our findings highlight the importance of taking a broad perspective when designing and evaluating early-childhood educational programs.Cattaneo, M. D., et al. (2020). "A Random Attention Model." Journal of Political Economy 128(7): 2796-2836.This paper illustrates how one can deduce preference from observed choices when attention is both limited and random. We introduce a random attention model where we abstain from any particular attention formation and instead consider a large class of nonparametric random attention rules. Our intuitive condition, monotonic attention, captures the idea that each consideration set competes for the decision maker?s attention. We then develop a revealed preference theory and obtain testable implications. We propose econometric methods for identification, estimation, and inference for the revealed preferences. Finally, we provide a general-purpose software implementation of our estimation and inference results and simulation evidence.Dube, O. and S. P. Harish (2020). "Queens." Journal of Political Economy 128(7): 2579-2652.Do states experience more peace under female leadership? We examine this question in the context of Europe over the fifteenth to twentieth centuries. We use gender of the firstborn and presence of a sister among previous monarchs as instruments for queenly rule. We find that polities led by queens engaged in war more than polities led by kings. While single queens were more likely to be attacked than single kings, married queens were more likely to attack than married kings. These results suggest asymmetries in the division of labor: married queens were more inclined to enlist their spouses in helping them rule, which enabled them ultimately to pursue more aggressive war policies.García, J. L., et al. (2020). "Quantifying the Life-Cycle Benefits of an Influential Early-Childhood Program." Journal of Political Economy 128(7): 2502-2541.This paper quantifies and aggregates the multiple lifetime benefits of an influential high-quality early-childhood program with outcomes measured through midlife. Guided by economic theory, we supplement experimental data with nonexperimental data to forecast the life-cycle benefits and costs of the program. Our point estimate of the internal rate of return is 13.7%, with an associated benefit/cost ratio of 7.3. We account for model estimation and forecasting error and present estimates from extensive sensitivity analyses. This paper is a template for synthesizing experimental and nonexperimental data using economic theory to estimate the long-run life-cycle benefits of social programs.Goldin, J. and D. Reck (2020). "Revealed-Preference Analysis with Framing Effects." Journal of Political Economy 128(7): 2759-2795.In many settings, decision makers? behavior is observed to vary on the basis of seemingly arbitrary factors. Such framing effects cast doubt on the welfare conclusions drawn from revealed-preference analysis. We relax the assumptions underlying that approach to accommodate settings in which framing effects are present. Plausible restrictions of varying strength permit either partial or point identification of preferences for the decision makers who choose consistently across frames. Recovering population preferences requires understanding the empirical relationship between decision makers? preferences and their sensitivity to the frame. We develop tools for studying this relationship and illustrate them with data on automatic enrollment into pension plans.Harstad, B. (2020). "Technology and Time Inconsistency." Journal of Political Economy 128(7): 2653-2689.Policy makers have time-inconsistent preferences if they fear losing power or are endowed with hyperbolic discount factors. Politicians may thus seek to influence future policy choices, for example, by investing in green technologies that motivate later politicians to act sustainably. I show that optimal investment subsidies are larger for technologies that are strategic complements to future investments, that are further upstream in the supply chain, or that are characterized by longer maturity. Time inconsistency can rationalize subsidies at similar levels as market failures such as externalities can. Furthermore, the two are superadditive: time inconsistency and strategic investments are especially important for long-term policies associated with externalities.Orlov, D., et al. (2020). "Persuading the Principal to Wait." Journal of Political Economy 128(7): 2542-2578.A principal decides when to exercise a real option. A biased agent influences this decision by strategically disclosing information. Committing to disclose all information with a delay is the optimal way to persuade the principal to wait. Without dynamic commitment, this promise is credible only if the agent?s bias is small; otherwise, he pipets information, probabilistically delaying the principal?s action. When the agent is biased toward early exercise, his lack of commitment to remain quiet leads to immediate disclosure, hurting him. Our model applies to pharmaceutical companies conducting clinical trials to influence the Food and Drug Administration or equipment manufacturers testing their products.Sotelo, S. (2020). "Domestic Trade Frictions and Agriculture." Journal of Political Economy 128(7): 2690-2738.I develop a model of agriculture on heterogeneous land to study the relation between trade, productivity, and welfare in Peru, where farmers face high internal and external trade costs. I quantify the model with new data on crop prices, yields, and land allocations. I then measure the effects of changes to trade opportunities. A policy of paving roads raises aggregate productivity (4.9%) and the median farmer?s welfare (2.7%), but increased competition from remote suppliers harms 20% of farmers. An increase in international grain prices spreads unevenly across regions, benefiting farmers but hurting urban consumers close to ports.
QJE 2020年8月期
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