【杨原】 两极体系下大国战略竞争的演化
[1]Ted Hopf, “Polarity,the Offense-Defense Balance, and War,”AmericanPolitical Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 2, 1991, p. 475; R. Harrison Wagner, “What WasBipolarity?” International Organization,Vol.47, No.1, 1993, p.79; DaleC. Copeland, “Neorealism and the Myth of Bipolar Stability: Toward a New DynamicRealist Theory of Major War,”SecurityStudies, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1996, p. 29.
[2]Marco Cesa, “RealistVisions of the End of the Cold War: Morgenthau, Aron and Waltz,”British Journal of Politics &International Relations, Vol. 11,No. 2, 2009, pp. 177-191; Cameron G.Thies,“The Roles of Bipolarity: A Role Theoretic Understanding of the Effectsof Ideas and Material Factors on the Cold War,”International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 14,No. 3, 2013,pp. 269-288.
[3]肯尼斯·华尔兹:《国际政治理论》,信强译,苏长和校,上海人民出版社,2003年,序言第19页。
[4]Gary Goertzand Paul F.Diehl, “Enduring Rivalries: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Patterns,”International Studies Quarterly, Vol.37, No. 2, 1993, p. 152.
[5]Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Stability of a BipolarWorld,” Daedalus, Vol.93, No.3, 1964,pp.882-883.
[6]David Reynolds, “BeyondBipolarity in Space and Time,”DiplomaticHistory, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1992, p. 225.
[7]Don Oberdorfer, The Turn: From the Cold War to a New Era:The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983-1990 (New York: PoseidonPress, 1991), p. 365; Deborah Welch Larson, “The U.S.-Soviet Rivalry,” in WilliamR. Thompson ed.,Great Power Rivalries(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1999), p. 383.
[8]DeborahWelch Larson, “The U.S.-Soviet Rivalry,”p. 372.
[9]相关总结和分析参见R. Harrison Wagner, “The Theoryof Games and the Balance of Power,”WorldPolitics, Vol. 38, No. 4, 1986, pp. 546-576; Robert Powell, “Stability andthe Distribution of Power,” WorldPolitics, Vol. 48, No. 2, 1996, pp. 239-267.
[10]相关梳理参见文献回顾部分。
[11]相关史实参见案例研究部分。
[12]LarisGaiser and IgorKovacGaiser,“From Bipolarity to Bipolarity: International Relations RepeatingAgain,” Journal of Global Policy andGovernance,Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 49-63; Yan Xuetong, “For a NewBipolarity: China and Russia vs. America,”NewPerspectives Quarterly, Vol. 30,No. 2, 2013, pp. 12-15; Michael Wesley, “TheNew Bipolarity,”American Interest,Vol. 8,No. 3, 2013, pp. 34-40; Quddus Z. Snyder, “The Bipolarity of a UnipolarWorld: Why Secondary Powers will Stand by America,”Chinese American Forum, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2014, pp. 17-19; SuishengZhao, “A New Model of Big Power Relations? China–US Strategic Rivalry and Balanceof Power in the Asia–Pacific,” Journal ofContemporary China, Vol. 24, No. 93, 2015, pp. 377-397; Stephen F. Burgess,“Rising Bipolarity in the South China Sea: theAmerican Rebalance to Asia andChina’s Expansion,” Contemporary SecurityPolicy, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2016, pp. 111-143; Sergey Karaganov, “The New ColdWar and the Emerging Greater Eurasia,”Journalof Eurasian Studies, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2018, pp. 85–93; Richard Maher, “Bipolarityand the Future of U.S.-China Relations,”PoliticalScience Quarterly, Vol. 133, No. 3, 2018, pp. 497-525; SedatAybar, etaleds., China andthe United States: Two Superpowers in the Global Economy(Newcastle:Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2018).
[13]朱锋:《中美战略竞争与东亚安全秩序的未来》,《世界经济与政治》2013年第2期,第4—26页;崔立如:《管理战略竞争:中美新关系格局的挑战》,《美国研究》2016年第2期,第9—17页;李巍:《制度之战:战略竞争时代的中美关系》,北京:社会科学文献出版社,2017年;刘丰:《中美战略竞争与东亚安全态势》,《现代国际关系》2017年第8期,第23—30页;孙学峰:《中美战略竞争时代的中国安全战略》,《战略决策研究》2018年第2期,第26—39页;左希迎:《战略竞争时代的中美关系图景》,《战略决策研究》2018年第2期,第79—88页;Russell Ong, China’s Strategic Competition with the United States (London:Routledge, 2012); LeszekBuszynski, “The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims,and U.S.–China Strategic Rivalry,”TheWashington Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 2, 2012, pp. 139-156; Thomas G. Mahnkin,ed. Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century:Theory, History, andPractice(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012),chapter 8-17; Suisheng Zhao, “A New Model of Big Power Relations? China–US StrategicRivalry and Balance of Power in the Asia–Pacific,” pp. 377-397; Steve Chan andRichard W. Hu, “East Asia’s Enduring Rivalries: Ripe for Abatement?”Journal of Asian Security and InternationalAffairs, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2015, pp. 133–153; Xiaoting Li, “Dealing with theAmbivalent Dragon: Can EngagementModerate China’s Strategic Competition withAmerica?” International Interactions,Vol. 41, No. 3, 2015, pp. 480-508; Lt Gen HPS Klair, “Hegemonic GlobalCompetition in the 21st Century,”IndianDefence Review, Vol. 31, No. 4, 2016, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/hegemonic-global-competition-in-the-21st-century/;John Sawers, “We Are Returning to a World of Great-Power Rivalry,”Financial Times, October 19, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/2291f260-954e-11e6-a1dc-bdf38d484582;Min-hyung Kim, “Why Provoke? the Sino-US Competition in EastAsia and NorthKorea’s Strategic Choice,” Journal ofStrategic Studies, Vol. 39, No. 7, 2016, pp. 979-998; Michael Mazarr andHal Brands, “Navigating Great Power Rivalry in The 21st Century,”War on the Rocks, April 5, 2017, https://csbaonline.org/about/news/navigating-great-power-rivalry-in-the-21st-century;Dean P.Chen, US-China Rivalry andTaiwan’s Mainland Policy: Security, Nationalism, and the 1992 Consensus(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017); Markus Brunnermeier, Rush Doshi andHarold James, “Beijing’s BismarckianGhosts: How Great PowersCompeteEconomically,”The Washington Quarterly,Vol. 41, No. 3, 2018, pp. 161–176; Tom Bramble, “The Return of Great PowerRivalry,”February 5, 2018, https://mronline.org/2018/02/06/the-return-of-great-power-rivalry/;Martin Wolf, “US-China Rivalry Will Shape the 21st Century,”Financial Times, April 10, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/5f796164-3be1-11e8-b9f9-de94fa33a81e;Earl Conteh-Morgan, “The United States and China: Strategic Rivalry in Africa,”Insight Turkey, Vol. 20,No. 1, 2018, pp.39-52; Andrew B. Kennedy and Darren J. Lim, “The Innovation Imperative:Technology and US–China Rivalry in the Twenty-First Century,”International Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 3,2018, pp. 553–572; Andrew Scobell, “The South China Sea and U.S.-China Rivalry,”Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 133, No.2, 2018, pp. 199-224; Tao XieandDonglin Han, “In the Shadow of StrategicRivalry: China,America, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank,” Journal of Contemporary China, 2019, DOI:10.1080/10670564.2019.1594104.
[14] Thomas G. Mahnkin,ed. Competitive Strategies for the 21stCentury: Theory, History, and Practice (Stanford: Stanford UniversityPress, 2012); Adam P. Liff and G. John Ikenberry, “Racing toward Tragedy?China’s Rise, Military Competition in the Asia Pacific, and the SecurityDilemma,” International Security,Vol. 39, No. 2, 2014, pp. 52-91; Lyle Goldstein, Meeting China Halfway: How to Defuse the Emerging US-China Rivalry(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2015); Thomas J. Wright, All Measures Short of War: the Contest forthe Twenty-first Century and the Future of American Power (New Haven, CT:Yale University Press, 2017); Daniel Burkhart and Alison Woody, “StrategicCompetition: Beyond Peace and War,” JointForce Quarterly, Vol. 86, No. 3, 2017. pp. 20-27; Abraham Denmark, “A NewEra of Intensified U.S.-China Competition,” January 4, 2018, Woodrow WilsonInternational Center for Scholars,http://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/new-era-intensified-us-china-competition;Timothy R. Heath and William R. Thompson, “Avoiding U.S.-China Competition IsFutile: Why the Best Option Is to Manage Strategic Rivalry,” Asia Policy, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2018, pp.91-119; Seng Tan, “Asia’s ‘Tragic’ Return to Great-Power Politics?” Asia Policy, Vol. 13, No. 4, 2018, pp.36-41; Patricia M. Kim, “Managing U.S.-China Relations in an Era of PeerCompetition,” June 20, 2018, the Council of Foreign Relations,https://www.cfr.org/blog/managing-us-china-relations-era-peer-competition;Bruce Jones, “The Era of U.S.-China Cooperation Is Drawing to a Close—WhatComes Next?” January 7, 2019, Brookings Institution,https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/01/07/the-era-of-u-s-china-cooperation-is-drawing-to-a-close-what-comes-next/;Satoru Mori, “US-China: A New Consensus for Strategic Competition inWashington,” January 30, 2019, TheDiplomat,https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/us-china-a-new-consensus-for-strategic-competition-in-washington/.
[15]GaryGoertz and Paul F. Diehl, “Enduring Rivalries: Theoretical Constructs andEmpirical Patterns,” InternationalStudies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 2, 1993, pp. 154-155; Paul R. Hensel, “AnEvolutionary Approach to the Study of Interstate Rivalry,”Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 17, No. 2, 1999, p.176.
[16]相关讨论参见Gary Goertzand Paul F.Diehl, “Enduring Rivalries: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Patterns,”International Studies Quarterly, Vol.37, No. 2, 1993, pp. 147-171; William R. Thompson, “Principal Rivalries,”Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 39,No. 2, 1995, pp. 196-203; WilliamR. Thompson, “Identifying Rivals and RivalriesinWorld Politics,”International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 4, 2001,pp. 557-586; Douglas Lemke and William Reed, “War and Rivalry among GreatPowers,”American Journal of PoliticalScience, Vol. 45, No. 2, 2001, p 468; Michael Colaresi and William R.Thompson,“Strategic Rivalries, Protracted Conflict, and Crisis Escalation,”Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 39,No. 3,2002, pp. 264-268.
[17]Brandon Valeriano,Becoming Rivals: TheProcess of Interstate Rivalry Development (New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 5.
[18]SedenAkcinaroglu,Elizabeth Radziszewskiand Paul F. Diehl, “The Effects of Rivalry on Rivalry:Accommodation and the Management of Threats,”Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2014, pp. 81–100.
[19]William R. Thompson, “WhyRivalries Matter and What Great Power Rivalries Can Tell Us about WorldPolitics,” in William R. Thompson ed., GreatPower Rivalries (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1999), p.16.
[20]George Modelski, World Power Concentrations: Typology, Data,Explanatory Framework(Morristown: General Learning Press, 1974), p.2. DavidP. Rapkin, William R. Thompson and Jon A. Christopherson, “Bipolarity andBipolarization in the Cold War Era: Conceptualization, Measurement, andValidation,” The Journal of ConflictResolution, Vol.23, No.2, 1979, pp.261-295. William R. Thompson, “Polarity,the Long Cycle, and Global Power Warfare,” TheJournal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.30, No.4, 1986, pp.587-615.
[21]参见Randall L. Schweller,“Tripolarity and the Second World War,” InternationalStudies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 1, 1993, p. 75.RaimoVayrynen, “Introduction,” in RaimoVayrynen ed., The Waning of MajorWar (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 13; Stephen G. Brooks andWilliam C. Wohlforth, World out ofBalance:International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 29.
[22]例如肯尼斯·华尔兹:《国际政治理论》,信强译,苏长和校,上海人民出版社,2003年,第218—219页。
[23]Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research:Design and Methods (4th edition) (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2008); Mario L.Small, “‘HowMany Cases Do I Need?’ On Science and the Logic of Case Selection in FieldBased Research,” Ethnography, Vol.10, No. 1, 2009, pp. 5-38.
[24]James D. Fearon, “RationalExplanation of War,”InternationalOrganization, Vol. 49, No. 3, 1995, pp. 379-414.
[25]事实上,近代领土和主权规范的产生源于类似的演化机制,参见Shiping Tang, TheSocial Evolution of International Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press,2013), pp. 106-107; Dominic D.P. Johnson and Monica Duffy Toft, “Grounds forWar: The Evolution of Territorial Conflict,”InternationalSecurity, Vol. 38, No. 3, 2013/2014, pp.7-38.
[26]Richard Ned Lebow, “TheLong Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism,”International Organization, Vol. 48, No.2, 1994, pp. 249-277; Dale C. Copeland, “Neorealism and the Myth of Bipolar Stability:Toward a New Dynamic Realist Theory of Major War,”Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1996, pp. 29-89.
(原文发表在《国际政治科学》2019年第4期,第1—54页。本号有删节。)
延伸阅读:
【肖 河】 国际安全竞争必定导向国内军事化?——竞争态势、战略反应与制度调适
【邹治波 刘玮】 构建中美核战略稳定性框架:非对称性战略平衡的视角
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