纽约时报：中国击杀大量CIA线人，重创美国谍报行动
全文翻译自纽约时报5月20日文章
原题：Killing C.I.A. Informants, China Crippled U.S. Spying Operations
作者：Mark Mazzetti, Adam Goldman, Michael S. Schmidt and Matt Apuzzo
译者：冬天毛
冬天毛导读：
情报通天的纽约时报，详尽刺激的报道背后是血淋淋的谍报战争。
冬天毛其实蛮惊讶的，这篇报道明显反映出了我国情报机构工作的成功，可事情都过去五六年了，这才通过“敌手”首见天日。可能谍报工作就是这样一种性质，无论是必要的隐秘性还是世人眼中这类工作的负面性质，现实中詹姆斯·邦德们取得的成果往往难以得到公开的认可。
另外，本文让冬天毛想起了数年前的一篇恶搞性质的网文，有兴趣的读者姥爷可以百度“一曲忠诚的赞歌”。
纽约时报（The New York Times）是一家日报，于1851年创办，是美国严肃报刊的代表。由于风格古典严肃，它有时也被戏称为“灰色女士”（The Gray Lady）。
（维基百科）
正文：
美国大使馆。2010至2012年间，中国政府杀死或监禁了18至20名CIA线人。
WASHINGTON — The Chinese government systematically dismantled C.I.A. spying operations in the country starting in 2010, killing or imprisoning more than a dozen sources over two years and crippling intelligence gathering there for years afterward.
华盛顿消息——从2010年开始，中国政府对CIA在中国的谍报活动进行了系统性的拆解，在两年间击杀或监禁了约20人，残废了美国此后多年的情报搜集工作。
Current and former American officials described the intelligence breach as one of the worst in decades. It set off a scramble in Washington’s intelligence and law enforcement agencies to contain the fallout, but investigators were bitterly divided over the cause. Some were convinced that a mole within the C.I.A. had betrayed the United States. Others believed that the Chinese had hacked the covert system the C.I.A. used to communicate with its foreign sources. Years later, that debate remains unresolved.
数名现任和前美方官员将这次情报工作出现的缺口形容为数十年来最惨重的一次。华盛顿的情报和执法部门竭力试图控制此事造成的恶果，但调查人员们在事情的缘由上观点迥异。一些人坚信是CIA内部的奸细背叛了美国，其他人则认为是中国人入侵了CIA用来和外国线人通讯的内部系统。事情过去数年，这一争论依然悬而未解。
But there was no disagreement about the damage. From the final weeks of 2010 through the end of 2012, according to former American officials, the Chinese killed at least a dozen of the C.I.A.’s sources. According to three of the officials, one was shot in front of his colleagues in the courtyard of a government building — a message to others who might have been working for the C.I.A.
但事件造成的损害是毋庸置疑的。据数名前任美国官员称，从2010年的最后几周开始，直到2012年年底，中国人杀死了至少一打（冬天毛注：一打是12个）CIA的线人。据其中三名官员称，其中一个人是在一座政府建筑的中庭，在同事的面前被射杀的——这是向其他潜在CIA人员发出的一条信息。
Still others were put in jail. All told, the Chinese killed or imprisoned 18 to 20 of the C.I.A.’s sources in China, according to two former senior American officials, effectively unraveling a network that had taken years to build.
其他人则被关进了监狱。据两名前任美国高级官员称，中国人总共击杀或监禁了18到20名CIA在中国的线人，实质上摧毁了美方花费多年时间建立的人员网络。
Assessing the fallout from an exposed spy operation can be difficult, but the episode was considered particularly damaging. The number of American assets lost in China, officials said, rivaled those lost in the Soviet Union and Russia during the betrayals of both Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen, formerly of the C.I.A. and the F.B.I., who divulged intelligence operations to Moscow for years.
一般来讲，要评估谍报行动暴露的后续损害并不容易，但这次事件的损害被认为是特别严重。官员们表示，美国这次在中国损失的线人可以匹敌当年在苏联和俄罗斯因为阿尔德里奇·艾姆斯和罗伯特·汉森的背叛造成的损失，后者分别是CIA和FBI的人员，在多年时间里向莫斯科泄露美国的情报活动。
The previously unreported episode shows how successful the Chinese were in disrupting American spying efforts and stealing secrets years before a well-publicized breach in 2015 gave Beijing access to thousands of government personnel records, including intelligence contractors. The C.I.A. considers spying in China one of its top priorities, but the country’s extensive security apparatus makes it exceptionally hard for Western spy services to develop sources there.
北京在2015年一次广为报道的情报攻破中获取了大量美国政府的人员记录，其中包括情报承包商（冬天毛注：美国政府有大量情报搜集工作都是外包给私人机构的），而在这一此前从未被报道过的事件中显示出的，是中国人在此前数年就已经在扰乱美国谍报行动和盗取机密方面取得巨大成功了。CIA把中国的谍报工作看作其重点使命之一，但中国遍地开花的安全机构使得西方国家的间谍组织很难在中国发展情报人员。
At a time when the C.I.A. is trying to figure out how some of its most sensitive documents were leaked onto the internet two months ago by WikiLeaks, and the F.B.I. investigates possible ties between President Trump’s campaign and Russia, the unsettled nature of the China investigation demonstrates the difficulty of conducting counterespionage investigations into sophisticated spy services like those in Russia and China.
如今，CIA还在试图弄清楚维基泄密在两个月前是怎么把它一批最敏感的文件泄露到网上的，而FBI在调查特朗普总统竞选团队与俄罗斯间的潜在联系。在这样一个时期，对中国（间谍暴露事件）调查的悬而未果也恰恰说明了对俄罗斯和中国这类复杂间谍机构进行反间谍调查的难度。
The C.I.A. and the F.B.I. both declined to comment.
CIA和FBI均对此事表示无可奉告。
Details about the investigation have been tightly held. Ten current and former American officials described the investigation on the condition of anonymity because they did not want to be identified discussing the information.
关于这项调查的细节信息仍处在严格的保密中。十名现任和前任美国官员匿名介绍了这项调查，因为他们不想就提供信息一事暴露身份。
调查人员对事因仍看法不一，但调查工作的悬而未果说明了对复杂间谍体系进行反间谍调查的难度。
The first signs of trouble emerged in 2010. At the time, the quality of the C.I.A.’s information about the inner workings of the Chinese government was the best it had been for years, the result of recruiting sources deep inside the bureaucracy in Beijing, four former officials said. Some were Chinese nationals who the C.I.A. believed had become disillusioned with the Chinese government’s corruption.
麻烦起初的迹象在2010年显现。四名前任官员表示，当时CIA关于中国政府的内部运作方式所掌握信息的质量正处在多年来的最佳水平，这是在北京官僚系统深处收买线人的结果，其中一些是CIA认为对中国政府腐败感到幻灭的中国人。
But by the end of the year, the flow of information began to dry up. By early 2011, senior agency officers realized they had a problem: Assets in China, one of their most precious resources, were disappearing.
但到了年底，信息流开始干涸。到了2011年初，CIA的高级官员们意识到了问题：他们最宝贵的资源之一，中国的线人正在不断失踪。
The F.B.I. and the C.I.A. opened a joint investigation run by top counterintelligence officials at both agencies. Working out of a secret office in Northern Virginia, they began analyzing every operation being run in Beijing. One former senior American official said the investigation had been code-named Honey Badger.
FBI和CIA开始了一次通力调查，由两家机构的高级反间谍官员共同执行。在位于弗吉尼亚州北部的秘密办事处里，他们开始分析当时在北京进行中的所有谍报行动。一位前任美国高级官员称，这项调查的代号是“蜜獾”。
As more and more sources vanished, the operation took on increased urgency. Nearly every employee at the American Embassy was scrutinized, no matter how high ranking. Some investigators believed the Chinese had cracked the encrypted method that the C.I.A. used to communicate with its assets. Others suspected a traitor in the C.I.A., a theory that agency officials were at first reluctant to embrace — and that some in both agencies still do not believe.
随着越来越多的线人失踪，调查行动的紧迫度也越来越高。美国大使馆几乎所有人员都接受了严密检查，无论职位有多高。一些调查人员认为，是中国人破解了CIA用来和线人联络的加密手段，也有人怀疑是CIA中出了一个叛徒——两家机构的官员们起初并不乐于接受这种解释，一些人至今不肯相信。
Their debates were punctuated with macabre phone calls — “We lost another one” — and urgent questions from the Obama administration wondering why intelligence about the Chinese had slowed.
他们的争论期间不时夹杂着令人毛骨悚然的电话——“又没了一个！”——以及奥巴马政府的紧急质询，对中国相关情报送达速度的减缓感到奇怪。
The mole hunt eventually zeroed in on a former agency operative who had worked in the C.I.A.’s division overseeing China, believing he was most likely responsible for the crippling disclosures. But efforts to gather enough evidence to arrest him failed, and he is now living in another Asian country, current and former officials said.
现任和前任官员表示，对奸细的搜查行动最终聚焦在了一名曾在CIA中国监视部门工作的前任特工身上，认为他最有泄密的可能，但人们没能搜集到逮捕他所需的足够证据，而此人目前居住在另一个亚洲国家。
There was good reason to suspect an insider, some former officials say. Around that time, Chinese spies compromised National Security Agency surveillance in Taiwan — an island Beijing claims is part of China — by infiltrating Taiwanese intelligence, an American partner, according to two former officials. And the C.I.A. had discovered Chinese operatives in the agency’s hiring pipeline, according to officials and court documents.
几位前任官员表示，怀疑内部人员不是没有理由的。据两名前任官员称，当时中国间谍通过打入台湾情报局内部，妨害了美国国家安全局在台湾的监控活动，而根据官员声称及法庭记录，CIA在台湾机构的人员招募名单中发现了中国特务。
But the C.I.A.’s top spy hunter, Mark Kelton, resisted the mole theory, at least initially, former officials say. Mr. Kelton had been close friends with Brian J. Kelley, a C.I.A. officer who in the 1990s was wrongly suspected by the F.B.I. of being a Russian spy. The real traitor, it turned out, was Mr. Hanssen. Mr. Kelton often mentioned Mr. Kelley’s mistreatment in meetings during the China episode, former colleagues say, and said he would not accuse someone without ironclad evidence.
但前任官员表示，至少在一开始，CIA的顶尖间谍调查者马克·凯尔顿对奸细说表示了反对：凯尔顿先生曾与布莱恩·J·凯利是密友，后者是一位CIA的官员，在90年代被FBI错怪为俄罗斯的间谍，而最后人们才发现，真正的叛徒是汉森先生。凯尔顿先生以前的同事们表示，在中国调查期间的会议上，他经常提起凯利先生的冤案，并称他不愿在没有铁证时怀疑任何人。
Those who rejected the mole theory attributed the losses to sloppy American tradecraft at a time when the Chinese were becoming better at monitoring American espionage activities in the country. Some F.B.I. agents became convinced that C.I.A. handlers in Beijing too often traveled the same routes to the same meeting points, which would have helped China’s vast surveillance network identify the spies in its midst.
奸细说的反对者们则将损失归结于美方间谍工作的稀松潦草，以及中国人愈发擅长在本国监控美国谍报活动所致。一些FBI特工们开始坚信，是CIA在北京的线人管理者过于频繁地选用相同路线、前往相同接头地点，使中国的庞大监视网络得以识别出自身当中的间谍。
Some officers met their sources at a restaurant where Chinese agents had planted listening devices, former officials said, and even the waiters worked for Chinese intelligence.
前任官员们称，一些情报官员与他们的线人选在餐馆接头，而中国特工在那里安装了窃听设备，甚至连服务员都是中国情报机构安插的。
This carelessness, coupled with the possibility that the Chinese had hacked the covert communications channel, would explain many, if not all, of the disappearances and deaths, some former officials said. Some in the agency, particularly those who had helped build the spy network, resisted this theory and believed they had been caught in the middle of a turf war within the C.I.A.
一些前任官员表示，这种粗心大意，再加上中国可能破解了美方的内部通讯频道，解释了许多——也可能是全部——线人的失踪和死亡。CIA的一些人，尤其是那些协助打造了谍报网络的人，反对这一理论，认为自己在此事上被卷入了CIA内部的地盘斗争。
Still, the Chinese picked off more and more of the agency’s spies, continuing through 2011 and into 2012. As investigators narrowed the list of suspects with access to the information, they started focusing on a Chinese-American who had left the C.I.A. shortly before the intelligence losses began. Some investigators believed he had become disgruntled and had begun spying for China. One official said the man had access to the identities of C.I.A. informants and fit all the indicators on a matrix used to identify espionage threats.
无论如何，在接下来的2011年直到2012年间，中国人接连狙击了更多的CIA间谍。随着调查人员们手里拥有信息权限的嫌疑人名单缩小，他们开始聚焦于一名在情报损失开始前不久离开CIA的华裔美国人。一些调查人员认为，他对CIA感到不满，并开始为中国人担任间谍。一位官员表示，此人拥有查看CIA线人身份的权限，并在用于衡量间谍危险性的矩阵中满足所有的迹象条件。
After leaving the C.I.A., the man decided to remain in Asia with his family and pursue a business opportunity, which some officials suspect that Chinese intelligence agents had arranged.
此人在离开CIA后决定和家人一起留在亚洲，发展一桩业务机会，而一些官员怀疑这是中国情报特务为他安排的。
Officials said the F.B.I. and the C.I.A. lured the man back to the United States around 2012 with a ruse about a possible contract with the agency, an arrangement common among former officers. Agents questioned the man, asking why he had decided to stay in Asia, concerned that he possessed a number of secrets that would be valuable to the Chinese. It’s not clear whether agents confronted the man about whether he had spied for China.
官员们表示，FBI和CIA在2012年间通过向此人提出与CIA的业务合同（这在离退官员当中很常见），设计将他引回了美国。特工们对此人进行了问讯，问他为什么决定留在亚洲，并对他持有大量对中国人而言有价值的机密表示了担忧，但不知道特工们有没有当面质问他是否为中国间谍。
The man defended his reasons for living in Asia and did not admit any wrongdoing, an official said. He then returned to Asia.
一位官员称，此人为住在亚洲的理由进行了辩解，并且否认了任何过失，随后返回了亚洲。
By 2013, the F.B.I. and the C.I.A. concluded that China’s success in identifying C.I.A. agents had been blunted — it is not clear how — but the damage had been done.
2013年，FBI和CIA表示，出于不明原因，中国识别CIA特务的成功率下降了，但此前的损失已经是既成事实。
The C.I.A. has tried to rebuild its network of spies in China, officials said, an expensive and time-consuming effort led at one time by the former chief of the East Asia Division. A former intelligence official said the former chief was particularly bitter because he had worked with the suspected mole and recruited some of the spies in China who were ultimately executed.
官员们表示，CIA此后开始试图重建在中国的谍报网络，这项工作成本昂贵，耗时庞大，一度由东亚分部的前任长官带领执行。一位前任情报官员称，这位前任长官忿忿不平，因为他曾与奸细嫌疑人共事，还曾在中国招募了一些最终被处决的特务。
China has been particularly aggressive in its espionage in recent years, beyond the breach of the Office of Personnel Management records in 2015, American officials said. Last year, an F.B.I. employee pleaded guilty to acting as a Chinese agent for years, passing sensitive technology information to Beijing in exchange for cash, lavish hotel rooms during foreign travel and prostitutes.
美国官员表示，自2015年入侵美国政府人事管理办公室记录以来，中国近几年的谍报活动尤其富有侵略性。去年，一位FBI员工认罪，承认自己多年来担任中国特务，将敏感的技术信息交给北京，以换取现金回报、国外旅行时奢侈的酒店房间和嫖娼活动。
In March, prosecutors announced the arrest of a longtime State Department employee, Candace Marie Claiborne, accused of lying to investigators about her contacts with Chinese officials. According to the criminal complaint against Ms. Claiborne, who pleaded not guilty, Chinese agents wired cash into her bank account and showered her with gifts that included an iPhone, a laptop and tuition at a Chinese fashion school. In addition, according to the complaint, she received a fully furnished apartment and a stipend.
今年三月，检察官宣布逮捕国务院资深员工坎迪斯·玛丽·克莱本，指控她在于中方官员联系一事上试图欺骗调查官。根据对克莱本女士的刑事诉讼，中国特务向她的银行账户打入现金，并向她提供了包括iPhone、笔记本电脑和中国一所时尚设计学院的学费在内的大量礼品，而克莱本女士拒绝认罪。根据诉讼指控，她还接受了一处装修完毕的公寓和一份薪水。
以上来源：冬天毛的一己之见
延伸阅读：
中国为何会被美国中情局等境外间谍机构盯上？
首先，中国的快速崛起和国际影响力与日俱增，包括中情局在内的各国间谍机构高度关注中国的国家战略、未来发展走向，希望能够从内部获取相关的佐证，以对崛起的中国作出一个相对准确的判断和定位。
其次，中国的军力发展日新月异，并迅速跻身世界军事大国和军事强国的行列，具备了与传统军事强国比高低的能力与实力。
再次，一些非传统安全问题在国家安全中地位日益提高，如世界范围的贸易战、货币战以及网络空间战等，正在取代传统的冲突与战争。此外，中国拥有众多的陆上与海上邻国，周边领土主权和海洋权益争端十分复杂，加之大国插足而导致的地缘竞争日趋激烈，军事安全较量风险增大，中国便成为了境外间谍机构紧盯的目标。
线人为何近年来屡屡“失联”？
据《纽约时报》的报道，至少有四名中情局前官员对该报表示，来自中国政府深层的消息源从2010年起出现枯竭现象，2011年初线人便陆续失踪。随后，中情局与联邦调查局（FBI）联合调查事件，这项调查被冠以代号“蜜獾”（honey badger）。如果按其所称，在中国政府内部的线人出现了连续的失联，那么应该有以下主要原因。
第一，中国有关部门的反间防间技术有了突飞猛进的进步和发展，真正达到了道高一尺魔高一丈的程度。
第二，从制度上堵塞了漏洞，扎紧了篱笆。
第三，安全教育已经深入人心，公民自身的防范意识有了明显的提高。
哪些人最容易成为敌人的线人？
据已经公开的国家安全机关统计数据，目前退伍军人、留学生、高校师生、军事发烧友以及军工企业、国防科研单位、政府机关人员等，都是被长期被境外间谍机关关注的重点对象。有几种情况尤其值得注意。
一是那些逞能声称掌握机密、了解内幕的人，他们极易被境外势力及其代理人通过激将法等成功拿下；
二是某些四处发泄对现实不满、自认为怀才不遇的人，他们的防间意志显然是极其脆弱的；
三是企图通过当线人不劳而获、大发横财的某些狭隘者、自私自利者。已经解密的刘连昆间谍案就是一个典型的例子。
思所以危则安矣，思所以亡则存矣。每个人都要有忧患意识，忧患意识就好比是一副清醒剂，能起到防患于未然和警钟长鸣的作用。
小心！间谍就在自己的身边！一则“写份分析报告会得到若干报酬”或“招聘信息员”的网络启示很有可能就是一个挖好的陷阱，切记：天上不会掉馅饼！
《延伸阅读》作者：秦伊 进锋（国际战略与安全研究所研究员、教授）