国有企业混合所有制改革中的制度阻力——基于地方政府政绩压力的证据

《上海财经大学学报》 2020年22卷第2期 页码：51 - 68  online：2020年3月26日

国有企业混合所有制改革中的制度阻力——基于地方政府政绩压力的证据

Research on the Institutional Resistance of Mixed Ownership Reform: Based on the Perspective of Local Government Performance Pressure

作者（中）：赵璨1, 2, 3, 王星晨1, 曹伟*, 4, 杨德明5

作者（英）：Zhao Can1, 2, 3, Wang Xingchen1, Cao Wei*, 4, Yang Deming5

作者单位：1.中国海洋大学 管理学院，山东 青岛 266100 2.中国企业营运资金管理研究中心，山东 青岛 266100 3.中国混合所有制改革与资本管理研究院，山东 青岛 266100 4.南京大学 商学院，江苏 南京 210004 5.暨南大学 管理学院，广东 广州 510000

摘要：文章以2007-2016年中国A股地方国有上市公司为研究样本，用混合主体深入度和混合主体制衡度衡量国有企业的混合所有制改革程度，研究了地方政府政绩压力对辖区内国有企业混合所有制改革的影响。研究发现，地方政府的政绩压力越大，辖区内国有企业的混合所有制改革程度越低。即地方政府会通过干预辖区内国企的混合所有制改革进程以服务于自身的政绩考核，这成为地方国企混合所有制改革进程中的制度阻力。同时，地方政府基于干预成本和收益的权衡，更倾向于阻碍金字塔层级较少、政策性负担较重的国有企业混改进程。进一步，结合地方官员个体异质性，研究发现地方政府政绩压力对混合所有制改革的抑制作用在官员年龄小、任期长、具有企业任职经历的样本中更为明显。最后，文章基于中国特色的政治锦标赛激励模式，从治理效应上对如何推动国有企业混合所有制改革进行了系统性研究。研究表明，地区非公有制经济的发展、地方政府政绩考核方式的转变均会弱化政绩压力对混合所有制改革的抑制作用。

关键词：政绩压力; 混合所有制改革; 地方国企; 晋升锦标赛

Summary: In recent years, the reform of mixed ownership has become an important breakthrough in the reform of state-owned enterprises. However, the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises has encountered some resistances. These resistances include not only the obstruction of vested interests, the solidification of ideology, public concern, but also the outdated incentive model and institutional design. At present, there are relatively few studies on the influencing factors of how to effectively promote the reform of mixed ownership and the empirical evidence of large samples is lacking. As the executor of the mixed ownership reform, local governments’ behavior and willingness will have a profound influence on the effect of the mixed ownership reform. So this paper selects performance pressure which has the greatest influence on local government policy behavior as the breakthrough point, manually collecting and organizing the property right information of the top ten shareholders. Taking A-share local state-owned listed companies in China from 2007 to 2016 as research samples, using mixed subject depth and hybrid equity balance degree to measure the level of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises, this paper studies the influence of local government performance pressure on the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises. The study finds that the greater the local government performance pressure, the lower the degree of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises. At the same time, the influence of performance pressure on the mixed ownership reform of local state-owned enterprises is different in object selection. Based on the balance between intervention costs and intervention benefits, local governments are more inclined to hinder the process of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises with fewer levels of the pyramid and heavier policy burden. As the decision-making process of the government is completed by officials, the motivation of officials is not only derived from the external performance pressure, but also related to the internal individual heterogeneity. Therefore, this paper further combines the heterogeneity of local officials and finds that the restraining effect of local government performance pressure on the mixed ownership reform is more obvious in the samples with young age, long tenure or enterprise service experience. Finally, this paper systematically studies how to promote the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises.

Key words: performance pressure; mixed ownership reform; local state-owned enterprises; political promotion championship

DOI：10.16538/j.cnki.jsufe.2020.02.004

收稿日期：2020-1-10

基金项目：国家自然科学基金青年项目“民营企业寻租、政治资本猝变及经济后果研究?基于官员落马的视角”（71702178）；国家社会科学基金青年项目“基于企业政治嵌入理论视角下的政企关系重构研究”（18CJY025）；国家自然科学基金青年项目“债务结构的影响因素、治理效应与债务违约风险”（71802184）；教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金“反腐败、政企关系重构与企业社会资本投资：基于社会关系网络理论的整合研究”（17YJC790005）

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