股权激励、市场关注与市场预期实现

《上海财经大学学报》 2020年22卷第2期 页码：81 - 95，137  online：2020年3月26日

股权激励、市场关注与市场预期实现

Equity Incentives, Market Attention and Meet Market Expectations

作者（中）：储溢泉1, 仓勇涛2, 储一昀3

作者（英）：Chu Yiquan1, Cang Yongtao2, Chu Yiyun3

作者单位：1.交通银行 博士后科研工作站，上海 200336 2.上海外国语大学 国际金融贸易学院，上海 200083 3.上海财经大学 会计学院，上海 200433

摘要：自从Jensen和Meckling（1976）指出股权激励能缓解股东和管理层之间的代理问题以来，已有很多研究为股权激励的内部治理效应提供了经验证据，但股权激励是否具有外部治理效应，却鲜有研究。基于此，文章研究股权激励能否吸引更多的市场关注，以及外部的市场关注能否激励管理层实现市场预期，从而为股权激励是否具有外部治理效应提供一定的经验证据。基于沪深两市A股上市公司数据的研究发现，与未实施股权激励的公司相比，实施股权激励的公司会吸引更多的市场关注，并且公司实际业绩与市场预期的差距更小；在没有达到市场预期的情形下，与没有实施股权激励的公司相比，实施股权激励公司达不到市场预期的程度更小；股权激励的外部治理作用主要发生在两职分离公司和民营公司，当市场关注度更高时，股权激励在提升公司业绩方面更有效。该结论为股权激励的有效性争论提供了新思路，也为监管部门完善股权激励政策提供了一定的理论基础。

关键词：股权激励; 市场关注; 市场预期实现; 外部治理

Summary: Ever since Jensen and Meckling pointed out that equity incentives can improve agency cost between shareholders and the management, many studies had provided empirical evidence for the internal governance effects of equity incentives. However, there are few studies on whether equity incentives have external governance effects. Based on this, this paper studies whether equity incentives can attract more market attention and whether external market attention can motivate the management to achieve market expectations. This will provide some empirical evidence for whether equity incentives have external governance effects.Equity incentives generally set exercise conditions for stock options or unlocking conditions for restricted stocks, and these conditions are based on certain performance targets. Generally, these performance evaluation targets are higher than before. Therefore, the implementation of equity incentives can signal to the capital market that the management will work harder to improve company performance. When this signal is passed to the capital market, it is bound to cause more market attention, and the market will set a goal for the management’s efforts. Whether the management achieves market expectations directly affects the management’s wealth. This is because if the management fails to meet the target set by the market, the company’s stock price will fall, and the management’s personal wealth will also decrease. On the other hand, the expected target set by the market can also be regarded as the market’s estimation of the level of the management effort. If the performance of the company announcement is lower than this estimate, it is easy for the market to believe that the management has not done its best to have lazy moral hazard suspects, which will stimulate the market to vote with their feet. and the gap between the company’s actual performance and market expectations is smaller. In the case of failure to meet market expectations, compared with companies that do not implement equity incentives, companies that implement equity incentives will meet market expectations to a lesser extent. Further research finds that the external governance effect of equity incentives mainly occurs in two-separated companies and private enterprises. This paper has implications for the literature and policies.

Key words: equity incentives; market attention; meet market expectations; external governance

DOI：10.16538/j.cnki.jsufe.2020.02.006

收稿日期：2019-12-9

基金项目：上海市2019年度“超级博士后”资助计划；教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目（17YJA79005）；财政部2017年度会计名家培养工程

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