地方审计体制改革：“治理监督”还是“放任自流”？——来自地方国有企业并购重组业绩承诺可靠性的经验证据

Local Audit System Reform: “Governance Supervision” or “Laissez-faire”? Empirical Evidence from the Reliability of Performance Commitments in the M&A of Local SOEs

《上海财经大学学报》2023年25卷第1期 页码：49 - 63 online：2023年2月1日

作者

中：王鑫鑫1, 张书敏2, 窦炜2

英：Wang Xinxin1, Zhang Shumin2, Dou Wei2

作者单位：1.武汉科技大学 管理学院，湖北 武汉 430081; 2.华中农业大学 经济管理学院，湖北 武汉 430070

摘要及关键词

摘要：文章以2015年末我国实施的省以下审计机关人财物试点改革作为准自然实验，选取2012—2020年沪深两市A股地方国有并购重组企业为样本，利用双重差分模型实证检验地方审计体制改革的治理监督作用对地方国有企业并购重组业绩承诺可靠性的影响。研究发现：（1）地方审计改革能够显著提升政府审计的治理监督作用，提高地方国有企业并购交易中的业绩承诺可靠性；（2）基于地方审计改革力度的异质性检验发现，干部人事、机构编制和经费资产管理等方面的改革举措力度越大，对地方国有企业并购业绩承诺的监管效果越好；（3）在地方审计改革监督效果提升的作用渠道分析中，政府审计能够通过加强其对违规问题的揭示和处罚更好地治理并购业绩承诺可靠性问题，但相关建议和指导并未能发挥显著的强化作用；（4）就地方审计改革对业绩承诺可靠性的影响机制而言，政府审计能够从业绩“失诺”现象产生的动因及显性表征切入，通过对并购溢价和大股东减持问题的治理，促进业绩承诺可靠性的提高。文章为推进审计管理体制改革提供了经验证据。

关键词：地方审计改革；业绩承诺可靠性；改革力度与作用渠道；并购溢价；大股东减持

Summary: In China, local audit institutions accept the “dual leadership” from local governments and higher-level audit institutions, which makes it difficult to fully and independently implement audit supervision on enterprises under local governments. In order to better play the important role of government audit in the national governance system, the General Office of the CPC Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council issued and implemented the reform of “unified management of people and property of local audit institutions below the provincial level” (hereinafter referred to as “local audit system reform”) at the end of 2015. This paper selects A-share local M&A SOEs in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2012 to 2020 as the research sample, and uses the DID model to empirically test the governance and supervision role of local audit system reform, and the impact on the reliability of performance commitments in the M&A of local SOEs. The results show that: (1) Local audit system reform can significantly improve the governance and supervision role of government audit and improve the reliability level of performance commitments in the M&A of local SOEs. This conclusion is verified in all the M&A samples as well as the samples excluding the potential earnings management behavior within the performance target of 5% and 10%, and remains valid after a variety of robustness tests. This shows that the hard constraints of government administrative supervision to enhance the audit governance role of local audit institutions, especially after the implementation of local audit system reform, is an effective measure to solve the “chaos” in the M&A of local SOEs and “missing commitments” in performance. (2) Further heterogeneity test shows that the stronger the reform measures in the aspects of cadres and personnel, institutional establishment and funds and assets management, the better the supervision effect on the reliability of performance commitments in the M&A of local SOEs. (3) In the analysis of the function channels of improving the supervision effect of local audit system reform, local audit institutions can better deal with the reliability of performance commitments in the M&A of local SOEs by strengthening the disclosure and punishment of violations, but relevant suggestions do not play a significant strengthening role. (4) In terms of the influence mechanism of local audit system reform on the reliability of performance commitments, government audit can promote the improvement of the reliability of performance commitments through penetrating review and supervision, starting from the causes and explicit representations of “missing commitments” in performance, and managing the M&A premium of major assets in M&A and major shareholders’ shareholding reduction. This paper enriches the research on the effect of local audit institutions on the audit governance of SOEs, especially the impact of the implementation of local audit system reform on performance commitments in enterprise M&A, and provides empirical evidence for promoting the reform of the audit management system.

Key words:local audit system reform; reliability of performance commitments; reform efforts and function channels; M&A premium; major shareholders’ shareholding reduction

其他信息

DOI：10.16538/j.cnki.jsufe.2023.01.004

收稿日期：2022-08-01

基金项目：国家社会科学基金项目（21BJY124）；中央高校基本科研业务费专项基金项目（2662021JGPYG03）

点

这里“阅读原文”，查看更多