奥巴马自述：为什么我在叙利亚问题上“㞞”了③
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如同本号在投资圈里一直传递的观点，2013年9月奥巴马在叙利亚问题上的突然“㞞”，是国际政经格局走势和全球资本市场走势的重大转折点。
在这个时点后，“政经场”接连发生了多个大转折——包括从乌克兰基辅之春到俄罗斯收回克里米亚，叙利亚反对派战场占上风到俄罗斯介入与美国共同主导叙利亚和平进程，伊朗问题从长期僵持到伊朗核协议达成，中国南海问题从中国被岛链和TPP包围到中国在南海连续填海并在航道控制和东盟经贸关系博弈上渐居上风。“资本场”也渐变为美国经济良性预期主要靠美联储加息预期支撑，美股主要靠美联储推迟加息预期支撑。 |
在那之后，奥巴马帮助国际上很多力量和市场主体认识到美国的虚弱和力量的显性下滑，虽然奥巴马陈述了废掉了红线和不动武的很多理由，这些理由按照奥巴马在自述中所说的“现实主义”、“国际主义”都是可以自圆其说的，但这仍然无法阻挡全球市场中一种认知的盛行——按照无论是政治领域还是经济领域最盛行的弱肉强食的游戏规则，奥巴马的选择不会只传递他本人的“㞞”，也会传递美国的“㞞”。
美国的“㞞”首先使国际“政经场”和“资本场”这“两大全球市场”内的有眼力的玩家们大惊失色，接着慢慢传递到各种市场主体的认知体系和内心深处，潜移默化，缓慢渗入。
奥巴马把“反搭便车运动”，推动其他国家承担国际责任，美国不应该继续像过去一样通过包办一切来领导世界，阐释为“奥巴马国际主义和多边主义”的实践。但是，“两大全球市场”内的有眼力的玩家们，更倾向于把这解释为美国绝对力量的下滑，正如特朗普在接受《华盛顿邮报》专访时所说，美国现在的地位已经与过去不同了。
特朗普：我们现在的地位已经与过去不同了。美国过去曾经是一个富裕、强大的国家，而现在我们是一个穷国、一个负债国。 |
今天推荐的深度原文翻译是，《大西洋月刊》2016年4月号刊载的对美国总统奥巴马的超长篇的专访，本号将陆续发布国内首个独家全文翻译。
【全文第一部分翻译③】，见“3 深度原文翻译”
今天首发专访全文的第一部分翻译，专访一上来，就以“浓墨重彩”的笔触，不惜篇幅的多维度讲述了2012年到2013年，奥巴马在对叙利亚划设了“不能使用化学武器，否则将武力打击阿萨德政权的红线”后，在2013年9月突然退缩，放弃武力打击阿萨德政权的背后原因和“心路历程”，揭示了被国际社会和美国国内广泛解读为奥巴马“㞞”了背后到底是怎么回事，描述了为什么不敢动武、出尔反尔、先出人意料示强又更加出人意料示弱等一系列行为背后的复杂考量和纠结背景。
奥巴马自述，最终突然作出不动武决定的四个主要考虑因素是—— 一，“我们有一些正在完成任务的联合国检察员在场，所以他们在的时候我们不能冒险发起攻击”。 二，“卡梅伦没有得到英国议会（关于授权英国参与对叙利亚动武）的许可”。 三，是最重要的因素，“我们预计尽管可以让阿萨德遭受一些损害，但我们不能通过导弹袭击来清除他们的化学武器，若如此，我们将面对的局面是，阿萨德躲过袭击并声称其已成功对抗美国，而美国未经联合国授权非法行动，也可能加强其影响而不是削弱他。” 四，第四个因素具有更深远的哲学上的重要性，“这属于有一段时间我曾深深思考过的一些事情。”他说，“我曾怀着这样强烈的信念进入政府：国家安全实务上的行政权范围非常广阔，但也不是没有限制。” |
奥巴马用美国过去在海外的失败作为美国减少和退出海外干预的解释。
“我是个地道的国际主义者,”奥巴马在之后的谈话中说道。 “搭便车者惹恼了我，”……奥巴马警告说，如果英国不能拿出2%的GDP用在国防支出上，英国将不再能够声称与美国有“特殊关系”。“你必须支付合理的价格”，奥巴马告诉遇到2%的门槛的卡梅伦(David Cameron)。 奥巴马解释说，他作为总统的一部分使命，是为了促进其他国家为自己而采取行动，并不是等待着美国领导这个世界。……总统似乎也认为,与其他国家分享领导权是一种检讨美国任性的冲动的一种方式。“我如此重视对于我们直接利益不受威胁情况采取多边行动的原因之一是,多边主义限制了美国的狂妄自大，”他解释道。 他一直援引对美国过去在海外的失败的理解作为美国自省的方式。“我们的历史,”他说，“我们在伊朗有历史,在印尼和中美洲有历史。当我们开始谈论干预的时候，必须注意我们的历史,，并开始理解别人的猜疑的来源。” 在他努力摆脱一些美国对其盟友的外交政策责任，奥巴马似乎是一个典型的紧缩型的总统，如艾森豪威尔和理查德·尼克松。在这种背景下，紧缩被定义为“撤回，花费更少，减少风险，将负担转移到盟友那里”，斯蒂芬•诺维奇，总统外交政策专家委员会的专家向我解释。“如果约翰·麦凯恩在2008年当选,你仍然会看到某种程度的紧缩，”他说。“这是这个国家想要的东西。如果你在战争进行不利的时期入主白宫,你应该相信美国人民是聘请你去少干预的。”一个艾森豪威尔和尼克松与奥巴马的区别是，奥巴马“似乎在个人意识形态上认同对外交政策消耗了这个国家过多的关注和资源。” 我问奥巴马关于紧缩的问题。“几乎每一个伟大的世界强国已经屈服于”过度扩张,他说，“我认为每次哪里有问题,我们派军队来恢复秩序的做法并不明智。我们不能这样做。” |
更多精彩内容，请看全文的第一部分翻译。
直接阅读原文，比照翻译，而不是从各种媒体获取第二手乃至第N手信息，是准确评估和解读重要人物及其观点的最好方式。
从《大西洋月刊》刊发起，国内没有任何媒体刊发过全文，本号特组织翻译全文，以英中对照的方式，方便读者解读奥巴马和2016年以后的美国。
略
3 深度解读
大西洋月刊：美国总统谈论自己关于美国在世界上的角色的艰难决定
【全文第一部分翻译③】
The U.S. president talks through his hardest decisions about America’s role in the world.
By JEFFREY GOLDBERG,APRIL 2016 ISSUE
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/
美国总统谈论自己关于美国在世界上的角色的艰难决定
杰弗里·戈德堡,2016年4月发表
OBAMA ON ...
1. Why he’s proud of not striking Assad in 2013
2. The necessity of pivoting from the Middle Eastto Asia and other regions
3. Why Ukraine will always be vulnerable to Russiandomination
4. Resisting John Kerry’s requests to attackSyrian-regime targets
5. Why Saudi Arabia should share the Middle Eastwith Iran
6. How ISIS is like the Joker
7. Why Putin is “not completely stupid”
8. How France and Great Britain contributed to themess in Libya
9. Why ISIS isn’t an existential threat, butclimate change is
10. Why he resents Netanyahu’s lectures
奥巴马谈：
1. 为什么他以2013年没有军事打击阿萨德为荣
2. 从中东转移到亚洲及其他地区的必要性
3. 为什么乌克兰总是易受俄罗斯主导
4. 拒绝克里袭击叙利亚政府目标的请求
5. 沙特阿拉伯为什么需要与伊朗共享中东
6. ISIS为何像《蝙蝠侠》中的“小丑”
7. 为什么普京“并非彻头彻尾地愚蠢”
8. 法国和英国如何助长了利比亚的混乱
9. 为什么ISIS不是存在的威胁，而气候变化是
10. 他为什么讨厌内塔尼亚胡的演讲
“Where am I controversial? When it comes to the use of military power,” he said. “That is the source of the controversy. There’s a playbook in Washington that presidents are supposed to follow. It’s a playbook that comes out of the foreign-policy establishment. And the playbook prescribes responses to different events, and these responses tend to be militarized responses. Where America is directly threatened, the playbook works. But the playbook can also be a trap that can lead to bad decisions. In the midst of an international challenge like Syria, you get judged harshly if you don’t follow the playbook, even if there are good reasons why it does not apply.”
“我有争议的地方在哪?当涉及到军事力量的使用,”他说。“这是争论的根源。在华盛顿存在一个总统应该效仿的剧本。这个剧本是外交政策体制的产物。并且，剧本规定对不同事件的反应都是军事化的反应。当美国受到直接威胁,剧本就开始上演了。但剧本也可以是一个陷阱,会导致错误的决定。在中东像叙利亚那样的国际挑战, 如果你不按照剧本来判断，你将被严厉审判,即使有为什么不适用的充分的理由。”
I have come to believe that, in Obama’s mind, August 30, 2013, was his liberation day, the day he defied not only the foreign-policy establishment and its cruise-missile playbook, but also the demands of America’s frustrating, high-maintenance allies in the Middle East—countries, he complains privately to friends and advisers, that seek to exploit American “muscle” for their own narrow and sectarian ends. By 2013, Obama’s resentments were well developed. He resented military leaders who believed they could fix any problem if the commander in chief would simply give them what they wanted, and he resented the foreign-policy think-tank complex. A widely held sentiment inside the White House is that many of the most prominent foreign-policy think tanks in Washington are doing the bidding of their Arab and pro-Israel funders. I’ve heard one administration official refer to Massachusetts Avenue, the home of many of these think tanks, as “Arab-occupied territory.”
“我开始相信,在奥巴马看来,2013年8月30日,是他的解放日,这一天他不仅不顾外交政策体制及其巡航导弹剧本,也忽视了美国沮丧的奢侈的中东盟友的需求,他私下向朋友和顾问抱怨说,他们寻求利用美国“肌肉”是为了他们自己的狭隘和宗教目的。到2013年,奥巴马的怨念到达极致。他厌恶那些认为“他们可以解决任何问题，只要总司令会给他们他们想要的东西”的军事领导人,他也讨厌外交政策智囊团的复杂。白宫内部一个被广泛持有的观点是,许多最著名的华盛顿的外交政策智囊团有阿拉伯和以色列资助者。我听说一位政府官员称马萨诸塞大道是这些智囊团的家，被称作阿拉伯殖民地。”
For some foreign-policy experts, even within his own administration, Obama’s about-face on enforcing the red line was a dispiriting moment in which he displayed irresolution and naïveté, and did lasting damage to America’s standing in the world. “Once the commander in chief draws that red line,” Leon Panetta, who served as CIA director and then as secretary of defense in Obama’s first term, told me recently, “then I think the credibility of the commander in chief and this nation is at stake if he doesn’t enforce it.” Right after Obama’s reversal, Hillary Clinton said privately, “If you say you’re going to strike, you have to strike. There’s no choice.”
对于一些外交政策专家来说，甚至和他一个政党的,当奥巴马执行红线的时候是一个令人失望的时刻,他表现出犹豫不决和天真,并且这一举措将会长时间损害美国在世界上的地位。“一旦总司令划定红线，”帕内塔(Leon Panetta),曾担任中央情报局局长,然后在奥巴马第一个任期作为国防部长,最近告诉我说,“他却不执行，那么我想总司令和这个国家的可信度将会岌岌可危。”就在奥巴马态度逆转之后,希拉里·克林顿私下说，“如果你说你要动武,你不得不动武。这毫无选择。”
“Assad is effectively being rewarded for the use of chemical weapons, rather than ‘punished’ as originally planned.” Shadi Hamid, a scholar at the Brookings Institution, wrote for The Atlantic at the time. “He has managed to remove the threat of U.S. military action while giving very little up in return.”
“实际上，阿萨德是因使用化学武器被奖励的,而不是按原计划惩罚。”哈米德,布鲁金斯学会(Brookings Institution)的学者,在大西洋月刊的一篇文章中写道，“在放弃很少的利益作为回应的同时，他已经成功消除美国军事行动的威胁。”
Even commentators who have been broadly sympathetic to Obama’s policies saw this episode as calamitous. Gideon Rose, the editor of Foreign Affairs, wrote recently that Obama’s handling of this crisis—“first casually announcing a major commitment, then dithering about living up to it, then frantically tossing the ball to Congress for a decision—was a case study in embarrassingly amateurish improvisation.”
甚至已经广泛赞同此政策的评论员认为这一事件是灾难性的。吉迪恩罗斯，《外交事务》的编辑，最近写道，奥巴马这一危机的处理——“首先随便宣布一项重大的承诺,然后犹犹豫豫的执行,然后扔给国会来决定是一个尴尬、业余、随心所欲施政的典型案例。”
Obama’s defenders, however, argue that he did no damage to U.S. credibility, citing Assad’s subsequent agreement to have his chemical weapons removed. “The threat of force was credible enough for them to give up their chemical weapons,” Tim Kaine, a Democratic senator from Virginia, told me. “We threatened military action and they responded. That’s deterrent credibility.”
然而，奥巴马的支持者说,他并没有伤害美国信誉，理由是阿萨德的后续协议同意清除他的化学武器。“武力威胁是可信的,他们放弃了他们的化学武器，”蒂姆凯恩,来自维吉尼亚州的民主党参议员告诉我，“我们曾威胁要采取军事行动,他们做出相应的反应。这就是威慑可信性。”
History may record August 30, 2013, as the day Obama prevented the U.S. from entering yet another disastrous Muslim civil war, and the day he removed the threat of a chemical attack on Israel, Turkey, or Jordan. Or it could be remembered as the day he let the Middle East slip from America’s grasp, into the hands of Russia, Iran, and isis.
历史可能会记住2013年8月30日，奥巴马阻止美国进入另一个灾难性的穆斯林内战的一天，这一天他化解了化学攻击对以色列、土耳其和约旦的威胁。也可以被作为他让中东从美国的手心滑落到俄罗斯,伊朗,和ISIS手上的一天。
I first spoke with obama about foreign policy when he was aU.S. senator, in 2006. At the time, I was familiar mainly with the text of aspeech he had delivered four years earlier, at a Chicago antiwar rally. It wasan unusual speech for an antiwar rally in that it was not antiwar; Obama, whowas then an Illinois state senator, argued only against one specific and, atthe time, still theoretical, war. “I suffer no illusions about Saddam Hussein,”he said. “He is a brutal man. A ruthless man … But I also know that Saddamposes no imminent and direct threat to the United States or to his neighbors.”He added, “I know that an invasion of Iraq without a clear rationale andwithout strong international support will only fan the flames of the MiddleEast, and encourage the worst, rather than best, impulses of the Arab world,and strengthen the recruitment arm of al-Qaeda.”
2006年，我第一次与奥巴马谈论关于外交政策的议题时，他还是一个美国参议员。当时，我主要是熟悉他四年前在芝加哥一个反战集会的演讲文本。这是一个不同寻常的反战集会上的演讲,因为那不是反战;奥巴马,作为当时一名伊利诺斯州参议员,他只反对一个特定的,当时还停留在理论上的战争——“我对萨达姆•侯赛因(SaddamHussein)不抱有任何幻想”，他说。“他是一个残忍的人。一个无情的人…但我也知道,萨达姆没有对美国和他的邻居构成直接又迫在眉睫的威胁。”他补充道,“我知道入侵伊拉克没有一个明确的理由,也没有强大的国际支持，只会对中东火上浇油,并且会鼓励阿拉伯世界最坏的而不是最好的冲动,并增强基地组织武装招兵买马的能力。”
This speech had made me curious about its author. I wantedto learn how an Illinois state senator, a part-time law professor who spent hisdays traveling between Chicago and Springfield, had come to a more prescientunderstanding of the coming quagmire than the most experienced foreign-policythinkers of his party, including such figures as Hillary Clinton, Joe Biden,and John Kerry, not to mention, of course, most Republicans and manyforeign-policy analysts and writers, including me.
这个演讲让我对其作者很好奇。我想了解一个兼职法学教授，整天在芝加哥和斯普林菲尔德之间的来回跑的伊利诺斯州参议员，如何会比最有经验的外交政策思想家在理解未来的困境上更有先见之明,包括像希拉里•克林顿、乔·拜登和约翰·克里这样的人物,更不用说大多数共和党人以及许多外交政策分析人士和专栏作家,包括我。
Since that first meeting in 2006, I’ve interviewed Obamaperiodically, mainly on matters related to the Middle East. But over the pastfew months, I’ve spent several hours talking with him about the broadest themesof his “long game” foreign policy, including the themes he is most eager todiscuss—namely, the ones that have nothing to do with the Middle East.
自2006年的第一次相见,我定期采访奥巴马，主要是关于中东问题。但在过去的几个月里,我花了几个小时跟他谈论最广泛的主题是“放长线钓大鱼”的外交政策,包括他最渴望探讨的主题，无关中东。
“isisis not an existential threat to the United States,” he told me in one of theseconversations. “Climate change is a potential existential threat to the entireworld if we don’t do something about it.” Obama explained that climate changeworries him in particular because “it is a political problem perfectly designedto repel government intervention. It involves every single country, and it is acomparatively slow-moving emergency, so there is always something seeminglymore urgent on the agenda.”
“对美国，ISIS并不是一个的威胁,”他曾对我说过。 “如果我们不做点什么，气候变化是对于整个世界一个潜在的威胁。”奥巴马解释说,气候变化是一个让他担忧的事情,因为“这是一个完全排斥政府干预的政治问题。它涉及到每一个国家,它是一个相对缓慢演进的紧急事务,所以总有一些看似更为紧迫的事情提上了日程。
At the moment, of course, the most urgent of the “seeminglymore urgent” issues is Syria. But at any given moment, Obama’s entirepresidency could be upended by North Korean aggression, or an assault by Russiaon a member of nato, or an isis-planned attack on U.S. soil. Few presidentshave faced such diverse tests on the international stage as Obama has, and thechallenge for him, as for all presidents, has been to distinguish the merelyurgent from the truly important, and to focus on the important.
当然,最紧迫的“看似更为紧迫的”问题是叙利亚。但在任何给定的时刻,奥巴马的整个任期可以被朝鲜侵略,或俄罗斯对北约成员的攻击,或一个ISIS计划的对美国本土的攻击所颠覆。很少有总统面临像奥巴马在国际舞台上所遇到的如此多样化的考验,他所面临的挑战,和所有的总统所面临的那样,是从最紧急中区分真正重要的问题并且集中精力在重要的问题上。
My goal in our recent conversations was to see the worldthrough Obama’s eyes, and to understand what he believes America’s role in theworld should be. This article is informed by our recent series ofconversations, which took place in the Oval Office; over lunch in his diningroom; aboard Air Force One; and in Kuala Lumpur during his most recent visit toAsia, in November. It is also informed by my previous interviews with him andby his speeches and prolific public ruminations, as well as by conversationswith his top foreign-policy and national-security advisers, foreign leaders andtheir ambassadors in Washington, friends of the president and others who havespoken with him about his policies and decisions, and his adversaries andcritics.
在我们最近的谈话过程中，我的目标是以奥巴马的视角看世界,并去理解他认为美国在世界上应该扮演什么角色。本文的依据是我们（2015年）11月那些发生在椭圆形办公室、在他的餐厅里的午餐时间时、在空军一号上，和他最近访问亚洲在吉隆坡时发生的一系列对话。同时根据我之前采访他的记录，他的演讲和大量公开的反思,以及与他的高级外交智囊团、国家安全顾问、外国领导人和他们在华盛顿的大使,总统的朋友以及与奥巴马探讨过他的政策、决定、对手以及批评者的其他人等。
Over the course of our conversations, I came to see Obama asa president who has grown steadily more fatalistic about the constraints onAmerica’s ability to direct global events, even as he has, late in hispresidency, accumulated a set of potentially historic foreign-policyachievements—controversial, provisional achievements, to be sure, butachievements nonetheless: the opening to Cuba, the Paris climate-change accord,the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement, and, of course, the Iran nucleardeal. These he accomplished despite his growing sense that larger forces—theriptide of tribal feeling in a world that should have already shed its atavism;the resilience of small men who rule large countries in ways contrary to theirown best interests; the persistence of fear as a governing humanemotion—frequently conspire against the best of America’s intentions. But healso has come to learn, he told me, that very little is accomplished ininternational affairs without U.S. leadership.
在我们的谈话中，我开始看到奥巴马作为总统对于美国的直接决定全球事件的能力存在限制的宿命感，即便是他在总统任期,获得了一系列有潜在历史意义的外交成就，尽管存在争议且是暂时性的，但它们始终是成就:对古巴破冰,巴黎的气候变化协议,TPP,当然,还有伊朗核协议。他取得了这些成就，尽管他越来越感觉到强大的力量——以部落化的洪流为表现的在这个世界上应该已经摆脱的返祖现象，以违反他们的最佳利益统治着大国的小人的韧性，主导性的普遍的反美情绪带来的持久性的恐惧。他告诉我,他也意识到几乎没有国际事务可以不依靠美国的领导作用解决。
Obama talked me through this apparent contradiction. “I wanta president who has the sense that you can’t fix everything,” he said. But onthe other hand, “if we don’t set the agenda, it doesn’t happen.” He explainedwhat he meant. “The fact is, there is not a summit I’ve attended since I’vebeen president where we are not setting the agenda, where we are notresponsible for the key results,” he said. “That’s true whether you’re talkingabout nuclear security, whether you’re talking about saving the world financialsystem, whether you’re talking about climate.”
奥巴马通过这个明显的矛盾向我解释。“我希望总统能意识到他不能解决所有问题,”他说。但另一方面,“如果我们不设置议程,它就不会发生。”他解释说，“事实是，自从我担任总统，没有一个峰会不是由我们来设置议程，没有一次我们对关键的结果不负责任。”“没错，无论是讨论核安全,拯救世界金融体系,还是谈论气候。”
One day, over lunch in the Oval Office dining room, I askedthe president how he thought his foreign policy might be understood byhistorians. He started by describing for me a four-box grid representing themain schools of American foreign-policy thought. One box he calledisolationism, which he dismissed out of hand. “The world is ever-shrinking,” hesaid. “Withdrawal is untenable.” The other boxes he labeled realism, liberalinterventionism, and internationalism. “I suppose you could call me a realistin believing we can’t, at any given moment, relieve all the world’s misery,” hesaid. “We have to choose where we can make a real impact.” He also noted thathe was quite obviously an internationalist, devoted as he is to strengtheningmultilateral organizations and international norms.
一天,在椭圆形办公室餐厅共进午餐时,我问总统他认为他的外交政策可能会如何被历史学家所理解。他开始描述代表着主要美国外交政策的流派的四个象限。一个他称为孤立主义,他对此予以驳斥。“世界一直在不断缩小,”他说。“收缩是不能维持的。”其他几个被贴上自由干涉主义、现实主义和国际主义的标签。“我想你可能会叫我现实主义者，因为我不相信我可以做到在任何特定的时刻，缓解世界上所有的痛苦，”他说。“我们必须选择我们可以产生实际影响的地方。”他还指出,他很明显是一个国际主义者,他致力于加强多边组织,国际准则。
I told him my impression was that the various traumas of thepast seven years have, if anything, intensified his commitment torealist-driven restraint. Had nearly two full terms in the White House soured him oninterventionism?
我告诉他我的印象是,如果说一定有什么东西的话，那可能是过去七年的各种创伤，加剧了他对现实主义作为驱动力的克制。是不是近两届白宫的任期使他对干涉主义深深失望？
“Forall of our warts, the United States has clearly been a force for good in theworld,” he said. “If you compare us to previous superpowers, we act less on thebasis of naked self-interest, and have been interested in establishing normsthat benefit everyone. If it is possible to do good at a bearable cost, to savelives, we will do it.”
“尽管仍存瑕疵，美国显然仍一直是世界上善的力量,”他说。“较曾经的超级大国而言，我们很少出于赤裸的私利而行动，而是旨在建立益于全体的规范。如果能在可承受的成本以内乐善好施，为了拯救生命，我们愿意这样做。
If a crisis, or a humanitarian catastrophe, does not meethis stringent standard for what constitutes a direct national-security threat,Obama said, he doesn’t believe that he should be forced into silence. He is notso much the realist, he suggested, that he won’t pass judgment on otherleaders. Though he has so far ruled out the use of direct American power todepose Assad, he was not wrong, he argued, to call on Assad to go. “Oftentimeswhen you get critics of our Syria policy, one of the things that they’ll pointout is ‘You called for Assad to go, but you didn’t force him to go. You did notinvade.’ And the notion is that if you weren’t going to overthrow the regime,you shouldn’t have said anything. That’s a weird argument to me, the notionthat if we use our moral authority to say ‘This is a brutal regime, and this isnot how a leader should treat his people,’ once you do that, you are obliged toinvade the country and install a government you prefer.”
如果一个危机或人道主义灾难,不符合他关于直接构成国家安全威胁的严格的标准,奥巴马不认为他应该被迫沉默。他表明,他不是完全的现实主义者,他不会对其他领导人的政策进行评价。迄今为止,尽管他排除了使用武力来直接推翻阿萨德,他认为呼吁阿萨德下台没有错,。“通常当你看到的对于我们的叙利亚政策的批判,他们会指出的一件事是你只能呼吁阿萨德下台,但你不能强迫他下台。你没有侵入叙利亚。他们的观念是,如果你不会推翻政权,你什么也不该说。对我来说，这是一个奇怪的观点，这个观念里如果我们用我们的道德权威说‘这是一个残酷的政权,这并不是一个领导者应该对待他的人民的方式’,一旦你这样做,你不得不入侵并扶持一个你喜欢的政府。”
【请看“奥巴马自述：为什么我在叙利亚问题上“㞞”了④”】
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