毛主席告诫我们：不要宋襄公蠢猪式的仁义道德

李克勤济学勤为径济学 2022-11-21

李克勤（jixuie）题记：仁义道德，在中国的含义，真的不能随便解读。因为存在大量伪善的仁义道德，假仁义道德，鲁迅称之为“吃人”。还有一种毛主席在《论持久战》里告诫的，我们不要的宋襄公“蠢猪式的仁义道德”。

周襄王十四年（公元前638年）初冬发生的泓水之战，是宋、楚两国为争夺中原霸权而进行的一次作战，战斗以宋国失败告终。也是中国古代战争史上因思想保守、墨守成规而导致失败的典型战例之一。

泓水之战标志着商周以来以"成列而鼓"为主要特色的"礼义之兵"行将寿终正寝，新型的以"诡诈奇谋"为主导的作战方式正在崛起。所谓的"礼义之兵"，就是作战方式上"重偏战而贱诈战"，"结日定地，各居一面，鸣鼓而战，不相诈"。它是陈旧的密集大方阵作战的必然要求，但是在这时，由于武器装备的日趋精良，车阵战法的不断发展，它已开始不适应战争实践的需要，逐渐走向没落。

宋襄公无视这一情况的变化，拘泥于"不鼓不成列""不以阻隘"等旧兵法教条，遭致悲惨的失败，实在是不可避免的。

这正如《淮南子》所说的那样:

【古之伐国，不杀黄口，不获二毛，于古为义，于今为笑，古之所以为荣者，今之所以为辱也。】

来看看毛主席在《论持久战》里的原话：

【（八三）错觉和不意，可以丧失优势和主动。因而有计划地造成敌人的错觉，给以不意的攻击，是造成优势和夺取主动的方法，而且是重要的方法。错觉是什么呢？“八公山上，草木皆兵”(34)，是错觉之一例。“声东击西”，是造成敌人错觉之一法。在优越的民众条件具备，足以封锁消息时，采用各种欺骗敌人的方法，常能有效地陷敌于判断错误和行动错误的苦境，因而丧失其优势和主动。“兵不厌诈”，就是指的这件事情。

什么是不意？就是无准备。优势而无准备，不是真正的优势，也没有主动。懂得这一点，劣势而有准备之军，常可对敌举行不意的攻势，把优势者打败。我们说运动之敌好打，就是因为敌在不意即无准备中。这两件事——造成敌人的错觉和出以不意的攻击，即是以战争的不确实性给予敌人，而给自己以尽可能大的确实性，用以争取我之优势和主动，争取我之胜利。要做到这些，先决条件是优越的民众组织。因此，发动所有一切反对敌人的老百姓，一律武装起来，对敌进行广泛的袭击，同时即用以封锁消息，掩护我军，使敌无从知道我军将在什么地方什么时候去攻击他，造成他的错觉和不意的客观基础，是非常之重要的。过去土地革命战争时代的中国红军，以弱小的军力而常打胜仗，得力于组织起来和武装起来了的民众是非常之大的。民族战争照规矩应比土地革命战争更能获得广大民众的援助；可是因为历史的错误(35)，民众是散的，不但仓卒难为我用，且时为敌人所利用。只有坚决地广泛地发动全体的民众，方能在战争的一切需要上给以无穷无尽的供给。在这个给敌以错觉和给敌以不意以便战而胜之的战争方法上，也就一定能起大的作用。

我们不是宋襄公，不要那种蠢猪式的仁义道德(36)。

我们要把敌人的眼睛和耳朵尽可能地封住，使他们变成瞎子和聋子，要把他们的指挥员的心尽可能地弄得混乱些，使他们变成疯子，用以争取自己的胜利。所有这些，也都是主动或被动和主观指导之间的相互关系。战胜日本是少不了这种主观指导的。】

注释：

〔34〕公元三八三年，秦王苻坚出兵攻晋。他依仗优势兵力，非常轻视晋军。晋军打败了秦军的前锋，从水陆两路继续前进，隔淝水同秦军对峙。苻坚登寿阳城（今安徽省寿县）瞭望，见晋兵布阵严整，又望见八公山上的草木，以为都是晋兵，觉得是遇到了劲敌，开始有惧色。随后在淝水决战中，强大的秦军终于被晋军打败。

　　〔35〕蒋介石、汪精卫等在一九二七年背叛革命以后，进行十年的反人民战争，同时又在国民党统治区实行法西斯统治。这就使得中国人民没有可能广泛地组织起来。这个历史错误是应该由蒋介石为首的国民党反动派负责的。

　　〔36〕宋襄公是公元前七世纪春秋时代宋国的国君。公元前六三八年宋国与强大的楚国作战，宋兵已经排列成阵，楚兵正在渡河。宋国有一个官员认为楚兵多宋兵少，主张利用楚兵渡河未毕的时机出击。但宋襄公说：不可，因为君子不乘别人困难的时候去攻打人家。楚兵渡河以后，还未排列成阵，宋国官员又请求出击。宋襄公又说：不可，因为君子不攻击不成阵势的队伍。一直等到楚兵准备好了以后，宋襄公才下令出击。结果宋国大败，宋襄公自己也受了伤。

【 83. To have misconceptions and to be caught unawares may mean to lose superiority and initiative. Hence, deliberately creating misconceptions for the enemy and then springing surprise attacks upon him are two ways--indeed two important means--of achieving superiority and seizing the initiative. What are misconceptions? "To see every bush and tree on Mount Pakung as an enemy soldier" [29] is an example of misconception. And "making a feint to the east but attacking in the west" is a way of creating misconceptions among the enemy. When the mass support is sufficiently good to block the leakage of news, it is often possible by various ruses to succeed in leading the enemy into a morass of wrong judgements and actions so that he loses his superiority and the initiative. The saying, "There can never be too much deception in war", means precisely this. What does "being caught unawares" mean? It means being unprepared. Without preparedness superiority is not real superiority and there can be no initiative either. Having grasped this point, a force which is inferior but prepared can often defeat a superior enemy by surprise attack. We say an enemy on the move is easy to attack precisely because he is then off guard, that is, unprepared. These two points--creating misconceptions among the enemy and springing surprise attacks on him-- mean transferring the uncertainties of war to the enemy while securing the greatest possible certainty for ourselves and thereby gaining superiority, the initiative and victory. Excellent organization of the masses is the prerequisite for attaining all this. Therefore it is extremely important to arouse all the people who are opposed to the enemy, to arm themselves to the last man, make widespread raids on the enemy and also prevent the leakage of news and provide a screen for our own forces; in this way the enemy will be kept in the dark about where and when our forces will attack, and an objective basis will be created for misconceptions and unpreparedness on his part. It was largely owing to the organized, armed masses of the people that the weak and small force of the Chinese Red Army was able to win many battles in the period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War. Logically, a national war should win broader mass support than an agrarian revolutionary war; however, as a result of past mistakes [30] the people are in an unorganized state, cannot be promptly drawn in to serve the cause and are sometimes even made use of by the enemy. The resolute rallying of the people on a broad scale is the only way to secure inexhaustible resources to meet all the requirements of the war. Moreover, it will definitely play a big part in carrying out our tactics of defeating the enemy by misleading him and catching him unawares.

We are not Duke Hsiang of Sung and have no use for his asinine ethics.[31]

In order to achieve victory we must as far as possible make the enemy blind and deaf by sealing his eyes and ears and drive his commanders to distraction by creating confusion in their minds. The above concerns the way in which the initiative or passivity is related to the subjective direction of the war. Such subjective direction is indispensable for defeating Japan.】

NOTRS：

29. In A.D. 383, Fu Chien, the ruler of the state of Chin, belittled the forces of Tsin and attacked them. The Tsin troops defeated the enemy's advance units at Lochien, Shouyang County, Anhwei Province, and pushed forward by land and water. Ascending the city wall of Shonyang, Fu Chien observed the excellent alignment of the Tsin troops and, mistaking the woods and bushes on Mount Pakung for enemy soldiers, was frightened by the enemy's apparent strength.

30. Comrade Mao Tse-tung is here referring to the fact that Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei, having betrayed the first national democratic united front of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in 1927, launched a ten-year war against the people, and thus made it impossible for the Chinese people to be organized on a large scale. For this the Kuomintang reactionaries headed by Chiang Kai-shek must be held responsible.

31. Duke Hsiang of Sung ruled in the Spring and Autumn Era. In 638 BC, the state of Sung fought with the powerful state of Chu. The Sung forces were already deployed in battle positions when the Chu troops were crossing the river. One of the Sung officers suggested that, as the Chu troops were numerically stronger, this was the moment for attack. But the Duke said, "No, a gentleman should never attack one who is unprepared." When the Chu troops had crossed the river but had not yet completed their battle alignment, the officer again proposed an immediate aback, and once again the Duke said, "No, a gentleman should never attack an army which has not yet completed its battle alignment." The Duke gave the order for attack on after the Chu troops were fully prepared. As a result, the Sung troops met with disastrous defeat and the Duke himself was wounded.

从现实出发，我理解毛主席这段话的内在含义，还是要分清敌友，如果把敌人当做朋友，哪怕是一点点，哪怕是一瞬间，都是对我们以及对我们的朋友的犯罪，这种“蠢猪式的仁义道德”是要不得的。

参考：

毛泽东提出的真问题：谁是我们的敌人？谁是我们的朋友？

春秋时期的那个宋襄公，之所以有如此愚蠢的行为，是他机械地教条式的按照所谓的兵法来作战。

宋襄公恪守的是当时盛行《司马法》。这部中国兵法的经典著作在当时影响很大。

司马迁的《史记·太史公自序》记载:

【《司马法》所从来尚矣，太公、孙、吴、王子(成父)能绍而明之。】

由此可见，《司马法》并非一人所撰，周朝开国之初的《司马法》是由姜太公所撰，姜太公死后，又有数人重新编撰，成为今天人们所熟知的《司马法》。

宋襄公背得很熟这一段：

【古者逐奔不过百步，纵绥不过三舍，是以明其礼也；不穷不能而哀怜伤病，是以明其仁也；成列而鼓，是以明其信也；争义不争利，是以明其义也；又能舍服，是以明其勇也；知终知始，是以明其智也。六德以时合教，以为民纪之道也，自古之政也。】

这是说，追击逃散的敌人不能超过一百步，追寻主动退却的敌人不能超过45公里，这是礼；不逼迫丧失作战能力的敌人并哀怜伤病人员，这是仁；等待敌人摆好作战阵势再发起进攻，这是信；争天下大义而不争一己小利，这是义；能够赦免降服的敌人，这是勇；能够预见战争胜负，这是智。

宋襄公所说的“不重伤，不禽二毛”、“不鼓不成列”正是《司马法》中“仁”、“信”的内容。