再读毛主席在七届二中全会上的报告（全文）

李克勤（jixuie）题记：说起七届二中全会，我们马上联想起“两个务必”，这是毛主席对当时的形势作了全面深入分析之后说的。毛主席的在这些分析中，有立场，有观点，也有方法。这在今天，似乎特别需要我们认真感悟其道。

首先，必须要认真读原著，如果连原著都不读，或者不能通读，那悟道恐怕是达不到应有效果的。

其次，毛主席的这个报告，立场坚定。

【在城市斗争中，我们依靠谁呢？有些糊涂的同志认为不是依靠工人阶级，而是依靠贫民群众。有些更糊涂的同志认为是依靠资产阶级。】

再次，毛主席提出了一系列观点，这些观点具有指导性。

至少有五点值得品味。

【（1）党的工作重心由乡村转移到城市。

（2）新民主主义革命胜利后,党的总任务是迅速恢复和发展生产,使中国稳步地由农业国变为工业国,把中国建设成为一个伟大的社会主义国家。

（3）建设新中国的一系列经济观点。中国现代工业最大的和最主要的部分集中在中国官僚资产阶级手里，没收这些资本归人民共和国所有，就可使社会主义性质的国营经济成为整个国民经济的领导成份。对于分散的个体的农业和手工业，必须谨慎地、逐步地而又积极地引导它们向着现代化和集体化的方向发展的。在革命胜利以后一个相当长的时期内，还需要尽可能地利用城乡私人资本主义的积极性，以利于国民经济的发展。同时要对它不利于国计民生的消极作用进行限制。

（4）革命在全国胜利并解决了土地问题以后，中国还存在着两种基本的矛盾：国内是工人阶级和资产阶级的矛盾，国外是中国和帝国主义国家的矛盾。因此，工人阶级领导的国家政权不是可以削弱，而是必须强化。

（5）提醒全党要警惕骄傲自满、以功臣自居的情绪的滋长，警惕资产阶级用糖衣裹着的炮弹的攻击，全党同志务必继续地保持谦虚、谨慎、不骄、不躁的作风，务必继续地保持艰苦奋斗的作风。】

最后，毛主席因为立场坚定，观点鲜明，所以，在道器变通之变上，主席的系统思考，他用通俗的语言，鲜明地表达出来，正所谓易则易知，简则易从。这就直接转化为方法。

用此方法，完全可以想得通，说得通，行得通，一气呵成，道器变通。

在中国共产党第七届中央委员会

第二次全体会议上的报告

（一九四九年三月五日）

　　（中国共产党第七届中央委员会第二次全体会议，一九四九年三月五日至十三日举行于河北省平山县西柏坡村。出席的有中央委员三十四人，候补中央委员十九人。这次会议是在中国人民革命全国胜利的前夜召开的，是一次极其重要的会议。毛泽东在这次会议上所作的报告，提出了促进革命迅速取得全国胜利和组织这个胜利的各项方针；说明了在全国胜利的局面下，党的工作重心必须由乡村移到城市，城市工作必须以生产建设为中心；规定了党在全国胜利以后，在政治、经济、外交方面应当采取的基本政策，特别着重地分析了当时中国经济各种成分的状况和党所必须采取的正确政策，指出了中国由农业国转变为工业国、由新民主主义社会转变为社会主义社会的发展方向。毛泽东估计了中国人民民主革命胜利以后的国内外阶级斗争的新形势，及时地警告资产阶级的“糖衣炮弹”将成为对于无产阶级的主要危险。毛泽东的这个报告，和他在同年六月所写的《论人民民主专政》一文，构成了为中国人民政治协商会议第一届全体会议所通过的、在新中国成立初期曾经起了临时宪法作用的《共同纲领》的政策基础。党的第七届中央委员会第二次全体会议，根据毛泽东的报告，通过了相应的决议。在这次会议以后，中共中央就由河北省平山县西柏坡村迁往北平。 ）

一

　　辽沈、淮海、平津三战役⑴以后，国民党军队的主力已被消灭。国民党的作战部队仅仅剩下一百多万人，分布在新疆到台湾的广大的地区内和漫长的战线上。今后解决这一百多万国民党军队的方式，不外天津、北平、绥远三种。用战斗去解决敌人，例如解决天津的敌人那样，仍然是我们首先必须注意和必须准备的。人民解放军的全体指挥员、战斗员，绝对不可以稍微松懈自己的战斗意志，任何松懈战斗意志的思想和轻敌的思想，都是错误的。按照北平方式解决问题的可能性是增加了，这就是迫使敌军用和平方法，迅速地彻底地按照人民解放军的制度改编为人民解放军。用这种方法解决问题，对于反革命遗迹的迅速扫除和反革命政治影响的迅速肃清，比较用战争方法解决问题是要差一些的。但是，这种方法是在敌军主力被消灭以后必然地要出现的，是不可避免的；同时也是于我军于人民有利的，即是可以避免伤亡和破坏。因此，各野战军领导同志都应注意和学会这样一种斗争方式。这是一种斗争方式，是一种不流血的斗争方式，并不是不用斗争可以解决问题的。绥远方式，是有意地保存一部分国民党军队，让它原封不动，或者大体上不动，就是说向这一部分军队作暂时的让步，以利于争取这部分军队在政治上站在我们方面，或者保持中立，以便我们集中力量首先解决国民党残余力量中的主要部分，在一个相当的时间之后（例如在几个月，半年，或者一年之后），再去按照人民解放军制度将这部分军队改编为人民解放军⑵。这是又一种斗争方式。这种斗争方式对于反革命遗迹和反革命的政治影响，较之北平方式将要保留得较多些，保留的时间也将较长些。但是这种反革命遗迹和反革命政治影响，归根到底要被肃清，这是毫无疑问的。决不可以认为反革命力量顺从我们了，他们就成了革命党了，他们的反革命思想和反革命企图就不存在了。决不是这样。他们中的许多人将被改造，他们中的一部分人将被淘汰，某些坚决反革命分子将受到镇压。 

二

三

　　从一九二七年到现在，我们的工作重点是在乡村，在乡村聚集力量，用乡村包围城市，然后取得城市。采取这样一种工作方式的时期现在已经完结。从现在起，开始了由城市到乡村并由城市领导乡村的时期。党的工作重心由乡村移到了城市。在南方各地，人民解放军将是先占城市，后占乡村。城乡必须兼顾，必须使城市工作和乡村工作，使工人和农民，使工业和农业，紧密地联系起来。决不可以丢掉乡村，仅顾城市，如果这样想，那是完全错误的。但是党和军队的工作重心必须放在城市，必须用极大的努力去学会管理城市和建设城市。必须学会在城市中向帝国主义者、国民党、资产阶级作政治斗争、经济斗争和文化斗争，并向帝国主义者作外交斗争。既要学会同他们作公开的斗争，又要学会同他们作荫蔽的斗争。如果我们不去注意这些问题，不去学会同这些人作这些斗争，并在斗争中取得胜利，我们就不能维持政权，我们就会站不住脚，我们就会失败。在拿枪的敌人被消灭以后，不拿枪的敌人依然存在，他们必然地要和我们作拚死的斗争，我们决不可以轻视这些敌人。如果我们现在不是这样地提出问题和认识问题，我们就要犯极大的错误。 

四

　　在城市斗争中，我们依靠谁呢？有些糊涂的同志认为不是依靠工人阶级，而是依靠贫民群众。有些更糊涂的同志认为是依靠资产阶级。在发展工业的方向上，有些糊涂的同志认为主要地不是帮助国营企业的发展，而是帮助私营企业的发展；或者反过来，认为只要注意国营企业就够了，私营企业是无足轻重的了。我们必须批判这些糊涂思想。我们必须全心全意地依靠工人阶级，团结其他劳动群众，争取知识分子，争取尽可能多的能够同我们合作的民族资产阶级分子及其代表人物站在我们方面，或者使他们保持中立，以便向帝国主义者、国民党、官僚资产阶级作坚决的斗争，一步一步地去战胜这些敌人。同时即开始着手我们的建设事业，一步一步地学会管理城市，恢复和发展城市中的生产事业。关于恢复和发展生产的问题，必须确定：第一是国营工业的生产，第二是私营工业的生产，第三是手工业生产。从我们接管城市的第一天起，我们的眼睛就要向着这个城市的生产事业的恢复和发展。务须避免盲目地乱抓乱碰，把中心任务忘记了，以至于占领一个城市好几个月，生产建设的工作还没有上轨道，甚至许多工业陷于停顿状态，引起工人失业，工人生活降低，不满意共产党。这种状态是完全不能容许的。为了这一点，我们的同志必须用极大的努力去学习生产的技术和管理生产的方法，必须去学习同生产有密切联系的商业工作、银行工作和其他工作。只有将城市的生产恢复起来和发展起来了，将消费的城市变成生产的城市了，人民政权才能巩固起来。城市中其他的工作，例如党的组织工作，政权机关的工作，工会的工作，其他各种民众团体的工作，文化教育方面的工作，肃反工作，通讯社报纸广播电台的工作，都是围绕着生产建设这一个中心工作并为这个中心工作服务的。如果我们在生产工作上无知，不能很快地学会生产工作，不能使生产事业尽可能迅速地恢复和发展，获得确实的成绩，首先使工人生活有所改善，并使一般人民的生活有所改善，那我们就不能维持政权，我们就会站不住脚，我们就会要失败。 

五

　　南方和北方的情况是不同的，党的工作任务也就必须有所区别。南方现时还是被国民党统治的区域。在这里，党和人民解放军的任务是在城市和乡村中消灭国民党的反动武装力量，建立党的组织，建立政权，发动民众，建立工会、农会和其他民众团体，建立人民武装力量，肃清国民党残余势力，恢复和发展生产事业。在乡村中，则是首先有步骤地展开清剿土匪和反对恶霸即地主阶级当权派的斗争，完成减租减息的准备工作，以便在人民解放军到达那个地区大约一年或者两年以后，就能实现减租减息的任务，造成分配土地的先决条件；同时必须注意尽可能地维持农业生产的现有水平不使降低。北方则除少数新解放区以外，是完全另外一种情况。在这里，已经推翻了国民党的统治，建立了人民的统治，并且根本上解决了土地问题。党在这里的中心任务，是动员一切力量恢复和发展生产事业，这是一切工作的重点所在。同时必须恢复和发展文化教育事业，肃清残余的反动力量，巩固整个北方，支援人民解放军。 

六

　　我们已经进行了广泛的经济建设工作，党的经济政策已经在实际工作中实施，并且收到了显著的成效。但是，在为什么应当采取这样的经济政策而不应当采取别样的经济政策这个问题上，在理论和原则性的问题上，党内是存在着许多糊涂思想的。这个问题应当怎样来回答呢？我们认为应当这样地来回答。中国的工业和农业在国民经济中的比重，就全国范围来说，在抗日战争以前，大约是现代性的工业占百分之十左右，农业和手工业占百分之九十左右。这是帝国主义制度和封建制度压迫中国的结果，这是旧中国半殖民地和半封建社会性质在经济上的表现，这也是在中国革命的时期内和在革命胜利以后一个相当长的时期内一切问题的基本出发点。从这一点出发，产生了我党一系列的战略上、策略上和政策上的问题。对于这些问题的进一步的明确的认识和解决，是我党当前的重要任务。这就是说： 

　　第一，中国已经有大约百分之十左右的现代性的工业经济，这是进步的，这是和古代不同的。由于这一点，中国已经有了新的阶级和新的政党——无产阶级和资产阶级，无产阶级政党和资产阶级政党。无产阶级及其政党，由于受到几重敌人的压迫，得到了锻炼，具有了领导中国人民革命的资格。谁要是忽视或轻视了这一点，谁就要犯右倾机会主义的错误。 

　　第二，中国还有大约百分之九十左右的分散的个体的农业经济和手工业经济，这是落后的，这是和古代没有多大区别的，我们还有百分之九十左右的经济生活停留在古代。古代有封建的土地所有制，现在被我们废除了，或者即将被废除，在这点上，我们已经或者即将区别于古代，取得了或者即将取得使我们的农业和手工业逐步地向着现代化发展的可能性。但是，在今天，在今后一个相当长的时期内，我们的农业和手工业，就其基本形态说来，还是和还将是分散的和个体的，即是说，同古代近似的。谁要是忽视或轻视了这一点，谁就要犯“左”倾机会主义的错误。 

　　第三，中国的现代性工业的产值虽然还只占国民经济总产值的百分之十左右，但是它却极为集中，最大的和最主要的资本是集中在帝国主义者及其走狗中国官僚资产阶级的手里。没收这些资本归无产阶级领导的人民共和国所有，就使人民共和国掌握了国家的经济命脉，使国营经济成为整个国民经济的领导成分。这一部分经济，是社会主义性质的经济，不是资本主义性质的经济。谁要是忽视或轻视了这一点，谁就要犯右倾机会主义的错误。 

　　第四，中国的私人资本主义工业，占了现代性工业中的第二位，它是一个不可忽视的力量。中国的民族资产阶级及其代表人物，由于受了帝国主义、封建主义和官僚资本主义的压迫或限制，在人民民主革命斗争中常常采取参加或者保持中立的立场。由于这些，并由于中国经济现在还处在落后状态，在革命胜利以后一个相当长的时期内，还需要尽可能地利用城乡私人资本主义的积极性，以利于国民经济的向前发展。在这个时期内，一切不是于国民经济有害而是于国民经济有利的城乡资本主义成分，都应当容许其存在和发展。这不但是不可避免的，而且是经济上必要的。但是中国资本主义的存在和发展，不是如同资本主义国家那样不受限制任其泛滥的。它将从几个方面被限制——在活动范围方面，在税收政策方面，在市场价格方面，在劳动条件方面。我们要从各方面，按照各地、各业和各个时期的具体情况，对于资本主义采取恰如其分的有伸缩性的限制政策。孙中山的节制资本的口号，我们依然必须用和用得着。但是为了整个国民经济的利益，为了工人阶级和劳动人民现在和将来的利益，决不可以对私人资本主义经济限制得太大太死，必须容许它们在人民共和国的经济政策和经济计划的轨道内有存在和发展的余地。对于私人资本主义采取限制政策，是必然要受到资产阶级在各种程度和各种方式上的反抗的，特别是私人企业中的大企业主，即大资本家。限制和反限制，将是新民主主义国家内部阶级斗争的主要形式。如果认为我们现在不要限制资本主义，认为可以抛弃“节制资本”的口号，这是完全错误的，这就是右倾机会主义的观点。但是反过来，如果认为应当对私人资本限制得太大太死，或者认为简直可以很快地消灭私人资本，这也是完全错误的，这就是“左”倾机会主义或冒险主义的观点。 

　　第五，占国民经济总产值百分之九十的分散的个体的农业经济和手工业经济，是可能和必须谨慎地、逐步地而又积极地引导它们向着现代化和集体化的方向发展的，任其自流的观点是错误的。必须组织生产的、消费的和信用的合作社，和中央、省、市、县、区的合作社的领导机关。这种合作社是以私有制为基础的在无产阶级领导的国家政权管理之下的劳动人民群众的集体经济组织。中国人民的文化落后和没有合作社传统，可能使得我们遇到困难；但是可以组织，必须组织，必须推广和发展。单有国营经济而没有合作社经济，我们就不可能领导劳动人民的个体经济逐步地走向集体化，就不可能由新民主主义社会发展到将来的社会主义社会，就不可能巩固无产阶级在国家政权中的领导权。谁要是忽视或轻视了这一点，谁也就要犯绝大的错误。国营经济是社会主义性质的，合作社经济是半社会主义性质的，加上私人资本主义，加上个体经济，加上国家和私人合作的国家资本主义经济，这些就是人民共和国的几种主要的经济成分，这些就构成新民主主义的经济形态。 

　　第六，人民共和国的国民经济的恢复和发展，没有对外贸易的统制政策是不可能的。从中国境内肃清了帝国主义、封建主义、官僚资本主义和国民党的统治（这是帝国主义、封建主义和官僚资本主义三者的集中表现），还没有解决建立独立的完整的工业体系问题，只有待经济上获得了广大的发展，由落后的农业国变成了先进的工业国，才算最后地解决了这个问题。而欲达此目的，没有对外贸易的统制是不可能的。中国革命在全国胜利，并且解决了土地问题以后，中国还存在着两种基本的矛盾。第一种是国内的，即工人阶级和资产阶级的矛盾。第二种是国外的，即中国和帝国主义国家的矛盾。因为这样，工人阶级领导的人民共和国的国家政权，在人民民主革命胜利以后，不是可以削弱，而是必须强化。对内的节制资本和对外的统制贸易，是这个国家在经济斗争中的两个基本政策。谁要是忽视或轻视了这一点，谁就将要犯绝大的错误。 

　　第七，中国的经济遗产是落后的，但是中国人民是勇敢而勤劳的，中国人民革命的胜利和人民共和国的建立，中国共产党的领导，加上世界各国工人阶级的援助，其中主要地是苏联的援助，中国经济建设的速度将不是很慢而可能是相当地快的，中国的兴盛是可以计日程功的。对于中国经济复兴的悲观论点，没有任何的根据。 

七

　　旧中国是一个被帝国主义所控制的半殖民地国家。中国人民民主革命的彻底的反帝国主义的性质，使得帝国主义者极为仇视这个革命，竭尽全力地帮助国民党。这就更加激起了中国人民对于帝国主义者的深刻的愤怒，并使帝国主义者丧失了自己在中国人民中的最后一点威信。同时，整个帝国主义制度在第二次世界大战以后是大大地削弱了，以苏联为首的世界反帝国主义阵线的力量是空前地增长了。所有这些情形，使得我们可以采取和应当采取有步骤地彻底地摧毁帝国主义在中国的控制权的方针。帝国主义者的这种控制权，表现在政治、经济和文化等方面。在国民党军队被消灭、国民党政府被打倒的每一个城市和每一个地方，帝国主义者在政治上的控制权即随之被打倒，他们在经济上和文化上的控制权也被打倒。但帝国主义者直接经营的经济事业和文化事业依然存在，被国民党承认的外交人员和新闻记者依然存在。对于这些，我们必须分别先后缓急，给以正当的解决。不承认国民党时代的任何外国外交机关和外交人员的合法地位，不承认国民党时代的一切卖国条约的继续存在，取消一切帝国主义在中国开办的宣传机关，立即统制对外贸易，改革海关制度，这些都是我们进入大城市的时候所必须首先采取的步骤。在做了这些以后，中国人民就在帝国主义面前站立起来了。剩下的帝国主义的经济事业和文化事业，可以让它们暂时存在，由我们加以监督和管制，以待我们在全国胜利以后再去解决。对于普通外侨，则保护其合法的利益，不加侵犯。关于帝国主义对我国的承认问题，不但现在不应急于去解决，而且就是在全国胜利以后的一个相当时期内也不必急于去解决。我们是愿意按照平等原则同一切国家建立外交关系的，但是从来敌视中国人民的帝国主义，决不能很快地就以平等的态度对待我们，只要一天它们不改变敌视的态度，我们就一天不给帝国主义国家在中国以合法的地位。关于同外国人做生意，那是没有问题的，有生意就得做，并且现在已经开始做，几个资本主义国家的商人正在互相竞争。我们必须尽可能地首先同社会主义国家和人民民主国家做生意，同时也要同资本主义国家做生意。 

八

　　召集政治协商会议和成立民主联合政府的一切条件，均已成熟。一切民主党派、人民团体和无党派民主人士都站在我们方面。上海和长江流域的资产阶级，正在同我们拉关系。南北通航通邮业已开始。陷于四分五裂的国民党，已经脱离了一切群众。我们正在准备和南京反动政府进行谈判⑶。南京反动政府方面在这个谈判中的推动力量是桂系军阀，国民党主和派和上海资产阶级。他们的目的是使联合政府中有他们一份，尽可能地保存较多的军队，保存上海和南方资产阶级的利益，力求使革命带上温和的色彩。这一派人承认以我们的八条⑷为谈判基础，但是希望讨价还价，使他们的损失不要太大。企图破坏这一谈判的是蒋介石及其死党。蒋介石还有六十个师位于江南一带，他们仍在准备作战。我们的方针是不拒绝谈判，要求对方完全承认八条，不许讨价还价。其交换条件是不打桂系和其他国民党主和派；一年左右也不去改编他们的军队；南京政府中的一部分人员允许其加入政治协商会议和联合政府；对上海和南方资产阶级的某些利益允许给以保护。这个谈判是全面性的，如能成功，对于我们向南方进军和占领南方各大城市将要减少许多阻碍，是有很大利益的。不能成功，则待进军以后各个地进行地方性的谈判。谈判的时间拟在三月下旬。我们希望四月或五月占领南京，然后在北平召集政治协商会议，成立联合政府，并定都北平。我们既然允许谈判，就要准备在谈判成功以后许多麻烦事情的到来，就要准备一副清醒的头脑去对付对方采用孙行者钻进铁扇公主肚子里兴妖作怪⑸的政策。只要我们精神上有了充分的准备，我们就可以战胜任何兴妖作怪的孙行者。不论是全面的和平谈判，或者局部的和平谈判，我们都应当这样去准备。我们不应当怕麻烦、图清静而不去接受这些谈判，我们也不应当糊里糊涂地去接受这些谈判。我们的原则性必须是坚定的，我们也要有为了实现原则性的一切许可的和必需的灵活性。 

九

　　无产阶级领导的以工农联盟为基础的人民民主专政，要求我们党去认真地团结全体工人阶级、全体农民阶级和广大的革命知识分子，这些是这个专政的领导力量和基础力量。没有这种团结，这个专政就不能巩固。同时也要求我们党去团结尽可能多的能够同我们合作的城市小资产阶级和民族资产阶级的代表人物，它们的知识分子和政治派别，以便在革命时期使反革命势力陷于孤立，彻底地打倒国内的反革命势力和帝国主义势力；在革命胜利以后，迅速地恢复和发展生产，对付国外的帝国主义，使中国稳步地由农业国转变为工业国，把中国建设成一个伟大的社会主义国家。因为这样，我党同党外民主人士长期合作的政策，必须在全党思想上和工作上确定下来。我们必须把党外大多数民主人士看成和自己的干部一样，同他们诚恳地坦白地商量和解决那些必须商量和解决的问题，给他们工作做，使他们在工作岗位上有职有权，使他们在工作上做出成绩来。从团结他们出发，对他们的错误和缺点进行认真的和适当的批评或斗争，达到团结他们的目的。对他们的错误或缺点采取迁就态度，是不对的。对他们采取关门态度或敷衍态度，也是不对的。每一个大城市和每一个中等城市，每一个战略性区域和每一个省，都应当培养一批能够同我们合作的有威信的党外民主人士。我们党内由土地革命战争时期的关门主义作风所养成的对待党外民主人士的不正确态度，在抗日时期并没有完全克服，在一九四七年各根据地土地改革高潮时期又曾出现过。这种态度只会使我党陷于孤立，使人民民主专政不能巩固，使敌人获得同盟者。现在中国第一次在我党领导之下的政治协商会议即将召开，民主联合政府即将成立，革命即将在全国胜利，全党对于这个问题必须有认真的检讨和正确的认识，必须反对右的迁就主义和“左”的关门主义或敷衍主义两种倾向，而采取完全正确的态度。 

十

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　　 注　　释 

　 　〔1〕见本卷《关于辽沈战役的作战方针》注〔1〕、《关于淮海战役的作战方针》注〔1〕、《关于平津战役的作战方针》注〔1〕。 

　　〔2〕一九四九年九月十九日，国民党绥远省政府主席董其武、兵团司令官孙兰峰等率部四万余人起义。起义部队自一九五○年二月二十一日起，在人民解放军绥远军区领导之下进行整编，至四月十日改编成为人民解放军。 

　　〔3〕关于和南京国民党反动政府举行和平谈判事宜，中共中央于一九四九年三月二十六日决定：“（一）谈判开始时间：四月一日。（二）谈判地点：北平。（三）派周恩来、林伯渠、林彪、叶剑英、李维汉为代表（四月一日中共中央决定加派聂荣臻为代表），周恩来为首席代表，与南京方面的代表团举行谈判，按照一月十四日毛泽东主席对时局的声明及其所提八项条件以为双方谈判的基础。（四）将上列各项经广播电台即日通知南京国民党反动政府，按照上述时间地点，派遣其代表团，携带为八项条件所需的必要材料，以利举行谈判。” 

　　〔4〕 见本卷《中共中央毛泽东主席关于时局的声明》。 

　　〔5〕孙行者钻进铁扇公主的肚子里从而战败铁扇公主的故事，见明朝吴承恩著的神话小说《西游记》第五十九回。 

REPORT TO THE SECOND PLENARY SESSION OF THE SEVENTH CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

March 5, 1949

[The Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held its Second Plenary Session in Hsipaipo Village, Pingshan County, Hopei Province, from March 5 to 13, 1949. Thirty-four members and nineteen alternate members of the Central Committee were present. This session, which was convened on the eve of the country-wide victory of the Chinese people's revolution, was extremely important. In his report at the session, Comrade Mao Tse-tung set forth policies to promote the speedy achievement of the country-wide victory of the revolution and to organize this victory. He explained that with this victory the centre of gravity of the Party's work should be shifted from the village to the city, defined the basic political, economic and foreign policies the Party should adopt after victory and set the general tasks and main course for transforming China from an agricultural into an industrial country, from a new-democratic into a socialist society. In particular, he analysed the current conditions in the different sectors of China's economy and the correct policies the Party had to adopt, pointed out the necessary ways to realize the socialist transformation in China, criticized various "Left" and Right deviations on this question and expressed the firm conviction that China's economy would develop at a comparatively high speed. Comrade Mao Tse-tung appraised the new situation in the class struggle both at home and abroad following the victory of the Chinese people's democratic revolution and gave timely warning that the "sugar-coated bullets" of the bourgeoisie would become the main danger to the proletariat. All this gives the document great significance for a long historical period. This report and his article On the People's Democratic Dictatorship, written in June of the same year, formed the basis for the policies embodied in the Common Programme adopted by the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, which served as a provisional constitution after the founding of New China. The Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Party adopted a resolution based on Comrade Mao Tse-tung's report. After the session, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China moved from Hsipaipo, Pingshan County, Hopei Province to Peiping.]

---

I

With the conclusion of the Liaohsi-Shenyang, Huai-Hai and Peiping-Tientsin campaigns, the main force of the Kuomintang army has been destroyed. Only a million odd of its combat troops are left, dispersed over vast areas from Sinkiang to Taiwan and over extremely long fronts. From now on there can be only three patterns for disposing of these Kuomintang troops -- the Tientsin pattern, the Peiping pattern or the Suiyuan pattern.[1] To dispose of the enemy forces by fighting, as we did in Tientsin, must still be the primary object of our attention and preparations. The commanders and fighters of the entire Chinese People's Liberation Army absolutely must not relax in the least their will to fight; any thinking that relaxes the will to fight and belittles the enemy is wrong. The possibility has increased for solutions on the Peiping pattern, that is, to compel enemy troops to reorganize peacefully, quickly and thoroughly into the People's Liberation Army in conformity with the latter's system. For the purpose of rapidly eliminating the vestiges of counter-revolution and liquidating its political influence, this solution is not quite as effective as the solution by fighting. However, it is bound to occur and is unavoidable after the main force of the enemy has been destroyed; furthermore, it is advantageous to our army and the people because casualties and destruction can be avoided. Therefore, the leading comrades of the various field armies should all pay attention to this form of struggle and learn how to use it. This is one form of struggle, a form of struggle without bloodshed; it does not mean that problems can be solved without struggle. The Suiyuan pattern is deliberately to keep part of the Kuomintang troops wholly or nearly intact, that is, to make temporary concessions to these troops in order to help win them over to our side or neutralize them politically. Thereby, we can concentrate our forces to finish off the main part of the remnant Kuomintang forces first and then, after a certain period (say, a few months, half a year or a year later), proceed to reorganize these troops into the People's Liberation Army in conformity with its system. That is another form of struggle. It will preserve more of the vestiges and political influence of counter-revolution than the Peiping form and for a longer period. But there is not the slightest doubt that they will eventually be eliminated. It must never be assumed that, once they yield to us, the counter-revolutionaries turn into revolutionaries, that their counterrevolutionary ideas and designs cease to exist. Definitely not. Many of the counter-revolutionaries will be remoulded, some will be sifted out, and certain die-hard counter-revolutionaries will be suppressed.

II

The People's Liberation Army is always a fighting force. Even after country-wide victory, our army will remain a fighting force during the historical period in which classes have not been abolished in our country and the imperialist system still exists in the world. On this point there should be no misunderstanding or wavering. The People's Liberation Army is also a working force; this will be the case especially when the Peiping or the Suiyuan pattern of solution is used in the south. With the gradual decrease in hostilities, its function as a working force will increase. There is a possibility that before very long the entire People's Liberation Army will be turned into a working force, and we must take this possibility into account. The 53,000 cadres now ready to leave with the army for the south are very inadequate for the vast new areas we shall soon hold, and we must prepare to turn all the field armies, 2,100,000 strong, into a working force. In that event, there will be enough cadres and the work can develop over large areas. We must look upon the field armies with their 2,100,000 men as a gigantic school for cadres.

III

From 1927 to the present the centre of gravity of our work has been in the villages -- gathering strength in the villages, using the villages in order to surround the cities and then taking the cities. The period for this method of work has now ended. The period of "from the city to the village" and of the city leading the village has now begun. The centre of gravity of the Party's work has shifted from the village to the city. In the south the People's Liberation Army will occupy first the cities and then the villages. Attention must be given to both city and village and it is necessary to link closely urban and rural work, workers and peasants, industry and agriculture. Under no circumstances should the village be ignored and only the city given attention; such thinking is entirely wrong. Nevertheless, the centre of gravity of the work of the Party and the army must be in the cities; we must do our utmost to learn how to administer and build the cities. In the cities we must learn how to wage political, economic and cultural struggles against the imperialists, the Kuomintang and the bourgeoisie and also how to wage diplomatic struggles against the imperialists. We must learn how to carry on overt struggles against them, we must also learn how to carry on covert struggles against them. If we do not pay attention to these problems, if we do not learn how to wage these struggles against them and win victory in the struggles, we shall be unable to maintain our political power, we shall be unable to stand on our feet, we shall fail. After the enemies with guns have been wiped out, there will still be enemies without guns; they are bound to struggle desperately against us; we must never regard these enemies lightly. If we do not now raise and understand the problem in this way, we shall commit very grave mistakes.

IV

On whom shall we rely in our struggles in the cities? Some muddle-headed comrades think we should rely not on the working class but on the masses of the poor. Some comrades who are even more muddle-headed think we should rely on the bourgeoisie. As for the direction of industrial development, some muddle-headed comrades maintain that we should chiefly help the development of private enterprise and not state enterprise, whereas others hold the opposite view that it suffices to pay attention to state enterprise and that private enterprise is of little importance. We must criticize these muddled views. We must whole-heartedly rely on the working class, unite with the rest of the labouring masses, win over the intellectuals and win over to our side as many as possible of the national bourgeois elements and their representatives who can co-operate with us -- or neutralize them -- so that we can wage a determined struggle against the imperialists, the Kuomintang and the bureaucrat-capitalist class and defeat these enemies step by step. Meanwhile we shall set about our task of construction and learn, step by step, how to administer cities and restore and develop their production. Regarding the problem of restoring and developing production we must be clear about the following: first comes the production of state industry, second the production of private industry and third handicraft production. From the very first day we take over a city, we should direct our attention to restoring and developing its production. We must not go about our work blindly and haphazardly and forget our central task, lest several months after taking over a city its production and construction should still not be on the right track and many industries should be at a standstill, with the result that the workers are unemployed, their livelihood deteriorates and they become dissatisfied with the Communist Party. Such a state of affairs is entirely impermissible. Therefore, our comrades must do their utmost to learn the techniques of production and the methods of managing production as well as other closely related work such as commerce and banking. Only when production in the cities is restored and developed, when consumer-cities are transformed into producer-cities, can the people's political power be consolidated. Other work in the cities, for example, in Party organization, in organs of political power, in trade unions and other people's organizations, in culture and education, in the suppression of counter-revolutionaries, in news agencies, newspapers and broadcasting stations -- all this work revolves around and serves the central task, production and construction. If we know nothing about production and do not master it quickly, if we cannot restore and develop production as speedily as possible and achieve solid successes so that the livelihood of the workers, first of all, and that of the people in general is improved, we shall be unable to maintain our political power, we shall be unable to stand on our feet, we shall fail.

V

Conditions in the south are different from those in the north, and the Party's tasks must also be different. The south is still under Kuomintang rule. There, the tasks of the Party and the People's Liberation Army are to wipe out the Kuomintang's reactionary armed forces in city and countryside, set up Party organizations, set up organs of political power, arouse the masses, establish trade unions, peasant associations and other people's organizations, build the people's armed forces, mop up the remnant Kuomintang forces and restore and develop production. In the countryside, our first tasks are to wage struggles step by step, to clean out the bandits and to oppose the local tyrants (the section of the landlord class in power) in order to complete preparations for the reduction of rent and interest; this reduction can then be accomplished within a year or two after the arrival of the People's Liberation Army, and the precondition for the distribution of land will thus be created. At the same time care must be taken to maintain the present level of agricultural production as far as possible and to prevent it from declining. In the north, except for the few new Liberated Areas, conditions are completely different. Here the Kuomintang rule has been overthrown, the people's rule has been established and the land problem has been fundamentally solved. Here the central task of the Party is to mobilize all forces to restore and develop production; this should be the centre of gravity in all work. It is also necessary to restore and develop cultural and educational work, wipe out the remnants of the reactionary forces, consolidate the entire north and support the People's Liberation Army.

VI

We have already carried out extensive economic construction, and the Party's economic policy has been implemented in practice and has achieved marked success. However, there are still many muddled views within the Party on the question of why we should adopt this kind of economic policy and not another, i.e., on a question of theory and principle. How should this question be answered? In our opinion, the answer should be as follows. Before the War of Resistance Against Japan, the proportions of industry and agriculture in the entire national economy of China were, modern industry about 10 per cent, and agriculture and handicrafts about 90 per cent. This was the result of imperialist and feudal oppression; this was the economic expression of the semi-colonial and semi-feudal character of the society of old China; and this is our basic point of departure for all questions during the period of the Chinese revolution and for a fairly long period after victory. This gives rise to a series of problems regarding our Party's strategy, tactics and policy. An important task for our Party at present is to reach a clearer understanding of these problems and their solution. That is to say:

1. China already has a modern industry constituting about 10 per cent of her economy; this is progressive, this is different from ancient times. As a result, China has new classes and new political parties -- the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, proletarian and bourgeois parties. The proletariat and its party, because they have been oppressed by manifold enemies, have become steeled and are qualified to lead the Chinese people's revolution. Whoever overlooks or belittles this point will commit Right opportunist mistakes.

2. China still has scattered and individual agriculture and handicrafts, constituting about 90 per cent of her entire economy; this is backward, this is not very different from ancient times -- about 90 per cent of our economic life remains the same as in ancient times. We have abolished, or will soon abolish, the age-old feudal ownership of land. In this respect, we have become, or will soon become, different from what we were in ancient times, and have or will soon have the possibility of modernizing our agriculture and handicrafts step by step. In their basic form, however, our agriculture and handicrafts today are still scattered and individual, somewhat as they were in ancient times, and they will remain so for a fairly long time to come. Whoever overlooks or belittles this point will commit "Left" opportunist mistakes.

3. China's modern industry, though the value of its output amounts to only about 10 per cent of the total value of output of the national economy, is extremely concentrated; the largest and most important part of the capital is concentrated in the hands of the imperialists and their lackeys, the Chinese bureaucrat-capitalists. The confiscation of this capital and its transfer to the people's republic led by the proletariat will enable the people's republic to control the economic lifelines of the country and will enable the state-owned economy to become the leading sector of the entire national economy. This sector of the economy is socialist, not capitalist, in character. Whoever overlooks or belittles this point will commit Right opportunist mistakes.

4. China's private capitalist industry, which occupies second place in her modern industry, is a force which must not be ignored. Because they have been oppressed or hemmed in by imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism, the national bourgeoisie of China and its representatives have often taken part in the people's democratic revolutionary struggles or maintained a neutral stand. For this reason and because China's economy is still backward, there will be need, for a fairly long period after the victory of the revolution, to make use of the positive qualities of urban and rural private capitalism as far as possible, in the interest of developing the national economy. In this period, all capitalist elements in the cities and countryside which are not harmful but beneficial to the national economy should be allowed to exist and expand. This is not only unavoidable but also economically necessary. But the existence and expansion of capitalism in China will not be unrestricted and uncurbed as in the capitalist countries. It will be restricted from several directions -- in the scope of its operation and by tax policy, market prices and labour conditions. We shall adopt well-measured and flexible policies for restricting capitalism from several directions according to the specific conditions in each place, each industry and each period. It is necessary and useful for us to apply Sun Yat-sen's slogan of "regulation of capital".[2] However, in the interest of the whole national economy and in the present and future interest of the working class and all the labouring people, we must not restrict the private capitalist economy too much or too rigidly, but must leave room for it to exist and develop within the framework of the economic policy and planning of the people's republic. The policy of restricting private capitalism is bound to meet with resistance in varying degrees and forms from the bourgeoisie, especially from the big owners of private enterprises, that is, from the big capitalists. Restriction versus opposition to restriction will be the main form of class struggle in the new-democratic state. It is entirely wrong to think that at present we need not restrict capitalism and can discard the slogan of "regulation of capital"; that is a Right opportunist view. But the opposite view, which advocates too much or too rigid restriction of private capital or holds that we can simply eliminate private capital very quickly, is also entirely wrong; this is a "Left" opportunist or adventurist view.

5. Scattered, individual agriculture and handicrafts, which make up 90 per cent of the total value of output of the national economy, can and must be led prudently, step by step and yet actively to develop towards modernization and collectivization; the view that they may be left to take their own course is wrong. It is necessary to organize producers', consumers' and credit co-operatives and leading organs of the co-operatives at national, provincial, municipal, county and district levels. Such co-operatives are collective economic organizations of the labouring masses, based on private ownership and under the direction of the state power led by the proletariat. The fact that the Chinese people are culturally backward and have no tradition of organizing co-operatives may confront us with difficulties, but cooperatives can and must be organized and must be promoted and developed. If there were only a state-owned economy and no cooperative economy, it would be impossible for us to lead the individual economy of the labouring people step by step towards collectivization, impossible to develop from the new-democratic society to the future socialist society and impossible to consolidate the leadership of the proletariat in the state power. Whoever overlooks or belittles this point will also commit extremely serious mistakes. The state-owned economy is socialist in character and the co-operative economy is semi-socialist; these plus private capitalism, plus the individual economy, plus the state-capitalist economy in which the state and private capitalists work jointly, will be the chief sectors of the economy of the people's republic and will constitute the new-democratic economic structure.

6. The restoration and development of the national economy of the people's republic would be impossible without a policy of controlling foreign trade. When imperialism, feudalism, bureaucrat-capitalism and the concentrated expression of all three, the Kuomintang regime, have been eliminated in China, the problem of establishing an independent and integrated industrial system will remain unsolved and it will be finally solved only when our country has greatly developed economically and changed from a backward agricultural into an advanced industrial country. It will be impossible to achieve this aim without controlling foreign trade. After the country-wide victory of the Chinese revolution and the solution of the land problem, two basic contradictions will still exist in China. The first is internal, that is, the contradiction between the working class and the bourgeoisie. The second is external, that is, the contradiction between China and the imperialist countries. Consequently, after the victory of the people's democratic revolution, the state power of the people's republic under the leadership of the working class must not be weakened but must be strengthened. The two basic policies of the state in the economic struggle will be regulation of capital at home and control of foreign trade. Whoever overlooks or belittles this point will commit extremely serious mistakes.

7. China has inherited a backward economy. But the Chinese people are brave and industrious. With the victory of the Chinese people's revolution and the founding of the people's republic, and with the leadership of the Communist Party of China, plus the support of the working class of the countries of the world and chiefly the support of the Soviet Union, the speed of China's economic construction will not be very slow, but may be fairly fast. The day is not far off when China will attain prosperity. There is absolutely no ground for pessimism about China's economic resurgence.

VII

Old China was a semi-colonial country under imperialist domination. Thoroughly anti-imperialist in character, the Chinese people's democratic revolution has incurred the bitter hatred of the imperialists who have done their utmost to help the Kuomintang. This has aroused the Chinese people to even deeper indignation against the imperialists and deprived them of their last shred of prestige among the Chinese people. At the same time the whole imperialist system is very much weakened after World War II, while the strength of the world anti-imperialist front headed by the Soviet Union is greater than ever before. In these circumstances, we can and should adopt a policy of systematically and completely destroying imperialist domination in China. This imperialist domination manifests itself in the political, economic and cultural fields. In each city or place where the Kuomintang troops are wiped out and the Kuomintang government is overthrown, imperialist political domination is overthrown with it, and so is imperialist economic and cultural domination. But the economic and cultural establishments run directly by the imperialists are still there, and so are the diplomatic personnel and the journalists recognized by the Kuomintang. We must deal with all these properly in their order of urgency. Refuse to recognize the legal status of any foreign diplomatic establishments and personnel of the Kuomintang period, refuse to recognize all the treasonable treaties of the Kuomintang period, abolish all imperialist propaganda agencies in China, take immediate control of foreign trade and reform the customs system -- these are the first steps we must take upon entering the big cities. When they have acted thus, the Chinese people will have stood up in the face of imperialism. As for the remaining imperialist economic and cultural establishments, they can be allowed to exist for the time being, subject to our supervision and control, to be dealt with by us after country-wide victory. As for ordinary foreign nationals, their legitimate interests will be protected and not encroached upon. As for the question of the recognition of our country by the imperialist countries, we should not be in a hurry to solve it now and need not be in a hurry to solve it even for a fairly long period after countrywide victory. We are willing to establish diplomatic relations with all countries on the principle of equality, but the imperialists, who have always been hostile to the Chinese people, will definitely not be in a hurry to treat us as equals. As long as the imperialist countries do not change their hostile attitude, we shall not grant them legal status in China. As for doing business with foreigners, there is no question; wherever there is business to do, we shall do it and we have already started; the businessmen of several capitalist countries are competing for such business. So far as possible, we must first of all trade with the socialist and people's democratic countries; at the same time we will also trade with capitalist countries.

VIII

All the conditions are ripe for convening the Political Consultative Conference and forming a democratic coalition government. All the democratic parties, people's organizations and democrats without party affiliation are on our side. The bourgeoisie in Shanghai and in the Yangtse valley are trying to establish contacts with us. Navigation and postal communications between north and south have been resumed. The disintegrating Kuomintang has alienated itself from all the masses. We are preparing to have negotiations with the reactionary Nanking government.[3] Its moving forces for negotiating with us are the warlords of the Kwangsi clique, those factions of the Kuomintang favouring peace and the Shanghai bourgeoisie. Their aims are to obtain a share in the coalition government, retain as many troops as possible, preserve the interests of the bourgeoisie in Shanghai and the south and do their best to moderate the revolution. These groups recognize our eight terms as the basis for negotiations, but they want to bargain so that their losses will not be too great. Those trying to wreck the negotiations are Chiang Kai-shek and his sworn followers. Chiang Kai-shek still has sixty divisions south of the Yangtse and they are preparing to fight. Our policy is not to refuse negotiations, but to demand that the other side accept the eight terms in their entirety and to allow no bargaining. In return, we would refrain from fighting the Kwangsi clique and the other Kuomintang factions which favour peace, postpone the reorganization of their troops for about a year, allow some individuals in the Nanking government to take part in the Political Consultative Conference and the coalition government and agree to protect certain interests of the bourgeoisie in Shanghai and in the south. The negotiations are to be on an over-all basis and, if successful, they will reduce many obstacles to our advance into the south and to the take-over of the big cities there, which will have great advantages. If they are not successful, then separate negotiations on a local basis will be held after our army advances. The negotiations on an over-all basis are tentatively fixed for late March. We hope to occupy Nanking by April or May, then convene the Political Consultative Conference in Peiping, form a coalition government and make Peiping the capital. Since we have agreed to hold negotiations, we should be prepared for the many troubles which will arise after the success of the negotiations, and we should be ready with clear heads to deal with the tactics the other side will adopt, the tactics of the Monkey who gets into the stomach of the Princess of the Iron Fan to play the devil.[4] As long as we are fully prepared mentally, we can beat any devilish Monkey. Whether the peace negotiations are overall or local, we should be prepared for such an eventuality. We should not refuse to enter into negotiations because we are afraid of trouble and want to avoid complications, nor should we enter into negotiations with our minds in a haze. We should be firm in principle; we should also have all the flexibility permissible and necessary for carrying out our principles.

IX

The people's democratic dictatorship, led by the proletariat and based on the worker-peasant alliance, requires that our Party conscientiously unite the entire working class, the entire peasantry and the broad masses of revolutionary intellectuals; these are the leading and basic forces of the dictatorship. Without this unity, the dictatorship cannot be consolidated. It is also required that our Party unite with as many as possible of the representatives of the urban petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie who can co-operate with us and with their intellectuals and political groups, so that, during the revolutionary period, we can isolate the counter-revolutionary forces and completely overthrow both the counter-revolutionary and imperialist forces in China and so that, after the victory of the revolution, we can speedily restore and develop production, cope with foreign imperialism, steadily transform China from an agricultural into an industrial country and build China into a great socialist state. Therefore, our Party's policy of long-term co-operation with non-Party democrats should be clearly established in the thinking and work of the whole Party. We must regard the majority of non-Party democrats as we do our own cadres, consult with them sincerely and frankly to solve those problems that call for consultation and solution, give them work, entrust them with the responsibility and authority that should go with their posts and help them do their work well. Proceeding from the desire to unite with them, we should carry out serious and appropriate criticism or struggle against their errors and shortcomings in order to attain the objective of unity. It would be wrong to adopt an accommodating attitude towards their errors or shortcomings. It would also be wrong to adopt a dosed-door or perfunctory attitude towards them. In each big or medium city, each strategic region and each province, we should develop a group of non-Party democrats who have prestige and can co-operate with us. The incorrect attitude towards non-Party democrats, fostered by the closed-door style in our Party during the War of Agrarian Revolution, was not entirely overcome during the War of Resistance Against Japan, and it reappeared in 1947 during the high tide of the land reform in the base areas. This attitude would serve only to isolate our Party, prevent the consolidation of the people's democratic dictatorship and enable the enemy to obtain allies. Now that China's first Political Consultative Conference under the leadership of our Party will soon be convened, that a democratic coalition government will soon be formed and that the revolution will soon be victorious throughout the country, the whole Party must make a serious and self-critical examination of this problem and understand it correctly; it must oppose the two deviations, the Right deviation of accommodation and the closed-door and perfunctory "Left" deviation, and adopt an entirely correct attitude.

X

Very soon we shall be victorious throughout the country. This victory will breach the eastern front of imperialism and will have great international significance. To win this victory will not require much more time and effort, but to consolidate it will. The bourgeoisie doubts our ability to construct. The imperialists reckon that eventually we will beg alms from them in order to live. With victory, certain moods may grow within the Party -- arrogance, the airs of a self-styled hero, inertia and unwillingness to make progress, love of pleasure and distaste for continued hard living. With victory, the people will be grateful to us and the bourgeoisie will come forward to flatter us. It has been proved that the enemy cannot conquer us by force of arms. However, the flattery of the bourgeoisie may conquer the weak-willed in our ranks. There may be some Communists, who were not conquered by enemies with guns and were worthy of the name of heroes for standing up to these enemies, but who cannot withstand sugar-coated bullets; they will be defeated by sugar-coated bullets. We must guard against such a situation. To win countrywide victory is only the first step in a long march of ten thousand li. Even if this step is worthy of pride, it is comparatively tiny; what will be more worthy of pride is yet to come. After several decades, the victory of the Chinese people's democratic revolution, viewed in retrospect, will seem like only a brief prologue to a long drama. A drama begins with a prologue, but the prologue is not the climax. The Chinese revolution is great, but the road after the revolution will be longer, the work greater and more arduous. This must be made clear now in the Party. The comrades must be taught to remain modest, prudent and free from arrogance and rashness in their style of work. The comrades must be taught to preserve the style of plain living and hard struggle. We have the Marxist-Leninist weapon of criticism and self-criticism. We can get rid of a bad style and keep the good. We can learn what we did not know. We are not only good at destroying the old world, we are also good at building the new. Not only can the Chinese people live without begging alms from the imperialists, they will live a better life than that in the imperialist countries.

NOTES

1. On September 19, 1949, Tung Chi-wu, Kuomintang governor of Suiyuan Province, and Sun Lan-feng, Kuomintang army commander, revolted and came over with more than forty thousand men. The regrouping of these units began on February 21, 1950, under the leadership of the Suiyuan Military Command of the People's Liberation Army. They were reorganized into the People's Liberation Army on April 10.

2. "Regulation of capital" was one of Sun Yat-sen's well-known slogans. The Manifesto of the Kuomintang's First National Congress, in which the Kuomintang and the Communist Party co-operated, was published on January 23, 1924 and gave the following interpretation to this slogan: "Private industries, whether of Chinese or of foreign nationals, which are either of a monopolistic nature or are beyond the capacity of private individuals to develop, such as banking, railways, and navigation, shall be undertaken by the state, so that privately owned capital shall not control the economic life of the people."

3. Concerning peace negotiations with the reactionary Nanking Kuomintang government, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China made the following decisions on March 26, 1949:

(1) Time for the negotiations to begin, April l;

(2) Place for the negotiations, Peiping;

(3) Chou En-lai, Lin Po-chu, Lin Piao, Yeh Chien-ying and Li Wei-han are appointed as delegates (on April 1, the Central Committee decided to add Nieh Jung-chen to the list of delegates), with Chou En-lai as chief delegate, to negotiate with the Nanking delegation on the basis of Chairman Mao Tse-tung's Statement on the Present Situation made on January 14 and the eight terms set forth therein;

(4) The reactionary Nanking Kuomintang government is to be immediately notified of the aforesaid by radio broadcast and told to send its delegation to the specified place, at the specified time and, in order to facilitate the negotiations, to bring all necessary material relating to the eight terms.

4. For the story of how Sun Wu-kung, the Monkey, changed himself into a tiny insect, found his way into the stomach of the Princess of the Iron Fan and thus defeated her, see the Chinese novel, Pilgrimage to the West, Chapter 59. 】

李克勤后记：

毛主席作为党、军队、国家和人民领袖，总是走在历史的前头。毛主席关于建设新中国的立场、观点、方法，今天的现实意义是明显的。我们需要深化对“两个务必”的认识，那就不得不认真的，而不是敷衍的读一读毛主席的原著。