【国关青年说】王诗思：合作还是对抗-中美关系未来路在何方？
作者系外交学院国关所2017级国际关系研究生；中山大学翻院2013级英语&西班牙语双专业
回顾文献
Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” International Security, Vol. 27, No.4 (Spring 2003), pp. 5-56.
Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” International Security, Vol.30, No.2 (Fall 2005), pp. 7-45.
Charles L. Glaser, “A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security, Vol.39, No.4 (Spring 2015), pp.49-90.
正文
The rapid rise of China over the past decade has generated much attention and concern of the world. The 2017 National Security Strategy of the United States of America has showed US decision to label China a “strategic competitor”. It seems to confirm what could no longer be concealed: the world’s two most powerful countries are locked in a fervent rivalry. What will the U.S.-China relations generate in the near term? Will they strengthen cooperation or inevitably lead to confrontation? And what strategy should the United States pursue toward China’s rise? To seek the answers to these questions are of great importance.
This article has carried out a close analysis of three works written by Aaron L. Friedberg, Alastair Iain Johnston, and Charles L. Glaser, whose attitudes toward U.S.-China relations could generally be defined as pessimistic, neutral and optimistic. Johnston has examined the accuracy of the conventional characterization of China as a revisionist state through two sets of indicators, which could serve to explore the conditions that China has utilized during the process of rise. Friedberg has made a prediction of U.S.-China relations in near term by analyzing six patterns of international relations theories. And Glaser suggests that the best option available for United States currently is to make a grand bargain with China over Taiwan issue.
Although they focus on different aspects of U.S.-China relations, two common themes could be driven—the conception of China’s core interests and aspirations, and the role of economic interdependence—to explore their underlying policy preference. Thus, the first section of the article discusses how the authors parse these themes, how they weigh or combine them. The second part puts forward an analytical model based on the two sets of indicators—to prioritize “power” or “security”, “economy” or “politics”—which could form four combinations. It then explores their correlation with the probability of leading to confrontation. And an assessment of the security strategy toward China revealed in the 2017 American NSS will be made.
China’s Aspirations
The conception of China’s aspirations decides the specific strategy to deal with China’s rise. However, no shared understanding of China’s core interests and aspirations has yet been reached. Grounded in defensive realist logic, Glaser holds the view that China is likely to be driven by its own security concern and will not change the status quo for non-security reasons, since the regional hegemony would provide only a small increase in its security. China’s goal of unification makes China a limited-aims expansionist state.Aaron Friedberg mentions that the realist optimists believe both China’s power and ambitions are likely to remain conservative and limited. Johnston also argues that the common characterization of China as a dissatisfied, revisionist state is inaccurate.
In contrast, some international relations theories mentioned in the article of Friedberg provide more pessimistic assessments of China’s rising power. Offensive realism envisions that China, acting in accordance with the theory’s call for states to maximize their power, will attempt to become the hegemony in Northeast Asia. Realist pessimists note that, throughout history, rising powers tend to define their interest more expansively and seek a greater degree of influence as their capabilities grow. By examining the historical record, Graham Allison also points out that when the relative power of a rising nation threatens to displace a ruling state, the result will be a war. A war between the United States and China in the decades ahead is not just possible, but much more likely than recognized at the moment.
Therefore, the conception of China’s core interests and strategic objectives can generally be summarized as to prioritize “security” or “power”. Those who argue that China’s conduct is driven by security concern for its limited ambition are more optimistic toward the development of U.S.-China relations. They regard “security” as China’s most prominent core interests. Those who believe that China is pursuing regional hegemony and expelling American leverage out of Asia actually consider “power” China’s primary objective and are more pessimistic about the future of the two countries.
The definition of China’s core interests decides different foreign policy toward China. The former, which emphasizes “security”, believes that U.S.’s accommodation on the issues of China’s core interests, like ending its defense commitment to Taiwan, could exchange China’s concession on other issues of American vital interests. Johnston shares the view that China’s balancing behavior against the United States may only be obvious when responding to U.S. military power on the issue of Taiwan.
From the perspective of the latter, which focuses on “power”, the competition-inducing mechanism will continue to exert a strong influence in U.S.-China relations for their irreconcilable conflict of interests. The competition will likely become more intense for the ideologically rooted fear, suspicion, and China’s expanding ambitions. Therefore, according to Friedberg, “China must find a way to bring Taiwan back, and push America out, while keeping Japan down.” Even the liberalization of China’s domestic political system will not necessarily lead to the improvement of relations between Washington and Beijing if policies pursued by China do not differ from the past.
The Role of Economic interdependence
The conventional way that international relations theorists deal with economic interdependence is about whether the trade and economic interconnectedness is enough to trump the political needs and aspirations. When applied to Sino-American relationship, the issue becomes whether their economic interdependence is great enough to ward off political-military conflicts. Johnston’s approach to U.S.-China interaction incorporates this economic dynamic: the growing global economic interdependence decides China’s reluctance to bear the economic and social costs to balance seriously against American power. Aaron Friedberg does not frame the issue quite this way, but he is equally cognizant of the potential pacifying effects of it, considering it a “brake” on the likely mounting competition and increasingly open confrontation in Sino-American relations. However, he believes that for great powers like China and the United States, the strategic and political ambition trumps the effects of economic interdependence. “If the PRC continues to grow wealthier and stronger without significant political liberalization, the tendency toward competition with the United States will remain and will likely become more intense, amplified by the workings of the security dilemma”. Glaser hasn’t expressed his opinion towards the importance of economic interdependence in Sino-American relations, but he points out that the key to alleviate the tension between these two powers is not in terms of economics but in politics, like making concession on Taiwan issue.
If Johnston’ approach seems to privilege economy over politics, Friedberg and Glaser 51 33969 51 17569 0 0 2824 0 0:00:12 0:00:06 0:00:06 3504 would prefer if things were the other way round. Johnston believes economic interdependence decides China’s active participation in international institutions and its unwillingness to balance against the U.S. while Friedberg and Glaser argue that the political issues matter more, and politics will drive economics.
Conclusion
Different attitudes towards the two themes above—to prioritize “power” or “security”, “politics” or “economy” in Sino-American relations—could form four combinations: (1) When China is seeking power rather than security, while economic interdependence cannot serve as a ballast to maintain Sino-American relations, the two countries will be highly likely to get into conflict, even confrontation; (2) If China still regards the regional hegemony as its prior objective whereas it will not bear economic cost to balance against the U.S., the possibility to exert a conflict will be comparatively low; (3) If China only wants to defend its security interests rather than pursue power, and economic interdependence plays a decisive role in its foreign policy, then a confrontation will be undoubtedly unnecessary; (4) When China considers security the highest interest of its state, though the improvement of economy is not enough to alleviate the tension with it, there is still considerable room for diplomatic negotiation. The diagram below demonstrates their relations and their correspondent supporters.
Figure 1. An Analytical Model for Sino-American Relations.
Then, which of the combination best describes today’s American conception of China? The 2017 NSS of America defines China as the “challenger of American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity”. To protect American interests against sophisticated challenges, they should ensure their military superiority, rethink the engagement strategy and turn to implement a competitive one, which is highly similar to the Clifford Report of Cold War. Obviously, the first type best suits today’s American judgment.
Although the containment strategy principle could be seen in the latest NSS of the U.S., Sino-American relations will not inevitably lead to military confrontation for the important and broad-based cooperative relationship between the two countries. However, the conflicts and its probability will not disappear automatically without enhancing political mutual trust and increasing communication.
References
Avery Goldstein, “First Things First, the Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations”, International Security, Vol.37, No.4（Spring 2013）,pp.49-89.
Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” International Security, Vol. 27, No.4 (Spring 2003), pp.5-56.
Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011).
Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” International Security, Vol.30, No.2 (Fall 2005), pp.7-45.
Charles L. Glaser, “A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security, Vol.39, No.4 (Spring 2015), pp.49-90.
Graham Allison, “The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?” the Atlantic, Sept24,2015 https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states-china-war-thucydides-trap/406756/.
John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).
National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington. DC: the White House.
Yuen Foong Khong, “Primacy or World Order? The United States and China’s Rise—A Review Essay”, International Security, Vol. 38, No.3 (Winter 2013/14), pp.153-175.
Zeev Maoz, “The Effects of Strategic and Economic Interdependence on International Conflict across Levels of Analysis,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 53, No. 1 (January 2009), pp.223-240.