转载 | 彭博专栏：复星不是巴菲特

昨天的彭博专栏上有一篇精彩的文章，讨论复星的买买买模式。其中最有意思的是三张图表。

前两张图对比了复星和伯克希尔的现金流组成。

小编的一位财务老师（英国老头儿）曾经经常念叨一句话“Profit is vanity; cash is reality”。大意是利润很容易被粉饰，但现金流量表却非常值得信任。

有一些财会背景的读者们会知道，长期为正数的营业现金流（CFO, Cash Flow from Operations Activities，下图青色）是一家公司稳健发展的重要指标。复星的CFO不停波动，去年更是大负特负，而且大量依赖融资现金流（CFF, Cash Flow from Financing Activities，下图红色）；而伯克希尔的CFO则常年都是正数，且在稳健增长。

图表1、复星历年现金流量组成

图表2、伯克希尔历年现金流量组成

第三张图显示了复星的WACC和ROIC。

加权平均资本成本（WACC, Weighted Average Cost of Capital），反映了企业各种长期资金（股、债、优先股等）的综合成本，也是其进行投资时要求的回报率。而资本回报率（ROIC, Return on Invested Capital）顾名思义，就是投出的资金所产生的回报。

下图可见复星的ROIC（黄线）走势疲软，明显劣于WACC。

图表三：复星历年WACC及ROIC

最近郭总、梁总不停发声要使复星的评级进步到投资级（Investment Grade），甚至不惜通过变卖投资的形式实现，从而降低综合融资成本，相信连带也能改善CFF、WACC等数据。但要做强CFO，仍需从长计议。

外界看起来，复星变卖投资好像是玩UNO牌时出了一张Reverse卡。但能在高歌猛进的同时提出这样冷静的目标，是中国企业中也是少见的。值得敬佩！

下面贴上彭博专栏的原文，以飨读者。

编/森

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Fosun Goes into Reverse

by David Fickling

It's all very well spending money like water when it's flowing freely. When funds dry up, you need to take smaller sips.

Fosun International, the Chinese investment group often likened to an Asian Berkshire Hathaway, is turning its back on a $15 billion takeover spree to apply that lesson. The company, whose investments span steel, pharmaceuticals, tourism, insurance and real estate, will sell as much as $6 billion in assets, Chief Executive Officer Liang Xinjun told Bloomberg's Haidi Lun in an interview. That compares to about $40 billion of long-term assets held at the end of December.

A quick glance at its cash flow statements makes it clear why the spending had to stop.

If Something Can't Go on Forever, It Won't

Sooner or later, Fosun's investments were going to have to start making a profit

In the long run, companies have to pay for their investments through profits. Debt and equity finance can plug the gap in lean years, but ultimately have to give way to operating cash flows if a business isn't to end up with a tottering debt pile and insufficient funds to pay interest.

Fosun's operating performance hasn't come close to justifying its ability to raise capital from investors. Operating cash flows have actually consumed, rather than provided, an aggregate 11 billion yuan ($1.7 billion) over the past 10 years.

Compare that to the performance of co-founder Guo Guangchang's guru Warren Buffett and you can see the difference between a business that pays for itself and one that's dependent on the goodwill of creditors:

You're No Warren Buffett

Berkshire Hathaway derives the bulk of its cashflows from operations

Guo has been hinting that the M&A party was coming to an end for some time. Fosun's main job would be to bed down what it had already assembled, he told Bloomberg News last September. The fact that the company is now turning from consolidation to outright clearance sales, though, is a sign of how quickly things can change in China.

Three months after the September interview, he prompted investor jitters by disappearing without warning to assist in a government investigation. He's declined to comment on what went on during that period, but Fosun abandoned a takeover of an Israeli insurer and an Anglo-German bank soon after.

Other arms of the Chinese state were cooling on Fosun at the same time that Guo was helping the government with its probe. Guotai Asset Management, ultimately controlled by state-owned China Jianyin Investment, sold out of an 812 million yuan position in Fosun's 6.875 percent 2020 notes between October and December 2015, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Bank of China Investment Management also quit a 100 million yuan position in Fosun's 2017 5.05 percent notes between June and December, according to the data based on filings.

That's relatively small potatoes compared with net debt that amounted to 37 billion yuan at the end of December. But every little bit counts at a time when Fosun's weighted average cost of capital appears to be rising, even as its return on capital moves closer to zero.

Money Pit

Fosun's returns to capital approximate to zero, and its costs of capital are rising

There are signs the acquisitions pipeline is already drying up, or even reversing its flow. Fosun raised about S$83 million ($62 million) in June from selling its stake in an initial public offering of EC World, a Singapore-based REIT. Last month it outlined another IPO to dispose of as much as half of Ironshore, a Bermuda-based property insurer it bought for $1.84 billion last year.

Then again, just last Thursday its pharmaceuticals affiliate announced plans to spend as much as $1.26 billion buying an Indian drugmaker, Gland Pharma. You can decide for yourself whether those three deals collectively count as a tap on the brakes, or the accelerator.

Still, the experience of Anbang, another acquisitive insurer which dropped a $14 billion bid for Starwood Hotels in March after Caixin Online reported the country's insurance regulator had doubts about the deal, is a salutary one. China tends to be wary of companies that stick their necks out too far, especially if -- as is the case with Fosun and Anbang -- the state doesn't own or control them.

Those whose growth has depended on access to seemingly limitless pots of mainland cash will find life harder if they have to become more dependent on funding from global capital markets. Companies that lose the support of domestic creditors and can't make sufficient profits from their investments risk hitting a wall.

This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of Bloomberg LP and its owners.

To contact the author of this story:
David Fickling in Sydney at [e-mail]

To contact the editor responsible for this story:
Matthew Brooker at [e-mail]

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心存远方，脚踏实地

地产与远方