纽约时报 | 中国对冲基金之王的覆灭（下）
Throughout his career, Xu’s wild success provided fodder for rumors and speculation: about his access to insider information, his uncanny timing and the possible government connections of his wealthy (and entirely anonymous) clients.
徐翔在股海沉浮，他的大获成功也为谣言和揣测提供了弹药，如获取内幕消息、精准的买卖时点，以及有钱的匿名客户可能具有政府背景。
The most persistent rumor held that Xu was investing on behalf of wealthy and corrupt Shanghai-based “princelings,” the second-generation descendants of prominent Communist Party officials.
一直以来，传言说徐翔帮着腐败的上海太子们投资。
These princelings, the rumors went, fed Xu inside information and protected him from prosecution; in exchange, he managed their wealth in private funds that were tailored to their needs and hid both the amount invested and the identity of the investor. These rumors had the virtue of being both entirely plausible and entirely unverifiable.
传言这些人给徐翔内幕消息，保护他免于制裁，让他可以量身管理他们的私人财富，掩护他们的投资额和投资者身份。这一传言完全说的通，可又绝对无法证实。
In an elegant waterfront coffee house in Ningbo, I met a young stock trader who speculated about the web of political connections that had enriched and ultimately doomed Xu.
在宁波一家优雅的水畔咖啡馆，一个年轻的股票交易员猜测，政治关系网让徐翔发家，又最后毁了他。
“Xu was pushed onto the stage,” the trader told me, as fashionable young women toting Gucci bags and wearing Cartier watches strode past us.
“徐翔被推上了舞台。”这位交易员对我说。时髦的年轻女士们提着古奇手包，戴着卡迪亚手表从我们身旁走过。
“There are a lot of red capitalists in Shanghai, the children of leaders and important officials. They put a lot of money into his private fund to use as their personal bank account.”
“上海有很多红色资本家，领导和大官子女。他们把大笔资金放入私募中，当做提款机。”
By the young trader’s telling, Xu’s entire operation was a cover for this simple scheme. “Xu had seven products,” the trader told me. “The most successful are for the red capitalists. The others are rat funds” — dummy products used to drive up stock prices and enrich Xu’s clients.
照这个年轻交易员的说法，徐翔的全部操作都给这一简单的轨迹打掩护。“徐翔有七个产品，最成功的是给红色资本家的，其他都是老鼠仓”，用来提升股价让客户致富的假冒产品。
Nearly every one of the experts I spoke with repeated some version of the same rumor: that Xu was less a financial genius than a puppet of even larger powers.
几乎所有人和我讲的都是同样的传言：徐翔不是什么金融天才，不过是大佬们的傀儡。
Most often, this explanation was deployed in response to a question that had been troubling observers of the Chinese financial world for months: Why hadn’t Xu stopped earlier?
这一解释常用来回答几个月来中国金融界的观察家都说不清的一个问题：徐翔为什么不提前收手？
Rumors of his illegal methods were an open secret, and he had already built the most successful hedge fund in China, reaping billions of dollars in personal wealth in the process. Why keep going and risk a reckoning?
非法牟利的传闻已是公开的秘密，既然建立了中国最成功的对冲基金，个人财富达数十亿元，为何还要冒着被清算的风险呢？
“That goes to the investor conspiracy,” a former hedge fund researcher told me. “The people who give money to him to manage would not like to see the fund wound down.”
一位前对冲基金研究员说：“这是投资者的阴谋，人们把钱给他管理，不想看到基金缩水。”
Whether Xu had begun as a willing partner or was coerced from the start was just further speculation. “When you have someone very politically powerful and well connected coming to you who wants you to manage money for him or her,” the researcher said, “then it’s sort of difficult to say no, right?”
徐翔是自愿合伙还是从一开始就被迫不过是猜测。这个研究员说：“有权、有关系的人找你为他们管钱，很难拒绝，对吧？”
If Xu was indeed tied to figures in the country’s opaque political elite, his carefully protected anonymity was all the more crucial. In a nation where political and economic control are inseparable, and where the flashiest are often the first to fall, remaining unknown can serve as a survival technique.
如果徐翔真有政治背景，隐姓埋名就尤其重要。毕竟在政治、经济不分家的地方，枪打出头鸟，默默无闻是一种生存技巧。
Even the true value of his assets remains a mystery. In 2015, the Hurun Rich List ranked Xu as the 188th-richest person in China, with a value of $2.2 billion. But that figure does not necessarily include all of Xu’s earnings from privately managed funds, the money he controlled through family members or assets stashed outside Zexi. Xu’s true wealth was unknown and unknowable.
他究竟有多少资产也是个谜。2015年，胡润财富排行榜将徐翔列为第188位，身价22亿美元。可这一数字不见得包含徐翔从私募基金中获得的收益，这些钱通过徐翔的家人控制或藏匿在泽熙资本以外某处。徐翔的真实财富无人知晓，也无从知晓。
As Zexi grew and thrived, the fund began to operate through murkier market channels. Buying and selling shares was no longer adequate to keep the empire growing apace. Xu needed a new business model.
随着泽熙做大，这支基金开始更加灰色的市场操作。买卖股票不足以让这个帝国迅速增长，徐翔需要新的业务模式。
In late 2010, he began operating through a network of shell companies and affiliated investment funds with near-identical names, purchasing ownership stakes in companies.
2010年末，他开始操纵空壳公司和名字相近的关联投资基金，购买公司股权。
He took on the role of the activist investor, padding corporate boards with his associates, who would then implement investor-friendly policies — particularly dividend payouts.
他成为主动投资人，找自己人进入公司董事会，实施对投资人有利的政策，特别是派发股息。
Between 2010 and 2014, Zexi invested in 45 companies that issued dividends — more companies than the average Chinese hedge fund had invested in altogether during that period.
2010年到2014年间，泽熙投资了45家派发股息的公司，比这一时期中国所有普通对冲基金投资的公司总数还要多。
“That strategy was quite unique,” the China-based Western fund manager told me. “Maybe in part because there are only a few managers who can pull that off.”
西部基金的基金经理说：“这一战略是独一无二的，可能因为他们是为数不多的能实现这些业绩的管理人。”
But Xu had the leverage and the connections. A company’s performance or fundamentals did not seem to concern him; if he could find a few winning stocks, he could use his tactics to ride them to huge profits.
可徐翔有手段，有关系。他从不关心某家公司的业绩或基本面，一旦发现高获利股票，他就以他的手段控制公司，攫取高额利润。
Zexi would use dividend payouts to purchase additional shares in the company, which it could then sell when prices rose, netting millions more in profits.
泽熙用派发的股息购买公司更多股份，在股价上涨后抛售，获利颇丰。
To execute this scheme, Xu relied on a network of trusted proxies. Two of the most important were his parents. As executives at Zexi and controlling shareholders at several related companies, Xu’s mother and father helped direct billions in investment in their son’s name.
徐翔依赖可信的代理人网络执行这一计划，他的父母是最重要的两个。徐翔的父母是泽熙的经理，控制着几家关联公司，他们以儿子的名义进行数以亿计的投资。
They also ran many of the companies that made up Xu’s secret empire. Through a Zexi-affiliated fund, Xu’s father owned a large share of Ningbo Zhongbai, a department store company based in Xu’s hometown.
他们运营着构成徐翔秘密帝国的诸多公司。通过泽熙有关联的基金，徐父拥有宁波中百的大额股份，这是徐翔老家的一家百货公司。
Other corporations, like an unprofitable apparel chain called Shanghai Metersbonwe Fashion & Accessories, were run by friends and allies.
他的朋友和伙伴运营着其他一些像上海美特斯邦威一样不怎么营利的公司。
The stock rout last summer coincided with the apex of both Xu’s success and his notoriety.
去年夏天的股灾时，徐翔的成功和恶名达到顶峰。
The government’s response to the crisis was swift and heavy-handed. Large shareholders were prohibited from selling listed stocks; I.P.O.s were halted, and state-run institutions were ordered to maintain their positions or to buy shares.
政府对危机的反应迅速有力：大股东禁止出售上市股票，公募暂停，国营机构被要求持股或购股。
The government also mobilized a “national team” of brokers and investors, backed by up to three trillion renminbi in state capital, to purchase shares and raise prices.
政府还动员券商和投资者“国家队”以三万亿国有资本救市，买入股票，提升股价。
But while the rest of the market was collapsing, Xu continued to thrive. From the beginning of 2015, one of Zexi’s funds grew by 357 percent, ranking first among 1,649 funds in China. Another grew by 187 percent.
市场崩溃时，徐翔继续盈利。从2015年一开始，泽熙的一只基金增长357%，在中国1649支基金中排名第一，另一只增长187%。
All five publicly listed funds had growth of at least 20 percent during three weeks of the crash in mid-June.
六月中旬股票崩溃的三周内，他的五只上市基金增长至少20%。
Xu benefited from seemingly miraculous luck and timing, according to The South China Morning Post. At least three of the stocks that Zexi held most heavily were purchased en masse by the “national team.”
《南华早报》报道，徐翔看起来有着难以置信的好运，总能把握精准的时点获利。至少泽熙重仓持有的三只股票被“国家队”大笔买入。
More remarkable still, all the funds run by Xu seemed to exit the stock market at just the right moment, when it briefly rebounded during the late summer before plummeting again. By the end of the summer, the annual return on his funds was more than 200 percent.
更离奇的是，徐翔管理的所有基金看起来都在正确的时间撤离，夏末时股市短暂反弹，后来又再次暴跌。夏天结束时，他的基金年回报率超过200%。
But as the market dried up, Xu became a target. In September, a social-media post implicating Zexi in corruption and insider trading went viral on the Chinese Internet.
市场输了个干净，徐翔自然成了目标。九月，一个社交媒体的帖子暗示泽熙涉嫌腐败和内幕交易，在中国网络上疯传。
The post, written anonymously, claimed that Zexi had conspired with Citic Securities, a powerful state-owned investment house, to direct buyers toward Shanghai Metersbonwe Fashion & Accessories, which saw its share prices surge during the worst of the market rout.
帖子是匿名的，称泽熙和国有投资大户中信证券勾结，引导买家购买上海美特斯邦威，在市场最糟糕的时刻，该股的股价大涨。
Zexi denied that Xu had worked with Citic to manipulate the price of Metersbonwe, but the arrest of several Citic executives that fall only fueled more speculation.
泽熙否认徐翔与中信共同操纵美特斯邦威股价，但当年秋天中信数名管理人的被捕引发更多猜测。
The same post provided a possible motive for the swindle. It began when a Shanghai princeling who held shares of Metersbonwe complained to Xu about the stock’s low price during the summer rout.
该帖为骗局提供了一种动机。持有美特斯邦威的上海太子们在股灾中抱怨股价太低。
Xu called in a favor at Citic Securities, and in a matter of weeks the “national team” purchased 15 percent of the company’s total shares in circulation, sending prices soaring.
徐翔让中信证券帮个忙，几周内“国家队”购买了公司流通股的15%，让股价暴涨。
The C.S.R.C. noticed the incident and began investigating. Almost immediately, the government placed restrictions on Xu’s ability to travel outside the country.
证监会注意到这一事件并开始调查，几乎同时，政府限制徐翔离境。
Nine days later, Xu was fleeing his grandmother’s birthday party, trying to reach Shanghai. The timing was not coincidental. A special group organized by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection was about to begin a top-to-bottom review of the activities and leadership of the C.S.R.C.
九天后，徐翔逃离奶奶寿宴，想回到上海。时不凑巧，中纪委特别组正要对证监会进行一次从上到下的巡视。
Taking down Xu — especially in public, and with photographic evidence — was a display of force and competence from a government battered by a summer of bad economic news.
当众抓捕徐翔并公布照片，显示受去年夏天经济坏消息打击的政府果断又有能力。
“In China,” one fund manager told me, “the compromising and bargaining is in the execution of the law, not the formulation. The government is using this case to show that from now on, they will enforce the law.”
一个基金经理告诉我：“在中国，执法而非立法中常常妥协和讨价还价。政府用这个案例显示从今开始，要执法了。”
Xu himself seemed to sense the end coming. A year before his arrest, in November 2014, he moved to Beijing and opened an office less than half a mile from the headquarters of the C.S.R.C.
徐翔自己嗅到了末日将近。2014年11月，逮捕徐翔一年前，他来到北京，在证监会总部半英里内开了一家办公室。
According to colleagues, the move was the start of a yearlong effort by Xu to use his connections and money to avoid a reckoning.
据同事讲，这一举动是徐翔长达一年的努力，想利用关系和花钱防止遭到清算。
But despite his billions, Xu was an ordinary man from a poor family. By itself, Xu’s market malfeasance might have been enough to spell his downfall; that he was said to be protected by some of the same corrupt officials targeted by the anticorruption push meant there was no escape.
尽管是亿万富翁，徐翔不过是穷人家出身的普通人。就事论事，徐翔的市场不端行为早该让他覆灭，可据说一些腐败官员保着他，可现在那些官员也被反腐行动盯上了，这意味着他在劫难逃。
Xu Xiang remains in detention in an undisclosed facility somewhere in Beijing. Months after his capture, the only detail confirmed by the Chinese government is that he has been detained for insider trading and stock manipulation. There has been no word of a trial, no taped confession, no formal charges or publicly disclosed evidence of wrongdoing.
徐翔仍被监禁在北京某个秘密的地方。被捕几个月后，中国政府唯一确认的细节是他因内幕交易和操纵股票被捕。尚未提到审判，没有认罪录像，没有提起公诉或公开发布罪状。
In his absence, Zexi has crumbled. Xu was Zexi; without him, the magic is gone.
他不在了，泽熙就垮了，没了他，一切魔力都消失了。
In the months since the crash, the Chinese government has instituted a sweeping crackdown on illegal practices in the financial markets. “There are many, many, many, many, many other managers in the market who could be apprehended for the same reasons,” the Western fund manager told me.
股灾以来几个月内，中国政府对金融市场的非法行为进行了大规模整治。西部基金经济告诉我：“有太多太多太多太多太多经理可能因相同原因被捕了。”
Xu proved an irresistible target not because of his own malfeasance, but because he offered a path to an even larger target — perhaps the clique of Shanghai princelings.
他成为不可避免的目标，并非因为自己的不端行为，而是因为他能引出更大的目标。
“If you’re going to knock somebody down, first you take out the whole row of people around them, the people who support them,” the fund manager said. “You tighten the noose around them.”
“你想打倒某人，必须首先除掉他周围的人，除掉那些支持他的人，收紧绳索。”
From the beginning of 2015 through September of that year, 34 companies listed on the Chinese stock market reported officials as either missing or under investigation by the authorities, according to Bloomberg News.
彭博新闻称，2015年前九个月，34家上市公司的高管失踪或被当局调查。
As of late November, Xinhua, the official Chinese news agency, had identified at least 16 major finance industry figures tied directly to the stock-market cleanup who were either arrested, under investigation or assisting the authorities.
到11月末，中国国家通讯社新华社确认至少16个与股票牟利直接相关的主要金融界人物或被捕，或接受调查，或协助调查。
In early January, the chairman of Metersbonwe joined the list, disappearing without explanation for more than a week.
一月初，美特斯邦威董事长加入这一名单，超过一周时间无端消失。
“The level of corruption is beyond your imagination,” a prominent Beijing-based hedge-fund manager told me over coffee several weeks after Xu’s arrest. Like all my sources, this fund manager was extremely nervous about being interviewed.
一个有名的北京基金经理在徐翔被捕几周后告诉我：“腐败程度超乎想象。”和所有采访对象一样，这位基金经理对接受采访感到异常紧张。
The fund manager insisted that I could not use his name, for fear of being blacklisted or arrested.
基金经理坚持不能说出他的名字，害怕上黑名单或被捕。
The ubiquity of wrongdoing, he said, did not make anyone safe. “No one knows who will be next. If they want to catch you, they will catch you.”
他说非法行为无所不在，没有人是安全的。“没人知道谁是下一个。如果想抓你，就会抓到你。”
The term used to describe what happened to these executives — shilian,“lost contact” — has become a coy euphemism for the Communist Party’s holding individuals indefinitely for questioning or arrest.
对这些经理人而言，“失联”是接受询问或被捕的婉转语。
The campaign was partly a reaction to widespread anger within China: The people, the party and the government all wanted someone to blame for the loss of face — and money.
这是对国内广泛愤怒的部分反应：丢了面子又丢了钱，总要有人负责。
Xu became the emblem of ubiquitous financial corruption. “There will be new tricks,” the former regulatory official says. “But none will be as outrageous as his.”
徐翔成为无所不在的金融腐败的象征。“还会有新花样，可没人会像他这么肆无忌惮。”一个前监管官员说。
For China’s would-be tycoons, the stakes of the crackdown go far beyond the market. During my conversation with the Beijing-based fund manager, which took place in a cafe on a university campus, a young man wandered toward us, admiring a pair of paintings on a nearby wall.
对于中国这些准巨富，反腐的代价不止于市场。与北京的一个基金经理的谈话在一所大学的咖啡馆进行，一个小伙子在我们周围闲逛，欣赏墙上的一幅画。
The manager went quiet, and shifted uncomfortably, watching the potential eavesdropper from the corner of his eye. When the young man had passed, the manager turned back to me. “In China,” he said, “the losing side doesn’t get to sleep at night.”
这位经理不说话了，很不自在，他用余光瞟着这位偷听者，直到这个人走开，这个经理才转过头来对我说：“在中国，输家晚上睡不着觉。”