此帐号已被封,内容无法查看 此帐号的内容被自由微信解封
文章于 2018年9月3日 被检测为删除。
查看原文
被微信屏蔽
其他

为什么中国挡不住资本外流? | 彭博

2016-12-09 英文联播

Why China Can't Stop Capital Outflows


How China manages its currency is likely to be the global economic story of 2017. Despite the government's best efforts, capital continues to leave the country at a brisk pace, with a balance-of-payments deficit through the third quarter of $469 billion. 

中国如何管理其货币,这可能构成2017年的全球经济故事。尽管政府尽了力,资本还是快速外流,第三季度收支逆差达4690亿美元。


Attempts to arrest this flow probably won't work. But they may well create new risks.

Capital outflows began gathering steam in 2012, when the government liberalized current-account payment transactions in goods and services. 

控制流出的努力可能不会生效,相反那可能产生新的风险。资本流出在2012年开始加速,当时政府放开了商品和服务经常项目支付交易。


Enterprising Chinese figured out that while they couldn't officially move money abroad to buy a house via the capital account -- individuals are barred from moving more than $50,000 out of the country each year -- they could create  that would allow them to deposit money where they needed it. 

有胆量的国人发现,他们不能以官方渠道把钱通过资本账户拿到国外去买房,因为每年每个人只允许兑换50000美元,于是他们开虚假贸易发票,这样就能给想用钱的任何地方汇钱。


The result was a huge discrepancy between payments recorded for imports and the declared value of goods passing through customs, amounting to $526 billion in hidden outflows last year.

结果进口金额和海关申报商品价值相差悬殊,去年隐性流出高达5260亿美元。


The problem has only worsened in 2016. French investment bank Natixis SA estimates that outflows will total more than $900 billion this year, despite new restrictions on yuan movements, including  on using credit and debit cards to pay for insurance products in Hong Kong.

问题在2016年进一步恶化。法国投资银行Natixis SA预计今年流出总量达9000亿美元,尽管政府对人民币流动进行了新的管制,包括禁止使用信用卡和借记卡在香港购买保险产品。


Last week, the government added yet another restriction. It announced that all international capital-account transactions of more than $5 million will need to be approved by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange. 

上周,政府推出另一个限制,所有超过500万美元的国际资本账户交易需要外汇管理局批准。


This has businesses deeply concerned, given that the administration likely doesn't have the manpower for the sheer number of transactions it will need to review. And if such restrictions can be placed on the capital account, it seems only a matter of time until they're imposed on goods and services transactions.

这让业界很担心,管理局可能没有足够的人手审核如此数量的交易。既然对资本账户进行了如此管制,早晚商品和服务交易也会如此。


All of which raises a simple question: Why is Beijing working so hard to prop up the yuan and crack down on outward capital flows?

所有这些引发了一个简单的问题:北京为什么费力力挺人民币,打击资本流出呢?


The real reason is that the government is concerned about the implications of further liberalizing. China's rickety banks, with , are receiving regular liquidity injections from the People's Bank of China. Money market rates have been rising, from under 2 percent this summer to above 2.3 percent in Shanghai today. 

真正的原因是政府担忧放松管制产生的后果。中国摇摇欲坠的银行,违约率达30%,它们正在接纳中国人民银行的定期流动性注入。货币市场利率在攀升,从今年夏天不到2%到如今上海市场的2.3%。


Allowing international capital mobility could easily trigger larger withdrawals -- and hence liquidity crunches for banks already feeling the pinch of bad loans. In other words, China is caught between trying to prop up a currency facing long-term decline and letting capital leave at will, risking a bank crisis.

允许国际资本流动容易引发更大的外逃,已经因坏账感到手紧的银行可能会面临流动性危机。换言之,中国处于两难境地,一边是力挺长期处于贬值通道的货币,另一边是让资本自由离开,这可能导致银行危机。


This is an unenviable position. But the government needs to accept that the days when it could micromanage its currency to run massive trade surpluses while accumulating large foreign-exchange reserves are history. 

这是一个艰难的处境。可政府该认识到,可以对货币进行微观管理以实现巨大的贸易顺差又能积累大量外汇储备的日子已经成为历史。


All evidence points to the probability of long-term net capital outflows. Chinese buying homes in Vancouver and Sydney aren't going to bring capital back home anytime soon.

所有证据显示,资本长期净流出成为可能,去温哥华和悉尼买房的中国人不准备把资本拿回国内。


The government also needs to tackle some longstanding problems. It has been talking about deleveraging for more than a year, yet total social financing has grown by 15 percent year-to-date, about twice the rate of gross domestic product.

政府需要解决一些长期存在的问题,降杠杆说了一年多,可今年的社会总融资增长15%,是国内生产总值增长率的两倍。


If the financial system wasn't in such bad shape, the risk of a falling yuan would be significantly lower, yet the government has shown little appetite for addressing the underlying problems facing banks.

如果金融系统不那么糟糕,人民币贬值的风险会低得多,可政府无意解决银行面临的深层问题。


All this might simply amount to a setback for a country with aspirations of a globally competitive capital market. But the longer real reform is put off the larger the ultimate price tag becomes. 

对于一个想在全球资本市场有所作为的国家,这等于遭遇了一场挫折。真正的改革迁延越久,最终的代价越大。


Financial crises or hard landings never happen for one reason, but rather a confluence of events. If China doesn't begin tackling these problems now, the probability of such a crisis will grow.

金融危机或硬着陆从来都不是某个原因导致的,那往往是种种事件的综合后果。如果中国现在不开始解决这些问题,发生危机的可能性将会增加。





您可能也对以下帖子感兴趣

文章有问题?点此查看未经处理的缓存