“达沃斯人”做错了什么？ | 华尔街日报
Late on a Sunday evening a little more than a year ago, Marine Le Pen took the stage in a depressed working-class town in northern France. She had just lost an election for the region’s top office, but the leader of France’s anti-immigrant, anti-euro National Front did not deliver a concession speech. Instead, Ms. Le Pen proclaimed a new ideological struggle.
距今一年有余的某个周日晚上，法国北部一个萧条的镇子里，玛丽娜·勒庞登上舞台，这里主要是工人阶级。她刚刚在地方主官的选举中败落，可这位主张反移民、反欧元的国民阵线的领导人并未发表败选演讲。相反，勒庞呼吁展开新的意识形态斗争。
“Now, the dividing line is not between left and right but globalists and patriots,” she declared, with a gigantic French flag draped behind her. Globalists, she charged, want France to be subsumed in a vast, world-encircling “magma.” She and other patriots, by contrast, were determined to retain the nation-state as the “protective space” for French citizens.
“现在，分野不是左与右，而是全球主义者和爱国主义者。”她宣称，背后是巨大的法国国旗。她指责全球主义者想让法国充斥整个世界的浩渺“岩浆”吞噬。相反，她和其他爱国者决心捍卫民族国家，让其成为法国公民的“保护区”。
Ms. Le Pen’s remarks foreshadowed the tectonic forces that would shake the world in 2016. The British vote to leave the European Union in June and the election of Donald Trump as U.S. president in November were not about whether government should be smaller but whether the nation-state still mattered. Ms. Le Pen now has a shot at winning France’s presidential elections this spring, which could imperil the already reeling EU and its common currency.
勒庞的言论预示了2016年撼动世界的构造性力量。6月英国投票离开欧盟、11月特朗普当选美国总统——问题的核心不在于政府是否该更小一点，而在于民族国家是否仍然重要。今年春天，勒庞有机会当选法国总统，这将让摇摇欲坠的欧盟和其共同货币陷于危险之中。
Supporters of these disparate movements are protesting not just globalization—the process whereby goods, capital and people move ever more freely across borders—but globalism, the mind-set that globalization is natural and good, that global governance should expand as national sovereignty contracts.
各色运动的支持者不仅反对全球化——全球化让货物、资本和人力跨境自由流动，他们还反对全球主义，这一思维认为全球化是自然的和好的，随着民族主权退缩，全球治理应该扩大。
The new nationalist surge has startled establishment parties in part because they don’t see globalism as an ideology. How could it be, when it is shared across the traditional left-right spectrum by the likes of Hillary Clinton, Tony Blair, George W. Bush and David Cameron?
新民族主义的崛起让当权政党惊慌失措，部分因为后者视全球主义为一种意识形态。希拉里、布莱尔、小布什和卡梅伦等传统左右翼都认同的东西怎么可能是意识形态呢？
But globalism is an ideology, and its struggle with nationalism will shape the coming era much as the struggle between conservatives and liberals has shaped the last. That, at least, is how the new nationalists see it.
可全球主义就是一种意识形态，它与民族主义的斗争将塑造即将到来的时代，正如保守派和自由派的斗争塑造了过去那个时代一样。至少，新民族主义者是这么认为的。
After successfully pressuring Carrier Corp. to keep in Indiana about half of the 2,100 jobs that the firm had planned to move to Mexico, Mr. Trump told a rally last month, “There is no global anthem, no global currency, no certificate of global citizenship. From now on, it’s going to be ‘America First.’ ”
特朗普成功迫使开利冷气公司把2100名员工中的近半数留在印第安纳州，公司本打算将之搬到墨西哥。他上个月在集会上说：“没有什么全球国歌，没有什么全球货币，也没有什么全球公民证。从现在开始，‘美国优先’。”
In the 1930s, nationalists were also expansionists who coveted other countries’ territory. Today, Mr. Trump and his ideological allies mostly want to reassert control over their own countries. Their targets are such global structures as the EU, the World Trade Organization, NATO, the U.N. and the North American Free Trade Agreement.
二十世纪三十年代，民族主义者当时还是扩张主义者，他们觊觎外邦的领土。今天，特朗普和他意识形态领域的同盟主要重申对自己国家的控制。他们攻击的目标是欧盟、世贸组织、北约、联合国、北美自贸协定等国际机构。
Little unites the new nationalists other than their shared antipathy toward globalism. Mr. Trump’s economic program is as far to the right as Ms. Le Pen’s is to the left. Nor do they have credible plans for replacing the institutions of globalization that they want to tear down, as Britain’s confused exit from the EU demonstrates.
新民族主义者最显见的共通之处是他们都厌恶全球主义。特朗普的经济计划右翼到家，勒庞的则左翼到家，他们也没有替代全球化建制的好计划，只是想将其撕裂，正如令人困惑的英国退欧显示得那样。
But globalists would be wise to face their own shortcomings. They have underestimated the collateral damage that breakneck globalization has inflicted on ordinary workers, placed too much weight on the strategic advantages of trade and dismissed too readily the value that many ordinary citizens still attach to national borders and cultural cohesion.
可全球主义者也该想想自己的短处。他们低估了快速全球化给普通工人造成的附带损害，他们太过重视贸易的战略优势，却太过轻易地忽视了普通公民仍然看重国家边界和文化凝聚。
Globalism’s early roots are found in basic economics: Just as two people are better off specializing and then trading with each other, so are two cities and two countries. “All trade, whether foreign or domestic, is beneficial,” the British economist David Ricardo wrote in 1817.
全球主义肇始于经济学原理：两个人分工并彼此交易会更加富裕，两个城市和两个国家也是如此。“所有贸易，无论对外或对内，都是有利的。”英国经济学家李嘉图1817年写道。
Britain presided over the first great age of globalization, from the mid-1800s to 1914. Its leaders were not self-consciously globalist. They adopted free trade and the gold standard purely for domestic benefit.
从十九世纪中叶到1914年，英国主导了第一个全球化的伟大时代，当时的领导者还不认为自己是全球主义者。他们推动自由贸易，采纳金本位制，那完全为了国内利益。
After World War II, the logic of globalism shifted beyond trade to grand strategy. By ceding modest amounts of sovereignty to international institutions, a country could make the world, and itself, far stronger than by pursuing its own narrowly defined interests.
二战后，全球主义的逻辑超越贸易成为一种宏大战略。相比只追求一己之私，把部分主权让渡给国际机构，国家可以让世界和自身变得更加强大。
“If the nations can agree to observe a code of good conduct in international trade, they will cooperate more readily in other international affairs,” President Harry Truman said in 1947.
“如果各国同意在国际贸易中遵守良好准则，它们将在其他国际事务中更愿意进行合作。”杜鲁门总统1947年说。
Truman and the other founders of the postwar order saw economic and geopolitical self-interest as inseparable: The U.S. opened its wallet and its markets to its allies to hold back Soviet communism. In 1957, six European countries signed the Treaty of Rome, creating what would become the EU, hoping that economic and political integration would make war unthinkable.
杜鲁门和其他战后秩序的奠基者认为经济的和地缘政治的自利是不可分割的：美国向盟国敞开钱包和市场，目的在于遏制苏联共产主义。1957年，6个欧洲国家签订《罗马条约》草创欧盟，希望经济和政治的融合让战争成为不可想象的事。
For decades, trade, industrialization and demographics produced a virtuous circle of rising prosperity. Between 1987 and 2008, total U.S. wages adjusted for inflation rose by 53%, while the profits that U.S. companies earned abroad soared by 347%.
数十年来，贸易、工业化和人口结构造就了日益繁荣的良性循环。1987年到2008年间，根据通胀调整后的美国总收入增长53%，美国公司海外利润增长347%。
Still, the strategic benefits of trade remained alluring: President Bill Clinton signed Nafta in 1993 in part to embed a pro-American government in Mexico, and the EU moved after the Cold War to admit former Soviet satellites to solidify their democracies and draw them out of Russia’s orbit.
贸易的战略性好处仍具有诱惑力：克林顿总统于1993年签署北美自贸协定，在某种程度上栽培了一个亲美的墨西哥政府，冷战后的欧盟吸纳前苏联的卫星国，巩固了后者的民主，将他们拉出俄国的势力范围。
By the 2000s, globalism was triumphant. The World Economic Forum had evolved from a cozy management-oriented workshop in the Swiss town of Davos to an extravagant summit for elites.
到二十一世纪的第一个十年，全球主义无往不胜。世界经济论坛最初只是在瑞士达沃斯小镇举办的一个研讨会，议程轻松，参加者主要是公司管理层，可如今则成为精英汇聚的豪华峰会。
The late political scientist Samuel Huntington applied the caustic label “Davos man” to those who see “national boundaries as obstacles that thankfully are vanishing.” For globalists, this was a badge of honor, symbolizing not just an outlook but a lifestyle of first-class departure lounges, smartphones and stock options.
已故政治科学家亨廷顿刻薄地给那些认为“国家边界是障碍，谢天谢地它正在消亡”的人打上“达沃斯人”的标签。对于全球主义者而言，这是一枚勋章，不只象征着一种世界观，还是生活方式——头等候机室、智能手机和股票期权。
This is also when globalists overreached. In 1999, 11 EU members joined the euro, the crowning achievement of European unity. Economists warned that Italy, Spain and Greece couldn’t compete with Germany without the safety valve of letting national currencies periodically devalue to offset their faster-rising costs.
可全球主义者走过了头。1999年，11个欧盟成员国加入欧元区，这是欧洲统一的终极成就。经济学家警告说，意大利、西班牙和希腊失去了让国家货币周期性贬值以应对成本增长更快的安全阀，就无法和德国竞争。
Sure enough, their trade deficits ballooned, but low-cost euro loans at first made them easy to finance. The loans proved unsustainable, and the resulting crisis has still not run its course. One result: In Italy, the populist 5 Star Movement, which is jostling for first place in the polls, has promised a nonbinding referendum on membership in the euro.
可以想见，他们的贸易赤字暴涨，可从一开始，低成本的欧元贷款让他们轻松融资。结果债务不可持续，导致的危机迄今仍未平息。其中一个结果：在意大利，在民调中争夺头把交椅的民粹主义五星运动党承诺对欧元区成员身份进行无约束力的公投。
Chinese and German trade surpluses could wreak havoc thanks to expanding cross-border finance. To globalists, its growth was as inexorable as that of trade.
由于跨境融资不断扩张，中国和德国的贸易赤字带来灾难。对全球主义者而言，融资的扩张与贸易同样不可阻挡。
In early 2008, President George W. Bush’s treasury secretary, Henry Paulson, put out a report arguing that globalization had made much of U.S. financial regulation obsolete. The priority was to maintain “American preeminence in the global capital markets.” Those same capital markets soon tipped the world into its worst financial crisis since the 1930s.
2008年初，小布什总统的财长保尔森发布报告称，全球化让美国多数金融规定过时。优先任务是保证“美国在全球资本市场中的卓越”。正是这些资本市场迅速将世界推向上世纪三十年代以来最严重的金融危机。
That crisis has woken up globalists to the flaws of globalization. Yet their faith in open borders remains unshaken. President Barack Obama entered office as a free-trade skeptic, but he soon threw his energy into negotiating the 12-nation Trans-Pacific Partnership.
那场危机让全球主义者警醒，认识到全球化的缺陷。可他们对开放边界的信念并未受到动摇。奥巴马总统上台时是个质疑自由贸易，可很快就投身于谈判12国参与的跨太平洋伙伴关系。
The pact’s anticipated economic benefits for the U.S. were modest, but its strategic aims were sweeping: The U.S. would forge a pro-America, pro-trade order in Asia rather than let a rising China dominate the region. With Mr. Trump’s win, the accord is now presumed to be dead.
该协议预期对美国产生的经济好处并不多，可战略目的广泛：美国将缔造一个支持美国、支持贸易的亚洲秩序，抵制崛起的中国统治这一地区。特朗普获胜后，这一协定要完蛋了。
Globalists were blind to the nationalist backlash in part because their world—entrepreneurial, university-educated, ethnically diverse, urban and coastal—has thrived as whiter, less-educated hinterlands have stagnated. Similar splits separate London from the rest of England and the EU’s capital cities from the countryside of continental Europe.
全球主义者对民族主义反拨视而不见，部分原因是他们那个世界繁荣了起来——企业家圈子、受过大学教育、种族多元、城市和沿海，可受教育程度不高、住在内地的更多白种人则逡巡不前。同样的撕裂还出现在伦敦和英格兰其他地区，欧洲的首都城市和欧洲大陆的乡村。
Many globalists now assume that the discontent is largely driven by stagnant wages and inequality. If people are upset about immigration, they reason, it is largely because they fear competition with low-wage workers.
许多全球主义者如今认为这种不满主要由于工资增长迟滞和不平等引发。他们解释说，如果人民对移民不满，那是因为他们担心低工资工人带来的竞争。
In fact, much of the backlash against immigration (and globalism) is not economic but cultural: Many people still care about their own versions of national identity and mistrust global institutions such as the EU.
事实上，对移民的反对，很大程度上不是经济问题，而是文化问题：许多人仍然看重自己的民族身份，不信任欧盟等国际机构。
by Ronald Inglehart of the University of Michigan and Pippa Norris of Harvard University analyzed party manifestos in 13 Western democracies and found that in the 1980s, economic issues such as taxes and welfare became less important than noneconomic issues such as immigration, terrorism, abortion and gay rights.
2016年密歇根大学的Ronald Inglehart和哈佛大学的Pippa Norris的研究分析了13个西方民主国家的党派主张，发现在八十年代，税收和福利等经济问题的重要性开始逊于移民、恐怖主义、堕胎和同性恋权利等非经济问题。
In July 2016, two scholars at the London School of Economics rising unemployment didn’t make British regions more likely to vote to leave the EU, but a growing migrant population did. These voters were bothered less by competition from immigrants than by their perceived effect on the country’s linguistic, religious and cultural norms.
2016年7月，伦敦经济学院的两名学者发现，不断增长的失业率并不是导致英国离开欧盟的主要原因，移民人口增多才是。相比来自移民的竞争，投票者更担心他们对国家的语言、宗教和文化规范可能造成的后果。
One of the first to exploit such cultural resentments was Jean-Marie Le Pen, the founder of the National Front, who frequently decried mondialisme in xenophobic terms. After his daughter Marine took over the party in 2011, she threw him out because his anti-Semitic outbursts were repelling mainstream French voters.
最早利用这种文化憎恨之情的人包括国民阵线的创始人让-马里·勒庞，他经常用仇外措辞谴责全球主义者。2011年，她的女儿玛丽娜接棒，将父亲踢走，因为他的反犹太言论让法国主流选民感到厌恶。
In 2014, Steve Bannon—Mr. Trump’s top strategist and the former leader of Breitbart News, a fiery conservative site that is fiercely opposed to immigration and multiculturalism—acknowledged that Ms. Le Pen’s National Front and its British counterpart, the UK Independence Party, “bring a lot of baggage, both ethnically and racially.”
2014年，特朗普的首席顾问、Breitbart新闻网前领导史蒂夫·班农承认勒庞的国民阵线和英国独立党“在民族和种族两方面背了许多包袱”，该网站是激进的保守主义网站，强烈反对移民和多元文化。
Nonetheless, Mr. Bannon saw them as fellow travelers. He said, “The working men and women in the world…are just tired of being dictated to by what we call the party of Davos.”
然而，班农认为他们是同路人。他说：“世界上的工作的男男女女，厌倦了被那些达沃斯党人统治。”
Indeed, found that Europeans’ opposition to immigration was driven less by pocketbook concerns than by worries about how changes to “the composition of the local population” would affect “their neighborhoods, schools and workplaces.”
实际上，2012年一项研究发现欧洲反对移民，其原因与其说是钱包问题，不如说担忧“当地人口比例”的变化会对“社区、学校和工作场所”造成影响。
The last big U.S. backlash against immigration came during the Roaring Twenties, the last time that the foreign-born share of the population stood as high as it is today, at 13%.
美国上一次对移民的反冲发生在“繁荣的二十年代”，那时外国出生的人口比例和今天一样，高达13%。
Which raises the most troubling question of the emerging globalist-nationalist divide: Is the new nationalism a cloak for ethnic and religious exclusion? Nationalist leaders insist that it isn’t. Ms. Le Pen, for example, says that she is merely defending France’s secular character when she criticizes overt displays of Islamic observance, distancing herself from her plainly xenophobic father.
在兴起的全球主义-民族主义鸿沟中，最令人困惑的问题是：新的民族主义是民族和宗教排斥情绪的外衣吗？民族主义领导人坚称并非如此。例如勒庞说，她批评伊斯兰 仪轨时只是捍卫法国的世俗性格，与单纯仇外的父亲划清界限。
Mr. Trump says that struggling Latino and African-American workers are victims of cheap foreign labor just as much as Rust Belt whites.
特朗普说，生活困难的拉美裔和非洲裔美国工人，和铁锈地带的白人一样，都是廉价外国劳动力的受害者。
Yet the new nationalism often thrives on xenophobia. Mr. Trump has been criticizing free trade since the 1980s, but his candidacy took off when he started attacking Mexican immigrants and Muslims. American Jewish groups heard unsettling echoes of anti-Semitic conspiracy theories when Mr. Trump accused Mrs. Clinton of meeting “in secret with international banks to plot the destruction of U.S. sovereignty.”
然而，新民族主义常常建立在仇外情绪之上。特朗普八十年代以来一直批判自由贸易，但他竞选之初就开始攻击墨西哥移民和穆斯林。特朗普指责希拉里“秘密会见国际银行策划破坏美国主权”时，美国犹太团体还嗅到了令人不安的反犹阴谋论。
Germany’s Alternative for Germany started as an anti-euro party, but as an influx of Middle Eastern refugees and migrants has stoked worries about crime and terrorism, the party’s focus on Islam (which “not a part of Germany”) and its popular support have both jumped.
德国“新选择党”一开始是反欧元党，可随着中欧难民和移民涌入——他们导致人们对犯罪和恐怖主义的担忧，该党把矛头对准伊斯兰（“不属于德国”就是他们的宣言），民众支持率飙升。
In short, there is ample reason for skepticism about whether the new nationalists can prove themselves a genuinely secular, democratic alternative to globalism.
简而言之，有充分理由怀疑，新民族主义者能否证明自己真是全球主义之外的另一个世俗和民主的选择。
If globalists are to regain the public’s trust, they will need to re-examine their own policies. The dislocation caused by past globalization casts doubt on the wisdom of prescribing more.
如果全球主义者要重获公众信任，他们必须重新审视自己的政策。过去的全球化导致的混乱让人们产生怀疑他们黔驴技穷。
That globalization’s winners can compensate its losers makes impeccable economic logic, but it rings hollow among those too old to retrain or move. Political capital might be better invested in preserving existing trade pacts, not passing new ones.
全球化的赢家应该补偿输家，这一经济逻辑没毛病，可对于那些上了岁数没法再做改变的人而言，这听起来很空洞。政治资本最好投资于保持现有的贸易协定，而不是推陈出新。
Many European globalists blame the euro’s crisis on too little integration, not too much. But pressing for a more federal Europe could further alienate voters who “do not share our Euro-enthusiasm,” warned Donald Tusk, the former prime minister of Poland who is now president of the European Council, last May. “Disillusioned with the great visions of the future, they demand that we cope with the present reality.”
许多欧洲全球主义者认为欧元危机处在融合不够，而非融合过度。可推动欧洲走向联邦会进一步疏远那些“不持有我们这种欧洲热情”的选民，波兰前总理、如今的欧洲理事会主席图斯克去年五月警告说。“他们未来的伟大愿景破灭了，他们要求我们脚踏实地，面对现实。”
Above all, globalists should not equate concern for cultural norms and national borders with xenophobia. Large majorities of Americans, for example, welcome immigrants so long as they adopt American values, learn English, bring useful skills and wait their turn. Australia’s low tolerance for illegal immigration helps to maintain public support for high levels of legal entrants.
最重要的是，全球主义者不要把对文化习俗和国家边界的忧虑等同于仇外。例如，美国绝大多数人欢迎移民，只要他们遵守美国价值，学习英语，有技能，并耐心等待。澳大利亚对非法移民的低容忍度恰恰有助于让公众继续支持合法移民。
“We’ve created this false dichotomy that if you’re not for open borders, you’re racist,” says Avik Roy, president of the conservative Foundation for Research on Equal Opportunity and a former adviser to Republican presidential candidates. “There is some sort of middle ground between a nationalist and globalist approach,” Mr. Roy argues.
“如果不开放边界，你就是种族主义者，这种非此即彼是错误的。”保守主义的平等机会研究基金会主席、共和党总统候选人前顾问Avik Roy说。“在民族主义和全球主义道路之间还有某种中间路线。”
Even as committed a globalist as Mr. Obama has come to acknowledge this. Democrats, he told Rolling Stone the day after the election, must recognize that “for the majority of the American people, borders mean something.”
就连像奥巴马一样的全球主义者也承认这一点。当选后他对《滚石》杂志说，民主党人必须认识到，“对大多数美国人，边界是有所意义的。”