书摘 | 巴以为何无和平？(上)
Israel-Palestine: the real reason there’s still no peace （Part 1）
Scattered over the land between the Jordan river and the Mediterranean Sea lie the remnants of failed peace plans, international summits, secret negotiations, UN resolutions and state-building programmes, most of them designed to partition this long-contested territory into two independent states, Israel and Palestine. The collapse of these initiatives has been as predictable as the confidence with which US presidents have launched new ones, and the current administration is no exception.
在约旦河和地中海之间的土地上，遍布着失败的和平计划、国际峰会、秘密协商、联合国决议和建国工程，这些烂尾行动多数旨在将这块长期存在争议的领土分成两个独立的国家——以色列和巴勒斯坦。历任美国总统都信心满满，推出新策，可以预料，这些行动终遭失败，本届政府也不例外。
In the quarter century since Israelis and Palestinians first started negotiating under US auspices in 1991, there has been no shortage of explanations for why each particular round of talks failed. The rationalisations appear and reappear in the speeches of presidents, the reports of thinktanks and the memoirs of former officials and negotiators: bad timing; artificial deadlines; insufficient preparation; scant attention from the US president; want of support from regional states; inadequate confidence-building measures; coalition politics; or leaders devoid of courage.
1991年巴以双方在美国的主持下首次开展谈判以来的二十五年中，不乏对历轮谈判失败原因的解释。总统的演讲、智库报告及曾经的官员和谈判者的回忆录里，反复找理由，如时机不对、人为设限、准备不足、美国总统缺乏关注、地区国家不予支持、未能建立信任、连横政治或是领导人缺乏勇气。
Among the most common refrains are that extremists were allowed to set the agenda and there was a neglect of bottom-up economic development and state-building. And then there are those who point at negative messaging, insurmountable scepticism or the absence of personal chemistry (a particularly fanciful explanation for anyone who has witnessed the warm familiarity of Palestinian and Israeli negotiators as they reunite in luxury hotels and reminisce about old jokes and ex-comrades over breakfast buffets and post-meeting toasts). If none of the above works, there is always the worst cliche of them all – lack of trust.
最常见的托词是，极端分子得以设置了议程，忽视了自下而上的经济发展及建国方案。也有人指出言辞负面、难以克服相互怀疑或个人关系不佳（巴以谈判人员在豪华酒店重聚，在自助早餐和会后祝酒宴上一起讲老笑话并回忆老战友时表现得亲密友好，对于见证此情此景的人，个人关系不好这尤属天方夜谭）。如果上述原因都不成立，总有一句最老套的话等着——缺乏信任。
Postmortem accounts vary in their apportioning of blame. But nearly all of them share a deep-seated belief that both societies desire a two-state agreement, and therefore need only the right conditions – together with a bit of nudging, trust-building and perhaps a few more positive inducements – to take the final step.
In this view, the Oslo accords of the mid-1990s would have led to peace had it not been for the tragic assassination of the Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995.
事后推责的方式各不相同，但几乎都打心底里认为，双方社会希望达成两国协议，因此只需条件合适，有人推上一把，建立信任，或许再有几个积极的诱导因素，就能大功告成。按这种观点，若非以色列总理伊扎克·拉宾1995年被暗杀，九十年代中期的奥斯陆和平协议本可以带来和平。
The 1998 Wye River Memorandum and its commitment to further Israeli withdrawals from the West Bank would have been implemented if only the Israeli Labor party had joined Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition to back the agreement. The Camp David summit in July 2000 would have succeeded if the US had been less sensitive to Israeli domestic concerns, insisted on a written Israeli proposal, consulted the Arab states at an earlier phase, and taken the more firm and balanced position adopted half a year later, in December 2000, when President Clinton outlined parameters for an agreement. Both parties could have accepted the Clinton parameters with only minimal reservations had the proposal not been presented so fleetingly, as a one-time offer that would disappear when Clinton stepped down less than a month later.
只要以色列工党加入总理本杰明·内塔尼亚胡联合政府并加以支持，1998年要求以色列进一步从约旦河西岸撤兵的《瓦伊河备忘录》就能得到实施。如果美国对以色列国内担忧不那么敏感，坚持将其以色列提议落在纸面上，早期能咨询阿拉伯国家，并在协议订立半年后即2000年12月克林顿总统制立协议规范时采取更加坚定平衡的立场，2000年6月的戴维营峰会本能取得成功。若非这项提议如此仓促，克林顿不到一个月下台后就成为过眼云烟，巴以双方本能稍稍有所保留后就接受克林顿规范。
The negotiations in Taba, Egypt, in January 2001 were on the brink of agreement but failed because time ran out, with Clinton just out of office, and Ehud Barak facing almost certain electoral defeat to Ariel Sharon. The two major peace plans of 2003 – the US-sponsored road map to peace in the Middle East and the unofficial Geneva accord – could have been embraced had it not been for a bloody intifada and a hawkish Likud prime minister in power.
2001年1月埃及塔巴谈判即将达成协议，但因为时间不够而失败，当时克林顿刚刚离任，埃胡德·巴拉克肯定要在大选中输给阿里尔·沙龙。如果没有巴勒斯坦血腥暴动，鹰派的利库德集团总理也没有掌权，那2003年两个重大和平计划——美国支持的中东和平路线图和非官方的《日内瓦协定》——就能被双方接纳。
And on it goes: direct negotiations between the Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas and Netanyahu in 2010 could have lasted more than 13 days if only Israel had agreed to temporarily halt construction of some illegal settlements in exchange for an extra $3bn package from the United States. Several years of secret back-channel negotiations between the envoys of Netanyahu and Abbas could have made history if only they hadn’t been forced to conclude prematurely in late 2013, because of an artificial deadline imposed by separate talks led by secretary of state John Kerry.
不止如此。若非以色列同意暂停建造非法定居点以交换美国价值30亿美元的援助，那么巴勒斯坦总统阿巴斯和以色列总理内塔尼亚胡的直接谈判会超过13天。若非美国国务卿约翰·克里在单独谈判中人为制造了最后期限，导致双方必须在2013年末过早终止，内塔尼亚胡和阿巴斯多年秘密渠道协商本可以改变历史。
And, finally, the Kerry negotiations of 2013–2014 could have led to a framework agreement if the secretary of state had spent even a sixth as much time negotiating the text with the Palestinians as he did with the Israelis, and if he hadn’t made inconsistent promises to the two sides regarding the guidelines for the talks, the release of Palestinian prisoners, curtailing Israeli settlement construction, and the presence of US mediators in the negotiating room.
最后，如果国务卿克里能在巴勒斯坦花上哪怕他在以色列的六分之一的时间商定协议文本，如果他没有在谈判指导原则、释放巴勒斯坦囚犯、限制以色列建造定居点和美国调解员进入谈判室等问题向双方作出不一致的承诺，那么2013年到2014年的克里谈判本可形成一个框架性协定。
Each of these rounds of diplomacy began with vows to succeed where predecessors had failed. Each included affirmations of the urgency of peace or warnings of the closing window, perhaps even the last chance, for a two-state solution. Each ended with a list of tactical mistakes and unforeseen developments that resulted in failure. And, just as surely, each neglected to offer the most logical and parsimonious explanation for failure: no agreement was reached because at least one of the parties preferred to maintain the impasse.
每一轮的外交谈判都誓言要在前者失败的地方取得成功。每一轮都表明实现和平时不我待，警告说谈判窗口正在关闭，认为那是推出两国方案的最后一次机会。每一轮都以一连串策略性失误和难以预见的情况导致失败。当然，同样没有例外，每一轮都没有给出最有逻辑性且最简洁的失败原因：至少一方愿意维持僵局，导致无法达成协议。
The Palestinians chose no agreement over one that did not meet the bare minimum supported by international law and most nations of the world. For years this consensus view supported the establishment of a Palestinian state on the pre-1967 lines with minor, equivalent land swaps that would allow Israel to annex some settlements. The Palestinian capital would be in East Jerusalem, with sovereignty over the holy site known to Jews as the Temple Mount and to Muslims as the Noble Sanctuary or al-Aqsa mosque compound, and overland contiguity with the rest of the Palestinian state. Israel would withdraw its forces from the West Bank and release Palestinian prisoners. And Palestinian refugees would be offered compensation, a right to return not to their homes but to their homeland in the State of Palestine, acknowledgment of Israel’s partial responsibility for the refugee problem, and, on a scale that would not perceptibly change Israel’s demography, a return of some refugees to their pre-1948 lands and homes.
巴勒斯坦拒绝接受达不到国际法和大多数国家支持的最基本条件的协议。多年来，以1967年第三次中东战争前边界线建立巴勒斯坦国，只允许存在少量、平等的土地交换从而允许以色列兼并某些定居点，这是建国的共识。巴勒斯坦首都在东耶路撒冷，主权范围包括犹太人心目中的圣地圣殿山，那里也是穆斯林的圣所阿克萨清真寺所在地，并应与巴勒斯坦国其他领土毗 43 35288 43 15289 0 0 2854 0 0:00:12 0:00:05 0:00:07 2855连。以色列应从约旦河西岸撤兵并释放巴勒斯坦囚犯。巴勒斯坦难民应得到赔偿，不是回家的权力，而是回到巴勒斯坦国家园的权利。以色列要承认对造成难民问题负有部分责任，在难民不会显著改变以色列人口构成的情况下，允许部分难民回到1948年第一次中东战争前的土地和家园。
Although years of violence and repression have led Palestinians to make some small concessions that chipped away at this compromise, they have not fundamentally abandoned it. They continue to hope that the support of the majority of the world’s states for a plan along these lines will eventually result in an agreement. In the meantime, the status quo has been made more bearable thanks to the architects of the peace process, who have spent billions to prop up the Palestinian government, create conditions of prosperity for decision-makers in Ramallah, and dissuade the population from confronting the occupying force.
尽管多年的暴力和压迫迫使巴勒斯坦人作出某些小的让步，削弱了这一折中方案，但他们并未彻底放弃。他们仍然希望世界大多数国家支持按这一划界方案达成协议。同时，和平进程设计者斥资数十亿美元支持巴勒斯坦政府，为拉马拉的决策者创造实现繁荣的条件，并说服人民不要与占领军发生冲突，这使得现状更加可以接受。
Israel, for its part, has consistently opted for stalemate rather than the sort of agreement outlined above. The reason is obvious: the deal’s cost is much higher than the cost of making no deal. The damages Israel would risk incurring through such an accord are massive. They include perhaps the greatest political upheaval in the country’s history; enormous demonstrations against – if not majority rejection of – Palestinian sovereignty in Jerusalem and over the Temple Mount/Noble Sanctuary; and violent rebellion by some Jewish settlers and their supporters.
以色列方面则一直选择维持僵局，而非达成上述协议。原因很明显，达成协议的成本远高于没有协议。达成如此协议招致的风险是巨大的，包括可能引发国家历史上最大的政治动荡，在耶路撒冷和圣殿山反对巴勒斯坦主权（即便不是多数人拒绝）的大规模示威游行及犹太人定居者及其支持者的暴力反抗。
There could also be bloodshed during forcible evacuations of West Bank settlements and rifts within the body implementing the evictions, the Israeli army, whose share of religious infantry officers now surpasses one third. Israel would lose military control over the West Bank, resulting in less intelligence-gathering, less room for manoeuvre in future wars, and less time to react to a surprise attack. It would face increased security risks from a Gaza-West Bank corridor, which would allow militants, ideology and weapons-production techniques to spread from Gaza training camps to the West Bank hills overlooking Israel’s airport. Israeli intelligence services would no longer control which Palestinians enter and exit the occupied territories. The country would cease extraction of the West Bank’s natural resources, including water, lose profits from managing Palestinian customs and trade, and pay the large economic and social price of relocating tens of thousands of settlers.
强制拆除西岸定居点也会引发流血事件，还可能导致实施驱逐机构即以色列军队内部的分裂，以军中虔信的步兵军官超过三分之一。以色列还会失去对西岸的军事控制，导致情报减少，在未来战争中机动空间变小，对突然袭击的反应时间变短。以色列将面临来自加沙-约旦河西岸走廊更大的安全风险，这一走廊允许好战分子、意识形态和武器制造技术从加沙训练营延伸到俯瞰以色列机场的西岸山区。以色列情报部门无法控制进出占领区的巴勒斯坦人。国家将停止从西岸获取自然资源，包括水资源，无法通过管理巴勒斯坦海关和贸易获利，还要为迁移上万名定居者付出巨大的经济和社会代价。
Only a fraction of these costs could be offset by a peace agreement’s benefits. But chief among them would be the blow dealt to efforts to delegitimise Israel and the normalisation of relations with other nations of the region. Israeli businesses would be able to operate more openly in Arab states, and government cooperation with such countries as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates would go from covert to overt. Through a treaty with the Palestinians, Israel could attain the relocation of every Tel Aviv embassy to Jerusalem, and receive additional financial and security benefits from the US and Europe. But all of these combined do not come close to outweighing the deficits.
和平协议带来的好处仅能抵消这些代价中的一小部分。但首要的益处是，这对不承认以色列为主权国家的企图可谓当头一击，可以让以色列与该地区其他国家关系正常化。以色列企业可以更加开放地在阿拉伯国家做生意，与沙特阿拉伯、阿联酋等国家的政府合作可以由暗转明。与巴勒斯坦签订条约，以色列可以将每一所特拉维夫大使馆搬回耶路撒冷，还将额外获得来自美国和欧洲的金融及安全利益。但所有这些好处远不能弥补坏处。
Nor have the moral costs of occupation for Israeli society been high enough to change the calculus. Ending international opprobrium is indeed important to the country’s elites, and as they find themselves increasingly shunned, the incentive to withdraw from the occupied territories will likely increase. But so far Israel has proven quite capable of living with the decades-old label of “pariah”, the stain of occupation and the associated impact on the country’s internal harmony and relations with diaspora Jews. For all the recent fretting about decreasing American Jewish support for Israel, the conversation today is not so different than it was at the time of the first Likud-led governments decades ago. Similarly enduring – and endurable – are the worries that occupation delegitimises Zionism and causes discord within Israel.
对以色列社会而言，占领的道德成本也没有高到可以改变这种盘算。终止国际指责对以色列精英来说的确很重要，且他们发现自己越是被人避之不及，从占领区撤军的动力反倒越强。数十年来的“弃民”标签、强占土地带来的污点，对国家内部和谐和同离散犹太人关系的共同影响，到目前为止，以色列与这三大问题和睦共存。尽管最近美国犹太人对以色列支持下降颇让人烦恼，今天这套说法同几十年前政府开始由利库德集团领导时差别不大。占领会使犹太复国主义不合法并引发以色列内部不和，这种担忧同样一直有之。
More than 30 years ago, former deputy mayor of Jerusalem Meron Benvenisti wrote of growing numbers of Israelis who had doubts about Zionism, “expressed in the forms of alienation, emigration of young Israelis, the emergence of racist Jews, violence in society, the widening gap between Israel and the diaspora, and a general feeling of inadequacy”. Israelis have grown adept at tuning such criticisms out.
30多年前，耶路撒冷的前副市长梅伦·本维尼斯蒂写到，越来越多的以色列人对犹太复国主义持怀疑态度，“表现在人心疏离，年轻以色列人移居国外，出现抱有种族偏见的犹太人和社会暴力，以色列和离散犹太人之间差距越来越大，以及人们普遍感到不幸福”。以色列人越来越擅长对这些批评置若罔闻。
It was, is, and will remain irrational for Israel to absorb the costs of an agreement when the price of the alternative is so comparatively low. The consequences of choosing impasse are hardly threatening: mutual recriminations over the cause of stalemate, new rounds of talks, and retaining control of all of the West Bank from within and much of Gaza from without.
不管是过去、现在还是将来，对于以色列而言，当另一种选择代价相对较低时，承担达成协议的代价都是不合理的。维持僵局，后果几乎毫无威胁性：对裹足不前相互指责，展开又一轮谈判，从内部控制全部约旦西岸，从外部控制大部分加沙地区。
Meanwhile, Israel continues to receive more US military aid per year than goes to all the world’s other nations combined, and presides over a growing economy, rising standards of living and a population that reports one of the world’s highest levels of subjective wellbeing. Israel will go on absorbing the annoying but so-far tolerable costs of complaints about settlement policies. And it will likely witness several more countries bestowing the State of Palestine with symbolic recognition, a few more negative votes in impotent university student councils, limited calls for boycotts of settlement goods, and occasional bursts of violence that the greatly overpowered Palestinians are too weak to sustain. There is no contest.
与此同时，以色列每年继续获得更多美国军事援助，而非拥抱世界上所有其他国家，让经济增长、人民生活水平上升，管理世界上主观幸福感最强的人民。以色列将会继续忍受对定居点政策令人讨厌但迄今为止成本可以忍受的抱怨。以色列可能会看到更多国家象征性地承认巴勒斯坦国，在无权的大学生理事会多上几张反对票，有限地呼吁抵制定居点商品及偶尔发生的暴力事件。在这些暴力事件中，被压服的巴勒斯坦人不堪一击，他们压根不是对手。
The real explanation for the past decades of failed peace negotiations is not mistaken tactics or imperfect circumstances, but that no strategy can succeed if it is premised on Israel behaving irrationally. Most arguments put to Israel for agreeing to a partition are that it is preferable to an imagined, frightening future in which the country ceases to be either a Jewish state or a democracy, or both. Israel is constantly warned that if it does not soon decide to grant Palestinians citizenship or sovereignty, it will become, at some never-defined future date, an apartheid state.
过去几十年，和平谈判失败的真正原因并非战术错误或情况不利，只要以色列认为行为不合理，任何战略都不会成功。关于以色列同意分治的大多数论点是，这总比一种想象中的可怕未来要好，即国家将不再是犹太国家或民主国家，或两者皆空。以色列不断受到警告，如果不早日决定给予巴勒斯坦公民身份或主权，将在未来某个日子，成为一个种族隔离国家。
But these assertions contain the implicit acknowledgment that it makes no sense for Israel to strike a deal today rather than wait to see if such imagined threats actually materialise. If and when they do come to be, Israel can then make a deal. Perhaps in the interim, the hardship of Palestinian life will cause enough emigration that Israel may annex the West Bank without giving up the state’s Jewish majority. Or, perhaps, the West Bank will be absorbed by Jordan, and Gaza by Egypt, a better outcome than Palestinian statehood, in the view of many Israeli officials.
但这些断言默认，以色列今天达成协议并没有意义，还不如等等看这些威胁是否会成真。如果果然成真，以色列就达成协议。也许这期间，巴勒斯坦人会因生活苦难而移民他国，以色列反倒把西岸吞并了，而不用放弃这个国家中占大多数的犹太人。又或许西岸会被约旦吸收，加沙被埃及吸收，在不少以色列官员看来，那比建立巴勒斯坦国更好。
It is hard to argue that forestalling an agreement in the present makes a worse deal more likely in the future: the international community and the PLO have already established the ceiling of their demands – 22% of the land now under Israeli control – while providing far less clarity about the floor, which Israel can try to lower. Israel has continued to reject the same Palestinian claims made since the 1980s, albeit with a few added Palestinian concessions. In fact, history suggests that a strategy of waiting would serve the country well: from the British government’s 1937 Peel Commission partition plan and the UN partition plan of 1947 to UN Security Council Resolution 242 and the Oslo accords, every formative initiative endorsed by the great powers has given more to the Jewish community in Palestine than the previous one.
很难说现在阻碍达成协议会让将来的协议更糟糕：国际社会和巴解组织已经确定了最高要求——得到现在以色列控制下22%的土地，却不说明最低要求，以防以色列尽可能压低。以色列则继续拒绝巴勒斯坦人自二十世纪八十年代以来提出的一贯主张，尽管巴勒斯坦人已作出了某些让步。事实上，历史表明，等待策略对以色列有利：从英国政府1937年剥离委员会分治计划到联合国1947年分治计划，再到联合国安理会242号决议及奥斯陆协定，每一份大国支持的关键倡议都比前一个给予巴勒斯坦犹太社区更多好处。
Even if an Israeli prime minister knew that one day the world’s nations would impose sanctions on Israel if it did not accept a two-state agreement, it would still be irrational to strike such a deal now. Israel could instead wait until that day comes, and thereby enjoy many more years of West Bank control and the security advantages that go with it – particularly valuable at a time of cataclysm in the region.
即使以色列总理有一天得知，如果以色列不接受两国协议，世界各国会制裁以色列，现在就接受如是协议也是不合理的。以色列可以等那一天到来，从而控制西岸更久，并获得随之而来的安全优势，这在该地区剧变之时尤其有价值。
未完待续
This is an adapted extract from The Only Language They Understand: Forcing Compromise in Israel and Palestine, published by Metropolitan Books.
译者 辛小川
观世界，学英文
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