全球化兴衰（下）| 卫报
One curious thing about the pro-globalisation consensus of the 1990s and 2000s, and its collapse in recent years, is how closely the cycle resembles a previous era. Pursuing free trade has always produced displacement and inequality – and political chaos, populism and retrenchment to go with it. Every time the social consequences of free trade are overlooked, political backlash follows. But free trade is only one of many forms that economic integration can take. History seems to suggest, however, that it might be the most destabilising one.
二十世纪九十年代和新世纪头十年达成的全球化共识，近年来瓦解了，让人好奇的是，这一周期同上一时代相似度有多高？追求自由贸易往往会造成人民流离失所和不平等现象，同时伴随着政治混乱、民粹主义和经济紧缩。每当自由贸易带来的社会后果被忽视时，强烈的政治反弹就随之而来。但自由贸易只是经济一体化可以采取的许多形式之一，然而历史似乎表明，它可能是最不稳定的一种形式。
Nearly all economists and scholars of globalisation like to point to the fact that the economy was rather globalised by the early 20th century. As European countries colonised Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, they turned their colonies into suppliers of raw materials for European manufacturers, as well as markets for European goods. Meanwhile, the economies of the colonisers were also becoming free-trade zones for each other. “The opening years of the 20th century were the closest thing the world had ever seen to a free world market for goods, capital and labour,” writes the Harvard professor of government Jeffry Frieden in his standard account, Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the 20th Century. “It would be a hundred years before the world returned to that level of globalisation.”
几乎所有的全球经济学家和学者都指出，到二十世纪初期，经济已相当全球化。欧洲国家殖民了亚洲和撒哈拉以南非洲地区，将殖民地转变为欧洲制造商原材料供应地和欧洲产品倾销地。同时，殖民者所有的经济体也彼此间成为自由贸易区。“20世纪初有最为自由的商品、资金和劳务世界市场，”哈佛大学政府管理专业教授杰夫里·弗里登在《全球资本主义》一书中写道。“要想恢复到那样的全球化水平还要100年。”
In addition to military force, what underpinned this convenient arrangement for imperial nations was the gold standard. Under this system, each national currency had an established gold value: the British pound sterling was backed by 113 grains of pure gold; the US dollar by 23.22 grains, and so on. This entailed that exchange rates were also fixed: a British pound was always equal to 4.87 dollars. The stability of exchange rates meant that the cost of doing business across borders was predictable. Just like the eurozone today, you could count on the value of the currency staying the same, so long as the storehouse of gold remained more or less the same.
除军事力量外，帝国间便利安排的根基是金本位。在这一体系下，每种国家货币都有既定的黄金价值：每英镑等同113粒纯金，每美元等同于23.22粒纯金。汇率是固定的：一英镑兑4.87美元。汇率稳定意味着跨境交易所需费用可以预见，就像在今天的欧元区，只要黄金储备或多或少维持相同水平，货币价值就会保持不变。
When there were gold shortages – as there were in the 1870s – the system stopped working. To protect the sanctity of the standard under conditions of stress, central bankers across the Europe and the US tightened access to credit and deflated prices. This left financiers in a decent position, but crushed farmers and the rural poor, for whom falling prices meant starvation. Then as now, economists and mainstream politicians largely overlooked the darker side of the economic picture.
当出现像十九世纪七十年代时那种黄金短缺时，系统会停止运转。为保护金本位承压时仍神圣不可侵犯，欧美中央银行家收紧信贷、压低物价。这让金融家维持了体面，却压垮了农民和农村的穷人，对他们而言，物价下降意味着挨饿。而现在，经济学家和主流政治家大都忽略了经济宏图中更加黑暗的这一面。
In the US, this fuelled one of the world’s first self-described “populist” revolts, leading to the nomination of William Jennings Bryan as the Democratic party candidate in 1896. At his nominating convention, he gave a famous speech lambasting gold backers: “You shall not press down upon the brow of labour this crown of thorns, you shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold.” Then as now, financial elites and their supporters in the press were horrified. “There has been an upheaval of the political crust,” the Times of London reported, “and strange creatures have come forth.”
在美国，这激发了世界上反抗，他们首次将自己定义为“民粹主义”，1896年，威廉·詹宁斯·布莱恩获提名为民主党候选人。在提名大会上，他发表了著名演讲，严厉斥责金本位支持者：“你们不该将荆棘之冠强加在劳动人民的额头上，不该将人类钉死在黄金的十字架上。”当时和现在一样，金融精英和他们的媒体支持者惊恐万分。伦敦《泰晤士报》报道：“政治地壳发生剧变，奇怪的生物从地底下跑出来了。”
Businessmen were so distressed by Bryan that they backed the Republican candidate, William McKinley, who won partly by outspending Bryan five to one. Meanwhile, gold was bolstered by the discovery of new reserves in colonial South Africa. But the gold standard could not survive the first world war and the Great Depression. By the 1930s, unionisation had spread to more industries and there was a growing worldwide socialist movement. Protecting gold would mean mass unemployment and social unrest. Britain went off the gold standard in 1931, while Franklin Roosevelt took the US off it in 1933; France and several other countries would follow in 1936.
布莱恩让商人痛苦不堪，他们支持共和党候选人威廉·麦金利，威廉·麦金利成功当选的部分原因在于其竞选开支是布莱恩的5倍。同时，南非殖民地发现新的黄金储备，黄金的地位得以加强，但金本位在第一次世界大战和随后的经济大萧条中分崩离析。到二十世纪三十年代，工会化已经扩展到更多行业，全球社会主义运动不断兴起。保护黄金意味着大规模失业和社会动荡。1931年，英国放弃金本位，富兰克林·罗斯福在1933年带领美国抽身而去，法国和其他几个国家在1936年紧跟其后放弃金本位。
The prioritisation of finance and trade over the welfare of people had come momentarily to an end. But this wasn’t the end of the global economic system.
将金融与贸易置于人民权益之上的时代暂告一段落，但这并非全球金融体系的尾声。
The trade system that followed was global, too, with high levels of trade – but it took place on terms that often allowed developing countries to protect their industries. Because, from the perspective of free traders, protectionism is always seen as bad, the success of this postwar system has been largely under-recognised.
随后产生的贸易体系也是全球性的，贸易水平很高，虽然这一体系建立的条件是常常允许发展中国家保护其工业。因为在自由贸易者看来，保护主义总归是害群之马，这种战后体系的成功在很大程度上被低估了。
Over the course of the 1930s and 40s, liberals – John Maynard Keynes among them – who had previously regarded departures from free trade as “an imbecility and an outrage” began to lose their religion. “The decadent international but individualistic capitalism, in the hands of which we found ourselves after the war, is not a success,” Keynes found himself writing in 1933. “It is not intelligent, it is not beautiful, it is not just, it is not virtuous – and it doesn’t deliver the goods. In short, we dislike it, and we are beginning to despise it.” He claimed sympathies “with those who would minimise, rather than with those who would maximise, economic entanglement among nations,” and argued that goods “be homespun whenever it is reasonably and conveniently possible”.
整个二十世纪三四十年代，自由主义者开始失去信仰，约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯也是其中之一，他过去把背离自由贸易的行为视作是“低能和暴行”。“战后我们被日渐式微的国际性个人资本主义所操控，但却发现这并非成功之举，”凯恩斯在1933年写道。“它不明智、不美妙、不公正、不道德，不能给我们带来益处。简而言之，我们讨厌它，并且开始鄙视他。”他赞同“那些减少而非增加国家间经济关连的人”，宣称“如果合理且方便的话”，商品“应尽量自产自销”。
The international systems that chastened figures such as Keynes helped produce in the next few years – especially the Bretton Woods agreement and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Gatt) – set the terms under which the new wave of globalisation would take place.
变卦的凯恩斯等人接下来几年中推动构建的国际体系，尤其是布雷顿森林协定和关税及贸易总协定，为新一轮全球化潮流奠定了基础。
The key to the system’s viability, in Rodrik’s view, was its flexibility – something absent from contemporary globalisation, with its one-size-fits-all model of capitalism. Bretton Woods stabilised exchange rates by pegging the dollar loosely to gold, and other currencies to the dollar. Gatt consisted of rules governing free trade – negotiated by participating countries in a series of multinational “rounds” – that left many areas of the world economy, such as agriculture, untouched or unaddressed. “Gatt’s purpose was never to maximise free trade,” Rodrik writes. “It was to achieve the maximum amount of trade compatible with different nations doing their own thing. In that respect, the institution proved spectacularly successful.”
罗德里克认为，系统可行性的关键在于其灵活性，这正是当下全球化缺乏的特性，当下资本主义是一刀切的模式。布雷顿森林体系通过将美元与黄金宽松挂钩，而其他货币与美元挂钩，从而稳定汇率。关税及贸易总协定包含管理自由贸易的规则，经过参与国“数轮”跨国协商后制定出来，但农业等全球性经济领域未被触及。“关贸总协定的目的从来就不是最大限度地实现自由贸易，” 罗德里克说。“其目的在于在实现贸易最大化的同时，各国能各行其是，各尽其责。该机构在这方面取得了巨大成功。”
Partly because Gatt was not always dogmatic about free trade, it allowed most countries to figure out their own economic objectives, within a somewhat international ambit. When nations contravened the agreement’s terms on specific areas of national interest, they found that it “contained loopholes wide enough for an elephant to pass”, in Rodrik’s words. If a nation wanted to protect its steel industry, for example, it could claim “injury” under the rules of Gatt and raise tariffs to discourage steel imports: “an abomination from the standpoint of free trade”. These were useful for countries that were recovering from the war and needed to build up their own industries via tariffs – duties imposed on particular imports. Meanwhile, from 1948 to 1990, world trade grew at an annual average of nearly 7% – faster than the post-communist years, which we think of as the high point of globalisation. “If there was a golden era of globalisation,” Rodrik has written, “this was it.”
关贸总协定对自由贸易并非总是一成不变，这在某些程度上允许大多数国家在某一国际范围内实现其经济目标。当国家违反具体领域的国家利益条款时，用罗德里克的话说，他们发现“漏洞大到能穿过一头大象”。 例如，如果一国要保护其钢铁行业，根据关贸总协定的规则，该国可以称其“受到伤害”，从而提高关税以减少钢铁进口：“这种行为从自由贸易角度看是面目可憎的。”通过对特定商品的进口加税，对于那些正从战争中复苏并需要通过关税建立本土产业的国家来说是行之有效的办法。另一方面，从1948年到1990年，世界贸易年均增长近7％，快于共产主义瓦解后的时期（译注：1990年后），我们认为这是全球化的巅峰时期。“如果全球化有黄金时代，”罗德里克写道，“应该是这段时期。”
Gatt, however, failed to cover many of the countries in the developing world. These countries eventually created their own system, the United Nations conference on trade and development (UNCTAD). Under this rubric, many countries – especially in Latin America, the Middle East, Africa and Asia – adopted a policy of protecting homegrown industries by replacing imports with domestically produced goods. It worked poorly in some places – India and Argentina, for example, where the trade barriers were too high, resulting in factories that cost more to set up than the value of the goods they produced – but remarkably well in others, such as east Asia, much of Latin America and parts of sub-Saharan Africa, where homegrown industries did spring up. Though many later economists and commentators would dismiss the achievements of this model, it theoretically fit Larry Summers’s recent rubric on globalisation: “the basic responsibility of government is to maximise the welfare of citizens, not to pursue some abstract concept of the global good.”
然而，关贸总协定未能覆盖发展中世界的许多国家。这些国家最终建立了自己的体系，即联合国贸易和发展会议。在这一准则下，许多国家都采取了保护本国工业的政策，以国产替代进口，这在拉丁美洲、中东、非洲和亚洲尤为普遍。但这种策略在某些地区施展不灵，例如在印度和阿根廷，他们的贸易壁垒设置过高，导致建造工厂成本高于所生产商品的价值。但在其他地区，这一策略取得辉煌成就，如东亚、拉丁美洲的大部分地区及撒哈拉沙漠以南的部分地区，这里的本土产业迅猛发展。尽管后来许多经济学家和评论家都否定这种模式成就，但理论上满足拉里·萨默斯最近提出的全球化标准：“政府的基本职责是最大限度扩大公民福利，而非追求一些抽象的全球共好的观念”。
The critical turning point – away from this system of trade balanced against national protections – came in the 1980s. Flagging growth and high inflation in the west, along with growing competition from Japan, opened the way for a political transformation. The elections of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan were seminal, putting free-market radicals in charge of two of the world’s five biggest economies and ushering in an era of “hyperglobalisation”. In the new political climate, economies with large public sectors and strong governments within the global capitalist system were no longer seen as aids to the system’s functioning, but impediments to it.
旨在平衡国家保护主义的贸易体系，在二十世纪八十年代迎来关键转折。西方增长放缓，通胀高企，日本竞争力不断增强，这为政治转型开辟了新道路。玛格丽特·撒切尔夫人和里根·里根当选具有重大影响，他们让支持自由市场的激进分子控制了五个世界最大经济体中的两个，并开创了一个“超全球化”时代。在新的政治气候中，全球资本主义体系中，国营经济庞大且政府实行强力控制的经济体不再被视为体系运行的助力，它们成了绊脚石。
Not only did these ideologies take hold in the US and the UK; they seized international institutions as well. Gatt renamed itself as the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the new rules the body negotiated began to cut more deeply into national policies. Its international trade rules sometimes undermined national legislation. The WTO’s appellate court intervened relentlessly in member nations’ tax, environmental and regulatory policies, including those of the United States: the US’s fuel emissions standards were judged to discriminate against imported gasoline, and its ban on imported shrimp caught without turtle-excluding devices was overturned. If national health and safety regulations were stricter than WTO rules necessitated, they could only remain in place if they were shown to have “scientific justification”.
这些意识形态不仅在美国和英国占据主导地位，它们控制了国际机构。关贸总协定更名为世界贸易组织，其规则开始更为深入地干涉国家内政，其国际贸易规则有时会破坏国家立法。世界贸易组织的上诉法院持续干涉成员国关税、环境和监管政策，其中包括美国：美国碳排标准被裁定歧视进口汽油，并驳回美国禁止进口在未装海龟放生装置条件下捕捉的咸水虾。如果国内健康和安全的监管比世贸组织要求更严格，只有出示”科学证据”才能执行。
The purest version of hyperglobalisation was tried out in Latin America in the 1980s. Known as the “Washington consensus”, this model usually involved loans from the IMF that were contingent on those countries lowering trade barriers and privatising many of their nationally held industries. Well into the 1990s, economists were proclaiming the indisputable benefits of openness. In an influential 1995 paper, Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner wrote: “We find no cases to support the frequent worry that a country might open and yet fail to grow.”
二十世纪八十年代，拉丁美洲试行了超全球化最为纯粹的版本。这个模式通常被称为“华盛顿共识”，国际基金组织根据国家贸易壁垒减低程度和国营经济私有化程度向拉美各国发放贷款。进入二十世纪九十年代，经济学家们宣称开放的益处毋庸置疑。1995年发布的一篇颇具影响力的文章中，杰弗里·萨克斯和安德鲁·华纳写道：“人们经常担忧国家开放可能带来增长停滞，但我们没有发现一例可以佐证这一观点的实例。”
But the Washington consensus was bad for business: most countries did worse than before. Growth faltered, and citizens across Latin America revolted against attempted privatisations of water and gas. In Argentina, which followed the Washington consensus to the letter, a grave crisis resulted in 2002, precipitating an economic collapse and massive street protests that forced out the government that had pursued privatising reforms. Argentina’s revolt presaged a left-populist upsurge across the continent: from 1999 to 2007, leftwing leaders and parties took power in Brazil, Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, all of them campaigning against the Washington consensus on globalisation. These revolts were a preview of the backlash of today.
但华盛顿共识对商业并无益处：大多数国家情况比以前更糟糕。增长徘徊不前，全拉美公民都在反抗试图私有化水和天然气。严格遵守华盛顿共识的阿根廷在2002年爆发严重危机，经济迅速崩溃，导致大规模游行抗议，追求私有化改革的政府被迫下台。阿根廷的反抗预示着左倾民粹主义在拉美大陆崛起。从1999年到2007年，左翼领导人和政党在巴西、委内瑞拉、玻利维亚和厄瓜多尔相继掌权，他们开展活动反对华盛顿共识对全球化的规定。这些反抗是如今抵制全球化的预演。
Rodrik – perhaps the contemporary economist whose views have been most amply vindicated by recent events – was himself a beneficiary of protectionism in Turkey. His father’s ballpoint pen company was sheltered under tariffs, and achieved enough success to allow Rodrik to attend Harvard in the 1970s as an undergraduate. This personal understanding of the mixed nature of economic success may be one of the reasons why his work runs against the broad consensus of mainstream economics writing on globalisation.
近期发生的事件最有力地证明了罗德里克的观点，作为一个当代经济学家，他自己就是土耳其保护主义的受益者。他父亲的圆珠笔公司在关税保护下得以生存，父亲的成功使他得以在二十世纪七十年代去哈佛读本科。个人对经济成功的复杂理解可能是他反对那些研究全球化的主流经济学家达成的广泛共识的原因之一。
“I never felt that my ideas were out of the mainstream,” Rodrik told me recently. Instead, it was that the mainstream had lost touch with the diversity of opinions and methods that already existed within economics. “The economics profession is strange in that the more you move away from the seminar room to the public domain, the more the nuances get lost, especially on issues of trade.” He lamented the fact that while, in the classroom, the models of trade discuss losers and winners, and, as a result, the necessity of policies of redistribution, in practice, an “arrogance and hubris” had led many economists to ignore these implications. “Rather than speaking truth to power, so to speak, many economists became cheerleaders for globalisation.”
“我从没觉得我的想法脱离主流，”罗德里克最近告诉我。相反，正是主流同经济学中已经存在多样观点和方法脱节了。“经济学很奇怪，你越是逃出研讨会深入公共领域，对细微之处的关注就越少，这在贸易问题上尤为明显。”可让他感到遗憾的是，在课堂上，贸易模型讨论赢家与输家，从而认为有必要推行重新分配政策，相反在实践中，一种“狂妄自大”倒让许多经济学家忽略其后果。“许多经济学家并未把真相告诉当权者，倒成了全球化的拉拉队员。”
In his 2011 book The Globalization Paradox, Rodrik concluded that “we cannot simultaneously pursue democracy, national determination, and economic globalisation.” The results of the 2016 elections and referendums provide ample testimony of the justness of the thesis, with millions voting to push back, for better or for worse, against the campaigns and institutions that promised more globalisation. “I’m not at all surprised by the backlash,” Rodrik told me. “Really, nobody should have been surprised.”
罗德里克在2011年出版的《全球化悖论》一书中得出结论，“我们不可能同时追求民主、国家自决权和经济全球化。”2016年美国大选和英国退欧公投结果充分证明了这一理论的正确性，数百万民众不论好坏，投票反对承诺扩大全球化的运动和机构。“公众抵制在我意料之中，”罗德里克告诉我。“说真的，没人应该对此感到惊讶。”
But what, in any case, would “more globalisation” look like? For the same economists and writers who have started to rethink their commitments to greater integration, it doesn’t mean quite what it did in the early 2000s. It’s not only the discourse that’s changed: globalisation itself has changed, developing into a more chaotic and unequal system than many economists predicted. The benefits of globalisation have been largely concentrated in a handful of Asian countries. And even in those countries, the good times may be running out.
可不管怎么说，到底该如何“扩大全球化”呢？开始反思自己承诺推动更强一体化的那些经济学家和作者，其含义同新世纪初不尽相同了。不仅关于它的话语变了风向，全球化本身也发生变化，发展成了一个比许多经济学家预想中更为混乱、更不平等的体系。全球化的益处集中在一小撮亚洲国家手中。即便这些国家，大好时光也眼看走到尽头了。
Statistics from Global Inequality, a 2016 book by the development economist Branko Milanović, indicate that in relative terms the greatest benefits of globalisation have accrued to a rising “emerging middle class”, based preponderantly in China. But the cons are there, too: in absolute terms, the largest gains have gone to what is commonly called “the 1%” – half of whom are based in the US. Economist Richard Baldwin has shown in his recent book, The Great Convergence, that nearly all of the gains from globalisation have been concentrated in six countries.
发展经济学家布兰科·米诺维奇2016年出版的《全球不平等统计》表明，相对而言，全球化最大的好处莫过于“新兴中产阶级”崛起，而其中绝大部分是中国人。但全球化弊端也在于此：绝对而言，全球化带来的最大收益都流向了所谓最富裕的“1%”，其中有一半是美国人。经济学家理查德·鲍德温在最近出版的《大趋同》一书中表明，全球化带来的收益几乎全部集中在六个国家。
Barring some political catastrophe, in which rightwing populism continued to gain, and in which globalisation would be the least of our problems – Wolf admitted that he was “not at all sure” that this could be ruled out – globalisation was always going to slow; in fact, it already has. One reason, says Wolf, was that “a very, very large proportion of the gains from globalisation – by no means all – have been exploited. We have a more open world economy to trade than we’ve ever had before.” Citing The Great Convergence, Wolf noted that supply chains have already expanded, and that future developments, such as automation and the use of robots, looked to undermine the promise of a growing industrial workforce. Today, the political priorities were less about trade and more about the challenge of retraining workers, as technology renders old jobs obsolete and transforms the world of work.
除去让某些右翼民粹主义继续得益的政治灾难，认为全球化不是我们的问题，沃尔夫承认他“一点都不确定”能否能阻止这种趋势，全球化注定要放缓，事实上，它现在已经放缓了。沃尔夫说，原因之一，“全球化所能带来的绝大部分福利已被开发完毕，虽然并非完全枯竭。现在的世界贸易经济比以往都要开放。”沃尔夫援引《大趋同》的话，指出供应链已经扩展，自动化和机器人等未来动向看起来会使增加产业劳动力需求的承诺化为泡影。今天，政治政策不应优先考虑贸易，而应着重应对工人再培训的挑战，技术进步淘汰了过时的工作，使工作领域产生了翻天覆地的变化。
Rodrik, too, believes that globalisation, whether reduced or increased, is unlikely to produce the kind of economic effects it once did. For him, this slowdown has something to do with what he calls “premature deindustrialisation”. In the past, the simplest model of globalisation suggested that rich countries would gradually become “service economies”, while emerging economies picked up the industrial burden. Yet recent statistics show the world as a whole is deindustrialising. Countries that one would have expected to have more industrial potential are going through the stages of automation more quickly than previously developed countries did, and thereby failing to develop the broad industrial workforce seen as a key to shared prosperity.
罗德里克也认为，无论扩大或缩小，全球化都不可能复制往日辉煌。在他看来，全球化放缓同所谓“过早去工业化”有关。过去，全球化最简单的模式表明，富国会逐步成为“服务型经济体”，而新兴经济体则负起工业重担。但最近数据显示，全球都在去工业化。人们看好的那些工业潜力更大的国家，现在却以比发达国家更快的速度步入自动化时代，因此无法培育充足的产业劳动力，后者被视作共同繁荣的关键。
For both Rodrik and Wolf, the political reaction to globalisation bore possibilities of deep uncertainty. “I really have found it very difficult to decide whether what we’re living through is a blip, or a fundamental and profound transformation of the world – at least as significant as the one that brought about the first world war and the Russian revolution,” Wolf told me. He cited his agreement with economists such as Summers that shifting away from the earlier emphasis on globalisation had now become a political priority; that to pursue still greater liberalisation was like showing “a red rag to a bull” in terms of what it might do to the already compromised political stability of the western world.
对罗德里克和沃尔夫来说，对全球化的政治反应可能带来深刻的不确定性。沃尔夫告诉我，“我发现要判断我们经历的一切究竟是小波折还是世界发生了根本、深刻的转变，至少与引发第一次世界大战和俄罗斯革命同样重要，这着实非常困难。”他同意萨默斯等经济学家的观点，表示摒弃早期推崇的全球化已成为政治上的首要任务。为稳定政局，西方做出了妥协，追求更大的自由化，无异于“在公牛前挥舞一块红布”。
Rodrik pointed to a belated emphasis, both among political figures and economists, on the necessity of compensating those displaced by globalisation with retraining and more robust welfare states. But pro-free-traders had a history of cutting compensation: Bill Clinton passed Nafta, but failed to expand safety nets. “The issue is that the people are rightly not trusting the centrists who are now promising compensation,” Rodrik said. “One reason that Hillary Clinton didn’t get any traction with those people is that she didn’t have any credibility.”
罗德里克指出，政客和经济学家强调有必要补偿因全球化流离失所的人，为他们提供再培训，建立更健全的福利国家，尽管姗姗来迟。但自由贸易的支持者一度削减了补偿：比尔·克林顿通过了北美自贸协定，却没有扩大社会安全网。“现在的问题是，人们有理由拒绝相信那些承诺补偿的温和派，”罗德里克说。“希拉里·克林顿没能获得这些人的支持，原因之一在于她没有信誉。”
Rodrik felt that economics commentary failed to register the gravity of the situation: that there were increasingly few avenues for global growth, and that much of the damage done by globalisation – economic and political – is irreversible. “There is a sense that we’re at a turning point,” he said. “There’s a lot more thinking about what can be done. There’s a renewed emphasis on compensation – which, you know, I think has come rather late.”
罗德里克认为，经济评论未能把握这种情况的重要性：全球增长途径越来越少，且全球化对经济、政治造成的诸多破坏不可逆转。“感觉我们处于一个转折点，”他说。“我们太多地考虑我们能做什么，将重点放在补偿上，但要知道，我认为来得太晚了。”
译者 叶璐