核战朝鲜之疯子理论（上） | 纽约客
连载
第一篇 疯子理论
第二篇 红色皇帝
第三篇 团结一心
第四篇 玉石俱焚
1. The Madman Theory
The United States has no diplomatic relations with North Korea, so there is no embassy in Washington, but for years the two countries have relied on the “New York channel,” an office inside North Korea’s mission to the United Nations, to handle the unavoidable parts of our nonexistent relationship. The office has, among other things, negotiated the release of prisoners and held informal talks about nuclear tensions. In April, I contacted the New York channel and requested permission to visit Pyongyang, the capital of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
美国与朝鲜没有外交关系，华盛顿没有朝鲜大使馆，可多年来两国依赖“纽约渠道”通气，那是朝鲜驻联合国使团内的一间办公室，处理两国不存在的外交关系中无法避免的问题，主要负责磋商释放囚犯并就核危机进行非正式对话。4月，我联系到了“纽约渠道”，要求获准访问朝鲜民主人民共和国首都平壤。
The New York channel consists mostly of two genial middle-aged men: Pak Song Il, a husky diplomat with a gray brush cut; and his aide-de-camp, Kwon Jong Gun, who is younger and thinner. They go everywhere together. (The North Korean government has diplomats work in pairs, to prevent them from defecting, or being recruited as spies.)
“纽约渠道”不过由两个态度亲切的中年人组成，一个是身材高大、留着平头、花白头发的外交官Pak Song Il，另一个是较为年轻、瘦小的副官Kwon Jong Gun，两人形影不离。（朝鲜政府的外交官总会出双入对，避免其中一位叛逃或被募为间谍。）
Under U.S. law, they can travel only twenty-five miles from Columbus Circle. Pak and Kwon met me near their office, for lunch at the Palm Too. They cautioned me that it might take several months to arrange a trip. North Korea periodically admits large groups of American journalists, to witness parades and special occasions, but it is more hesitant when it comes to individual reporters, who require close monitoring and want to talk about the nuclear program.
按美国法律，他们只能在哥伦比亚特区半径25英里的范围内活动。Pak和Kwon在办公室附近的Palm Too牛排馆同我共进午餐。他们警告说，朝鲜之行可能需要几个月来安排。朝鲜定期接纳美国记者团，目睹阅兵和特殊活动，可对个人采访却有几分疑虑，这些记者需要严密监视，因为他们想谈论核项目。
Americans are accustomed to eruptions of hostility with North Korea, but in the past six months the enmity has reached a level rarely seen since the end of the Korean War, in 1953. The crisis has been hastened by fundamental changes in the leadership on both sides. In the six years since Kim Jong Un assumed power, at the age of twenty-seven, he has tested eighty-four missiles—more than double the number that his father and grandfather tested.
美国人一贯敌视朝鲜，但过去六个月中，这种敌意达到自1953年朝鲜战争结束以来未有之高度。双方领导层发生根本性变化以来，危机加速恶化。金正恩二十七岁掌权，迄今六年，四十八次试射导弹，比父亲和祖父任内试射次数加起来多一倍以上。
Just before Donald Trump took office, in January, he expressed a willingness to wage a “preventive” war in North Korea, a prospect that previous Presidents dismissed because it would risk an enormous loss of life. Trump has said that in his one meeting with Barack Obama, during the transition, Obama predicted that North Korea, more than any other foreign-policy challenge, would test Trump. In private, Trump has told aides, “I will be judged by how I handle this.”
就在唐纳德·特朗普一月就任前，他表达意愿对朝鲜发动“先发制人”战争，美国前任总统都否认了这种可能，因为那可能导致大量人员伤亡。特朗普表示，过渡期间某次同贝拉克·奥巴马会晤时，奥巴马预计朝鲜会对特朗普构成考验，比任何外交挑战都更为紧迫。私下里，特朗普对幕僚说，“我怎么处理这个问题，将决定人们对我的评判。”
On the Fourth of July, North Korea passed a major threshold: it launched its first intercontinental ballistic missile powerful enough to reach the mainland United States. In response, on July 21st, authorities in Hawaii announced that they would revive a network of Cold War-era sirens, to alert the public in the event of a nuclear strike. Trump said that he hopes to boost spending on missile defense by “many billions of dollars.”
7月4日当天，朝鲜跳过了龙门：它发射了首枚洲际弹道导弹，其威力足以打击美国本土。作为回应，7月21日，夏威夷当局宣布将恢复冷战时期的预警系统，如发生核打击，可向公众预警。特朗普表示，他希望提高导弹防御支出，计“上百亿美元”。
On September 3rd, after North Korea tested a nuclear weapon far larger than any it had revealed before—seven times the size of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki—the U.S. Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, warned that a threat to America or its allies would trigger a “massive military response.”
9月3日，朝鲜试射了一枚前所未见的核武器，烈度比投在广岛和长崎的核弹大几倍，之后美国国防部长詹姆斯·马蒂斯警告说，威胁美国或其盟友可能引发“大规模军事反应”。
A few days after the July 4th missile test, Pak told me that I could book a flight to Pyongyang. I submitted a list of people I wanted to interview, including diplomats and Kim Jong Un himself. About the latter, Pak only laughed. (Kim has never given an interview.) After Pak stopped laughing, he said I could talk to other officials.
7月4日导弹试验后几天，Pak告诉我，我可以订飞机前往平壤。我提交了一份采访名单，包括多名外交官和金正恩本人。关于后者，Pak只是笑。（金正恩从未接受过采访。）Pak收住笑容后说，我可以采访其他官员。
I wanted to understand how North Koreans think about the kind of violence that their country so often threatens. Were the threats serious, or mere posturing? How did they imagine that a war would unfold? Before my arrival in North Korea, I spent time in Washington, Seoul, and Beijing; many people in those places, it turned out, are asking the same things about the United States.
我希望弄明白朝鲜人如何看待本国经常扬言要采取的暴力行为。这些威胁是认真的还只是做姿态？开战的后果他们是否想过？我到朝鲜之前，曾在华盛顿、首尔和北京工作，结果这些地方的许多人也向美国提出相同问题。
About a week before my flight to Pyongyang, America’s dealings with North Korea deteriorated further. On August 5th, as punishment for the missile test, the U.N. Security Council adopted some of the strongest sanctions against any country in decades, blocking the sale of coal, iron, and other commodities, which represent a third of North Korea’s exports.
飞赴平壤约一周前，美国与朝鲜的往来日益恶化。8月5日，作为对导弹试射的惩罚，联合国安理会通过数十年来对该国最严厉的某些制裁，禁止其出售煤、铁和其他商品，这些占朝鲜出口的三分之一。
President Trump, in impromptu remarks at his golf club in New Jersey, said that “any more threats to the United States” will be met “with fire and fury like the world has never seen.” A few hours later, North Korea threatened to fire four missiles into the Pacific Ocean near the American territory of Guam, from which warplanes depart for flights over the Korean Peninsula. Trump replied, in a tweet, that “military solutions are now fully in place, locked and loaded, should North Korea act unwisely.”
特朗普总统在他新泽西州的高尔夫俱乐部中发表即兴演讲，表示“再有任何对美国的威胁”都将“招致世界从未见识过的烈火与狂怒”。数小时后，朝鲜威胁向美国领土关岛附近的太平洋海域发射四枚导弹，半岛上空的战机从那里起飞。特朗普在推文中回应，“军事解决方案一切就绪，如果朝鲜昏了头，那么装弹上膛准备开火。”
Suddenly, the prospect of a nuclear confrontation between the United States and the most hermetic power on the globe had entered a realm of psychological calculation reminiscent of the Cold War, and the two men making the existential strategic decisions were not John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev but a senescent real-estate mogul and reality-television star and a young third-generation dictator who has never met another head of state. Between them, they had less than seven years of experience in political leadership.
突然间，美国与全球最封闭的力量之间发生核对抗的前景走到了心理较量的地步，这让人想到冷战，可做出关乎生存的战略决定的那两个人不是约翰·肯尼迪和尼基塔·赫鲁晓夫，而是年老昏聩的地产大亨、电视真人秀明星和一个年轻的第三代独裁者，两位国家元首素未谋面。至于政治领导人生涯，两人加起来也不到七年。
Brinkmanship, according to Thomas Schelling, the Nobel Prize-winning economist who pioneered the theory of nuclear deterrence, is the art of “manipulating the shared risk of war.” In 1966, he envisaged a nuclear standoff as a pair of mountain climbers, tied together, fighting at the edge of a cliff. Each will move ever closer to the edge, so that the other begins to fear that he might slip and take both of them down. It is a matter of creating the right amount of fear without losing control. Schelling wrote, “However rational the adversaries, they may compete to appear the more irrational, impetuous, and stubborn.” But what if the adversaries are irrational, impetuous, and stubborn?
提出核威慑理论的诺贝尔奖经济学家托马斯·谢林认为，边缘博弈是一种“玩弄共同战争危险”的行为。1966年，他将核僵局设想为绑在一起的一对登山者，在悬崖旁较量。一方靠近悬壁，另一方就开始担心自己会滑下去，然后双方都会掉下去。关键是制造合理的恐吓却不失去控制。谢林写道，“无论对手多么理智，他们都会争相让自己看起来更不理智、更莽撞、更固执。”可若是对手真的不理智、莽撞而固执又该如何呢？
Three days after Trump’s “locked and loaded” tweet, I flew from Beijing to Pyongyang. The flight was mostly empty, except for some Chinese businessmen and Iranian diplomats. I was accompanied by the photographer Max Pinckers and his assistant, Victoria Gonzalez-Figueras. In the air, I deleted from my laptop some books about North Korea; the government is especially sensitive about portrayals of the Kim family. (When you buy a North Korean newspaper with an image of Kim Jong Un on the front page, the clerk folds it carefully, to avoid creasing his face.)
特朗普在推文中号称“炮弹上膛”的三天后，我从北京飞往平壤。航班上几乎是空的，除了一些中国商人和伊朗外交官。和我同行的是摄影师马科斯·平克斯和他的助手维多利亚·冈萨雷斯-菲格拉斯。在空中，我删除了笔记本电脑中某些关于朝鲜的书；政府对金家故事尤其敏感。（你要是买张朝鲜报纸，头条上有金正恩的图片，店员会小心折叠，避免他的脸被打了褶。）
The airport was quiet and immaculate. At customs, when I opened my suitcase, I saw that I had forgotten to discard two books: “The Great Successor,” an account of Kim’s ascent, and “The Impossible State.” The customs officer called over a colleague, who flipped through the pages and alerted his superiors. I was led to a room, where an officer told me that the books are “very disparaging about the D.P.R.K.” He wanted to know where and when I had bought them, and wh 36 41651 36 15289 0 0 2552 0 0:00:16 0:00:05 0:00:11 2975ether I had read them. After some discussion, I was told to write a statement promising “never to bring them to the D.P.R.K. again.” I signed it, the books were confiscated, and I hustled on.
机场里很安静，一尘不染。在海关，我打开行李箱时，发现自己忘了丢掉两本书：讲述金正恩如何发达起来的《伟大的继承者》和《不可能之国》。海关官员叫来一名同事，这名同事翻书查看，并给他的领导发警报。我被带进一间屋子里，官员告诉我这些书“严重诋毁朝鲜民主人民共和国”。经过讨论，我被告知要写一则声明，承诺“永不会把这些东西带到朝鲜民主人民共和国来”。我签了字，书被没收了，我赶忙出来。
I was approached by a smiling man in a crisp white short-sleeved button-down shirt with a small red pin on his left breast, bearing a likeness of Kim Il Sung—Kim Jong Un’s grandfather, and the first leader of North Korea. (Citizens over the age of sixteen are expected to wear a badge celebrating at least one of the Kims.)
一个满脸笑容的男人来接我，他穿着笔挺的白色短袖衬衫，领口订着纽扣，左胸上有一枚小红章，看起来像金正恩的爷爷、朝鲜第一代领导人金日成。（超过16岁的公民都会戴一枚徽章，至少是三位金将军中的某一位。）
He introduced himself, in English, as Mr. Pak, of the Foreign Ministry’s Institute for American Studies, and said that he would be my guide. I followed him outside, where the air was clear and still. Pak presented the others who would be accompanying us: two drivers and a slim young man with a military bearing named Mr. Kim, who provided only one-word answers to my occasional queries. Pak and I climbed into a Toyota S.U.V.
他用英语做了自我介绍，他是Pak先生，来自外交部美国研究所，他是我的向导。我跟着他出来，空气清新宁静。Pak给我介绍了陪着我的其他人：两位司机和一个瘦小的军人金先生，只用一个词回答我我偶尔提出的问题。Pak和我钻进一辆丰田SUV。
Pak—by coincidence, he has the same full name, Pak Song Il, as the senior member of the New York channel—is thirty-five years old, with short bushy hair and a placid demeanor. Most of North Korea’s twenty-five million people are not permitted to travel abroad, but Pak’s job has allowed him to visit several countries, which he described in terms of their cleanliness: Switzerland (very clean); Belgium (not so clean); Bangladesh (not clean at all). In 2015, he went to Utah (clean) for a nongovernmental exchange attended by members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. The experience convinced him that Mormons have a lot in common with North Koreans.
很巧合，Pak的全名是Pak Song II，与“纽约渠道”的高级成员同名，他35岁，短发浓密，举止温和。朝鲜有2500万人，大多数人不许出国旅行，但Pak的工作让他到过多个国家，他用干净程度来形容这些国家：瑞士（非常干净）；比利时（不怎么干净）；孟加拉国（一点都不干净）。2015年，他赴犹他州（干净）参加非政府交流，活动中有基督教后圣徒会成员。这一经历让他相信，摩门教徒和朝鲜人有诸多相像之处。
“When the L.D.S. started, they were hated,” he told me. “They were sent to the desert. But they made it thrive. They are organized like a bee colony, where everyone works for one purpose and they would die for it. And they make huge output, as a result. We understand each other very well.”
“摩门教兴起之初，他们被人憎恨，”他告诉我。“他们被驱逐到沙漠中去，但他们最后发达了。他们像蜂群一样组织起来，每个人都为某个事业而奋斗，他们可以为之献身，结果，他们做出的贡献很大。我们相互理解。”
Pak spends most of his time analyzing American politics and news reports, trying to divine America’s intentions regarding North Korea. Since the election of Donald Trump, he said, the task had become more demanding. “When he speaks, I have to figure out what he means, and what his next move will be,” he said. “This is very difficult.”
Pak花了很多时间分析美国政治和新闻报道，尝试预言美国对朝鲜的各种意图。他说唐纳德·特朗普当选以来，这一任务日益困难。“他说话时，我必须思考，他到底想说什么，他下一步又要干什么，”他说。“这很困难。”
That would probably please Trump, who prides himself on being unpredictable. Many commentators have drawn comparisons to Richard Nixon and his “madman theory” of diplomacy, in which Nixon sought to leave his adversaries with the impression that he possessed an unstable, dangerous state of mind.
这兴许让特朗普开心，他以自己难以预测为荣。许多评论家将他与理查德·尼克松及尼克松的外交“疯子理论”相提并论，尼克松试图让他的对手感觉他精神不稳定，很危险。
Later, I asked Pak what he and other North Koreans thought of Trump. “He might be irrational—or too smart. We don’t know,” he said. They suspected that Trump’s comment about “fire and fury” might be part of a subtle strategy. “Like the Chinese ‘Art of War,’ ” he said. “If he’s not driving toward a point, then what is he doing? That is our big question.”
后来，我问Pak和其他朝鲜人如何看待特朗普。“他可能不太正常，或是太聪明了。我们不知道。”他怀疑特朗普所谓“烈火与狂怒”可能是一种巧妙策略的一部分。“就像中国的‘战法’，”他说。“如果他没有意图，那么他在干什么呢？这是我们最大的问题。”
For Pak and other analysts in North Korea, the more important question about the United States extends beyond Trump. “Is the American public ready for war?” he asked. “Does the Congress want a war? Does the American military want a war? Because, if they want a war, then we must prepare for that.”
对于Pak和朝鲜其他分析人士而言，更为重要的美国问题不只是特朗普。“美国公众做好准备要打仗了吗？”他问。“国会想打仗吗？美国军队想打仗吗？因为，如果他们想打仗，那么我们必须备战。”
Commuters on the Pyongyang Metro. The capital, marooned by politics, presents a panorama from another time. Photograph by Max Pinckers for The New Yorker
We arrived at the Kobangsan Guest House, a small, three-story hotel on the outskirts of Pyongyang, surrounded by corn and rice fields. The place had an air of low-cost opulence—chandeliers, rhinestones, and pleather sofas. We were the only guests. The Foreign Ministry uses the hotel for “Americans and V.I.P.s,” Pak said. (In 2013, Eric Schmidt, the former C.E.O. of Google, was put up there.)
我们抵达Kobangsan宾馆，这是平壤郊外一座三层楼小型酒店，周围是玉米和水稻田。这个地方让人感觉豪华却很廉价——枝形吊灯、人造钻石和人造革沙发。我们是这里唯一的客人。Pak说，外交部使用该酒店招待“美国人和重要客人”。（2013年，谷歌前首席执行官埃里克·施密特曾在这里下榻。）
In North Korea, no visitor is left unattended, and Pak had a room down the hall from mine. I paid a hundred and forty-one dollars a night—a month’s income for the average citizen. “From time immemorial, there is a tradition of giving foreigners the best service,” Pak explained. “The No. 1 thing is to protect them, unless they are spies or enemies.”
在朝鲜，没有哪位游客是无人照料的，Pak住在我楼下。我每晚支付一百四十一美元，这是普通朝鲜公民一个月的收入。“自古以来，为外国人提供最好的服务就是一种传统，”Pak解释说。“第一要务是保护他们，除非他们是间谍或敌人。”
We had dinner that night with Ri Yong Pil, a Foreign Ministry official in his mid-fifties, who is the vice-president of the Institute for American Studies. Gregarious and confident, he served eight years in the Army, learned English, and became a diplomat. He raised a glass of Taedonggang beer and toasted our arrival. We were in a private hotel dining room that felt like a surgical theatre: a silent, scrubbed, white-walled room bathed in bright light. Two waitresses in black uniforms served each course: ginkgo soup, black-skin chicken, kimchi, river fish, and vanilla ice cream, along with glasses of beer, red wine, and soju. (The U.N. says that seventy-two per cent of North Koreans rely on government food rations, and the country is experiencing a historic drought. But in Pyongyang a foreign guest eats embarrassingly well.)
我们当晚同Ri Yong Pil共进晚餐，五十多岁的一名外交部官员，美国研究所副所长。他是个场面人，谈吐自如，在军队服役八年，后来学了英语，于是成为一名外交官。他举起一杯大同江啤酒，欢迎我们到来。我们在一家私人酒店的餐厅中，这里感觉像手术室：安静，一尘不染，四周的白墙沐浴在明亮的灯光里。两位身着黑制服的女侍者一道道上菜：银杏汤、乌鸡、泡菜、河鱼和香草冰淇淋，还有几瓶啤酒、红酒和烧酒。（联合国称，百分之七十二的朝鲜人依靠政府食品分配过活，该国曾遭受史无前例的饥荒。可令人尴尬的是，在平壤，外国客人吃得很好。）
Ri made a series of points, waiting for me to write each one in my notebook:
Ri发表了几点声明，等着我把每一条记在本子上：
“The United States is not the only country that can wage a preventive war.”
“美国不是唯一能够发动先发制人战争的国家。”
“Three million people have volunteered to join the war if necessary.”
“如有必要，我们有三百万人志愿参战。”
“Historically, Korean people suffered because of weakness. That bitter lesson is kept in our hearts.”
“历史上，朝鲜人因贫弱而受难。我们心中忘不了那个苦难的教训。”
“Strengthening our defensive military capacity is the only way to keep the peace.”
“加强我国军事防卫能力是保卫和平的唯一方式。”
“We are small in terms of people and area, but in terms of dignity we are the most powerful in the world. We will die in order to protect that dignity and sovereignty.”
“我们人口不多，地方不大，但我们是全世界最讲尊严的国家。我们愿意赴死以保护尊严和主权。”
After several more toasts, Ri loosened his tie and shed his jacket. He had some questions. “In your system, what is the power of the President to launch a war?” he asked. “Does the Congress have the power to decide?”
几轮敬酒后，Ri松开领带，脱下外套。他也有几个问题。“在你们的体制中，总统多大程度可以决定发动战争？”他问。“是国会才有权决定吗？”
A President can do a lot without Congress, I said. Ri asked about the nuclear codes: “I’ve heard the black bag is controlled by McMaster. Is it true?” (He was referring to H. R. McMaster, the national-security adviser.)
我说总统可以在没有国会干预下做很多事。Ri问到核密码：“我听说麦克马斯特控制着一个黑包，这是真的吗？”（他说的是国家安全顾问H·R·麦克马斯特。）
No, the President can launch nukes largely on his own, I said. “What about in your country?” His answer was similar. “Our Supreme Leader has absolute power to launch a war,” he said.
不，总统基本可以自己决定是否发射核弹，我说。“你们国家呢？”他的答案差不多。“我们的最高统帅有发动战争的绝对权力，”他说。
I turned in early. My room was furnished in the style of Versailles by way of Atlantic City—champagne-colored leather and gold-painted trim. The room was equipped with a TV, but, instead of North Korean programming, the only options were Asian satellite channels. There was no news to be found. I flipped past a Christian evangelist and a Singaporean cooking show, and drifted off to the sight of sumo wrestlers colliding.
我早早上床睡了觉。我的屋子是大西洋城的凡尔赛风格，香槟色皮革，饰有金边。屋子里有一台电视机，可并没有朝鲜节目，唯一的选择是亚洲卫星频道。没有新闻播送，我换台中看到一个基督教福音派节目和一个新加坡厨艺秀，并在看相扑者相互扭打时昏昏睡了过去。
Trump is the fourth U.S. President who has vowed to put an end to North Korea’s nuclear program. Bill Clinton signed a deal in which North Korea agreed to freeze its nuclear development in exchange for oil and a civilian reactor, but neither side fulfilled its commitments. George W. Bush refused bilateral negotiations, then switched tacks and convened what are known as the Six-Party Talks. Obama first offered inducements, and later adopted a stonewalling policy called “strategic patience.”
特朗普是第四位宣称要终止朝鲜核项目的美国总统。比尔·克林顿同朝鲜签署协议，朝鲜同意冻结发展核弹以换取石油和民用反应堆，但双方都没有履行承诺。小布什拒绝双边谈判，后来变了卦，参加了所谓六方会谈。奥巴马开始给了点甜头，后来又采用了被称为“战略耐心”的拖延政策。
Under Trump, the U.S. has led the U.N. Security Council in its passage of the eighth round of sanctions against North Korea in eleven years. The Kims’ nuclear program is still going. “They have managed to play an abysmally bad hand for more than seventy years,” Evans Revere, a former head of Korean affairs at the State Department, told me.
特朗普任下，美国引导联合国安理会通过了八轮未来十一年内对朝鲜的制裁。金家的核计划仍在进行。“七十多年来，他们想方设法玩转一手烂牌，”国务院前朝鲜事务主管埃文斯·利威尔对我说。
U.S. intelligence has often underestimated the progress of North Korea’s weapons development. But now the basic facts, accumulated by American, European, and Chinese intelligence agencies, are clear. North Korea has between twenty and sixty usable nuclear warheads, and ICBMs capable of hitting targets as far away, perhaps, as Chicago. It has yet to marry those two programs in a single weapon, but American intelligence agencies estimate that it will achieve that within a year.
美国情报部门常常低估朝鲜的武器开发进展。可现在，美国、欧洲和中国情报机构共同得出的基本事实很清楚了，朝鲜拥有二十到六十颗核弹头，洲际导弹可能最远能打到芝加哥。目前，两个项目还未能集成起来制造出洲际核导弹，但美国情报部门预计一年内就可以实现。
The U.S. is in the process of upgrading its ability to shoot down an incoming missile. It reportedly tried to derail North Korea’s weapons development through cyber sabotage, but it only delayed the progress. A former U.S. official said, “You spend millions putting it in place and then you ask, ‘Did it work?’ And the answer comes back: Maybe.”
美国正在升级射落飞弹的能力。据称还试图从事网络破坏以挫败朝鲜的武器开发计划，可那只能延缓其进程。一位前美国官员说，“你耗巨资上马了，然后问‘管用吗？’得到的答案是：兴许吧。”
In recent talks, when Americans have asked whether any combination of economic and diplomatic benefits, or security guarantees, could induce Pyongyang to give up nuclear weapons, the answer has been no. North Koreans invariably mention the former Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi. In 2003, when Qaddafi agreed to surrender his nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, Bush promised others who might do the same that they would have an “open path to better relations with the United States.” Eight years later, the U.S. and NATO helped to overthrow Qaddafi, who was captured, humiliated, and killed by rebels. At the time, North Korea said that Qaddafi’s fall was “a grave lesson” that persuading other nations to give up weapons was “an invasion tactic.”
最近多轮谈判中，美国人一直在问，经济、外交好处或安全保障加起来能否让平壤政府放弃核武器，答案从来都是不行。朝鲜人无一例外地提到利比亚前领导人穆阿迈尔·卡扎菲。2003年，卡扎菲同意放弃核武器、化学武器和生物武器，布什承诺像他一样的人走上“改善同美国关系的坦途”。八年后，美国和北约出手推翻了卡扎菲，卡扎菲被叛军俘获，受到凌辱并被处死。当时，朝鲜表示，卡扎菲的失败是“严厉的教训”，劝说他国放弃武器不过是“侵略策略”罢了。
James Clapper, the former director of National Intelligence, who visited Pyongyang in 2014, told me, “The North Koreans are not going to give up their nuclear weapons. It’s a non-starter.” The American national-security community is now nearly unanimous on this point, but the government cannot say so openly, because that would cede leverage in a future negotiation, and raise the risk that other countries will try to follow North Korea’s example. “Whether it’s pressuring, threatening, negotiating, or trying to leverage China, everybody’s tried all of that—and it’s not working,” Clapper said.
2014年访问过朝鲜的前美国国家情报主任詹姆斯·克拉珀对我说，“朝鲜人不准备放弃核武器，那是不可能的事。”美国国家安全界现在几乎对此达成共识，但政府不能公开说出来，因为那就等于放弃了在未来谈判中的筹码，导致其他国家也效仿朝鲜。“无论施压、威胁、谈判或是推给中国，所有招都试过了，都不管用，”克拉珀说。
Inside the Trump Administration, there is disagreement about how to handle North Korea. Shortly before Steve Bannon, the President’s former chief strategist, was fired, in August, he told an interviewer, “There’s no military solution here, they got us.” But Mattis and McMaster argue that Kim Jong Un must be contained. Testifying before the House Armed Services Committee in June, Mattis called North Korea “the most urgent and dangerous threat to peace and security,” supplanting Russia as the No. 1 threat to the U.S.
特朗普政府内部，对如何对付朝鲜有不同意见。总统前首席战略官史蒂夫·班农八月被炒前不久接受采访时说，“没有军事解决方案，他们难住我们了。”但马蒂斯和麦克马斯特认为金正恩必须加以遏制。七月在参议院三军委员会作证时，马蒂斯将朝鲜称作“对和平和安全最紧迫、最危险的威胁”，取代俄罗斯成为美国的头号威胁。
In an e-mail, McMaster told me, “Their provocations seem likely to increase—not decrease—over time. The North Koreans have also proliferated just about every capability they’ve ever produced, including chemical weapons and a nuclear reactor. Then there’s the matter of what other countries do—in the region and beyond—when they see that a rogue regime developed nukes and got away with it.”
在一封邮件中，麦克马斯特对我说，“随着时间推移，他们的挑衅行为看起来可能还会增加，而非减少。朝鲜人可能还会扩散他们制造的所有军事能力，包括化学武器和核反应堆。等到那时，看到一个流氓政权发展核弹却毫发无伤，地区内外的其他国家会怎么做呢？”
Experts can’t say definitively why Kim wants nuclear weapons. Are they for self-defense, as North Korea claims, or will Kim use them to achieve the unfulfilled ambition of the Korean War—forcing reunification with South Korea? A senior Administration official told me that members of Trump’s national-security team are not convinced that Kim will stop at self-protection.
专家说不清金正恩为何想要核武器。真如朝鲜所言为了自卫？或是金正恩要用核武器实现朝鲜战争中未实现的雄心，即迫使统一韩国？一位政府高级官员对我说，特朗普国家安全团队成员不相信金正恩会止步于自卫。
“There are fewer and fewer disagreements about North Korea’s capabilities now, and so then, inevitably, the question of their intentions becomes critical,” he said. “Are they pursuing these weapons in order to maintain the status quo on the Peninsula, or are they seeking to fundamentally alter the status quo?” The official added, “Sometimes dictators are able to kid themselves that ‘Hey, once I’ve got that weapon, I’m invincible, and I have a free hand to launch conventional wars and subversion and assassination campaigns against my neighbors.’ ”
“现在对朝鲜军事实力的不同意见越来越少，不可避免，其意图变得至关重要，”他说。“他们制造这些武器旨在维护半岛现状吗？还是谋划彻底改变现状？”该官员还说，“有时独裁者们会骗自己说：瞧，一旦我拥有那种武器，我就战无不胜，我可以随意发动传统战争，颠覆或刺杀我的邻居。”
The White House could try to deter North Korea from using or selling its weapons—or it could start a preventive war. Deterrence relies, at bottom, on the assumption that an adversary is not suicidal, but this Administration suspects that Kim’s recklessness could trigger his own destruction.
白宫可以阻遏朝鲜不使用或出售武器，或是可以发起一场先发制人的战争。说到底，阻遏的前提是对手不是自寻死路，但本届政府换衣金正恩的鲁莽将自取灭亡。
The official said, “Saddam Hussein was not suicidal, but he committed suicide.” In 2003, as the U.S. threatened to attack Iraq, Saddam was surrounded by sycophants and cut off from reliable information. He doubted that America would actually launch a full-scale attack, and, as a result, he miscalculated the odds of destroying himself and his regime.
该官员说，“萨达姆·侯赛因本人并非自寻死路，可他却自取灭亡了。”2003年，美国威胁要打击伊拉克，萨达姆周围都是溜须拍马者，他完全不掌握可信信息。他认为美国不会发动全面打击，结果他错估了形势，毁灭了自己和政权。
A warm drizzle was falling on Pyongyang the morning after my arrival, as we left the Kobangsan Guest House to see the city. More than any other capital that has been marooned by politics—Havana or Rangoon or Caracas—Pyongyang presents a panorama from another time.
我抵达平壤的第二天早上，离开宾馆进城时，细雨蒙蒙，天气暖和。相比其他困于政治之中的国家首都——哈瓦那或仰光或加拉加斯，平壤更令人感觉恍若隔世。
Soviet-era Ladas and ancient city buses ply the streets, while passengers stick their heads out the windows in search of cool air. Buildings are adorned with Korean-language banners hailing the “Juche ideology,” the official state credo, which glorifies self-reliance and loyalty. On an embankment near a major intersection, workers in gray coveralls were installing an enormous red sign that praised the “immortal achievements of the esteemed Supreme Leader, comrade Kim Jong Un, who built the nuclear state of Juche, the leader in rocket power!”
苏联时期的拉达汽车和古城巴士穿梭在街道上，乘客的头伸出窗外，渴求一丝清凉。建筑物上拉着朝鲜语横幅，向官方的信条“主体思想”致敬，这一信条强调自立和忠诚。一个大路口的路堤上，穿着灰色连裤工服的工人们正在安装巨大的红色标语，赞扬“受人爱戴的最高领袖、建立了主体思想下的核国家并拥有火箭军力的领导人金正恩同志的不朽成就”。
未完待续（连载）
关注公号查看二条推送
《核战朝鲜之疯子理论（下）》