年度人物 | 温和的伊朗人鲁哈尼
By Joe Klein
It is not easy to be a moderate politician in Iran. Every day is a somersault through flaming rhetorical hoops.
在伊朗，做一位温和的政治家不容易，每天都要在热血言论圈子里翻筋斗。
Here, for example, is Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani, responding in November to a question from an Italian newspaper about the possibility of establishing formal diplomatic relations with the U.S.: “One day these embassies will reopen, but what counts is behavior, and the Americans hold the key to this,” he said.
伊朗总统哈桑·鲁哈尼是为一例。他11月就与美国建立外交关系的可能性回答一家意大利报纸时说：“总有一天，这些使馆会重开，但要听其言，观其行，决定权在美国人手中。”
“If they modify their policies, correct errors committed in these 37 years and apologize to the Iranian people, the situation will change and good things can happen.”
“如果美国调整政策，纠正这三十七年来犯下的错误，向伊朗人民道歉，情况自然会好转。”
This is what passes for a wildly pro-American statement in Iran these days, even though many Americans will hear only the laundry list of conditions the U.S. would have to meet to deserve the recognition of the Islamic Republic.
如今伊朗，这就算公然的亲美言论，虽然很多美国人只听到一大串清单要美国照做，以示对伊斯兰共和国的认同。
But still: one might even call this statement courageous—it’s one of a series Rouhani made in October and November directly challenging the power and worldview of Iran’s hard-line regime.
即便如此，这一声明也尤需勇气。十月和十一月，鲁哈尼接连直面强权，打破世人对伊朗强硬派政权的印象。
This sort of public behavior is unprecedented; the last reform President of Iran, Mohammed Khatami, who left office in 2005, wilted in the face of pressure from the hard-liners. He never took them on publicly.
这种公开言行史无前例。2005年去职的改革总统哈塔米在强硬派的压力下萎缩，再未公开提起。
Rouhani is not exactly a counterrevolutionary; he is a long-standing member of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s inner circle.
鲁哈尼并非反革命分子，他长期处于最高领袖哈梅内伊的核心圈子。
But he has emerged this year as a historic figure, perhaps the harbinger of a new political calculus within Iran—a significant step toward normalization, both within the country and in its dealings with the rest of the world.
可今年他名载青史，可能会成为伊朗政治新局的先驱，为伊朗对内对外的正常化迈出重要一步。
The idea that “good things can happen” between the U.S. and Iran has been anathema to the religious and military leadership of the Islamic Republic since the Shah was deposed in 1979.
自1979年巴列维被罢黜后，美伊两国“关系能够改善”的想法，对伊斯兰共和国的宗教和军事领袖而言是一种诅咒。
The U.S. embassy in Tehran was the site of the infamous hostage siege of 1979–81, for which—speaking of grievances—Iran never apologized.
1979年至1981年，美国驻德黑兰大使馆发生人质事件，忿忿不平的伊朗从未对此道歉。
The building was later reopened as a museum of the Great Satan (or, more familiarly, “the Den of Thieves”), replete with official graffiti, some hilarious, like this one: on the day the great satan praises us, we shall mourn.
此后，使馆以大撒旦博物馆（或“贼窝”）的面貌开放，四处是官方的涂鸦，有些近于滑稽：大撒旦称颂我们之日，我们应该哀悼。
Praise from the Great Satan has long been an unstated fear of Khamenei and his religious military, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Khamenei’s problem is that revolutionary fervor fades; it’s difficult to sustain fanaticism for decades and even more difficult to rationalize oppression.
一直以来，大撒旦的称颂是哈梅内伊和他的教军伊朗革命卫队未言明的恐惧。哈梅内伊面临的问题是革命热情消退，几十年保持狂热很难，为压迫正名更难。
A mortal enemy was needed to maintain the pretense that Iran was under siege, about to be overtaken by the same clandestine Western forces that overthrew the elected government of Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953.
他需要一个真实的敌人，假称伊朗处于围困之中，会被1953年颠覆摩萨台民选政府的隐秘西方力量颠覆。
译者注：这是《时代周刊》的一家之言。不论国内政教合一的体制是否合理，伊朗面临着以色列、美国、以沙特为代表的逊尼世界甚至伊斯兰国的挑战，显然并不缺少真实的“敌人”。美国1953年颠覆摩萨台民选政府的历史臭名昭著，如今倒拿出来自夸，也是醉了。
But the threat came to seem threadbare over time, as satellite dishes sprouted on the rooftops of Tehran and throughout the countryside.
可当卫星接收器在德黑兰和全国各处的屋顶上架起来后，这种威胁日益显得乏味无奇。
The idea of a Great Satan seemed as plausible as the Great Pumpkin to a young generation of Iranians, perhaps the most sophisticated people in the Middle East outside of Israel, who gorge on Adele and The Walking Dead and Star Wars.
对年轻一代伊朗人而言，大撒旦听起来就和大南瓜一样似是而非，他们兴许是除以色列以外最开化的中东人，他喜欢阿黛尔、《行尸走肉》和《星球大战》。
译者注：Great Pumpkin取自连载漫画Peanuts。“大南瓜”是主人公Linus van Pelt想象出来的节日任务。每年万圣节前夜，Linus坐在南瓜里等待“大南瓜”出现。漫画作者舒尔茨在接受电视采访时说：“有三样东西我最喜欢和人讨论：宗教、政治和大南瓜。”
The Islamic revolution has slowly been corroded by the information revolution—and it has been suffocated by intense economic sanctions over the country’s nuclear program, imposed not just by the Great Satan but also by countries traditionally friendly to Iran, like Russia and China.
伊斯兰革命慢慢被信息革命侵蚀，严厉的经济制裁使之窒息——制裁不仅来自大撒旦，还来自传统上对伊朗有好的俄罗斯和中国。
The Iranian public’s impatience with this state of affairs was made apparent in the presidential election of 2013, when Rouhani—the most moderate of a handpicked field of candidates—won in a landslide.
伊朗公众对这种情况的不满，在2013年总统大选中显而易见。在精心挑选的总统候选人中，鲁哈尼是最温和的，他获得了压倒性胜利。
Rouhani’s victory forced the Supreme Leader to make a huge concession, to agree, finally, to negotiations with the international community over Iran’s nuclear program, a tacit acknowledgment that Iran had violated the spirit of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which it signed in 1968.
鲁哈尼的获胜迫使最高领袖作出巨大让步，最终同意就伊朗核问题与国际社会展开磋商，这等于默认伊朗违反了于1968年签署的《核不扩散条约》的精神。
Rouhani was allowed to proceed with the talks because he was considered reliable. He was close to Khamenei, a lifelong regime activist and former national-security chief who had been arrested many times during the Shah’s reign.
鲁哈尼获准参加谈判，他被认为值得信赖。他和哈梅内伊关系密切，一生支持当下政权，曾任最高国家安全委员会秘书，巴列维统治期间多次被捕。
His negotiating team, led by Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, had to thread a needle—come up with an agreement that both the U.S. and the Iranian military could live with.
由外交部长穆罕默德·贾瓦德·扎里夫领导的谈判团队可谓纫针走线，在美国和伊朗军方都能接受的范围内达成协议。
They bargained tough, and on July 14 a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was negotiated to dispose of 98% of Iran’s enriched uranium, dismantle 75% of the centrifuges that had spun the material, close the country’s heavy-water nuclear reactor and open its other nuclear facilities to inspection.
国际社会要求不低。7月14日达成的共同全面行动计划中，伊朗要销毁98%浓缩铀，卸载75%制备材料的离心机，关闭重水核反应堆，同意其他核设施接受核查。
In return, the sanctions would be lifted and Iran would slowly begin to breathe again—but only after all those and other conditions had been met, which they are likely to be in early 2016.
作为回报，对伊朗的经济制裁被取消，伊朗逐渐恢复生气，可条件是所有条件都得到满足，这在2016年初可能会实现。
The American reaction to the nuclear deal was mostly negative, according to public-opinion polls. Neoconservative Republicans were appalled—the deal left Iran with the capability to enrich uranium to a low grade (which is its right under the Non-Proliferation Treaty). Some, like Senator Marco Rubio, threatened to “tear up” the deal on their first day in office.
公众调查显示，美方对核协议的反应更多是负面的。共和党新保守主义者大惊失色，这一协议让伊朗可以拥有在最低限度上浓缩铀的能力，这是其在《不扩散条约》中的权利。总统竞选者、参议员卢比奥等人威胁只要当上总统，第一天就要“撕毁”协议。
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu tried to make opposition to the deal into a litmus test for American support for Israel (although most of Israel’s military and intelligence community seemed ready to accept it, if warily).
以色列总理内塔尼亚胡试图把是否反对协议作为美国是否支持以色列的试纸，尽管大多数以色列军方和情报部门看来准备谨慎地接受这一协议。
The furor has died down in the months since Congress failed to block the deal—the terrorist depredations of ISIS have emerged as a clear and present danger, and Iran has taken a backseat as an international threat. Even Netanyahu has gone to ground.
国会未能阻止这一协议通过后的几个月，怒火平息下来了，伊斯兰国的恐怖主义破坏上升为可见和紧迫的危险，伊朗的国际威胁靠边站了。内塔尼亚胡也消停了。
But a strange thing has happened within Iran since the deal was consummated: a formerly secret arm of the IRGC—the Intelligence Office—has suddenly emerged as a domestic force and is arresting journalists, artists, writers and musicians, as well as Iranian-American businessmen.
可协议圆满达成后，伊朗国内却发生怪事：伊朗革命卫队的前情报办公室突然做大，他们逮捕记者、艺术家、作家、音乐家和美籍伊朗商人。
A Washington Post reporter, Jason Rezaian, was convicted of unspecified charges in October and has spent more than 500 days in jail.
10月，华盛顿邮报记者Jason Rezaian受到莫须有的被控，已经在牢房里呆了500多天。
These sorts of arrests are nothing new. What is new is that the President of Iran, Hassan Rouhani—the Supreme Leader’s guy—has opposed them publicly.
类似逮捕过去也有。不同的是最高领袖的人、伊朗总统鲁哈尼公开反对这种行为。
The long-term rift between reformers and hard-liners in Iran has once again gone public—but this time the military regime seems to have lost its monopoly on power.
改革者和强硬派长期以来的隔阂再次公开化了，这一次军事集团看起来失去了对权力的独断。
Unlike Mir-Hossein Mousavi, the Green Movement leader who “lost” the rigged 2009 election to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Rouhani has not been placed under house arrest. He is directly criticizing the actions of the Revolutionary Guards, forcing the IRGC to respond with a public explanation for its brutality.
和在2009年受到操纵的大选中的绿色运动领袖穆萨维不同，鲁哈尼没有被软禁。他直接批评革命卫队的行为，迫使后者对其暴行进行公开解释。
In November, an IRGC spokesman tried to sell the notion that the arrests were necessary because a secret U.S.- and Britain-inspired “infiltration group” had been discovered with a plan “[to] soften the image of America, raise the issue of human rights and prepare the ground for America’s official presence in Iran.”
11月，一名革命卫队的发言人试图让人相信逮捕是必要的，因为发现有英美指示的秘密“渗透集团”“美化美国形象，提出人权关切，为美国在伊朗的官方存在铺路”。
Rouhani chose to publicly confront this claim—in a video posted on his Instagram page. “We should not senselessly go after one person or two people, and take them from here or there, and say this is linked to infiltration and make this a big case in the country.”
鲁哈尼选择公开驳斥这一声明，在他Instagram账户的视频中说：“我们不该无端地跟踪一个人或两个人，随便抓住他们，说这和渗透有关，小题大做。”
More recently, he has spoken against the regime’s control of television and many newspapers. “If we look at the headlines in some media we will know who will be arrested tomorrow, who will be shut down tomorrow and who is fair game for slander.”
最近，他发言反对政府对电视和许多报纸的控制。“看看有些媒体的头条，我们就会知道明天谁会被逮捕，哪家会被关停，谁会被泼脏水。”
It is unprecedented for the President of Iran to accuse the state of “slander.” And it begs a larger question: Now that the Islamic Republic has successfully negotiated with the Great Satan, is Iran’s “revolutionary” era coming to a close?
伊朗总统指控国家“泼脏水”，这是史无前例的。这引出更大的问题；既然伊斯兰共和国已经和“大撒旦”达成协议，伊朗的革命时代终结了吗？
No doubt the religious hard-liners, and their police henchmen, will want to continue their oppressive ways—but the government has been slowly giving ground on freedom of expression, and Rouhani’s recent statements indicate a new level of political candor in the run-up to crucial parliamentary elections in February.
毫无疑问，宗教强硬派和其警察亲信想要继续压迫，可政府已经逐渐向言论自由让步，鲁哈尼最近的声明表明，2月份至关重要的议会选举前，公开言政已达到新阶段。
This may be a sign of even more profound changes in Iran’s secretive hierarchy. There are new geo-strategic realities in the Middle East, where chaos is metastasizing. The old straight-line national borders are crumbling.
这可能标志着伊朗的秘密等级制要发生更深刻的变革。中东出现了新的地缘政治现实，混乱四处游荡，旧有的线性国家边界在崩溃。
Longtime power players—Saddam Hussein, Muammar Gaddafi—have been deposed. Egypt has been crippled by the Arab Spring and the crackdown that followed. Saudi Arabia’s kingdom is rattled by generational change. Iran has become, almost by default, the most stable country in the Middle East.
过去的政治大佬萨达姆和卡扎菲都完蛋了。阿拉伯之春及随后的镇压令埃及陷入泥潭。沙特阿拉伯王国正被代际交替搞得一团乱。伊朗自然而然地成为中东地区最稳定的国家。
The other candidates, Turkey and Israel, have Kurds and Palestinians to provide domestic roil.
其他两个竞争者——土耳其和以色列，各自有库尔德人和巴勒斯坦人在国内捣乱。
Iran is also, and crucially, the protector of the region’s Shi‘ites, who represent only 13% of Islam but seem to have an uncanny ability to position themselves atop fossil fuels. Even in Saudi Arabia, Shi‘ites are a majority of the population in the Eastern province, where most of the Saudi oil sits.
伊朗还是什叶派的保护者，尽管什叶派只占伊斯兰世界13%的人口，却有出色的能力择石油而居。在沙特阿拉伯石油丰富的东部省份中，什叶派是多数派。
The Sunni-Shi‘ite divide has supplanted the old East-West conflict as Iran’s most immediate threat. A proxy war is being fought between Sunni and Shi‘ite armies on two fronts, in Syria and Yemen.
相比东-西对立，逊尼-什叶的对立成为伊朗最紧迫的威胁。在叙利亚和也门，逊尼和什叶军队的代理人战争在双线展开。
译者注：逊尼和什叶的夙愿由来已久，但是否是当下中东乱局的唯一原因或深层次原因有待考虑。表面的代理人背后是否还有更深的代理人或国际政治因素《时代周刊》也没有深入讨论。
And while the Iranian hard-liners still see the U.S. as a quiet ally of the Saudis and Gulf states, the successful nuclear negotiations—which Saudi Arabia opposed—and the Western war against ISIS may be causing some second thoughts among the Revolutionary Guards leadership about who Iran’s real enemies are.
伊朗的强硬派认为美国是沙特和海湾国家的铁杆盟友，可沙特反对的核谈判以及西方对伊斯兰国的作战，可能会让革命卫队的领袖转念想想谁是伊朗真正的敌人。
译者注：美国与伊朗核谈判是否意味着背叛了沙特和以色列？美国与伊斯兰国作战是否意味着把反恐放在推翻巴沙尔政权之上？美国打击伊斯兰国是否用尽全力？这些问题不好回答，可以说是也不是。
In October, Foreign Minister Zarif told a New York audience that the biggest news in Iran was “public outrage” over the Saudis’ failure to return the bodies of most of the 464 Shi‘ite pilgrims (an Iranian estimate) who were trampled to death in Mecca during the hajj.
10月，外长扎里夫对一名纽约听众说，伊朗最大的新闻是沙特未能将463名（据伊朗估计）在麦加朝圣被踩踏致死的什叶信徒的遗体返还伊朗，这引起“公众的愤怒”。
This was due, in part, to a fundamental clash of religious values—Shi‘ites memorialize their dead; Sunnis don’t—but it is indicative of the growing tension between the two countries.
这部分源于宗教价值的基本冲突，什叶派纪念死者，逊尼派不纪念，可这却显示了两国关系日益紧张。
The nuclear talks have changed America’s calculus as well: Iran isn’t a friend, but it is no longer an outlaw state—at least so long as it abides by the agreement. It is also a tacit ally in the fight against America’s greatest strategic threat, Wahhabi-style Sunni terrorism.
核谈判改变了也美国的看法：伊朗不是朋友，可也不是非法国家，至少只要其遵守协议。美国最大的战略威胁是逊尼派瓦哈比恐怖主义，于是伊朗也成为美国未言明的同盟。
Iran has now been included in the diplomatic talks about Syria’s future—it wasn’t, before the nuclear agreement—and Zarif has even proposed a peace plan that assumes Bashar Assad’s imminent departure.
伊朗现在参加了关乎叙利亚未来的外交谈判，在核谈判之前，伊朗还不能参加。扎里夫甚至还提出让巴沙尔尽快离职的和平计划。
The credibility of the plan is questionable so long as Iran’s Lebanon-based military surrogate, Hizballah, remains an integral part of Assad’s forces, but it does exist—and, according to U.S. diplomats, provides some basis for hope.
Rouhani’s power is limited. National security is not his brief.
只要伊朗在黎巴嫩的代理人真主党仍然是阿萨德武装的重要组成部分，这一计划的可信性成疑。可计划确实存在，据美国外交方面表示，这一计划有点希望。鲁哈尼的权力受限，国家安全不是他的职责。
The economy is, and there he may be vulnerable: Iranians are expecting a boom as soon as the sanctions are lifted, which is highly unrealistic. For the moment, though, Rouhani is immensely popular—in a recent poll he was viewed favorably by 89% of Iranians.
经济仍然脆弱：伊朗人希望制裁解除后经济迅速复苏，可这是不现实的。尽管当下，鲁哈尼大受欢迎，最近的民调显示89%的伊朗人支持他。
And it is possible that despite the crackdown, he is still the Supreme Leader’s man—that Khamenei and his military advisers have made the calculation that greater freedom for the Iranian people, and the support for the regime that will ensue, is necessary given the chaos and sectarian terrorism that lies just beyond Iran’s borders.
很有可能他还是最高领袖的人，尽管受到压制，哈梅内伊和他的军事顾问们算好了，鉴于伊朗周边的混乱和宗派恐怖主义形势，让伊朗人民享有更大的自由，换取对政权的支持是必须的。
That is not likely, given the history of the past 37 years, but—for the first time—it’s not entirely impossible either.
尽管考虑到过去37年的历史，这有点不太可能。可头一遭，这也不是一点可能性都没有。