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沙特哪根筋儿不对了?

Oilprice.com 英文联播 2018-08-21


译者注:

伊斯兰世界逊尼和什叶,对当下中东局势的解释力是有限的。四大哈里发谁正谁歪与感慨“千年仇怨”冤冤相报何时了,至少在历史唯物主义者看来,有点不得要领。


您可能也有同样的疑问,中世纪和近代的基督徒们也因为“三位一体””一性论“”能不能自己读圣经“云云打个你死我活,18世纪以来不就不闹腾了吗?咋唯独中东穆斯林因为一千多年前老祖宗的身份问题打得你死我活?


这多半暗示了中东乱局另有原因,宗教教义多多少少成为掩人耳目的说辞或唆使民众的历史素材罢了。从阿拉伯的劳伦斯时代开始,这片土地就是大国政治的皮影戏:犹太复国主义、阿拉伯复兴主义、真主党、阿克萨烈士旅、哈马斯、伊斯兰国……你方唱罢我登场,仔细想来,全然为教义而战的实在少之又少,正如一个十字军战士兴许真诚地想夺回圣地,但策动战争的国王贵族却压根也不这么想。


那么,最近“平白”闹腾起来的沙特究竟哪根筋儿不对了?


美国页岩油的进展本来已让Saudi-America关系渐远,伊朗核谈判达成协议又制造了一个潜在的竞争对手(以及背后的产油大户俄罗斯)。现在油价降到了每桶30美元以下,沙特或欧佩克为啥还不减产呢?原来沙特想自损八百,伤敌一千,把俄罗斯拖垮可能目标有点大,不让伊朗好活这倒没错。


再看看习大大要出访的中东三国处在什么地往里位置:埃及、伊朗、沙特,三个大国(以及去年访问的土耳其)正好从四面夹着围着命运多舛的中东新月地区——伊拉克和叙利亚。


如今逊尼派多数的埃及可谓一塌糊涂;库尔德问题让土耳其也危机四伏。于是问题来了,秉承零和游戏思维的沙特王国环顾四周:伊拉克是什叶派,叙利亚的巴沙尔看样子又活过来了——他属于什叶派分支阿拉维派;现在解除了制裁的伊朗也缓过劲儿来了,那我大沙特的明天还能好吗?


看看oilprice.com的文章如何分析。


Saudi Arabia’s Sudeiri-line leadership of the House of Sa’ud began 2016 with a major push to save its position and control of the Kingdom. It was also a bid to solidify regional power as the Kingdom moved well beyond the shadow of the major power relationships which had dominated its existence since the creation of the State in 1932.

自1932年立国以来,王国摆脱了笼罩自己的大国关系阴影。2016年伊始,沙特阿拉伯的沙特王室苏德里系领导层致力维护其地位及对沙特王国的控制,并力图巩固其地区权力。


Saudi Arabia’s execution of Shi’a cleric Sheikh Nimr Baqr al-Nimr, 56, on January 2, 2016, along with 46 other political dissidents also sparked a divide between Iran on the one hand and Saudi Arabia and several of its allies on the other.

2016年1月2日,沙特阿拉伯处决56岁的什叶派教士奈米尔及其他46名政治异见者,引发伊朗与沙特及其盟友的分裂。


It was a salvo in a geopolitical war, which is far more deeply-constructed than the seemingly intra-Muslim sectarian war, which is often characterized by symbolic actions and rallying calls.

这是地缘政治战的爆发,要比表面上穆斯林世界的教派战争深刻得多,后者常常只是象征性行动和口号。


That is not to say that there was no religious element — even motivation — to the actions. There clearly was a significant religious aspect, but the actions of the Saudi leaders stemmed mostly from an attempt to preserve their position at the head of the geopolitical entity of the Kingdom as well as through their claim to religious leadership from the position which they seized in 1932 as Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques.

并不是说这些行动背后没有宗教因素甚至宗教动机。显然这里有重要的宗教考量,可沙特领导人的行为更多旨在维护其在地缘政治体中的领导地位,这一地位通过沙特在1932年成为麦加和麦地那两大圣地清真寺监护人而获得的宗教领导地位来保障。


This was a crisis which had been brewing for some months, and the execution merely served — and deliberately so on Riyadh’s part — as a catalyst for more visible divisions. GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs Yossef Bodansky said that the execution potentially cast Sheikh Nimr in that catalytic position as “the Archduke Ferdinand of the Middle East”.

危机酝酿了数月之久,利雅得一方故意处决教士不过是催化了显而易见的分歧。Yossef Bodansky认为被处决的奈米尔相当于“中东的斐迪南大公”。(注:刺杀费迪南大公成为第一次世界大战的导火索。)


As Bodansky also reported on May 18, 2009: “The fiery Sheikh Nimr Baqr al-Nimr (40+) of Awwamiyah is reported to be the spiritual guide of the new Republic [of Eastern Arabia]” which was declared in the Shi’a areas of Saudi Arabia, reason enough for the Kingdom to want his head: he had called for the break-up of the Kingdom. Sheikh Nimr was not the unimportant cleric many Western media reports claimed.

Bodansky在2009年5月18日报道:“激进的奈米尔酋长据称是新的东阿拉伯共和国的精神领袖”,该国宣称拥有沙特阿拉伯的什叶派地区,沙特王国有充分理由要他的脑袋:他呼吁分裂沙特。奈米尔并非许多西方媒体所说的无关紧要的教士。


But, by the beginning of 2016, the Saudi leadership needed to galvanize support for its leadership, even its legitimacy, both within the Kingdom and abroad. Concerns over internal social and political fracturing may, arguably, have been more important than winning additional support from other Sunni states for Riyadh’s primacy in wars against Yemen and Syria.

但2016年初,沙特领导层需要在国内外获取更多支持,甚至增强其合法性。正因如此,对国内社会和政治分裂的担忧比赢取其他逊尼派国家支持利雅得政府推动对也门和叙利亚开战更显重要。


逊尼派(红)、什叶派(蓝)分布图


The ramifications of the symbolism of the executions — which immediately appeared profound within the region — seemed likely to be even more significant than the reactive outcry indicated.

处决教士这一象征性事件立即在区域内产生深刻影响,但其远期后果可能比当下的激烈反应更有意义。


Of significance is that the event once again, as a byproduct, damaged U.S.-Saudi Arabian ties, or served to show that Riyadh had moved beyond the influence of Washington.

意义之一是美国-沙特关系再次躺枪,或表明利雅得已脱离了华盛顿的影响力。


U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry had, immediately after the anti-Saudi riots which destroyed Saudi diplomatic missions in Iran, telephoned Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif to discuss the issue.

伊朗反对沙特杀戮行为抗议爆发后,沙特和伊朗断交,美国国务卿克里迅速与伊朗外长扎里夫通电话,讨论这一事宜。


He then telephoned his Saudi counterpart, Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir, only to be told that the Saudis did not wish to speak to him.

他随后给沙特外长朱贝尔去电,却被告知沙特不想和他通话。


This was the worst snub to the U.S. by Saudi Arabia since the late King ‘Abdallah bin ‘Abd al-’Aziz al Sa’ud cut short U.S. Pres. Barack Obama’s State visit to the Kingdom on March 28, 2014.

这是沙特已故国王阿卜杜拉·本·阿卜杜勒-阿齐兹·阿勒沙特2014年3月28日中断奥巴马总统访问沙特以来,沙特对美国最严重的冷落。


Thus, the growing rift between the Saudi bloc and Iran now appears to be beyond the scope of the U.S. to influence. This begs the question as to how the Saudi-Iran confrontation may now progress, and who might benefit or suffer from it.

沙特集团和伊朗日益增加的裂痕目前看来超越了美国影响范围。沙特伊朗对峙将如何发展,谁将获益谁将受损,这就成了问题。


It was immediately clear that the event threw into chaos negotiations for a peaceful end to the Saudi-led war in Yemen. Continuation of that conflict threatens to exacerbate the Saudi budget crisis, which has already led senior Saudi princes to challenge the wisdom of the current leadership.

显而易见,该事件让旨在结束沙特在也门战争的谈判陷入了混乱。冲突的继续可能加剧沙特的财政危机,这已让沙特的阿哥们对当前领导人的能力发起挑战。


This may cost Saudi Arabia dearly, particularly if the U.S. position as a Saudi ally is simultaneously thrown into doubt.

这可能让沙特阿拉伯损失惨重,尤其当美国是否还是沙特的盟友也令人产生疑虑。


What now seems significant is that the only “major power” capable of taking advantage of the situation — given the overall spread of conflict from Syria to Yemen, and even across the Red Sea — is Turkey.

考虑到从叙利亚到也门甚至跨越红海的冲突蔓延,现在唯一可对此加以利用的“大国”是土耳其,


The U.S. and European Union (EU) have no influence; Russia is perceived as being in support of Iran; and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is attempting to take no side in the rift.

美国和欧盟难以施加影响,俄罗斯支持伊朗,中华人民共和国试图在裂痕中“不选边”。


It also begs the question as to what provoked the Kingdom into the mass executions of dissidents as the “unified symbolic message,” which it was.

这也让人想要知道沙特为什么要大规模处死政治异见者。


Part of it lay in the fact that the Saudi leaders had come under increasing pressure from domestic and regional hard-line Wahhabists to demonstrate their credentials and legitimacy.

部分原因在于沙特领导层受到来自国内和中东强硬的瓦哈比派日渐增强的压力,需要展示他们的资质和合法性。


译者注:瓦哈比派被认为是伊斯兰教中极端的原教旨主义,与基地组织关系密切,与之类似的还有巴基斯坦和阿富汗一带的德奥班德派。译者认为,瓦哈比派兴起的背景和恐怖主义有可以类比之处,极端的瓦哈比是对奥斯曼土耳其帝国不公正统治的一种矫枉过正,而恐怖主义也宣称自己在对抗美帝国主义。


This included pressure from Islamic State (DI’ISH) supporters as well as domestic radicals and even mainline members of the Royal Family who had become disillusioned with the rash destruction of the Saudi economy by escalating spending on foreign wars.

这包括来自伊斯兰国支持者的压力,以及国内激进主义甚至皇室主流成员的压力,后者因海外战争花费持续增加而给沙特经济带来的严重毁灭感到失望。


It is significant that, of the 47 dissidents executed on January 2, 2016, three were indeed Saudi Shi’as, but about a third were al-Qaida-linked Saudis, the majority were Sunni.

重要的是,2016年1月2日处死的47名政治异见者中,三个是沙特的什叶派,至少有三分之一是与基地组织有关的沙特人,大多数是逊尼派。


In the meantime, although the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) called for an emergency meeting to discuss the crisis, it was clear that the GCC itself was not in harmony, and nor could it represent a balanced view of the situation. Iran, for example, is not represented in the GCC.

同时,尽管海湾合作委员会呼吁召开紧急会议讨论问及,很明显委员会自己也不和睦,也无法做出持平之论,例如委员会中没有伊朗。


But within the GCC there is strong antagonism between Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman because the Saudis felt that Oman had acquiesced to Iranian delivery of weapons and combatants to Yemen, overflying Omani airspace to skirt Saudi Arabia and possible U.S. Navy interdiction.

但在委员会中沙特阿拉伯和安曼苏丹国敌意很深,因为沙特认为安曼默许伊朗将武器和战士输送到也门去,这些物资兵力越过安曼领空,绕过沙特甚至美国海军的封锁。


Those flights — by Iranian Air Force Ilyushin Il-76MD and Boeing 747 transports — had transported major weapons systems, such as the Iskander-E (NATO codename SS-26) battlefield ballistic missile, and Hizballah combatants to the Zaidi Shi’a Houthi forces fighting the Saudi coalition.

通过这一航线,伊朗空军伊尔76和波音747将包括Iskander-E陆基弹道导弹和真主党战士送到什叶栽德派的胡塞人武装手中,与沙特联军作战。


Oman had, in November 2015 (and later), played a role in bringing the Houthis into the Geneva Peace Talks on Yemen.

2015年11月及其后,安曼推动胡塞人加入日内瓦和平谈判。


Abd al-Rab Mansour al-Hadi and the Houthis began in Geneva, under United Nations auspices, and on December 15, 2015, both sides called for an immediate ceasefire for seven days.

在联合国主持下,曼苏尔-哈迪政府和胡塞武装在日内瓦开始谈判,2015年12月15日,双方呼吁立即停火七天。


Breaches of the ceasefire began almost immediately, and the talks again broke down and ended by December 20, 2015.

双方几乎立即破坏停火,谈判在2015年12月20日再次破裂。


Significantly, the Saudi-led coalition fighting in Yemen had been addressing more than merely the Zaidi Houthis; various Sunni al-Qaida groups were also been in conflict with the coalition.

沙特联军在也门要面对的不仅是栽德派胡塞人,各路逊尼派基地组织也参与了于联军的冲突。

......

Qatar, at odds with Saudi Arabia on several key issues, was supportive of the Kingdom on this front. In September 2015, Qatar committed 1,000 troops, supported by 200 armored vehicles and 30 Boeing AH-64 Apache helicopter gunships, to support the Saudi operation.

卡塔尔尽管与沙特在许多重要问题上看法不同,在这一阵线上支持沙特。2015年9月,卡塔尔派遣1000名士兵、200辆装甲车和30架阿帕奇武装直升机支持沙特的行动。


Coalition casualties on the ground have been heavy, and several combat aircraft have been lost to surface-to-air missile fire and accidents: the Royal Moroccan Air Force lost one F-16 in May 2015, and the Bahraini Air Force lost an F-16 in Jazan region, near the Saudi-Yemen border “due to a technical error” in December 2015.

联军在战场上损失惨重,几架战舰被地对空导弹消灭:皇家摩洛哥空军在2015年6月折了一架F16,2015年12月,巴林空军在沙特也门边境附近的Jazan地区由于“技术原因”折了一架F16。


Broader Ramifications: The polarizing of what was portrayed as a “Sunni-Shi’a rift” — in reality a geostrategic rivalry — had a range of other attendant issues:

还有更加深远的影响:被视作“逊尼-什叶裂痕”——实则是地缘战略对手裂痕——其加剧还有其他一些影响。


一、国内安全

二、地区恐惧

三、经济压力

四、仓促举动

五、埃及及其他

六、叙利亚和伊斯兰国



1.  Domestic Security


The attempt by the Saudi leadership, acting in the name of King Salman bin ‘Abd al-’Aziz al Sa’ud, but particularly galvanizing around his son, Defense Minister and Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, 30, to suppress the growing dissent over within the extended Royal Family over the conduct of national affairs and the growing decline in the economy and economic outlook.

沙特领导层以国王之名,但主要围绕在他的儿子、30岁的国防大臣默罕默德·本·萨勒曼周围,镇压王室内部对国家事务及经济前景疲弱的日益不满。


This known dissidence has reinforced other, non-Royal, dissidents, and all opposition was now being treated as “terrorism”.

王室不和睦还助长了其他非王室的异见者,所有反对派都被视作“恐怖主义”。


2.  Regional Fears


There is no doubt that there has been concern within the Government, as well as regionally, that the Russian intervention in the Syrian conflict has taken the initiative away from the collection of often mutually-opposing “Sunni forces”, and restored the initiative to the Government of Bashar al-Assad and, therefore, to his ally, Iran.

毫无疑问,政府内以及整个地区都担忧俄罗斯对叙利亚冲突的干涉瓦解了内部不合的“逊尼派势力”,重兴了巴沙尔政府和其盟友伊朗。


Moreover, successful actions by the Shi’a-dominated Iraqi Government against Islamic State (DI’ISH) forces in recent months had also reduced the impetus of Sunni forces in Iraq, which could be influenced by Saudi Arabia, and given momentum to Iran.

什叶派主导的伊拉克政府近几个月来对伊斯兰国的成功行动也克制了受伊朗影响的逊尼派势力在伊拉克的劲头,从而有利于伊朗。


Iran, too, was gaining in strength by its ability to shape the conduct of the war in Yemen, by ensuring no quick victory for Saudi-led forces.

伊朗也能左右也门战局,拖住沙特联军取得胜利的步伐。


This was compounded by the reality that Iran would only gain in economic and military strength (and regional influence) as the international sanctions against it were lessened as a result of the 2015 deal which Iran struck with the G5+1 team, led by the U.S. Little wonder that the Saudi leadership viewed the U.S. as no friend.

伊朗不仅在经济和政治上(地区影响力)得利,因为随着在美国主导下,伊朗与G5+1达成和协议后,国际制裁的影响渐弱了。难怪沙特领导层不把美国当朋友了。



3.  Economic Pressures


Both Iran (freed from oil sanctions) and Saudi Arabia committed to increasing crude oil production in early 2016. Saudi Arabia was counting on the fact that falling international oil prices were helping to drive U.S. shale oil producers out of business.

摆脱了石油禁运的伊朗和沙特阿拉伯在2016年初要增加原油生产。沙特指望国际油价下跌能把美国页岩油挤出市场。


Although the U.S. shale production technologies have proven to have evolved more rapidly towards low-cost viability than expected, the decline in oil prices by more than 60 percent since June 2014 has driven the number of U.S. oil rigs from a peak of 1,609 rigs in October 2014 to a low of 524 on December 11, 2015.

尽管美国页岩油生产技术的经济可行性发展比预想的快,但自2014年6月以来,油价下跌了60%,这使美国的油井从2014年10月的1609口下降到2015年12月11日的524口之低。


Some Saudi analysts would argue that the gamble to continue strong oil production in the face of low prices was paying off. But the continued high budget deficits which the Saudi Government is incurring threaten to exhaust its $700-billion of financial reserves within five or so years.

有沙特分析人士认为押宝在油价低迷时增产正在付出代价。但沙特政府高企的预算赤字可能在五年左右时间内耗尽7000亿财政储备。


And Saudi Arabia’s oil and gas reserves have been estimated to last — at the current rates of depletion — for only another 18 or so years. Saudi Arabia’s policies, however, are a gamble that the low price of oil has been determined largely by the increased supplies made available by U.S. shale exploitation.

以目前的消耗速率观,沙特的石油和天然气储备只能开采18年左右。然而,沙特阿拉伯的政策是种赌博,他们押宝油价低迷主要由于美国页岩油开采造成增产。


This is not the case: current and anticipated global economic malaise has also limited demand.

事实并非如此,当下及未来的全球经济停滞导致需求下降。


Moreover, a rise in global economic fortunes (and therefore energy demand) would also trigger a resumption of the rise in U.S. production, quite apart from the reality that a future U.S. administration would at some stage approve a widening of the exploitation of the larger U.S. oil and gas reserves which currently have been ruled out of bounds.

此外,全球经济复苏后,能源需求增加,美国石油产量自然会增加,并非所谓现在禁止开采而未来美国政府会在某个阶段会批准加大开采美国石油和天然气。


But for the Saudi leadership the existential nature of short-term survival outweighs long-term considerations.

但对沙特领导层而言,来自短期生存的压力盖过了长期的考量。




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