沙特哪儿根筋儿不对了？（下）
4. Rash Actions
Saudi Arabia’s very real concerns that the Yemen war was dragging on far longer than it could realistically sustain has made it undertake rash actions, such as the steps, in concert with the United Arab Emirates, in 2015 to cut relations with Djibouti and bolster Eritrea and potentially Somaliland. The way in which this occurred de facto caused a threat to Ethiopia, which depends vitally on Djibouti for its exports.
沙特最真实的担忧是也门战争迁延不决，自己入不敷出，因而被迫狗急跳墙，例如2015年和阿联酋一起与吉布提断交，支持厄立特里亚王国甚至索马里兰。这种态势事实上对埃塞俄比亚造成威胁，后者的出口严重依赖吉布提港。
Despite Saudi Arabia’s feelings of distrust for the U.S. at present, the U.S. had, in fact, supported Saudi Arabia and the UAE over its rift with Djibouti, at potentially significant strategic cost to the United States’ ability to sustain power projection in the Red Sea.
尽管沙特目前对美国产生不信任感，美国是事实上支持沙特和阿联酋与吉布提闹僵，这却对美国在红海投射兵力造成潜在的战略代价。
This, too, jeopardizes Ethiopia’s security, and the polarization of Saudi-Ethiopian feelings seems likely to impact on Saudi Arabia’s and the UAE’s military support for Eritrea, reviving the belief by Pres. Isayas Afewerke in Asmara that he could (with help from Riyadh and Abu Dhabi) resume his proxy war against Ethiopia.
这也危害到埃塞俄比亚的安全，沙特和埃塞俄比亚对立可能对沙特及阿联酋给予厄立特里亚的军事支持造成影响，让厄立特里亚总统以为在沙特和阿联酋的帮助下自己要重开一场对埃塞俄比亚的代理人战争。
译者注：这里情况较为复杂，小国吉布提可谓东非的棋眼，它扼守红海的出海口，而红海是连接印度洋和地中海的通道，另一个可以与吉布提相提并论的就是苏伊士运河。吉布提也是埃塞俄比亚唯一的出海口，决定这埃塞人的生存大事。
去年吉布提和海湾国家大佬怎么闹僵了呢？这其中不乏吉布提准许中国在吉布提建立基地有关，在约翰内斯堡举行的非洲领导人会议间隙，吉布提外长优素福对记者说：“谈判已经结束，中国将在吉布提建海军基地。”这让美国和海湾国家很不爽，加上其他一些原因，阿联酋和吉布提产生一场外交危机。
想斡旋中东，口说无凭，中国在吉布提和巴基斯坦的瓜达尔港建立基地，在地缘上建立了间接影响中东的支点，这也是习大大访问中东三国的一个颇有意味的注脚。
再说说厄立特里亚，这个沿红海国家本来属于埃塞，但意大利殖民日久，就逐渐独立出去了。1999年至2000年,位于“东非之角”的埃塞俄比亚和厄立特里亚为了争夺巴德梅地区爆发战争。这也是一场代理人战争，战争中沙特和阿联酋支持厄立特里亚。
It was not insignificant that Ethiopia was jarred on January 2, 2015, to learn that the U.S. had unilaterally withdrawn from its use of the Ethiopian Air Base at Arba Minch, from where it had conducted UAV strike and reconnaissance operations against Somalia’s al-Shabaab and other jihadist rebel groups.
还有一件不可忽视的事，2015年1月2日，埃塞俄比亚吃惊地发现美国单方面撤出阿尔巴明契空军基地，美军曾在这里对索马里青年党和其他圣战反对组织发动无人机打击和侦察。
The Ethiopian leadership had pinned all its strategic hopes on the protective umbrella of the U.S., but that was now being gradually eroded.
埃塞俄比亚领导层把全部的战略希望放在美国的保护下，现在保护伞却逐渐消失了。
Rash Saudi actions have continued elsewhere, and the least obvious of these, the construction of Wahhabist mosques around the world, may finally face opposition, not just in Western countries, but even in Pakistan and Ethiopia.
沙特草率的行动四处可见，最明显的是在全世界各处营造瓦哈比清真寺，这最终会遭到反对，不仅在西方国家，甚至在巴基斯坦和埃塞俄比亚也如是。
But Saudi Arabia’s financial support for anti-Chinese jihadist groups, such as the “East Turkistan Independence Movement” has alienated PRC support for Saudi Arabia. Russia, by September 2015, had become the primary oil supplier to the PRC, a situation which seemed likely to continue.
可沙特阿拉伯对反华圣战组织如东突的支持离间了中国对沙特的支持。到2015年9月止，俄罗斯成为中国的主要石油供应国，这一趋势还将持续。
There is little doubt that, as U.S./Western strategies persist, and Saudi-Qatari-Turkish support for jihadism continues, Russia and the PRC have found growing identity of strategic interests.
毫无疑问，美国西方策略未变，沙特-卡塔尔-土耳其继续支持圣战，俄罗斯和中国战略兴趣日增。
5. Egypt and Others
Saudi Arabia and the UAE were vital economic supporters of Egypt when popular dissent drove then-Pres. Mohammed Morsi from office in mid-2013. They remain the most critical investment partners of incumbent Pres. Abdul Fatah al-Sisi.
民众2013年中把总统穆尔西赶下台时，沙特和阿联酋曾是埃及重要的经济支柱。两国仍然是现任塞西总统最关键的投资伙伴
As a result, Egypt has been compelled to support the Saudi-UAE drive into Yemen, and to remain silent on Saudi actions — in concert, often, with Qatar and Turkey — in Syria, even though Cairo has grave concerns about Saudi actions.
于是，埃及被迫支持沙特-阿联酋对也门的作战，就算开罗对沙特的行为表示严重的忧虑，它还是与卡塔尔和土耳其一样，默认沙特在叙利亚的行为。
The Egyptian Government has also remained notably quiet on issues such as the Saudi and UAE rift with Djibouti and Riyadh’s and Abu Dhabi’s move to create military bases into (and provide military and economic support for) Eritrea.
埃及政府在沙特-阿联酋与吉布提的分歧以及两国准备在厄立特里亚建立军事基地的行为也缄默不言。
Saudi Arabia’s and the UAE’s actions with regard to Yemen, Eritrea, and Djibouti profoundly affect Egypt’s most vital trade route: the Suez/Red Sea sea-line of communication (SLOC).
沙特和阿联酋在也门、厄立特里亚和吉布提的行为严重影响到埃及最重要的贸易通道：苏伊士/红海通道（SLOC）。
But Saudi Arabia’s seemingly messianic war against Shi’ism in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and domestically within the Kingdom has made some of its historical allies, such as Pakistan (where some 20 percent of the population is Shi’a), nervous.
沙特在也门、叙利亚、伊拉克和王国内部对什叶派弥赛亚式的战争让其历史上的一些盟友感到焦虑，例如什叶派人口占大约20%的巴基斯坦。
Not surprisingly, Pakistan’s National Assembly voted unanimously on April 10, 2015, to reject Saudi Arabia’s request to join the anti-Houthi military coalition, despite the extremely close ties which Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has had with the Kingdom.
不令人吃惊，2015年4月10日，巴基斯坦国民大会投票一致反对应沙特邀请加入打击胡赛武装的联盟，尽管巴基斯坦总理谢里夫和沙特关系非常好。
Even for Egypt, which has no Shi’a population of any significance, Saudi Arabia’s marriage with intra-Sunni rivals Turkey and Qatar causes concern.
即便在什叶派人口不足一提的埃及，沙特与埃及在逊尼派内部的对手土耳其和卡塔尔的联姻也导致担忧。
Clearly, Egypt is seeking cultural and strategic leadership within the Arabic-speaking world, but has not sought the kind of religious leadership of the Sunni community which has been sought by the Saudis, Qatar, and Turkey.
显然，埃及寻求在阿拉伯世界发挥文化和战略的领导地位，却并未如沙特、卡塔尔和土耳其一样，寻求在逊尼世界寻求宗教领导地位。
As if to reinforce his secular credentials over the religious, Egyptian Pres. al-Sisi on December 26, 2015, met with Iraqi citizen Nadia Murad, a Yazidi woman who had been kidnapped and assaulted by DI’ISH fighters when they took control of Sinjar city in August 2014. The Yazidi religion of Sharfadin is pre-Islamic and linked to ancient Mesopotamian religions.
埃及总统塞西2015年12月26日会见伊拉克公民Nadia Murad，这名雅兹迪女人在伊斯兰国2014年8月拿下辛加尔市时被绑架和袭击，这显示出埃及要增强其世俗影响力而非宗教影响力。因为沙法丁的雅兹迪教派是前伊斯兰时期的，与古美索不达米亚宗教有关联。
Unspoken in all media reporting is the position of Israel, which has significant, close intelligence ties with Saudi Arabia, but which is concerned over Turkish, Qatari, and Saudi (and U.S.) attempts to replace Syrian Pres. Bashar al-Assad.
所有媒体都没有报道的是以色列的态度，以色列与沙特阿拉伯有密切的情报联络，但以色列对土耳其、卡塔尔和沙特（以及美国）试图推翻叙利亚巴沙尔政府感到担忧。
The latest Saudi moves seem likely to consolidate consultations between Egypt, Israel, and Jordan, in particular.
沙特最近的举动可能强化埃及、以色列，尤其是与约旦之间的磋商。
Bahrain, committed to the Saudi coalition in Yemen, and yet with a majority Shi’a population, immediately sided with Saudi Arabia in breaking diplomatic relations with Iran.
在也门与沙特联军站在一起的巴林立即响应沙特，与伊朗断绝外交关系。但巴林人口中什叶派也占多数。
译者注：与巴沙尔的叙利亚相反，巴林王国占少数的逊尼派统治多数的什叶派信徒，这与萨达姆时期的伊拉克相仿。
This may have been an attempt to limit any Iranian Embassy-based inspiration of riots against the Government, but even so, Iran’s reach into the Bahraini community is clearly deep and discreet, and Bahrain could soon experience significant unrest. This would impact U.S. and British military deployments based in that Kingdom.
这是限制伊朗策动反政府暴动的努力，但即便如此，伊朗对巴林社会的影响深远而审慎的。巴林可能很快就会出现动荡，这将影响美国和英国在巴林王国的军事部署。
6. Syria and DI’ISH
The question remains as to whether the significant upsurge in internal security actions, which the January 2, 2016, executions symbolized, would detract from Saudi Arabia’s physical ability to fund and staff military, intelligence, and jihad-related activities against Syrian Pres. Bashar al-Assad and in tacit support of DI’ISH (Islamic State).
问题在于，以1月2日处决教士为象征的沙特内部安全的重大变故是否会让沙特分心，影响其为推翻叙利亚巴沙尔政权和暗中支持伊斯兰国提供的人力财力。
Saudi Arabia cannot afford to absent itself from the leadership of the Sunni cause in Syria and Iraq, but neither can it afford the physical cost of a significant military contribution.
沙特担受不起不在叙利亚和伊拉克的逊尼派事业中发挥领导权，但也付不起巨额的军事支出。
Thus, the Syria/Iraq intervention would likely continue to be a function of the intelligence services.
因此对叙利亚和伊拉克的干涉可能只限于情报服务。
In the short term, Saudi Arabia seems likely to continue to escalate its military activities in Yemen to attempt to force a settlement — and a public indication of victory — as quickly as possible. Iran’s function would be to defer, mitigate, or defeat this goal.
短期内，沙特可能将升级在也门的军事行动，试图建立据点，并尽快向公众宣告胜利。伊朗则会拖延、减低和挫败这一目标。
Saudi Arabia’s next step, already underway, must be to mobilize to the maximum the radical and moderate Sunni Muslim support, galvanized around Wahhabism, to fight its geopolitical war against Iran as a religious war.
沙特正在进行的下一步行动，必须最大程度的获取极端及温和逊尼派的支持，以瓦哈比派为核心，以宗教战争之名，对伊朗打一场地缘政治的战争。
译者注：几乎多数恐怖主义的幕后支持者和精神源泉都是以瓦哈比派立国的沙特，这已是众所周知的秘密。在沙特法律中，无神论倒被定义为“恐怖主义”。但自罗斯福时代，美国就与沙特因油结缘，对瓦哈比派睁一只眼闭一只眼。另一方面，土耳其对伊斯兰国的支持同样影影绰绰，但作为反俄先锋和北约成员，美国对土耳其也态度暧昧，可见中东乱局和美国是脱不了干系的。
In such a war, assertions of moral and dialectical correctness are major weapons of legitimacy, but they are not the underlying cause of the conflict.
在这场战争中，道义和道理上显得正确是争取合法性的主要武器，却并非冲突的根本原因。
It is also true that the factors actually beyond measurable calculation or control, such as the social motivations within the Muslim world’s various factions, may be the determinants of whether the situation could trigger an irreversible and major conflict, or the collapse of states.
但另一方面，难以估测或控制的因素，如穆斯林世界各派系的社会动机，决定了当前形势是否会引发一场不可逆转的大冲突，甚至导致国家的覆灭。
Saudi Arabia could still be one of the major casualties of its own actions. And while the break-up of Yemen, once again, now seems like a foregone conclusion, the break-up of Saudi Arabia could occur with equal speed.
沙特是其自身行动的受害者之一。也门的分裂看起来不可避免，沙特的分裂速度可能不逊于此。