Accounting, Organizations and Society｜2016年第8月目录摘要

Original 2016-12-29 木夏之秋、陈前前 会计学术联盟会计学术联盟

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Accounting, Organizations and Society

Volume 53, Pages 1-62 (August 2016)

1.Motivating revisions ofmanagement accounting systems: An examination of organizational goals andaccounting feedback

Tyler F. Thomas

2. Knowing patients: The customersurvey and the changing margins of accounting in healthcare

Dane Pfluege

3. White collar incentives

Bok Baik, John H. Evans III, Kyonghee Kim,Yoshio Yanadori

4. The effects of a reasonableinvestor perspective and firm's prior disclosure policy on managers' disclosurejudgments

Diane Mayorga, Ken T. Trotman

1. Motivating revisions of management accountingsystems: An examination of organizational goals and accounting feedback

Tyler F. Thomas

Accounting,Organizations and Society, 2016(53):1-16

Abstract：Successful revisions of management accountingsystems (MAS) require substantial effort, and it has been suggested thatproviding feedback about the success of short-run MAS changes can motivatecontinued change efforts. Based on psychology theories of goal priming, Ipredict that such feedback can either increase or decrease continued effort,depending on whether it activates a high-level goal (i.e., an overarchinglong-term project goal) in individuals' minds. Activation of a high-level goalvia a slogan in an accounting report leads participants in my experiment tointerpret feedback in terms of their commitment to the goal, and thus to exertmore effort toward MAS revision after success than failure. In the absence ofhigh-level goal activation, however, participants interpret feedback in termsof whether sufficient progress has yet been made, and thus they exert moreeffort after failure than success. These findings not only provide insight intothe effects of accounting feedback on individual effort; they also expand ourunderstanding of the effects of accounting-report design by providing evidenceof motivational effects in addition to the cognitive effects addressed in priorstudies.

2. Knowing patients: The customer survey and thechanging margins of accounting in healthcare

Dane Pfluege

Accounting, Organizationsand Society, 2016(53):17-33:

Abstract：This research investigates the changing“margins of accounting” (Miller, 1998) in the field of healthcare where, as inother fields, customer surveys have emerged as a means of accounting forcustomers and of holding professionals and organizations to account. Drawingupon methodological insights provided by genealogical studies of accounting andanthropological studies of “things,” this research addresses the activities andtransformations that take place to move the survey from war to ward—from ameans of learning about medical populations during and immediately after WorldWar II to a means of accounting for the views of consumers and of holdingproviders accountable for their care. These movements are shown to entail thestaging and stabilizing of “knowing patients” in both senses of the term: theseare patients that are equipped and empowered as consumers with knowledge aboutquality and their care, and simultaneously stripped of their individualizing characteristicsso as to be made knowable to organizations in terms that can be managed andimproved. These findings speak to the limitations of accounting as itinfiltrates fluid and personal spaces in order to represent people in modesother than financial and to reconstitute knowledge from below. Doing so isshown not just to limit the possibilities for customers to speak and to beheard, but to give rise to a particularly pernicious form of territorializationin which the subject and object of accounting knowledge become inextricablyintertwined and indistinguishably blurred. This has implications for thepromises and practices of accounting in a post-modern society and for the kindsof questions that researchers ask about its effects.

3. White collar incentives

Bok Baik, John H. Evans III, Kyonghee Kim,Yoshio Yanadori

Accounting,Organizations and Society, 2016(53): 34-49

Abstract：This study analyzes the incentive designstructure for a sample of mid-level white collar managers (WCM) in large, technology-orientedU.S. firms whose knowledge-based outputs are difficult to measure objectively.Consistent with the limited availability of objective outcome measures for WCM,we find that the sample firms make significant use of tournament-like implicitpromotion incentives to motivate WCM, in addition to using explicit financialincentives. We also find that implicit and explicit incentives are complementsrather than substitutes in our setting in which sample firms are generally notconstrained in their ability to adjust implicit and explicit incentives.Finally, while both implicit and explicit incentives increase in job level,explicit incentives increase more rapidly than implicit incentives, resultingin an increase in the intensity of explicit incentives relative to implicitincentives. We attribute this finding to WCM at higher job levels exercisinggreater influence on organization performance, making organization-levelperformance measures more informative. Overall, the results are consistent withthe availability of objective performance measures for WCM influencing thestructure of their implicit promotion and explicit financial incentives.

4. The effects of a reasonable investor perspectiveand firm's prior disclosure policy on managers' disclosure judgments

Diane Mayorga, Ken T. Trotman

Accounting,Organizations and Society, 2016(53):50-62

Abstract：Security laws and accounting standardssuggest that reasonable investors' expectations are an important considerationfor disclosure judgments. Regulators have expressed concerns that manydisclosure judgments are made without adequate consideration of how investorswould evaluate the information. However, the psychological literature suggeststhat individuals may face difficulties considering the facts from another'sperspective. We conduct two experiments to examine whether prompting managersto take the perspective of a reasonable investor affects their disclosurerecommendations of a probable negative change in their company's earningsexpectations, and whether this effect is impacted by the firm's priordisclosure policy (known that its past preference to be biased towards nodisclosure versus unknown). We find that experienced managers are more likelyto recommend disclosure when they are prompted to take the perspective of areasonable investor than when they are not and this effect is stronger when thefirm's prior disclosure policy is unknown.

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