国际顶刊 | 《比较政治研究》2023年第56卷第11期
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期 刊 介 绍
Comparative Political Studies(CPS,《比较政治研究》)是一个比较政治学者和学生交流思想的国际顶刊之一。期刊刊载的文章包括了全球学者关于比较方法论、理论和研究的创新工作。该刊力图向读者展现全球范围内比较政治研究的全景式画面:从第三世界的民主到中东的文武关系,从东欧的选举制度和政党政治到拉丁美洲的经济表现,从比较北美和西欧的政治庇护到亚洲国家的民族冲突。《比较政治研究》被认为是政治科学中比较政治子领域最为重要的期刊之一。该刊在《科睿唯安 2022 年期刊引用报告》(ClarivateJCR2022)中 JIF=5.0,在 187 种政治科学类(Political Science-SSCI)期刊中排名第 10(Q1)。
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期刊目录
1.Attitudinal Ambivalence on Redistribution: Causes and Electoral Implications Across Europe
对再分配的态度分歧:欧洲的原因和各地选举影响
2.The Activist Personality: Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Opposition Activism in Authoritarian Regimes
活动家人格:威权政体中的外向性、宜人性和反对派激进主义
3.Repression Works (Just Not in Moderation)
镇压有效(只是不适度)
4.Minding (Your Own and) Others’ Business: Assigning CoResponsibility in Cabinet Decisions
管好(自己和)别人的事:在内阁决策中分配共同责任
5.Low-Skill Products by High-Skill Workers: The Distributive Effects of Trade in Emerging and Developing Countries
高技能工人生产低技能产品:贸易在新兴和发展中国家的分配效应
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摘要译文
01 对再分配的态度分歧:欧洲的原因和各地选举影响
【题目】
Attitudinal Ambivalence on Redistribution: Causes and Electoral Implications Across Europe
【作者】
Alon Yakter
【摘要】
尽管欧洲各地对再分配的支持率仍然很高,但传统上认同这一议程的左翼政党的投票率一直不高。过去的研究通过基于阶级的对再分配优先事项的分歧和第二维度的态度来解释这一难题。然而,这些解释假设了选民对结构变化的一致偏好。相比之下,我认为部分困惑还在于对再分配政策的态度矛盾——同时存在负面和正面评价。利用横断面民意和政党立场数据,我发现这种矛盾心理随着政治复杂度的降低、价值冲突的加剧和经济需求的减弱而加剧。在选举方面,它加深了对再分配的支持和左翼自我认同之间的脱节,并增加了对更多经济和文化右翼政党的投票。这些模式独立于阶级差异和第二维度态度,并在早期数据中稳定复制。这些发现有助于对态度结构和投票模式进行持续的辩论,并阐明了经济进步政党面临的另一个挑战。
While support for redistribution remains high across Europe, voting for left-wing parties, traditionally identified with this agenda, has been under par. Past research explains this puzzle by class-based disagreements about redistributive priorities and by second-dimension attitudes. These explanations, however, assume coherent voter preferences reacting to structural changes. By contrast, I argue that part of the puzzle also lies in attitudinal ambivalence—simultaneous negative and positive evaluations—regarding redistributive policy. Using cross-sectional public opinion and party position data, I find that such ambivalence increases with lower political sophistication, greater value conflict, and weaker economic need. Electorally, it deepens detachment between support for redistribution and left-wing self-identification and increases voting for more economically and culturally right-wing parties. These patterns hold independently of class differences and second-dimension attitudes and replicate stably in earlier data. The findings contribute to ongoing debates about attitude structures and voting patterns and illuminate an additional challenge for economically progressive parties.
02 活动家人格:威权政体中的外向性、宜人性和反对派激进主义
【题目】
The Activist Personality: Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Opposition Activism in Authoritarian Regimes
【作者】
Jan Matti Dollbaum, Graeme B. Robertson
【摘要】
人们为什么会参与威权政体中的反对派活动——即便该政体下的政见分歧可能会招致社会责难与危险?本文就这一经典问题给出了新的答案——人格。文章首次考察了民主语境之外的人格特质与反对派激进主义之间的关联,并认为某些人格特质具有普遍性,而另一些则与政治语境相互作用。与民主国家类似,高外向性无论持亲政权或是反政权立场都预示着政治激进主义,且外向性对解释从线上到线下行动的转变尤为重要。此外,不同于民主语境,低宜人性可以预测威权政体中的反对派激进主义,因为它降低了非协调性的认知成本。文章基于俄罗斯的两个独立调查样本检验了上述论点,在一系列的统计检验(包括两个案例对照设计)中,所有假设都得到了一致支持。
Why do people become opposition activists in authoritarian regimes where dissent invites social censure and can be dangerous? We make a new contribution to answering this classic question: personality. For the first time outside of democratic contexts, we investigate the association between personality traits and opposition activism, arguing that some traits work universally, while others interact with political context. We propose that—as in democracies—high extraversion predicts political activism, regardless of its pro- or anti-regime orientation, and, in particular, that extraversion is critical to explain the shift from online to offline action. We also argue that—contrary to democratic contexts—low agreeableness predicts opposition activism in autocracies, because it reduces the perceived costs of non-conformity. We test these arguments based on two independent survey samples from Russia, a stable authoritarian regime. In a series of statistical tests, including two case-control designs, we find consistent support for all hypotheses.
03 镇压有效(只是不适度)
【题目】
Repression Works (Just Not in Moderation)
【作者】
Yuri M. Zhukov
【摘要】
为什么政府的暴力行为在一些条件下能够威慑政治挑战者,而另一些情形下则会激怒他们?本文认为,镇压在中低水平上会增加反对派活动,但在极端情况下会减少反对派活动。暴力具有临界值,只要在此之上,反对派就难以招募新成员且叛乱会瓦解——即便政府方杀害了更多的无辜者。本文基于车臣的分类数据和对71国的次国家冲突动态的元分析认为,临界值是存在的,但达到临界值所需的暴力程度存在差异。当然,许多政府缺乏能力或意愿至此。文章探讨了临界值门槛可能更高或更低的条件,并强调了减少政府暴力与维护公民自由之间的基本平衡。
Why does government violence deter political challengers in one context but inflame them in the next? This paper argues that repression increases opposition activity at low and moderate levels but decreases it in the extreme. There is a threshold level of violence, where the opposition becomes unable to recruit new members, and the rebellion unravels—even if the government kills more innocents. We find empirical support for this proposition in disaggregated data from Chechnya and a meta-analysis of sub-national conflict dynamics in 71 countries. The data suggest that a threshold exists, but the level of violence needed to reach it varies. Many governments, thankfully, are unable or unwilling to go that far. We explore conditions under which this threshold may be higher or lower and highlight a fundamental trade-off between reducing government violence and preserving civil liberties.
04 管好(自己和)别人的事:在内阁决策中分配共同责任
【题目】
Minding (Your Own and) Others’ Business: Assigning CoResponsibility in Cabinet Decisions
【作者】
Ilana Shpaizman, Amnon Cavari
【摘要】
在联合政府中,政党会投入大量精力来管理各部长的授权成本。本文探讨了管理授权成本的内部执行机制:在内阁决策中分配部长的共同责任。基于以色列的内阁决策数据,文章检验了共同责任在何时以及何种条件下被分配。研究发现,共同责任是在内阁成员权衡放任风险和施加共同责任的成本后战略性地分配的。这揭示了在政策进入内阁后,联合政府缩小部长自主权和信息优势的机制。这一点尚未被学界充分研究,而本研究也有助于更好地理解联合政府的政策制定。
In coalition governments, parties invest much effort to manage delegation costs to individual ministers. In this article, we examine an intra-executive mechanism for managing delegation costs: Assigning ministerial co-responsibility in cabinet decisions. Using data of cabinet decisions in Israel, we test when and under what conditions co-responsibility is assigned. We find that co-responsibility is assigned strategically by cabinet members weighing the risk of a drift against the costs of imposing co-responsibility. These findings demonstrate an understudied mechanism through which coalition governments narrow ministerial autonomy and informational advantage once policies reach the cabinet. In doing so, this research contributes to a better understanding of policymaking in coalition governments.
05 高技能工人生产低技能产品:贸易在新兴和发展中国家的分配效应
【题目】
Low-Skill Products by High-Skill Workers: The Distributive Effects of Trade in Emerging and Developing Countries
【作者】
Irene Men´endez Gonz´alez, Erica Owen, Stefanie Walter
【摘要】
在发展中国家,贸易愈发与高技能劳动力的更高回报和不平等的加剧相联系。这些经验模式与发展中世界的典型贸易模式存在差异。这对这些国家的贸易政治经济学而言意味着什么?本文认为,尽管发展中国家在低技能产品方面具有比较优势,但这些产品却是由同行中相对高技能的工人所生产的。贸易和全球生产有利于相对熟练工人,尤其是那些从事制造业出口和外国直接投资的工人。该论点有助于我们深入了解为什么相对熟练的工人们最支持自由贸易,以及为什么发展中国家的不平等现象正在加剧。文章基于关于政策偏好的跨国调查数据以及关于贸易和不平等的综合数据,探讨了基本论点在微观与宏观层面的影响。研究结果对发展中国家的贸易政治经济学和全球生产具有重要意义。
In developing countries, trade is increasingly associated with greater returns to high-skilled labor and rising inequality. These empirical patterns are at odds with canonical models of trade in the developing world. What does this mean for the political economy of trade in these countries? We argue that although developing countries have a comparative advantage in low-skill products, these are produced by workers that are relatively high-skilled compared to their peers. Trade and global production benefit relatively skilled workers, particularly those exposed to exports and inward foreign direct investment in manufacturing. Our argument offers insight into why relatively skilled workers are most supportive of free trade and why inequality is rising in developing countries. We examine micro- and macro-level implications of our argument using cross-national survey data on policy preferences and aggregate data on trade and inequality. The findings have important implications for the political economy of trade and global production in developing countries.
翻 译:李征宇、马丝妮
校 对:周嘉豪、李征宇
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编辑:冉芷箐
一审:聂凯巍
二审:大 兰
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