双语阅读｜印度国有银行资本重组
ONE of the perks of owning a bank is the ability to tap it when you need money. The Indian government, which has majority stakes in 21 lenders, is no exception. As it happens, it needs to finance a bail-out of the banks it owns, most of which are in trouble. So under a cunning plan unveiled on October 24th, the ailing banks will lend the government 1.35trn rupees ($21bn), about a third of their combined market value. The government will reinvest this money in bank shares, thus ensuring they no longer need a bail-out.
拥有银行的一个额外好处就是钱能随用随取。控股21家银行的印度政府也不例外。碰巧的是，印度需要向国有银行提供财政援助，因为大部分银行都陷入了困境。因此，印度政府10月24日公布了一个非常巧妙的计划：经营状况不佳的银行借给政府共计1.35万亿卢比（合210亿美元），约为市场总估值的三分之一；印度政府用这笔钱购买这些银行的股票，保证他们不再需要财政援助。
Steadying a tottering financial system is never a graceful exercise, as American and European authorities discovered after the financial crisis. India’s lenders withstood the meltdown of 2007-08 well, but then embarked on an ill-advised lending spree, backing lots of infrastructure projects that got snarled in bureaucracy. Bad loans piled up. State-owned lenders, which account for around two-thirds of the sector, now have “stressed” loans of 10.5trn rupees, about a fifth of their book.
金融危机后，如美国和欧洲当局发现，去稳定摇摇欲坠的金融体系并不是善举。印度的银行虽经受住了2007年至2008年的金融危机，却在之后走上了一条轻率的放贷狂潮之路，支持大量的基础设施项目，这些项目在官僚体制中陷入混乱，不良贷款堆积如山。现在国有银行占到银行业的三分之二，承受着10.5万亿卢比贷款“压力”，约占其总资产的五分之一。
Banks have been reluctant to acknowledge that money they have lent is unlikely to be repaid, in part because that would trigger a loss, which in turn depletes the bank’s equity (the money shareholders invest). State-owned banks already have equity levels close to regulatory minimums, so they have preferred to pretend that even their ropiest borrowers will pay them back in full. At the very least, they don’t have the capacity to extend new loans. Predictably, bank-credit growth has slumped, recently nearing record lows. That is one reason why year-on-year GDP growth slowed to 5.7% in the second quarter, from well over 7% a year ago.
印度的银行一直不愿承认他们贷出的钱可能会收不回来，一部分原因是这将会引发亏损，从而减少银行的股权（股东投资的钱）。国有银行股权水平接近监管最低要求，因此，它们宁愿假装相信甚至信用度最低的借款人也会全额还贷。至少，他们不再有能力发放新贷款。果不出所料地，银行信贷增长大跌，近来接近了历史低点，导致了GDP同比增速从一年前的超过7%放缓至第二季度的5.7%。
Despite the roundabout method of recapitalisation, getting money into the banking system is good policy. Bankers are being encouraged to use a new bankruptcy code to deal with bust borrowers; having fresh equity makes it easier for them to acknowledge past mistakes and move on.
尽管有迂回的资本重组方法，把钱存入银行体系策略仍然没有错。印度政府鼓励银行家们使用新的破产法来处理破产借款人；拥有新的股权使他们更容易承认过去犯下的错误，然后继续前进。
Details of the bail-out scheme are pending, but may resemble a rescue plan in the 1990s, whereby banks financed “recapitalisation bonds” issued by the government. The proceeds were used to subscribe to banks’ rights issues. (Banks will have to raise 580bn rupees themselves, perhaps by selling non-core assets, and receive a further 180bn rupees from government coffers left over from a previous scheme.) One attraction is that the money the government will have to borrow, roughly 1% of GDP, will not be reflected in its deficit, saving the finance ministry’s blushes.
官方的救助方案的细节还不得而知，不过，有可能类似于在上世纪90年代的救援计划，即银行出资购买政府发行的“资本重组债券”。所得款项用于认购银行的权利。（银行得自己筹集5800亿卢比，或是出售非核心资产，才能从之前的方案中从国库里划拨出的1800亿卢比。）这个计划吸引力之一是政府出面来借，数额约是占GDP的1%，但不会反映在政府赤字之中，扫了财政部门的颜面。
The prospect of fresh funds sent most state-owned banks’ share prices soaring by well over 25%. Unlike recent Indian bank-rescue schemes, the package is large enough to make a difference. It should allow banks to lend again, if they can find willing borrowers. Indian businesses have plenty of spare capacity and many are still over-indebted. Some are still dealing with the effects of a sudden “demonetisation” of the economy last November, which has dented output. The complex implementation of a new goods-and-services tax in July has also frayed corporate confidence.
这些新资金未来将让大多数国有银行股价飙升超过25%。与近来印度银行救援方案不同，该个方案中足以让改变当前形势，能让银行在找到借款的人的情况下，有钱再次放贷。印度企业有大量的富余产能，许多仍然还是负债累累。一些银行还没有从去年11月份突如其来的经济“去货币“政策的影响缓过来，因为这个政策削弱产出。七月复杂的货物和服务新税政策的实施也削弱了企业的信心。
The government also says its banks will be run more efficiently, to prevent further incontinent lending. There is reason to doubt that. Reform of their corporate governance is long overdue; and letting the private sector take over the reins at public banks remains taboo. Still, repair of the balance-sheets is at last under way.
印度政府还表示，为防止进一步无节制放贷，银行将的运营应更为高效。这一表态无法让人相信。企业治理改革迟迟不成成效；私营部门接管公共银行的控制权仍然讳莫如深。然而，对银行负债表的修复最终还是开始了。
编译：黎金梅
审校：兰韦如
编辑：翻吧君
来源 ：经济学人