刊讯｜SSCI期刊《心智与语言》2021年第5期

Mind & Language

Volume 36, Issue 5, November 2021

Mind & Language（SSCI一区，2020 IF：1.938）2021年第36卷5期共发表7篇论文。研究论文涉及感知认识论、格赖斯语用学、语义认识论、句法学等方面。主题包括表象论、赤池信息量准则、语用侵蚀、实验认识论等。

目录

ISSUE INFORMATION

■ Issue Information,  Pages 641.

SUBMITTED ARTICLES

■ Visual indeterminacy and the puzzle of thespeckled hen, by Jessie Munton, Pages 643-663.

■Hypotheses that attribute false beliefs: A two-part epistemology (Darwin + Akaike), by William Roche, Elliott Sober, Pages 664-682.

■ The explanatory project of Gricean pragmatics, by Lars Dänzer, Pages 683-706.

■ (Implicit) Knowledge, reasons, and semantic understanding, by Natalia Waights Hickman, Pages 707-728.

■ Much at stake in knowledge, by Alexander Dinges, Julia Zakkou, Pages 729-749.

■ Communication and representation understood as sender–receiver coordination, by Ronald J. Planer, Peter Godfrey-Smith, Pages 750-770.

■Pain, placebo, and cognitive penetration, by Henry Shevlin, Phoebe Friesen, Pages 771-791.

摘要

Visual indeterminacy and the puzzle of thespeckled hen

Jessie Munton, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK

Abstract I identify three aspects to the puzzle of the speckled hen: A general puzzle, an epistemic puzzle, and a puzzle for the representationalist. These puzzles rely on an underly- ing “pictorialist” assumption, that we visually perceive general, determinable properties only in virtue of determi- nate properties or more specific, local features of our visual experience. This assumption is mistaken: Visual perception frequently starts from a position of uncertainty, and is routinely able to acquire information about general properties in the absence of more specific information. Acknowledging that visual indeterminacy is structured this way resolves all three puzzles of the speckled hen.

Key words: perceptual epistemology, pictorialism, representationalism, speckled hen, visual indeterminacy

Hypotheses that attribute false beliefs: A two-part epistemology (Darwin + Akaike)

William Roche, Department of Philosophy, Texas Christian University, Fort Worth, Texas

Elliott Sober, Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin – Madison, Madison, Wisconsin

Abstract Why expect organisms that have beliefs to have false beliefs? And if an organism occasionally occupies a neural state that encodes a perceptual belief, how do you evaluate hypotheses about the state's semantic con- tent, where some of those hypotheses attribute beliefs that are sometimes false while others attribute beliefs that are always true? To address the first of these ques- tions, we discuss evolution by natural selection. To address the second, we discuss a problem that is widely recognized in statistics, the problem of overfitting, and use the Akaike Information Criterion to solve epistemological versions of the disjunction and distality problems.

Key words: Akaike Information Criterion, disjunction and distality problems, evolution by natural selection, misrepresentation, predictive accuracy, reliability

The explanatory project of Gricean pragmatics

Lars Dänzer, Institute of Philosophy, University of Duisburg-Essen, Essen, Germany

Abstract The Gricean paradigm in pragmatics has recently been attacked for its alleged lack of explanatory import, based on the claim that it does not seek accounts of how utterance interpretation actually works, but merely of how it might work. This article rebuts this line of attack by offering a clear and detailed account of the explanatory project of Gricean pragmatics according to which the latter aims for rationalizing explanations of utterance interpretation. It is shown that, on this view, Gricean pragmatics seeks psychological explanations of utterance interpretation that are “cognitively real” in a perfectly clear and robust sense.

Key words: Gricean pragmatics, pragmatic explanation, psychological reality, rational reconstruction, rationalizing explanation, utterance interpretation

(Implicit) Knowledge, reasons, and semantic understanding

Natalia Waights Hickman, Worcester College, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

Abstract This paper exploits recent work on the normative and constitutive roles of knowledge in practical rationality, to put pressure on the idea that speakers could communicate without exploiting linguistic knowledge. I defend cognitivism about meaning, the view that speakers have rationally accessible (i.e., implicit rather than tacit) knowledge of semantic facts and principles, and that this knowledge is constitutive of their linguistic competence.

Key words: knowledge norm, knowledge view of reasons, rational integration criterion, rationality of language, semantic cognitivism, semantic understanding

Much at stake in knowledge

Alexander Dinges, Institut für Philosophie, Friedrich- Alexander-Universität Erlangen- Nürnberg, Erlangen, Germany

Julia Zakkou, Institut für Philosophie, Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin, Germany

Abstract Orthodoxy in the contemporary debate on knowledge ascriptions holds that the truth-value of knowledge ascriptions is purely a matter of truth-relevant factors. One familiar challenge to orthodoxy comes from intuitive practical factor effects. But practical factor effects turn out to be hard to confirm in experimental studies, and where they have been confirmed, they may seem easy to explain away. We suggest a novel experimental paradigm to show that practical factor effects exist. It trades on the idea that people retract knowledge attributions when practical factors shift. We also explain why the resulting data raise a serious challenge to orthodoxy.

Key words: experimental epistemology, knowledge ascriptions, pragmatic encroachment, retraction, salient alternative effects, stakes effects

Communication and representation understood as sender–receiver coordination

Ronald J. Planer, School of Philosophy, The Australian National University, Canberra, Australian Capital Territory, Australia

Peter Godfrey-Smith, History and Philosophy of Science, University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia

Abstract Modeling work by Brian Skyrms and others in recent years has transformed the theoretical role of David Lewis's 1969 model of signaling. The latter can now be understood as a minimal model of communication in all its forms. In this article, we explain how the Lewis model has been generalized, and consider how it and its variants contribute to ongoing debates in several areas. Specifically, we consider connections between the models and four topics: The role of common interest in communication, signaling within the organism, meaning, and the evolution of human communication and language.

Key words: co-evolution, common interest, evolution of language, meaning, sender–receiver model, syntax

Pain, placebo, and cognitive penetration

Henry Shevlin, Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK

Phoebe Friesen, Biomedical Ethics Unit, Department of Social Studies of Medicine, McGill University, Montreal, Canada

Abstract There is compelling evidence that pain experience is influenced by cognitive states. We explore one specific form of such influence, namely placebo analgesia, and examine its relevance for the cognitive penetration debate in philosophy of mind. We single out as important a form of influence on experience that we term radical cognitive penetration, and argue that some cases of placebo analgesia constitute compelling instances of this phenomenon. Still, we urge caution in extrapolating from this to broader conclusions about cognitive penetration in perceptual experience. Instead, we suggest that the cognitive penetration of pain raises distinctive psychological, epistemological, and ethical issues.

Key words: cognitive penetration, pain, placebo, placebo analgesia

期刊简介

The phenomena of mind and language are currently studied by researchers in linguistics, philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence, cognitive anthropology and cognitive archaeology. Mind & Language brings this work together in a genuinely interdisciplinary way. Along with original articles, the journal publishes forums, survey articles and reviews, enabling researchers to keep up-to-date with developments in related disciplines as well as their own.

目前，语言学、哲学、心理学、人工智能、认知人类学和认知考古学的研究人员正在研究心理和语言现象。Mind & Language 以真正跨学科的方式将这些研究工作结合在一起。除了原创文章，该期刊还发表论坛、调查文章和评论，使研究人员能够及时了解相关学科以及他们自己所在学科的最新发展。

It is an important forum for sharing the results of investigation and for creating the conditions for a fusion of effort, thus making real progress towards a deeper and more far-reaching understanding of the phenomena of mind and language.

它是一个重要的论坛，学者可以在这里分享调查结果并为合作研究创造条件，从而真正更深入、更深远地理解思维和语言现象。

官网地址：

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14680017

本文来源：Mind & Language官网

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