修宪公投|《经济学人》：无足轻重的埃尔多安vs举足轻重的土耳其
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我与我们的世界，既是一个“奋斗”的世界，也是一个“思考”的世界。奋而不思则罔，思而不奋则殆。这个世界，你大，它就大；你小，它就小。
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本期导读：政治，是牵动社会全体成员利益并支配其行为的重要力量。政治可指统治阶层对社会的治理行为，亦可指统治阶层维护其统治权益的各种行为。我们每个人，无时无刻不受到“政治”或明显、或潜在的各种影响。
人类社会的整个政治发展史，从阶级立场角度看，就是统治阶层与被统治阶层之间的斗争史，从意识形态角度讲，就是自由民主与专制独裁之间的斗争史。受历史、文化、地缘等各方面的综合影响，各个国家表现出各具特色的政治生态景象。
当今的世界中，有些国家，是自由民主稳稳占据主流地位，而有些国家，是专制独裁牢牢把控主流地位，还有些国家，是自由民主与专制独裁的拉锯战场，具体哪方势力最终会赢，没人能说得清、道得明。自由民主与专制独裁的战场之一，便是土耳其。
起源于13世纪末14世纪初的奥斯曼土耳其帝国，极盛时势力范围横跨亚、欧、非三大洲，最终却于一战中败于协约国，随之分裂。20世纪初凯末尔领导起义，建立土耳其共和国，奥斯曼帝国至此灭亡。
现在的土耳其共和国，说得夸张点，正面临“内忧外患”。对于我们吃瓜观众来说，外患很是明显，土耳其周边国家局势一直不稳，然后就殃及池边“土耳其”这条鱼。而内忧相较来说，却没那么显而易见，因为，在某些国家，政治斗争总是“静水深流”，表面总是波澜不惊。
土耳其面临的“内患”之一，便是“居伦运动”。居伦运动，又称葛兰运动，把已经七八十岁的旅居美国的伊斯兰学者费特胡拉·居伦奉为思想导师和精神领袖。居伦在中东地区及周边国家都拥有很大影响力，曾被《经济学人》杂志称为当今最重要的穆斯林人物之一。
居伦运动据称现在是全世界最大的伊斯兰运动，在美国、俄罗斯、土耳其、伊拉克以及撒哈拉以南非洲地区的不少国家建立了数千所学校以及下属商业机构，旗下还有若干家媒体。其真正的影响力来自土耳其内部，居伦运动在政府各部门有平行组织，有“国中之国”的外号。
Turkey’s referendum
土耳其修宪公投
The slide into dictatorship
走向独裁
Recep Tayyip Erdogan is carrying out the harshest crackdown in decades. The West must not abandon Turkey
埃尔多安正试图通过修宪对异己势力进行几十年来最严重的打压，西方国家不能放弃，不能不管。
TURKEY matters not just for its size, but also as a bellwether of the political forces shaping the world. For centuries it was the seat of a great empire. Today, as a frontier state, it must cope with the violence spewing out of war-ravaged Syria; it is a test case of whether democracy can be reconciled with political Islam; and it must navigate between Western liberalism and the authoritarian nationalism epitomised by Russia. In recent years under Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey has gone backwards. This weekend it can begin to put that right.
土耳其之所以重要，不仅在于它的体量，而且还在于，它也是影响世界政治的一支重要力量。历史上，连续几个世纪，那里是泱泱帝国的中心。现如今，紧邻战乱频仍的叙利亚，土耳其成为应对暴力扩散的前沿地带，土耳其也是民主政治与伊斯兰政治能否和谐相处的试验田，土耳其还是西方自由主义与俄罗斯所代表的独裁民族主义的竞技场。近年来，土耳其在埃尔多安的领导下，逐渐堕落。本周末，那种堕落可能会彻底变得又稳又妥。
On April 16th Turks will vote in a referendum over whether to abandon their parliamentary system for an executive presidency. A Yes is likely, but far from certain. There is nothing wrong with a strong president, but Turkey’s new constitution goes too far. The country would end up with a 21st-century sultan minimally curbed by parliament. A Yes would condemn Turkey to the elected dictatorship of President Erdogan. A No might just let Turks constrain him.
4月16日，土耳其民众会参与公投，决定是否要用总统制把现有的议会制取而代之。公投有可能通过，但也还不太确定。强化总统的权力，这没有错，但是，土耳其的新宪法，所要做的却远不止这些，而是要把议会对总统权力仅剩的那点儿制衡也取消掉。公投通过的话，土耳其将会陷入总统埃尔多安的独裁手中，公投未通过的话，土耳其民众则可继续对总统权力进行制衡。
Authority figure
权威数据创造威权人物
After Mr Erdogan came to power in 2003, he and his AK party did a lot that was good. Encouraged by the IMF, he tamed inflation and ushered in economic growth. Encouraged by the EU, he tackled the cabal of military officers and bureaucrats in the “deep state”, strengthened civil liberties and talked peace with the Kurds. He also spoke up for working-class religious conservatives, who had been locked out of power for decades.
埃尔多安2003年掌管权力后，他和他的正发党确实做了不少工作，而且都是有益的。在国际货币基金组织的支持下，埃尔多安控制住了通胀，创造了经济增长。在欧盟的支持下，埃尔多安清除了“深入国家权力体系”中的军人干政和官僚势力，加强了公民社会自由，与库尔德人开启了和平谈判进程。埃尔多安还曾替几十年来一直被排斥在权力之外的宗教保守派工薪阶层说话。
But today Turkey is beset by problems. In the shadow of the Syrian civil war, jihadists and Kurdish militants are waging campaigns against the state. Last summer the army attempted a coup—probably organised by supporters of an American-based cleric, Fethullah Gulen, who had penetrated the bureaucracy, judiciary and army in their tens of thousands. The economy, once a strength, is growing slowly, plagued by cronyism, poor management and a collapse in tourism.
但是，今天的土耳其，却被各种问题缠身。受叙利亚内战影响，圣战分子和库尔德激进分子纷纷向土耳其的国家权力体系提出挑战。去年夏天，军方还曾搞了场政变，而那场政变，很可能是由旅居美国的伊斯兰知名人士居伦的支持者们所策划，成千上万的居伦支持者早已渗透土耳其的官僚系统、司法系统和军队系统。曾经增长强劲的土耳其经济，现在也逐渐放缓，被裙带关系、管理不善和旅游业崩溃所拖累。
Mr Erdogan argues that, to put this right, Turkey needs a new constitution that will generate political stability. He says that only a strong president can galvanise the state and see off its enemies. Naturally, he is talking about himself.
埃尔多安称，要解决这些问题，土耳其需要一部能带来政治稳定的新宪法，只有赋予总统更多权力，才能让国家运行顺畅，让各种问题得到彻底解决。当然，埃尔多安所说的总统，自然是在说他自己。
The new constitution embodies the “illiberal democracy” of nationalists such as Viktor Orban of Hungary and Vladimir Putin of Russia, to whom Mr Erdogan is increasingly compared. On this view, election winners take all, constraints are obstacles to strong government and the ruling party has a right to subvert institutions, such as the judiciary and the press.
土耳其的新宪法，体现出诸如匈牙利欧尔班和俄罗斯普京等民族主义分子所代表的那种“伪民主”，而埃尔多安与他们两个也越来越像。在民族主义分子看来，赢者可以通吃，权力制衡是政府能力的障碍，执政党有权利颠覆诸如司法独立、媒体自由等体制机制。
Yet this kind of stability is hollow. The most successful democracies make a point of separating powers and slowing governments down. The guiding idea of the American constitution is to stop presidents from acting as if they were monarchs, by building in checks and balances. Even the British prime minister, untrammelled by a written constitution, has to submit herself to the courts, a merciless press and a weekly grilling in Parliament, broadcast live.
不过，这样的稳定，只不过是一副空皮囊。最成功的民主体制，证明了权力分立制衡以及政府稳健前行的重要性。美国宪法的重要思想就是，通过监督制衡机制防止总统按照专制君主的独裁行事。在英国，即使没有受到成文宪法的约束，首相也必须接受法院的审察、媒体的批评，以及议会每周例会的拷问，而且会现场直播。
Turkey is especially ill-suited to winner-takes-all government. It is divided between secular, religious and nationalist citizens, as well as Turks, Kurds, Alevis and a few remaining Greeks, Armenians and Jews. If the religious-conservative near-majority try to shut out everyone else, just as they were once shut out, Turkey will never be stable.
土耳其这个国家，特别不适合建立“赢者通吃型”政府。在国内，有世俗派、宗教阶层以及民族主义群体，还有土耳其民族、库尔德民族、阿拉维派，以及其他少数的希腊族、亚美尼亚族和犹太族。若近乎占多数的宗教保守派努力把其他各派排除在权力之外，正如历史上曾出现过的那样，那么，土耳其就永无宁日。
But the most important argument against majoritarian politics is Mr Erdogan himself. Since the failed coup, he has been governing under a state of emergency that demonstrates how cruelly power can be abused.
但是，对多数主义政治最重要的反对声音，就来自埃尔多安他自己。自去年政变失败以来，埃尔多安就一直在紧急状态下当政，也正是过去的这段时间，显示出权力可以被滥用到何种程度。
The state is entitled to protect its citizens, especially in the face of political violence. But Mr Erdogan has gone far beyond what is reasonable. Roughly 50,000 people have been arrested; 100,000 more have been sacked. Only a fraction of them were involved in the coup. Anyone Mr Erdogan sees as a threat is vulnerable: ordinary folk who went to a Gulenist school or saved with a Gulenist bank; academics, journalists and politicians who betray any sympathy for the Kurdish cause; anybody, including children, who mocks the president on social media. Whatever the result on April 16th, Mr Erdogan will remain in charge, free to use—and abuse—his emergency powers.
人民赋予国家以权力，是用来保护人民的，特别是在人民面临政治暴力之时。但是，埃尔多安所做的，早已远远超出情理所能容许的程度。到目前为止，已约有50000人被捕，另有100000人被停职，而这些人当中，只有一小部分参与了那场政变。只要被埃尔多安视为威胁，就可能会被拿来问罪，包括在与葛兰有瓜葛的学校或银行上过学或有过存款的普通民众，对库尔德主义展现出任何丝毫同情之心的学者、记者或政界人士，以及在社交媒体做出不尊重埃尔多安总统言行的任何人，包括儿童。不管4月16日公投结果如何，埃尔多安都依然会稳坐总统宝座，自由使用并滥用他那紧急状态权力。
During the campaign he accused the Germans and Dutch of “Nazi practices” for stopping his ministers from pitching for expatriate votes. EU voices want to suspend accession talks—which, in any case, are moribund. Before long, the talk may even turn to sanctions. Some in the West will point to Turkey’s experience to claim that Islam and democracy cannot coexist. But to give up on that idea would be to give up on Turkey itself.
为修宪公投拉票期间，埃尔多安手下的部长到德国和荷兰向境外土耳其人宣传拉票，受到德国和荷兰的阻拦，埃尔多安谴责这是“纳粹行径”。欧盟开始出现声音，要求中止土耳其的入欧谈判，不过，不管怎样，土耳其的入欧之梦都会停留在梦想的阶段。很快，欧盟对土耳其可能会由谈判转向制裁。西方有些人士将会拿土耳其的经历来证明，伊斯兰与民主不能共存。但是，若真是那样认为，那么土耳其也就真的没救了。
The fault is not so much with political Islam—many AK members and voters are uneasy with the new constitution. It is with Mr Erdogan and his inner circle. Although he is a religious man, he is better seen as an old-fashioned authoritarian than as a new-fangled Islamist. The distinction matters because AK, or an Islamist party like it, is bound to feature in Turkey’s democracy. Mr Erdogan, however, will one day leave the stage, taking his authoritarian instincts with him.
主要问题并不在于政治伊斯兰，其实，很多正发党成员和支持正发党的选民也对新宪法感到不安。问题在于埃尔多安以及埃尔多安的那个小圈子。埃尔多安尽管也是一位有宗教信仰的人，但更应该把他视为一个老套的独裁主义者，而非一位新型的伊斯兰主义者。做这样的区分，是很重要的，因为正发党，或像正发党之类的某个伊斯兰主义政党，在土耳其的民主政治中，必定不会缺位。而埃尔多安将来某天却肯定消失于土耳其的政治舞台，包括他那独裁主义的本性。
Hold him close
对他要不离不弃（土耳其民众要对他制衡，西方国家要对他拉拢）
Hence the outside world should not give up on Turkey, but be patient. Partly, this is self-interest. As a NATO member and a regional power, Turkey is too important to cut adrift. It will play a vital part in any peace in Syria. Driving it into Russia’s arms makes no sense. Turkey has also been a conduit for refugees into the EU as well as vital in controlling their inflow. The refugee situation is in flux: the EU will need to keep talking to Turkey about how to cope with the resulting instability.
因此，西方世界不应该放弃土耳其，而应保持耐心。首先，这符合西方自己的利益。作为北约成员国和一个区域大国，土耳其的重要性不言而喻，不能让它随波逐流。叙利亚要实现和平，土耳其的作用不可或缺，而让土耳其投入俄罗斯的怀抱，更是大错特错。土耳其也是难民流入欧盟的通道之一，因此对管控难民也很重要。难民情势还不稳定，欧盟需要继续与土耳其保持对话，来处理难民问题导致的动荡。
Engagement is also in Turkey’s interests. The EU is its biggest trading partner. Contact with it bolsters the Western-leaning Turks who are likely to be Mr Erdogan’s most potent opposition. NATO membership can moderate the next generation of officers in its armed forces. Although Turkey will not join the EU for many years, if ever, a looser EU, with several classes of member or associate country, might one day find room for it.
与土耳其保持接触，也符合土耳其自身利益。欧盟是土耳其最大的贸易伙伴，与土耳其保持接触，将会对亲西方的土耳其人形成某种支持，而他们正是可能成为反对埃尔多安的中坚力量。土耳其拥有北约成员国身份，也能缓和土耳其武装力量中下一代军官的干政冲动。在可见的将来，土耳其不可能加入欧盟，不过，一个更为松散欧盟，成员国及联系国在不同程度上进行一体化的欧盟，将来某天也会给土耳其留有一定的空间。
Turkey will remain pivotal after April 16th. If Mr Erdogan loses, Turkey will be a difficult ally with a difficult future. But if he wins, he will be able to govern as an elected dictator.
4月16日修宪公投后，土耳其的重要性依然会存在。若埃尔多安输掉公投，土耳其将是一个难以合作的同盟伙伴，合作前景也会比较晦暗。若埃尔多安赢了公投，埃尔多安将能继续享受总统宝座，其身份却会是民选的独裁者。
往期精彩：
世界观|《经济学人》：土耳其的命运，全靠夹在美俄欧之间的埃尔多安
朝核问题|《特朗普下最后通牒》：中国帮就帮，不帮美国自己搞定
地球村儿|《全球脑库》：全球化一直在进行，只是风险程度有所不同
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