中印关系|《经济学人》：中印互为近邻，会否唇齿相依？

原创 2017-07-31 从余启 我与我们的世界我与我们的世界

欢迎打开“我与我们的世界”，从此，让我们一起“纵览世界之风云变幻、洞察社会之脉搏律动、感受个体之生活命运、挖掘自然之点滴奥妙”。

我与我们的世界，既是一个“奋斗”的世界，也是一个“思考”的世界。奋而不思则罔，思而不奋则殆。这个世界，你大，它就大；你小，它就小。

欢迎通过上方公众号名称打开公众号“查看历史信息”来挖掘往期文章，因为，每期都能让你“走近”不一样的世界、带给你不一样的精彩。

本期导读：1962年爆发的中印边界战争，主要原因在于边界争端，但其他因素也在其中起到了一定作用。1959年西藏和平解放后，印度给藏传佛教领袖提供了庇护所，中印边界地带就开始发生系列冲突事件。

印度实施“前进政策”（Forward Policy）后，开始在中印争议边界沿线建立哨所，包括麦克马洪线以及双方实际控制线以北地区。在进行系列磋商后发现政治解决无望，中方于1962年10月20日在中印边界沿线多个地方同时发起进攻，对印方军队形成全线碾压之势，在东西两段均取得全面胜利。1962年11月20日，中方宣布停火，同时从所占印度领土撤军，战争结束。

Banyan

菩提之国

Daggers out at the chicken’s neck

剑指鸡脖要害

The longer a stand-off between India and China persists, the more dangerous it will become.

中印之间的僵局持续越久，危险就会越大。

FOR nearly six weeks, armed contingents of two of the biggest military forces in the world have faced off in a high-altitude game of chicken in the Himalayas. Roughly 300-400 Indian soldiers and an equal number of Chinese border guards are stuck glowering at one another over a scrubby patch of land at a “tri-junction”, where the two countries and the tiny kingdom of Bhutan all meet. Analysts cannot see how either side might easily stand down. Memories of a bloody border war fought between China and India in 1962 are all too easily evoked.

近来，中国和印度，世界上的两个军力大国，在喜马拉雅的高原地带，又杠上了，而且这次持续已近六周，双方谁也不敢先动手，当然也不愿意先退让。约有三四百名印度士兵，与数量相当的中国边防战士，在中国、印度与夹在中印之间的小王国不丹三国的交界地带，双方人员你瞪着我、我瞪着你，就这样僵持着。分析人士认为，中印双方任何一方，都不大可能先退让，这不禁让人想起，中印两国1962年在边境沿线进行的那场血战。

That war, which saw India humiliated, began after the Chinese built a road across disputed territory in the far west of the two countries’ 4,000km-long, disputed border. The latest problems began when Chinese border guards were spotted moving road-making equipment onto the Dolam plateau, a flat spot in the slightly larger region known as Doklam (or Donglang in Mandarin) which all three sides patrol. On June 18th Indian troops moved onto the plateau to prevent the resurfacing of a dirt track. No shots were fired, though a shoving match was captured on video. Doklam is the subject of a long-standing territorial dispute, one of many in the region. What makes India’s actions extraordinary is that the dispute is not between India and China, but rather between China and Bhutan. India makes no claim to the plateau, which it says it has moved onto on Bhutan’s behalf. What is less clear is whether Bhutan, an ally which India has in the past treated as a vassal, really wanted Indian help.

1962年的那场战争，印度惨败，起因是中国在长达4000公里的争议边境沿线某争议地区修建道路。中印之间近期的僵局，发生在中国边境战士向多拉姆高原运送修路设备之时。多拉姆高原是比其所在的德克拉姆地区（中方称洞朗地区）稍小的一处平地。目前，中国、印度、不丹三国在德克拉姆地区都有巡逻。6月18日，印方部队登上多拉姆高原，阻止土质路基的修建。尽管双方一个子弹也没打，但却发生了你推我搡，并有视频记录。德克拉姆地区是长期领土争端的焦点之一，也是该地区很多争议地带之一。不过，印方此次行动很不寻常，主要是因为，该地区争议不是印中之间，而是中国与不丹之间。印方称，其是代表不丹采取行动，毕竟，印方对多拉姆高原没有领土诉求。不过，目前还不清楚的一点是，作为印方的盟友并被印方一直视为附庸的不丹，是否真的想让印方帮这个忙。

The Chinese government claims that India’s incursion is a black-and-white instance of breach of sovereignty—and it has a case. Chinese officials cannot appear soft, for fear of ridicule at home. The more rabid parts of their media are already rattling sabres. The defence ministry has vowed to stand firm in Doklam, warning that it is “easier to move a mountain than to shake the People’s Liberation Army”. The government says the Indians must withdraw entirely before the matter can be discussed.

中国政府称，印方的越界，是对中国主权赤裸裸的侵犯，而且中方的这个说法有根有据。中国政府不得不强硬表态，不然就会被国民嘲笑。中国有些激愤的媒体，已开始有点磨刀霍霍。中国国防部已发誓，会坚定维护洞朗地区的主权，并警告称，“撼山易，撼解放军难！”中国政府表态称，印方人员全部撤走之前，一切免谈。

Some historical context is in order. The 1962 war was fought on multiple fronts all along the Himalayan range. Before it was over, the Chinese had surged through the eastern Himalayas down into India’s isolated north-east (they later withdrew). Now, as Chinese might grows, Indian strategists worry that the north-east is becoming ever more imperilled. As it is, a jagged cartographic dagger from Tibet points southward, separating most of the Indian state of Sikkim, to the west, from Bhutan, to the east. Were China to extend a road system south to the full extent of its claim, it would reach a ridge that is just 100km north of a vulnerable point on the Indian plains below: the “chicken’s neck”, a 21km-wide corridor connecting mainland India to the eight states of its north-east. India has a metaphorical pinched nerve too: China’s annual defence spending dwarfs India’s, $215bn to $56bn.

在此，或许应提一点历史背景。中印1962年那场战争期间，沿整个喜马拉雅山脉开辟了多处前线。战争结束前，中方军队已越过喜马拉雅东段，直入印度偏远的东北地区（之后中方撤离了该地区）。目前，随着中方实力的增长，印方的战略家担心，印度东北地区所面临的危险前所未有。如上方地图所示，西藏南边的那块地区，正像一副深入向南犬齿交错的匕首，西侧是印度的锡金，东侧则是不丹。若中国把路往南修，一直修到中国诉求领土的边境，中国就会抵达战略要地，距离宽约21千米、把印度大陆与东北八邦连接起来、被称为“鸡脖地带”的印方平原仅有100公里。印方还有另一隐忧，那就是国防预算，中国每年的国防预算高达2150亿美元，而印度的却仅有560亿。

A solution may be hiding in misty Bhutan, a Buddhist country that has far more in common culturally with the neighbouring Chinese region of Tibet than it does with India. It finds its relationship with its neighbour to the south increasingly embarrassing—a legacy of days when Bhutan was a protectorate of British India. Its foreign relations are still handled by diplomats in Delhi, albeit unofficially. That means it can get caught up in Indian spats with China that have nothing to do with it. In May, India decided to snub China by staying away from an international summit in Beijing to discuss China’s “Belt and Road Initiative”—a scheme to link China to its neighbours and countries beyond with a splurge of spending on infrastructure and power projects. The point of India’s gesture was to show its anger at China’s extension of the scheme into the part of Kashmir that is controlled by Pakistan but claimed by India. Struggles over Kashmir do not affect Bhutan’s gross national happiness index, its much-vaunted means of measuring its progress. But Bhutan, presumably under orders from India, stayed away from the gathering in Beijing, too.

或许，问题的解决之道，在于左右为难的不丹。从文化角度来讲，不丹这个佛教国家与紧邻的中国西藏地区之间的关系，要比与印度之间的，深厚的多得多。对于不丹来说，与南方近邻印度之间的关系，显得越来越尴尬，因为双方目前的关系模式，源于不丹曾是英属印度保护国这一历史渊源。不丹的对外关系，目前依然由新德里的外交人员负责，尽管此种做法没有通过官方协约商定。这就意味着，不丹� 46 33146 46 15287 0 0 3404 0 0:00:09 0:00:04 0:00:05 3403��管与印中之间的争端无关，但却逃不掉成为池鱼的命运。今年5月，印度决定不参加在北京举行的旨在通过大规模基础设施投资把中国与邻国及相关各国联接起来的一带一路合作高峰论坛，以此向中国发难。印方此举的目的在于，向全世界展示其对中国一带一路深入印方有领土诉求的巴控克什米尔地区的不满。克什米尔地区的争端，完全不会影响到不丹的国民幸福指数，该指数也是不丹极力推崇的用于衡量进步的指标。不过，对于北京的那次峰会，不丹也没参加，八九不离十，是因为有印方的指示。

Some politicians in Bhutan would like their country to pursue a more independent policy, and China is keen to encourage that. Having Bhutan as a friend would make it all the easier for China to control that strategic swathe of the Himalayas and cause India to squirm. Why then move troops into an area claimed by Bhutan? It could make sense, says Bérénice Guyot-Réchard, a historian at King’s College London and author of “Shadow States: India, China and the eastern Himalayas”. The message China may be trying to send to India’s protégé is: if you deal with us directly instead of through Delhi, we might be more sympathetic to your border claims and walk quietly out of Doklam.

不丹的某些政界人士，想要不丹能走一条更具独立性的对外政策，而中国，则积极鼓励不丹这样做。若把不丹变成自己人，中国要控制喜马拉雅那块战略要地，则将变得容易得多，并能给印度一点颜色看看。那么，中国为什么要让军队进入不丹有领土诉求的区域呢？当然，这不无道理。据《大国阴影下的小国：中印之间的喜马拉雅》一书的作者，伦敦国王学院史学家伯伦尼斯·盖约特·理查德分析，或许，中国要向印度的保护国不丹传递的信息是：若你直接与我交涉，而不是通过新德里，那么，我们可能会对你的领土诉求更宽容些，并会悄悄撤离德克拉姆地区。

Glacial change

冰川在融化，局势在变化

But Bhutan cannot turn its back on India so easily. It is the biggest single recipient of Indian aid. India is the main market for its glacier-melt hydropower. India supports Bhutan’s puny army. And India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi, is conscious of China’s designs: his first trip abroad after taking office in 2014 was to Bhutan. The kingdom’s fear of changing the status quo may explain why the stand-off in the Himalayas has persisted far longer than previous surges of tension between China and India along their border in recent years. It becomes all the more worrying when you consider that Mr Modi and China’s president, Xi Jinping, are nationalists who want to be seen as strongmen.

但是，不丹没有能力轻易背弃印度。不丹是印度对外援助资金的最大受援国，印度是不丹冰川融水发电站的主要电力输出市场，不丹的那点儿军事力量，靠的也主要是印度的支持。而且，印度总理莫迪，对中国的意图也耿耿于怀，莫迪2014年上任后的首次对外出访，就选择了不丹。不丹对于改变现状，很是害怕，这或许也能说明，为什么这次喜马拉雅的对峙，比近年来中印边境地区之前的对峙，持续的时间要长得多。考虑到印度与中国当局的领导人，都是想为自己塑造强人形象的民族主义者，当前的对峙则就显得更令人忧虑。

Fortunately, however, there is one thing that matters more to Mr Xi than praise for defending China’s border claims. That is stability. In the build-up to a sweeping reshuffle of the leadership expected this autumn, he is preoccupied with political struggles at home: a shooting match with India that risked escalating into war would be a dangerous distraction. As for Mr Modi, a conflict ending in the kind of defeat that India suffered in 1962 would be ruinous for his country and might finish his political career. Both countries are far more powerful than they were 55 years ago. It can only be hoped that they do not misjudge their strength.

不过，幸好，对中国来说，有件事要比捍卫边境权益更为重要，那就是：稳定。今年秋天即将举行的中国共产党全国代表大会的准备工作正如火如荼，中国正埋头于国内的政治改革，与印度交火的话，则有可能升级成一场战争，这将是一个能分散注意力的危险举动。而对莫迪来讲，与中国产生冲突，则有可能重蹈1962年的覆辙，这对印度整个国家来说，具有灾难性，也有可能完全葬送掉莫迪的政治生命。中印两国的实力，比55年前都强得多。人们只能祈望，中印双方不要误判彼此力量。

1962年中印边界战争力量与伤亡对比

注释：

1.Banyan:菩提树，印度的国树。

2.Game of chicken: it comes from mathematical game theory. "Chicken" in this usage means coward (we call people who are cowards "chickens" because chickens run away when people approach). A game of chicken is any contest with two players where neither one wants to "back down" or let the other win, even though not backing down can be very dangerous. The classic game of chicken takes place when two people drive cars at very high speeds directly towards each other. Obviously, if neither one turns away, there will be a big crash and both will be harmed. The person that turns first is the chicken. In mathematical game theory, not being a chicken can have very dire consequences, especially if the other player does not "turn away". The point is, "winning" or playing a game to its conclusion, may not always be in the best interest of the player.