哈佛教授有话说|《全球脑库》：川普能否搞定朝鲜、中国？

原创 2017-08-30 从余启 我与我们的世界我与我们的世界

欢迎打开“我与我们的世界”，从此，让我们一起“纵览世界之风云变幻、洞察社会之脉搏律动、感受个体之生活命运、挖掘自然之点滴奥妙”。

我与我们的世界，既是一个“奋斗”的世界，也是一个“思考”的世界。奋而不思则罔，思而不奋则殆。这个世界，你大，它就大；你小，它就小。

欢迎通过上方公众号名称打开公众号“查看历史信息”来挖掘往期文章，因为，每期都能让你“走近”不一样的世界、带给你不一样的精彩。

本期导读：国际社会大家庭中，玩家很多，不过，能起到重要作用的关键玩家，却没几个，而且，小小朝鲜，就是其中一个。

古希腊物理学家阿基米德曾说过，只要给他一个支点，他就可以撬动整个地球。而朝鲜，就找到了那个能撬动地球的支点，即中美关系。

Can Trump Deal with North Korea and China?

特朗普能搞定朝鲜和中国么？

For years, Americans have misunderstood the nuclear threat from North Korea, misjudging how to address it. They have also misunderstood the bilateral trade deficits with China, overestimating their importance. Today, as President Donald Trump threatens new trade barriers against China, on which the United States must depend to help rein in an increasingly dangerous North Korea, these two issues have become closely connected. Yet US officials seem no closer to figuring them out.

多年来，针对朝核问题，美国一直都没看清问题所在，随之便误判重重。而对与中国之间的双边贸易赤字问题，也没看清问题所在，且高估了该问题的重要性。目前，特朗普威胁称，将对中国实施新的贸易壁垒措施，而中国，却是美国要解决日渐升级的朝核问题，所必须依靠的对象，这两个问题紧密相连，但是，美国却对此还没认清。

The stakes obviously are much higher regarding North Korea, with US-South Korean joint military exercises this week aggravating already-high tensions. If the US and North Korea do get into a military confrontation, there is a real risk that nuclear weapons will be used. Even a conventional war would likely be catastrophic.

朝核问题，其重要性显然更高。本周的美韩军演，让早已剑拔弩张的局势雪上加霜。若美朝之间真的爆发军事冲突，使用核武的风险或将变为现实，即使只发生常规战争，后果也很可能相当严重。

Trade is relevant to the North Korean nuclear challenge, because strict economic sanctions by China – potentially including a halt in oil supplies – are probably the world’s best bet for stopping the North’s nuclear program (in exchange for certain security guarantees from the US). Trump may well understand this. But he apparently believes that he can use US trade with China as a bargaining chip to secure its help in dealing with North Korea. This is the wrong approach.

对于朝核问题，从贸易角度找到解决办法或许会更有效，毕竟，中国若对朝实施严厉的经济制裁，不排除停止对朝石油供应，或许将是让朝鲜停止核武开发的最佳解决方案，另外，美国也可对朝做出一定的安全保证。特朗普可能知道这些，但显然觉得，自己能利用贸易问题这个筹码，让中国在朝核问题上给予美国以协助。这个解决方向是错误的。

Trump’s approach to governance – characterized by an unprecedented lack of interest in rules, principles, alliances, and institutions – is sometimes described as transactional. Justifications of that approach typically focus on Trump’s business background, which supposedly makes him the dealmaker the US needs. In fact, Trump’s behavior reflects a lack of regard for some of the most elementary requirements for successful negotiation.

特朗普的管治模式，几乎对规则、原则、盟友、制度等完全无视，通常被冠以“交易性”特征，而这，显然主要是基于特朗普所具有的经商背景，并被认为能让特朗普成为美国所需交易的“谈判大师”。其实，特朗普的行为，却恰恰忽视了谈判成功所需的某些最基本要求。

A skillful negotiator knows that one must look at the game from the other player’s viewpoint, in order to determine which outcomes they may view as favorable, and find common ground. Moreover, concluding a deal requires credibility with respect to both inducements and punishments.

谈判高手都知道，必须从对方的角度考虑问题，以确定有哪些结果会对自己有利，并找到双方能达成共识的基础。另外，最终达成协议，则需有充分有效的激励和惩罚措施。

Trump’s attempts at bargaining with China reflect a failure on both fronts. From China’s perspective, a nuclear-armed North Korea is undesirable, but still less problematic than the potential breakdown of order in the country, which could produce an influx of refugees into China and bring American troops closer to China’s border. Against this background, erratic US trade threats are not the way to convince China to apply pressure on its troublesome ally.

特朗普试图与中国进行的讨价还价，不具有上述两个方面的特征。从中国的角度看，它是不希望看到朝鲜有核武的，不过，中国更担心的是，朝鲜国内秩序失控，到那时，大量难民就会涌入中国，美国军队也会距离中国边境更近。鉴于此，美国突然进行贸易威胁，并不是促使中国对朝施压的解决办法。

Instead, the US, along with South Korea, should promise that, if Chinese-backed sanctions did cause the North Korean regime to collapse, China would not be confronted either by US troops north of the 38th parallel or by a unified, nuclear-armed Korean Peninsula. In the shorter term, the US and South Korea should offer to pause the deployment of America’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea, if China adopts and enforces additional sanctions on the North.

若想让中国对朝施压，美国，加上韩国，应对中国做出承诺，若中国对朝施压导致朝鲜政权崩溃，中国既不会面临美国军队会越过三八线，也不会面临一个拥有核武的统一的朝鲜半岛。短期内来讲，若中国对朝采取并落实更多制裁措施，美韩应主动停止在韩部署萨德系统。

But credibility on the part of the US president is needed to make this – or any – strategy work. Unfortunately, Trump’s statements – whether about the past, the present, or the future – are often out of touch with reality. On the North Korean nuclear issue alone, he has shown a remarkable lack of consistency, credibility, and follow-through.

不过，若要这项战略措施，包括其他任何战略举措，具有可行性，美国总统方面则就需更具可信度。悲催的是，特朗普的言行，不管是关于过往、当前或是未来的，都经常与现实不符。光朝核问题这一项，特朗普在一致性、可信度、落实度方面都鲜有积极表现。

In January, Trump tweeted that North Korea’s development of a nuclear weapon capable of reaching parts of the US “won’t happen!” By July, the North was testing an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching the US, and it is believed that the country already possesses the capability to produce a miniaturized, ICBM-ready nuclear payload.

今年1月，特朗普社交网站发帖称，朝鲜开发出能抵达美国领土的核武“将不会变成现实！”，到了7月，朝鲜测试了能抵达美国的洲际弹道导弹，而且，业界认为，朝鲜已有能力制造装载于洲际弹道导弹的小型化核弹头。

Earlier this month, when Trump said that any North Korean threat “will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen,” North Korean leader Kim Jong-un responded by threatening to attack Guam. Instead of delivering fire and fury, Trump reiterated that if Kim “utters one threat in a form of an overt threat … he will truly regret it. And he will regret it fast.” These statements clearly are neither credible nor accurate.

本月初，特朗普表示，若朝鲜再进行任何威胁，将“面临世所未见的‘烈焰之火’”，朝鲜领导人金正恩则以威胁袭击关岛作回应。而特朗普，没有祭出他的“烈焰之火”，反而一再声言，若金正恩“再明目张胆进行任何威胁”，将真的会为此感到后悔，而且会很快为此感到后悔。所有这些言行，显然既没可信度，也不具落实性。

Trump has displayed similar caprice and lack of follow-through with respect to China. In December, then-President-elect Trump challenged the “One China” policy that his predecessors, Democrats and Republicans alike, had respected. He either didn’t know that China is more willing to go to war over Taiwan than the US is, or was displaying his characteristic shortsightedness. In any case, on February 9, he had to reverse his position, losing face just a couple of weeks after his inauguration and setting a bad precedent for future deal-making with the strategically savvy Chinese.

对于中国，特朗普也一直反复无常、有言无行。去年12月，特朗普成功当选后就挑战了他前任各届总统、民主党、共和党长期以来遵循的“一个中国”的政策。特朗普之所以有这样的言行，不是不知道中国比美国更想就台湾问题开战，就是想向世人展示他的短视无知。内情怎样咱们不知，不过到2月9日，特朗普就改变了态度，就职没几周就自己打了自己的脸，也在和极具战略意识的中国进行交涉方面创造了极坏的先例。

Likewise, Trump backed down on his oft-repeated promise that he would name China a currency manipulator as soon as he took office. It was a foolish threat all along – not least because, if Chinese authorities had stopped intervening in the foreign-exchange market in 2015-2016, the result would have been a weaker renminbi, not a stronger one.

同样，特朗普曾一再声称，就职后会把中国列为货币操纵国，后来也打了退堂鼓。把中国列为操纵国这样的指控，愚蠢至极，不仅仅是因为，若中国2015至2016年间停止干预外汇市场，结果则是人民币变弱，而不会变得更强。

By now, Chinese President Xi Jinping, like most world leaders, has learned to discount Trump’s warnings. Trump’s statements suggesting a lack of loyalty to America’s allies – he took months to affirm his support for Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO’s bedrock collective-defense clause – have left even close US partners hesitant to make deals with his administration.

时至今日，中国方面，也像其他大多国家，已认识到，特朗普的言行，要打些折扣。特朗普的各类言行中，不乏有悖于维护美国盟友关系的言行。特朗普曾花费数月，向盟友一再确认他对北约集体防务的基石条款《北大西洋公约》第五条的支持，消除自己之前不当言行的消极影响。特朗普的所言所行，让即使是美国关系最铁的盟友，也开始对与特朗普政府达成协议望而却步。

The White House is still pursuing aggressive trade-policy measures against China, only some of which have any merit. (While the effort to enforce intellectual property rights has some basis in reality, the attempt to block steel imports using a national-security exemption is farcical.) But these initiatives will not do much, if anything, for America’s trade balance, real income growth, or employment. And they certainly won’t convince China to help mitigate the North Korean nuclear threat.

目前，针对中国，白宫仍在贸易政策方面采取攻势，各项政策中只有极少数还算有那么一点道理。（比如，施压中国加强知识产权保护力度，就有一定的现实依据，不过，以国家安全为由禁止中国钢铁进口，则很是滑稽可笑。）而且，所有那些政策措施中，如果会起到什么作用，也不会对美国的贸易赤字、实际收入增长、国内就业等问题带来积极作用。最重要的是，这些措施，并不能促使中国提供协助，以缓和来自朝鲜方面的核威胁。

Contributor: Jeffrey Frankel, a professor at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, previously served as a member of President Bill Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisers. He directs the Program in International Finance and Macroeconomics at the US National Bureau of Economic Research, where he is a member of the Business Cycle Dating Committee, the official US arbiter of recession and recovery.

作者简介：杰弗里·弗兰克尔，哈佛大学肯尼迪政府学院教授，曾任克林顿政府经济顾问委员会委员，现为美国经济发展荣枯评定官方机构经济周期划定委员会委员，在美国国家经济研究局主持国际金融与宏观经济研究项目。