普京政权|《全球脑库》：普京正在失去他对权力的掌控？

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本期导读：中文的“权力”大致对应于英语的power。power来自拉丁语potestsa或potentia，引申自拉丁语动词potere，意为可以做某件事，权力则指通过意志的运用以达到某种目的的能力。

权力作为人类社会的普遍现象，在东西方古代哲学文献即被广泛探讨。在柏拉图、亚里士多德、马基维利、霍布斯、孔子、韩非等人的言论或著作中，都曾直接或间接讨论到权力的要素、正当性或非正当性权力的评价、权力的取得与丧失等伦理与现实问题。

权力是一种广泛存在的社会现象，是政治学、国际关系与国际政治学的核心概念。在政治学与国际关系研究中，对“权力”主要有四种定义：“权力”作为个人或国家的追求目标（power as a goal）；“权力”作为影响力（influences）的度量（measurement）尺度，即资源的内容与多寡；“权力”作为政治斗争的结果（results）；“权力”作为一种宰制（domination）与被宰制关系的表述。

关于上述四种定义，由于个别研究者研究领域各有侧重，因此不同的文献和学人，可能使用不同的定义。例如社会学、文化批判、话语权研究（discourse studies）等领域可能侧重“宰制关系”。政治哲学侧重个人、团体、国家等单位追逐的目标的探讨。国际政治学则侧重国际行为者影响力的度量。

由于权力天生的强制性和不平等性，人们常常将权力与恶相提并论。但是权力也是人类社会维持运作的必然手段。个体对权力的遵从不是来自于恐惧，而是权利的合法性所带来的反抗权力可能导致的惩罚。

但是国家对权力的行使只依赖暴力的话，则会形成暴政，无法使权力稳固，社会稳定。当权力作为力量的正当性失去后，往往会蜕变成赤裸裸的暴力。

Is Vladimir Putin Losing His Grip?

普京正在失去他对权力的掌控？

In recent decades, as President Vladimir Putin has entrenched his authority, Russia has seemed to be moving backward socially and economically. But while the Kremlin knows that it must reverse this trajectory, genuine reform would be incompatible with the kleptocratic character of Putin’s regime.

内容提要：近二十年间，随着普京逐步树立、加固他的权威，俄罗斯的社会、经济却都在逐渐退步。不过，尽管克里姆林宫知道，必须要扭转这个趋势，但俄罗斯所需的真正改革，却与普京政权所具有的腐败性，是互不相容的。

In 1984, just before Mikhail Gorbachev’s ascent to power, there was a sense in Moscow that the Soviet Union was petrified, and nothing could change. Then everything did change, exposing the extent of the transformation that had occurred beneath the surface. Today, a similar mood pervades Moscow, with President Vladimir Putin’s regime appearing stable, even unbreachable. But, as was the case back then, a closer look reveals a number of chinks in the armor.

早在1984年戈尔巴乔夫登上权力宝座之前，莫斯科就弥漫着这么一种感觉：苏联已彻底僵化，什么也改变不了它了。但是随之，一切都变了，平静表面下所掩盖着的所有波涛汹涌，都一股脑地呈现在了光天化日之下。今天的莫斯科，弥漫着一种类似的气氛，普京政权看起来相当稳固，甚至有点坚不可破。不过，正如几十年前那个时候的苏联，细看的话，将能发现那副坚固外壳上有很多裂纹。

In many ways, Russia has been moving backward in recent decades. In the 1990s, Russia was a freewheeling place, where virtually everything was allowed. Moscow had 20 daily newspapers, with views ranging from liberal to Stalinist. Today, Russian civil society is severely stifled, and to watch television in Moscow is to find 20 channels controlled by the Kremlin.

在很多方面，俄罗斯近几十年间都一直在退步。1990年代那时，俄罗斯是一块自由之地，几乎干什么事都可以。光莫斯科就有20份日报，所持观念从自由主义到斯大林主义，不一而足。而现在，俄罗斯的公民社会已被严重压缩，在莫斯科看电视的话，会发现20个电视频道全都由克里姆林宫掌控。

In 1991, Boris Yeltsin, in one of his first actions as President, broke up the old KGB into several agencies, cut its staff by half, and slashed its budget. Today, the KGB’s successor, the Federal Security Service (FSB), has seized complete control over Russia’s security apparatus, including by arresting high-level generals in other law-enforcement agencies. The result is a single security service that is more powerful than at any time since Stalin – and viewed as independent from the Kremlin.

1991年叶利钦成为俄罗斯总统后采取了系列措施，其中一项就是拆分克格勃，该机构员工规模砍半，预算也遭到削减。而现在，克格勃功能的传承机构俄罗斯联邦安全局，已完全掌控俄罗斯的所有安全机构，通过实施包括批捕其他执法机构的高级负责人等措施。最后结果就是，俄罗斯联邦安全局单这一家机构的权力，已达到斯大林时代以来的顶峰，而且人们认为，该机构独立于克里姆林宫。

On the economic front, too, Russia has backtracked. In 2003, Russia’s private sector produced 70% of the country’s GDP. Today, the state sector generates most of the country’s output, squeezing out small and medium-size enterprises, and five big state banks dominate the financial market.

在经济领域，俄罗斯也在退步。2003年时，俄罗斯私有领域产值占该国GDP的比例高达70%。现如今，该国的产值中，大部分由国有部门创造，中小型企业被挤了出去，整个金融市场也由五家大型国有银行霸据。

Moreover, Putin’s policy of “de-offshoring” has imposed such cumbersome controls on the business leaders of the 1990s that most have sold off their assets in Russia and decamped to London or Monaco. This trend has been accelerated by Russia’s lack of any real property rights, which has enabled the Kremlin to cut Russia’s wealthy down to size at will, often targeting the most law-abiding among them. Small wonder that forecasts for annual GDP growth are stuck at 1.5-2%.

还有，普京让“俄罗斯海外资本撤回国内”的政策，已使得1990年代把俄罗斯国内资产出售然后把资产转移到伦敦或摩纳哥的商界大佬被牢牢掌控。不过，这种趋势有增无减，主要是因为，俄罗斯无法为财产权提供真正保护，这样克里姆林宫就能任意对俄罗斯的富商进行索取，而且，被索取的对象，通常都是按法律办事的富商。这也就难怪，俄罗斯的年度GDP增长率预期一直都在1.5-2%的低位徘徊。

The regime wants to change this pattern. In May 2016, Putin asked three expert groups to recommend economic-reform programs: a liberal group led by former Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin; a technocratic group led by Economy Minister Maxim Oreshkin; and the more statist Stolypin Club led by Putin’s business ombudsman Boris Titov. Each group has delivered thousands of pages of expert reports.

俄罗斯当局想要改变这种局面。2016年5月，普京下令让三个专家组研究经济改革方案，一个由前财政部长库德林带头的自由派专家组，一个由经济部长奥列什金带头的技术型专家组，一个由普京手下商业监察官季托夫带头的更具国家主义性质的“斯托雷平俱乐部”。每个专家组已提交的专家报告，都长达数千页之多。

译者注：

斯托雷平： 1862年4月14日生于德国德累斯顿，1911年9月18日死于乌克兰基辅，俄罗斯帝国政治家，曾任俄罗斯内务大臣（1904年－1905年）和帝国大臣会议主席（首相职务，1906年－1911年）。斯托雷平的任期以镇压革命势力和土地改革而著称，斯托雷平土地改革的主旨是将土地从地土或贵族手中交给农民。

But any shift toward respecting the rule of law would be incompatible with the kleptocratic character of Putin’s regime, implying that genuine reform is out of the question. The mandate given to the three groups thus appears to have been little more than therapy for social scientists, a way to keep them busy – and out of the opposition.

不过，任何趋向于尊重法治的举措，都与普京政权所具有的腐败性互不兼容，这也就意味着，进行真正的改革，不会在他们的考虑之中。这样，普京给三个专家组下达的命令，只不过仅是给某些专家找点儿活干，不能让他们闲着没事儿做，同时，这样也能让他们免于被敌对阵营利用。

Far from embracing change, Putin will seek a fourth term in next year’s presidential election – a race he will surely win, given the Kremlin’s control over the media and the courts. But, to render his victory credible, Putin needs Russia’s dispirited population to show up to vote. It is rumored that Sergei Kiriyenko, the Kremlin’s first deputy chief of staff, is targeting 70% turnout, with 70% of those votes going to Putin.

变化遥遥无期，普京明年总统大选期间还会寻求第四个任期，而且鉴于克里姆林宫对媒体和法院的控制，普京铁定会赢。不过，为了让自己的大选胜利更具可信度，普京需要让已然感到无味的俄罗斯民众鼓起投票的兴趣。据说，克里姆林宫负责人事的第一副部长基里延科估计，投票率会达70%，其中，会有70%的票投给普京。

That won’t be easy to achieve. In the State Duma elections in September 2016, only 47.8% of registered voters turned out. In local elections last month, even fewer bothered to participate, with Vladivostok reporting just 13% turnout.

那样的目标，不太容易实现。2016年国家杜马选举时，注册的选民中只有47.8%的人出来投票。上个月的地方选举中，去投票的人更少，符拉迪沃斯托克（海参崴）的投票率只有13%。

If voters are going to show up for next year’s presidential election, they will need to believe that real change is possible. Putin needs a credible rival, not the same old Kremlin-linked candidates – the communist Gennady Zyuganov, the nationalist buffoon Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and the purported liberal Grigory Yavlinsky – to join the race. The socialite Ksenia Sobchak, who announced her candidacy after meeting with Putin, may seem able to inject some life into the campaign. But there is only one real option to secure a large voter turnout: the anti-corruption campaigner and vocal Kremlin critic Alexei Navalny.

若想要选民明年大选中出来投票，就需要让他们相信，有可能会有真正的变革。这样，普京就需要一个有挑战性的对手，而不能老是那些与克里姆林宫有暧昧关系的候选人，如信奉共产主义的久加诺夫，信奉民族主义的季里诺夫斯基，抑或据说信奉自由主义的雅夫林斯基。与普京见面后宣布参选的社会知名人士索布恰克，她或许可能给明年的大选注入点儿活力。不过，要想实现真正的高投票率，唯一的办法就是，让敢于直言批评克里姆林宫的反腐人士纳瓦尔尼参选。

译者注： 44 34132 44 15288 0 0 2453 0 0:00:13 0:00:06 0:00:07 2897

索布恰克是位美女：Ksenia Sobchak (born November 5, 1981) is a Russian TV anchor, journalist, socialite, and actress. Sobchak became known to the wider public as a host of the reality show Dom-2 on the Russian channel TNT. She is sometimes described as "Russia's Paris Hilton". She is an anchor at an independent TV channel Dozhd.

纳瓦尔尼是位帅锅：Alexei Navalny (born June 4, 1976) is a Russian lawyer, political and financial activist, and politician. Since 2009, he has gained prominence in Russia, and in the Russian and international media, as a critic of corruption and of Russian President Vladimir Putin. He has organized large-scale demonstrations promoting democracy and attacking political corruption, Putin, and Putin's political allies. In 2012, The Wall Street Journal described him as "the man Vladimir Putin fears most".

In September 2013, when Navalny ran for mayor of Moscow, he received 27% of the vote. But the independent pollster Levada Center reckons that, despite strong support for Navalny in Moscow, he would not obtain more votes today.

2013年9月，纳瓦尔尼竞选莫斯科市长时，赢得了27%的选票。不过，独立民意调查机构勒瓦达中心预计，尽管纳瓦尔尼在莫斯科能获得很多支持，但现在的话，他能赢得的票数不会更多。

Given this, some Kremlin advisers want to let Navalny run, while keeping him off national television. And it seems that the Kremlin may be considering just that, as it has allowed Navalny to hold large campaign meetings with up to 10,000 people in 100 cities.

鉴于此，克里姆林宫有些政府顾问，建议让纳瓦尔尼参选，并想办法不让他在国家级电视台露面。而且，鉴于当局已允许纳瓦尔尼在100个左右城市召集规模多达万人的大型竞选集会，克里姆林宫貌似也可能正考虑让他参选。

But others in Putin’s inner circle would prefer to lock up Navalny for the fourth time this year – no surprise, given his proven capacity to disrupt the Kremlin’s authority. Last March, for example, Navalny produced a 50-minute documentary on corruption, revealing that Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev had used $1.3 billion in bribes to purchase six palaces and two vineyards. The film, watched on YouTube by some 25 million people, effectively killed Medvedev’s political career.

不过，普京的内圈里的某些人，却想把纳瓦尔尼再扣起来，正如之前三次做的那样。鉴于纳瓦尔尼对克里姆林宫权威所具有的破坏力，这点并不让人感到惊奇。例如，去年3月，纳瓦尔尼制作了一部50分钟的反腐纪录片，其中揭露，总理梅德维杰夫曾使用13亿美元的贿赂资金购买了六处宫殿和两片葡萄园。那部纪录片在视频网站油管上的观看次数已有2500万次，这无疑宣告了梅德维杰夫政治生涯的结束。

Now, Putin will need to consider who should succeed Medvedev. In the past, he has usually installed a loyal non-entity in that position, and he has many possible candidates, such as the remarkably ineffective Gazprom Chairman Alexei Miller. The question is whether the next prime minister will be more closely allied with Putin or the FSB.

现在，普京就需要考虑准备让谁接替梅德维杰夫。以往，普京通常会把忠于自己但不具实质影响的人安放于总理那个位置，而且，普京有很多这样的人可选，如非常听话的俄罗斯天然气公司主席米勒。但是，问题在于，下一位总理人选会与普京关系更近，还是与俄罗斯联邦安全局关系更近。

The United States may play an unexpected role in this drama. The recently enacted Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, which calls for a report on Russian “oligarchs and parastatal entities” within 180 days, offers the US a unique opportunity to influence the Kremlin before the presidential election.

美国因素或许在这方面能起到一种令人意想不到的作用。美国近期制定的“通过制裁应对美国敌手法案”，要求180天内就俄罗斯“政治寡头和半官方实体”提出报告，让美国获得了一个特有的机会，在俄罗斯大选前对克里姆林宫施加影响。

Many of Russia’s wealthy have already fled Russia in fear of the FSB. Now, Russia may see another wave of departures, with those close to the Kremlin fearing that Putin can no longer protect them. Putin may be guaranteed another presidential term, but a regime that cannot satisfy even its rulers is hardly sustainable.

由于恐惧俄罗斯联邦安全局，很多富商都已逃离了俄罗斯。现在，俄罗斯可能将面临另一波富商逃离，包括与克里姆林宫有亲密关系却担心普京不能再给自己提供保护的富商。普京能再次赢得大选，可能毫无疑问，但一个连掌权阶层自己都不能满意的政权，很难继续存续。

作者简介：

Anders Åslund: a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Washington, DC, the author of Ukraine: What Went Wrong and How to Fix It and, most recently, Europe's Growth Challenge (with Simeon Djankov). He is currently writing a book on Russia’s crony capitalism.

安德斯·奥斯伦德：美国智库大西洋理事会高级研究员，著有《乌克兰：问题出在哪里，如何搞定它》、《欧洲增长的挑战》（与西米恩·德加科夫合著），正在写一本关于俄罗斯“亲信资本主义”的新书。

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