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陆克文谈中国|《全球脑库》:当中国领导世界。。。

2017-11-02 从余启 我与我们的世界 我与我们的世界

欢迎打开“我与我们的世界”,从此,让我们一起“纵览世界之风云变幻、洞察社会之脉搏律动、感受个体之生活命运、挖掘自然之点滴奥妙”。

我与我们的世界,既是一个“奋斗”的世界,也是一个“思考”的世界。奋而不思则罔,思而不奋则殆。这个世界,你大,它就大;你小,它就小。

欢迎通过上方公众号名称打开公众号“查看历史消息”来挖掘往期文章,因为,每期都能让你“走近”不一样的世界、带给你不一样的精彩


本期导读:陆克文(英语:Kevin Michael Rudd,1957年9月21日-)是澳大利亚政治家、外交家,曾任澳大利亚工党领袖、澳大利亚外交部长、澳大利亚总理等要职,在2008年入选为时代百大人物。


陆克文是第一位能说流利汉语(普通话)的西方国家领导人,年轻的时候,即对中国文化感到兴趣,不但曾到台湾的国立台湾师范大学留学,更以外交官的身份长期派驻中华人民共和国工作,并与各界建立广泛的人脉关系。


陆克文在哥本哈根参加2009年联合国气候变化大会时在非公开发言时被媒体捕捉到“那些中国混蛋想搞死我们!(Those Chinese fuckers are trying to rat-fuck us!)”的言论。据悉,陆克文是在与中国代表进行了一场激烈争论后失控爆粗的。在此会议上,中国作为澳大利亚最重要的贸易伙伴,坚持不愿与澳大利亚和美国合作,签订具有国际约束力的碳减排条约。


退出政坛后,陆克文多次在全球各地就中国问题发表演讲、参加论坛。在他的外孙女出生后,也时常以个人身份到访中国,看望住在北京的女儿一家。他还加入中国社交网站新浪微博与中国大众互动。他曾在社交网站上“晒出”的照片小到刮胡子受伤,大到与中国国家元首通电话,都成为中国媒体报道的话题。


2015年初新一轮“中国崩溃论”在西方燃起,陆克文在纽约举行的世界中国学论坛美国分论坛上发表驳斥认为其“胡说八道”,认为二三十年来每隔一阵出现的中国崩溃论内容都老调重弹,总认为经济进入下滑期后中国内部贫富矛盾会爆发然后会内部暴乱会崩溃,西方有一批学者永远不肯放弃此论点,然而这些预测从没有发生,他认为也永远不会发生。


陆克文的妻子李恩(Thérèse Rein)是他大学时代的恋人,心理学专业毕业。1989年,李恩买下一家濒临倒闭的小型职业介绍公司,通过17年的努力,这家原来仅有两人的小公司已成为拥有1200名雇员、65家分公司的大型跨国人力资源服务公司,现名“英格斯公司集团”,业务已拓展到了英国、法国和德国。即使是这样由自己一手操办的企业,在大选之前,为避嫌疑,李恩也不得不出售自己的股份。


陆克文夫妇育有3个孩子:


长女杰西卡(Jessica,中文名陆杰喜),1984年出生,文学士(政治科学专业)和法学士毕业,曾任律师,现写作为业。2007年和一位布里斯班的律师、银行家谢若谷(Albert Tse)结婚,谢是自香港移民澳大利亚的潮州人;,2012年杰西卡诞下一女谢悦儿(Josephine)。


长子尼古拉斯(Nicholas,中文名陆雨德),1986年出生,大学学习法律和中文,曾于2005年在复旦大学学习,现任职律师。2012年与律所同事萨拉·沙弗汝丁(Zara Shafruddin)结婚;


幼子马克斯(Marcus),1993年出生,中学毕业后也已经开始研习汉语。



When China Leads

当中国领导世界


提要:For the last 40 years, China has implemented a national strategy that, despite its many twists and turns, has produced the economic and political juggernaut we see today. It would be reckless to assume, as many still do in the US, Europe, and elsewhere, that China’s transition to global preeminence will somehow simply implode, under the weight of the political and economic contradictions they believe to be inherent to the Chinese model.


juggernaut /ˈdʒʌɡəˌnɔːt/  If you describe an organization or group as a juggernaut, you are critical of them because they are large and extremely powerful, and you think they are not being controlled properly.


正文:The West, by and large, has no idea what awaits it as China continues its rise. The United States, under President Donald Trump, has become a global laughingstock in less than a year. Europe, with the notable exception of French President Emmanuel Macron, remains a rolling seminar on itself, oblivious to its declining relevance to the rest of the world. And the less said about Britain’s collective act of national political and economic suicide in last year’s Brexit referendum, the better.

总体上来讲,中国崛起对于西方意味着什么,西方是不大清楚的。特朗普领导下的美国,不到一年的时间,沦落为全球的一个笑柄。欧洲那边,尽管有法国总统马克龙这位新星,但依然只是个供各家轮番登场的政治论坛,与世界其他国家和地区的联系性,越来越低。而英国,自去年那场堪比全体国民进行政治经济自杀的脱欧公投后,不提它也罢,毕竟,越提它,越让人伤心。


In short, the West has turned decisively inward, while China, breaking with its 3,000 years of dynastic history, has turned decisively outward, so that today few corners of the world are untouched by its influence. Deng Xiaoping’s maxim, “hide your strength, bide your time, and never take a lead” has already been dead for some years. The just-completed 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) was its state funeral. Xi is now proclaiming explicitly to his own people and the world that it is time for China to take center stage within the global order, and to create a new type of international relations.

简而言之,西方已决绝地向内看,而中国,甩掉3000多年的皇朝历史后,开始决绝地向外看,因此,当今的世界,没有哪个角落,不会受到中国的影响。曾经的“韬光养晦”战略,死了已有些年份了,刚开完的大会,则是为那个战略举行的“国葬”。大会上向国民和全世界响亮地宣布,中国是时候走向全球秩序舞台的中心了,也是时候开始构建新型国际关系了。


So, beyond the pomp and ceremony of the 19th National Congress, it is crucial to understand what its outcomes will mean for China and the world.


XI THE THOUGHT LEADER

思想领导者

CPC congresses are about three things: leadership and personnel, ideology, and political vision. Even before this Congress, Xi had strengthened his position to the point that he is now China’s paramount leader. Five years ago, I said he would be China’s most powerful leader since Deng. I was wrong. He is now China’s most powerful leader since Mao Zedong. His absolute control over the CPC is reflected in its deepest structures, from which, in an arcane process resembling the workings of the Roman Curia, an entirely new body of “Xi Jinping thought” has been elaborated – and has now been incorporated into the Party’s constitution.


Xi’s achievement is no small matter. In one fell swoop, he has transcended his immediate predecessors and joined the ranks of Mao and Deng, who have until now been the only leaders to hold this political status.


Clearly, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign over the last five years helped him consolidate his position. Since the campaign began, some 278,000 officials have been punished, including 440 at ministerial rank and above – several of which were Xi’s politburo rivals. And, rather than loosening the screws, Xi’s report to the 19th National Congress suggested just the opposite: the Party should prepare for further tightening.


The new Politburo Standing Committee also reflects Xi’s personal preferences; indeed, its members will be loyal ultimately to Xi himself. Li Zhanshu, who will chair the National People’s Congress, and Zhao Leji, who will chair the Party’s disciplinary authority, are both members of Xi’s inner circle. Han Zheng, the executive vice premier, and Wang Huning, who is in charge of all CPC affairs, are both protégés of former president Jiang Zemin. And Premier Li Keqiang and Wang Yang (likely to be Chair of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Committee) are from the Tuanpai, the Communist Youth League faction. This political balance will likely favor Xi enough to allow him to secure a third term as president.


Xi’s priorities are reflected in other key appointments. Liu He – a Harvard-educated economist and Xi confidant, who is the current vice-chair of the National Development and Reform Commission – has been appointed to the Politburo, the top ruling body after the Standing Committee. Already one of Xi’s closest financial and economic advisers, Liu is now likely to become Vice Premier, gaining even more influence over China’s economic-reform agenda. This, together with the elevation of Han – who has brought with him from Shanghai a reputation for strong economic governance – to the Politburo Standing Committee, suggests that economic reform will be a top priority for Xi in the next five years.


On the foreign-policy front, Yang Jiechi’s appointment to the Politburo is a sign that Xi intends to lift the status of the Chinese foreign-policy establishment within the system. This will put him in a stronger position to realize his ambition of a more globally assertive China.


Then there is the question of Xi’s own future. Everything about the 19th National Congress points to Xi continuing as China’s paramount leader beyond the next five years, and possibly for the next 15. His report didn’t point to the conclusion of his mandate by 2021, the centenary of the CPC’s birth and the date (announced in 2013) by which China would become “a moderately prosperous society” against global benchmarks. Rather, the speech points to 2035, when the next national milestone is to be reached on China’s path to becoming a global power by 2049, the centenary of the People’s Republic. The strong inference is that Xi is likely to remain in office through the 2030s.


What all of this reflects is that Xi is likely to be in power for longer than any other major national leader serving today, including Vladimir Putin. What he thinks and says to the Party, the country, and the world, therefore, must be taken with the utmost seriousness. Xi is driving China in a new direction, and whether we like it or not, the rest of us had better understand his agenda sooner rather than later.


GRAND AMBITIONS

雄心壮志

This brings us to the actual content of Xi’s ideology, which can be found behind the CPC’s almost impenetrable dialect. First, Xi’s China will remain permanently governed by a Leninist party that monopolizes state power. The decades-long hope of many in the West that China will gradually transform itself into something approaching a Singaporean-style or Western-style democracy is the stuff of dreams.


Xi states that China will never import a political system from anywhere else in the world. “China’s socialist democracy,” he argues, “is the broadest, most genuine, and most effective democracy to safeguard the fundamental interests of the people,” and it now represents an alternative model for the rest of the developing world.


China’s official media have taken the cue. Government-controlled news outlets have flooded the country with story after story on why Western-style liberal democracy is now moribund. Moving beyond the conventional arguments that democratic decision-making has been ineffective in bringing about long-term economic development, a new set of arguments has been unveiled: Western democracy is corrupt, hypocritical, and fails to meet the needs of the poor. Under Xi, the CPC senses that the global spread of liberal democratic ideas has ground to a halt, leaving the West’s geopolitical power and prestige ripe for challenge.


Xi has outlined two grand objectives for the CPC and the Chinese people. During the 15 years from 2020 to 2035, China should become a “fully modern” economy and society. This is to be followed by another 15-year period until mid-century, when China’s quest for national wealth and power, first dreamed up in the 1890s, will finally come to fruition. By then, according to Xi, China will have become “a global leader of composite national strength and international influence.”


GLOBAL CHINA

走向全球

As for China’s role in the world, we have seen its outlines emerging since the CPC’s 18th National Congress in 2012, particularly in Xi’s speech to the Central Work Conference on Foreign Affairs in November 2014. The heavily edited published version of this speech provides an invaluable glimpse of the contours of Xi’s strategic vision.


It is a vision of a new type of great power relations, by which Xi means geopolitical parity between the US and China. Moreover, China is to shape the rules governing a new international system that includes not only the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions, but also China’s own institutional innovations in the form of the Belt and Road Initiative, the New Development Bank, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.


Where we will see even greater Chinese diplomatic innovation is in Xi’s concept of a ”global community of common destiny for all humankind.” Whereas strategic “realists” in the West simply roll their eyes when they hear this type of language, for the Chinese, Xi’s concept looms as large as the Atlantic Charter, the Bretton Woods conference, or even the UN Charter.


But the world should be prepared, because Xi’s “global community” remains very much an experimental concept – and for good reason. The truth is that Chinese history provides little guidance on how China should act on the world stage. Throughout most of China’s history, its leaders have focused on domestic governance and how to keep foreigners from entering the country. Still, the message conveyed by Xi’s coded language is easy to decipher: the rest of us should get ready for a new wave of Chinese global policy activism.


IT’S STILL THE ECONOMY

经济依然是核心

The third dimension of any CPC National Congress is, of course, policy. Foreign analysts will complain that Xi’s report to the 19th Congress is short on details. A careful read of the text suggests very little variation from China’s existing economic, foreign, and defense policy settings. But spelling out the details is not the traditional role of a National Congress. These will come in the subsequent annual plenums to be convened by the CPC’s newly elected central committee.


Nonetheless, the central policy question remains the economy. The challenge for Xi is to implement the Party’s 2013 blueprint for economic reform. That plan outlined a comprehensive market-based strategy to replace China’s current economic-growth model, based on low-wage, labor-intensive export manufacturing, with one based on technology-driven productivity gains, high wages, and a booming service sector driven by the rapid emergence of the domestic consumer market.


If Xi succeeds in implementing this economic-reform agenda, notwithstanding significant social – and some political – instability along the way, China will entrench its position as the world’s largest economy. If, on the other hand, Xi deems the transition too difficult, China’s economy may fall short of both domestic and international expectations. We should have our first reliable read on Xi’s intentions either at the next Central Economic Work Conference (likely to be held later this year or early next year), or at the Third Plenum of the 19th Central Committee of the CPC, in the autumn of 2019.


When China does become the world’s largest economy over the next decade, the global system will be led by a non-English-speaking, non-Western, non-democratic state for the first time since George I ruled Great Britain and Ireland. The current rule-based international order will not remain immune from this fundamental geo-economic and geopolitical change. Nor will the conceptual foundations of the West – Judeo-Christian values and the Enlightenment principles of science, liberty, and universal human rights – be immune from challenge. To believe otherwise is willfully to ignore the deep changes that are now afoot.


The list of what can go wrong for China’s unfolding economic and international project is formidable. Still, for the last 40 years, China has implemented a national strategy that, despite its many twists and turns, has produced the economic and political phenomenon that we see today. It would be reckless to assume, as many still do in the US, Europe, and elsewhere, that China’s transition to global preeminence will somehow simply implode under the weight of the political and economic contradictions they believe to be inherent to the Chinese model.


Since the fall of the Soviet Union, there has been little, if any, grand strategy to guide the future of the West. Instead, we find a West – particularly its twin pillars, the European Union and the US – that is increasingly self-absorbed, self-satisfied, and internationally complacent.


It is sobering to reflect on the fact that the CPC’s 19th National Congress occurs on the 200th anniversary of Napoleon’s famous reflection on China’s prospects and potential. “China is a sleeping giant,” he wrote in 1817 from the splendid isolation of his exile on Saint Helena. “Let her sleep, for when she wakes she will move the world.”


Contributor:

Kevin Rudd: former Prime Minister of Australia, President of the Asia Society Policy Institute in New York and Chair of the Independent Commission on Multilateralism. He is the author of “UN 2030 – Rebuilding Order in a Troubled World.”

作者简介:

陆克文:澳大利亚前总理,纽约亚洲协会政策研究所主任、多边主义独立委员会主席,研究报告联合国2030:世界在分裂,秩序在重建》的作者。


往期精彩:


遥望世界2050|《普华永道》:中国和印度,将领跑全球

深度报告|《皮尤研究中心》:中美力量博弈与全球局势变迁

深度民调|《皮尤研究中心》:枪支暴力泛滥,民众态度依然

全球青年报告|《瓦尔基基金会》:青年就是太阳,青年就是希望

世界风云榜|《全球创新指数报告》:创新是能力,也是动力

知识就是力量|《汇丰集团报告》:教育的价值,越来越高

美国癌症协会:2017癌症统计报告:远离癌症,拥抱健康

深度|《汉学与中国学》:“中国”是头大象,大家都是盲人

印尼一瞥|《裸体主义》:穆斯林国家印尼,裸体主义在涌动

诗图一家|《远观中国》:只身远在萨摩亚,心魂牵系新中国


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