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大国博弈|《中美关系》:表面波澜不惊,深层波涛汹涌

2017-11-21 从余启 我与我们的世界 我与我们的世界

【世界决定视界】【视界决定世界】

欢迎打开“我与我们的世界”,从此,让我们一起“纵览世界之风云变幻、洞察社会之脉搏律动、感受个体之生活命运、挖掘自然之点滴奥妙”。

我与我们的世界,既是一个“奋斗”的世界,也是一个“思考”的世界。奋而不思则罔,思而不奋则殆。这个世界,你大,它就大;你小,它就小。

欢迎通过上方公众号名称打开公众号“查看历史消息”来挖掘往期文章,因为,每期都能让你“走近”不一样的世界、带给你不一样的精彩


本期导读:中美关系是指中国与美国之间的双边关系,被称为是21世纪全球最重要的双边关系之一,其历史可以追溯到美国建国之初,1784年,刚获得独立不到半年的美国就派中国皇后号到中国进行贸易。当前,两国关系十分复杂,既非完全的敌人又非正式的伙伴,敌对与合作并存,不过,总体上来讲,是合作多于冲突,共同利益远大于彼此分歧。


2011年的《中美联合声明》确认中美双方将共同努力,建设互相尊重、互利共赢的中美合作伙伴关系,是中美双方对中美关系的新定位和表述。2012年5月,在北京召开的中美战略与经济对话期间,双方将构建中美“新型大国关系”作为主题,这一概念被高调推出。现时中国将两国关系称为“建设性战略伙伴关系”,而中美两国则被部分西方学者称为两国集团(G2)或中美国。



Trump and Xi’s Narcissism of Small Differences

表面波澜不惊,深层波涛汹涌


The presidents of the United States and China are destined to clash, precisely because their economic worldviews are so similar.

中美两国注定要冲突重重,关键原因在于,他们各自对经济在国际博弈中所扮演的角色,持有相似看法。


President Donald Trump is returning home from an Asian trip during which the United States and China announced agreements worth over $250 billion. This allows Trump, who built much of his political identity on his supposed negotiating prowess and willingness to stand up to China, to return home triumphantly announcing his success at standing up to China.

美国总统特朗普已圆满结束了他的亚洲之行,成果丰硕,中美签订的合作协议总值超2500亿美元,这也就能让特朗普这位极其推崇自己的谈判能力并坚持自己敢于直面中国的美国总统,能拿得出充分的证据来宣扬他直面中国的胜利。


Perhaps unsurprisingly, this supposed victory is entirely hollow. Most of the largesse comprises ongoing deals or ones unlikely to be executed; even if all of the $250 billion in deals is realized, it will have minimal impact on the structural United States trade deficit and does nothing to address the lack of market access facing foreign firms in China. Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping carefully avoided any public discussion of more fundamental issues like market access to China by foreign firms.

不过,这种所谓的胜利,可能只是徒有其表,这一点也不奇怪,主要是因为,所签订的协议中,大部分都是已经正在进行的协议,或是某些不大可能落实的协议。即使2500亿美元的所有协议都得到落实,也不会对美国贸易赤字结构性问题产生什么大的影响,同时,也解决不了想要进入中国的外国公司所面临的市场准入问题。中美两国都巧妙地避开了在公开场合谈论诸如市场准入之类的更具根本性的议题。


Xi, who has staked his identity and regime upon projecting China as a great power on the same level as the United States and returning it to global prominence, had broader objectives in mind. In their joint press conference, Xi talked about “promoting coordination and cooperation among major countries” to demonstrate to his domestic audience he treated Trump as an equal.

中国方面,非常注重自己与美国平起平坐的大国地位,也在努力塑造全球影响力,让自己重回世界舞台的中心,并详细布设了系列规划目标。在联合新闻发布会上,中国方面提到“推动大国之间的协调与合作”,以向国民展示中国已具有与美国相同的分量。


But his talk about cooperation did little to obscure the underlying conflict between Trump and Xi — a conflict that stems from their fundamental similarities rather than their superficial differences. Trump the brash-talking reality TV star and real estate mogul and Xi the guarded, re-educated party leader seem to share little in common. But they have fundamentally similar geopolitical – and, more specifically, geo-economic — worldviews.

不过,中国方面关于大国合作的说辞,并不会减弱中美两国之间的潜在冲突,而这样的冲突,主要源于中美之间具有根本性的相同之处,而非中美之间具有表面性的相异之别。美国方面的夸夸其谈与中国方面的谨言慎行,貌似没什么共同点,不过,从根本上来讲,中美两国在地缘政治方面,或者更具体地说,在地缘经济方面,持有相似的观点或看法。


Trump and Xi are both strident nationalists. Trump’s infamous “Make America Great Again” catch phrase strikes the same chord as Xi’s sloganeering promotion “national rejuvenation” or the “Chinese dream.” Both romanticize historical eras when they their countries commanded more respect or power. Their visions of these periods may never have existed or censor out key historical details, but they both want to return to hazy replication of previous glories.

中美两国的管事儿者,都心怀浓重的民族主义情感。美国方面的“让美国再次伟大”,与中国方面的“民族复兴”或者说“中国梦”,有异曲同工之妙。中美双方都对各自历史上的辉煌时期,有着浓浓的眷恋之情。尽管中美双方对各自历史辉煌的想法没有什么具体根据,也找不出什么关键性的历史依据,不过,中美双方都想让他们头脑里那种懵懵懂懂的往日辉煌重现。


Nationalism informs their other agendas and how they pursue their goals. Flowing from their nationalist mindsets, Trump and Xi view the economic world in mercantilist terms. Trump prioritizes addressing the chronic U.S. trade deficit in the mistaken belief this is a sign of economic weakness and that surpluses equal strength. Xi prioritizes maintaining closed Chinese markets while prying open international markets to drive the trade surplus required by the capital accumulation model of economic growth.

民族主义能给中美双方提供灵感以制定目标规划,并指引中美双方落实目标规划的方向和道路。中美两国的管事儿者内心饱满的民族主义深情,使得双方都采用重商主义的视角来看待世界的经济格局。美国方面,把解决美国长期积累的贸易赤字问题列为优先任务,误以为贸易赤字就是经济脆弱的表现,贸易顺差就等于经济实力。而中国方面,对国内市场采取保护主义态度的同时,又充分利用国际市场的开放性,进而推动了贸易顺差,而贸易顺差,也正是经济增长资本积累所必须的。


Their latent nationalist mercantilism informs how and what objectives each pursues. Economic negotiations are seen as zero-sum games rather than attempts to expand the range and level of opportunities. Any agreement to open up markets implies a national weakness that may exacerbate the measure of national strength through the trade surplus. This approach narrows opportunity for agreement between countries.

中美之间这种潜在的民族主义式的重商主义,也就意味着各自会以怎样的方式来寻求什么样的目标。经济谈判通常意味着零和博弈,而非蛋糕会变大或机会均等。任何针对市场开放的协议,都意味着开放国在该市场领域的力量较弱,这就可能进一步激发该国会采取措施通过贸易顺差来提高国家实力。这样的一种演进模式,只会减少双方之间达成协议的机会。


Beyond how Xi and Trump negotiate, mercantilism decides what they will negotiate. Gone are the days of negotiating sweeping, fundamentally revolutionary agreements, with the leaders instead focusing on transactional bargaining that accomplishes no larger goal. In the spring, Trump and Xi announced a 10-point agreement on narrowly focused issues such as U.S. beef exports and Chinese bank investigations in the United States. Described as a “herculean” effort, this agreement contained no larger objectives remaining purely transactional. Market access issues were similarly absent from the recent package of deals. Even China’s announcement that it will allow foreigners to own Chinese banks seems like an attempt to persuade foreigners to bail out an increasingly shaky financial system rather than a principled shift in market access. Negotiation between the two major global powers focuses on specific transactions rather than advancing broad principles.

不管中美双方采取的是什么样的谈判方式,他们之间的谈判内容,则可由重商主义的视角来决定。那种能达成具有全面性、根本性、革命性协议的历史时期已经一去不返,而中美双方也只能就具体的交易进行讨价还价,实现不了什么具有较大影响的目标。今年春季,中美双方针对一些诸如美国牛肉出口中国和中国银行投资美国等议题宣布了一项10点协议,媒体报道说谈判多困难、多艰巨云云,但该协议所包含的目标,也只不过都是交易性的。最近中美之间签订的各项协议中,也没有涉及市场准入等具有根本性的议题。即使中国方面宣称,将允许外国资本在中资银行中控股,但这多少看来更像是在劝说外国资本来挽救日益不稳的金融系统,而非在市场准入等原则性问题方面要转变态度。中美两个大国所进行的谈判,都主要聚焦于具体性的交易事项,而非更具根本性的原则问题。


This shift bears significant consequences for the state of the bilateral economic relationship. Despite Trump’s focus on addressing the trade deficit with China, it is simply an impossibility to arrest a $350 billion deficit via individual transactions negotiated by the president. Absent a broader agreement, either on a bilateral basis or, preferably, a multilateral one, transactional negotiation will fail to prevent an expansion of the trade deficit worsening Chinese-U.S. economic relations.

这样一种处理问题的方式,对中美双边经济关系的状况会带来重大影响。尽管美国方面一直关注解决与中国的贸易赤字问题,但想要只通过高层就具体交易事项进行谈判来解决数千亿美元的贸易赤字,这是完全不可能的。若不达成一项更具广泛性的协议,中美双边之间的也行,但多边性的则会更好,那么,只就具体交易事项进行谈判,是解决不了导致中美经济关系恶化的贸易赤字问题的。


It also further entrenches Chinese interests in an illiberal world order. For all the hand-wringing over Trump’s isolationist rhetoric, the world has feted Chairman Xi’s closing of Chinese markets and nationalist industrial policies. The longer Trump focuses on transac 44 34083 44 15289 0 0 2477 0 0:00:13 0:00:06 0:00:07 2921tional negotiations rather than principles, the more entrenched illiberal Chinese market practices will take hold and dominate. Perversely, Trump attempting to reduce the U.S.-China trade deficit one transaction at a time is further entrenching the illiberal market practices China holds at home and projects abroad.

这样的话,也会进一步让中方的利益深陷于非自由式的世界秩序里。美国方面孤立主义情绪渐浓,这样世界各国都有点心急如焚,而与此同时,中国方面市场准入依然不那么开放,采取的行业政策也都具有民族主义性质。美国方面关注交易性谈判而非原则性谈判的时间越长,中国方面非自由式的市场行为也就变得更顽固、发力更强。而且事与愿违的是,特朗普试图通过时不时地达成具体交易来减少美中贸易赤字,这种做法只会进一步让中国非自由式的市场行为在国内和国际上变得更顽固。


This shift in substance and style between the two major powers is not lost on the rest of the world. Historically, the United States acted as a liberalizing influence and pushed others to join multilateral agreements. We are currently witnessing a fragmentation of interaction, with many states moving negotiations into more bilateral settings, retreating from multilateral institutions, and struggling in reaching broad consensus. Other countries follow the lead of the bipolar leaders, moving into transactional negotiation rather than pursuit of liberal principles. The South Korean dispute with China over hosting the THAAD anti-missile system in Seoul has focused little on the larger regional security threat, North Korea, and more on transactional negotiations over Beijing’s targeting Lotte outlets and restricting travel.

中美两个大国之间这种关于谈判内容和谈判方式的转变,自然不会不对其他国家带来影响。曾几何时,美国高举自由旗帜,为自由秩序鼓与呼,促动其他国家一起达成多边协议。而现如今,我们看到的是,国家间互动的碎片化,很多国家把注意力越来越集中于双边谈判,甚至会退出多边机制,要达成更具广泛性的共识越来越难。其他很多国家,也在追随中美两个大国的脚步,专注于交易性的谈判,而非坚持对自由原则的追求。中韩两国关于萨德反导系统的争端也有点失焦,不是关注于朝鲜给区域安全所带来的威胁,而是纠缠于诸如抵制乐天、限韩令之类的交易性谈判。


The primary tragedy of Trump’s bilateral, transactional negotiation approach to confronting Chinese protectionism is that he would have widespread support if he assembled a coalition to truly tackle the issue. Domestically, Trump would have broad support from Democrats in Congress and labor unions, as well as Republican national security and business interests. Internationally, Trump would receive broad support from countries that face the same type of rampant protectionism as U.S. firms. South Korean, Japanese, Australian, German, and United Kingdom officials have all complained about China’s strident protectionism .

为应对中国的保护主义,特朗普采取了双边性、交易性的谈判方式,悲哀的是,若特朗普真的想要解决这个问题,他本来也能获得广泛支持的。国内方面,特朗普不仅能获得国会里民主党和劳工组织的广泛支持,而且也能因符合国家安全和商界利益而获得共和党人士的广泛支持。国际方面,特朗普也能获得与美国公司面临同样严重的保护主义的国家的广泛支持。韩国、日本、澳大利亚、德国以及英国的官员们,都对中国严重的保护主义抱怨连连。


Even the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreed to recently by a multilateral coalition of countries is primarily a response to Chinese protectionism. It was originally spearheaded by the United States under the Barack Obama administration and then killed by Trump. Charges that Trump is an economic protectionist overstate the shift in policy, but he clearly offers no global leadership or the forceful liberal rebuttal the world seeks to Chinese nationalism. Simplistic transactional negotiation may allow a short-term gain, but it obfuscates the larger economic objectives of the coalition of countries the United States once led.

即使近期由几个国家就跨太平洋伙伴关系达成的多边协议,也主要是对中国的保护主义所做出的回应。跨太平洋伙伴关系最初是由奥巴马政府带头启动,而到了特朗普,他却从中退了出来。大家都指责说,特朗普是个经济保守主义者,这样的指责,太过于关注具体政策的转向,但更严重的问题在于,特朗普放弃了全球的领导力,或者说,放弃了坚守针对中国的民族主义所建立起来的强有力的自由堡垒,而后者,则是这个世界所真正需要的。只进行简单的交易性谈判,短期来讲,可能会带来收益,但这样做的话,就会让美国领导下建立起来的、更具重要性的自由经济秩序的目标化为泡影。


Trump’s reluctance to assemble a broad coalition stems at least in part from his clear recognition that there are costs associated with the privileged U.S. position of global leadership. Free trade and investment markets bring large net benefits but also impose costs. The U.S. dollar has become the dominant global currency at least in part because it has willingly run large current account deficits. Coupling the world’s largest economy with one of the most open markets continually displaces workers, which now compete with industries around the world. Trump’s domestic voting base consists in key states of workers either displaced by global competition or not benefiting along with other groups.


Trump may be mocked for complaining about the costs associated with U.S. leadership, but they are real. The focus, however, should be on mitigating the risks associated with global leadership and market openness, of which the United States has been arguably the biggest beneficiary.


This points to the clear traditional divergence in the visions between historical United States and projected Chinese leadership. The United States was historically willing to incur costs and risks in defense of liberal principles, and China is unwilling to incur neither costs nor risks for principles. The United States was willing to bind itself to principles at the risk of losing in dispute resolution forums like the World Trade Organization, which has happened sometimes, to the consternation of the Trump administration. Conversely, playing its size advantage, China commits itself to no binding principles, preferring bilateral negotiations instead. Whereas the United States allowed itself to run a large current account deficit and the U.S. dollar became the global currency, China insists on running trade surpluses, insisting the yuan will become a global currency despite the world’s inability to freely trade in the currency.


If the Trump-Xi worldview of economics and negotiations takes place, we can expect not just great power transactional bargaining, but also a drift away from a principled liberal global order. Brexit, NAFTA, and the South China Sea are a small list of examples where bilateral nationalistic transactional bargaining dominates over principled liberal order negotiation. This implies greater fragmentation as countries seek out other self-interested parties whose specific position matches in some way their own, even as China and the United States negotiate individual transactions.


Former Obama State Department appointee Anne-Marie Slaughter wrote that the post-World War II order benefited from American creation of administrative international institutions that broadly mirrored domestic institutions. Though significant amounts of the costs associated with creating and nurturing these nascent institutions in the wake of World War II fell to the United States, it gave the U.S. great influence to establish standards and formulate the direction of policy founded on liberal principles.


A retreat by the Trump administration into isolationist nationalism, and an unwillingness to recognize the enormous benefits derived from the openness championed by U.S. leadership, plays directly into the hands of Chinese strategy, where size matters most. Engaging China on bilateral transactions fails to solve the fundamental problem and sends a clear message about the lack of U.S. interest in defending the liberal order the country once built.


Contributor:

Christopher Balding: an associate professor of business and economics at the HSBC Business School in Shenzhen and author of "Sovereign Wealth Funds: The New Intersection of Money and Power."

作者简介:

克里斯多夫·鲍尔丁:深圳汇丰商学院经济学、商学副教授,著有《主权财富基金:金钱与权力之间的新型交媾》


往期精彩:


深度报告|《皮尤研究中心》:中美力量博弈与全球局势变迁

排行榜|《国际关系重镇一览》:大国博弈,本质是智慧角力

陆克文谈中国|《全球脑库》:当中国领导世界。。。

俄乌关系|《经济学人》:普京提出要价,西方如何接招?

太平洋不太平|《波涛汹涌》:为什么中国要在太平洋里撒钱?

中亚一瞥|《BBC》:中亚大国哈萨克斯坦要转换字母系统

深度报告|《世界经济论坛》:实现男女平等,还要再等100年

新知|《苍蝇难拍》:苍蝇的反应速度为啥子能完胜人类?

红色记忆|《历史在荡漾》:百年记忆之“哈巴罗夫斯克篇”

诗图一家|《远观中国》:只身远在萨摩亚,心魂牵系新中国


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