【有奖竞赛】“第三届许渊冲翻译大赛”参赛通知
“第三届许渊冲翻译大赛”参赛规则及评委设置及原文
推送日期：2018年12月20日
截稿时间：2019年6月30日24时
为推动国内翻译人才的培养进程，促进BTI、MTI方向的发展，乃至DTI的建立，以及整个翻译学科的发展和中外文化交流，研究和践行许渊冲先生的翻译理念，继2017年和2018年前两届许渊冲翻译大赛所取得的良好反响，兹定于2019年举办“第三届许渊冲翻译大赛”。本次大赛由山西大同大学许渊冲翻译与比较文化研究院、《外语学刊》编辑部、西安外国语大学联合主办，辽宁省翻译学会、《语言文化研究》编辑部协办，本届大赛仍分英译汉和汉译英两种类型，设立一等奖、二等奖、三等奖、优秀奖和优秀组织奖五个奖项，参赛者可任选一种或两种。欢迎海内外广大翻译工作者和爱好者比秀佳译，共鉴达雅。
一、赛程
1、《外语学刊》于2019年第1期发布启事，第5期发布获奖结果，《语言文化研究》、许渊冲翻译与比较文化研究院网站、协办单位网站同时公布相关信息。
2、投稿截止时间：2019年6月30日24时。
二、参赛要求
1、参赛者国籍、年龄、性别、学历不限，不接受合作译稿，一经发现取消比赛资格。
2、仅第一次投稿有效，不接受再投稿件，只接受电子投稿，不接受纸质稿。
3、截稿之日前，妥善保存译文，勿在媒体上公布，违者取消参赛资格并承担一切后果。
4、参赛译文一经发现抄袭或雷同，即取消参赛资格，且投稿即视为同意并自愿遵守赛事规定。
三、奖项设置
1、“英译汉”“汉译英”各设一等奖1名，二等奖2名，三等奖3名，优秀奖若干名。
2、一、二、三等奖颁发证书、奖金和奖品，优秀奖颁发证书和奖品。
四、参赛费用
1、参加一项缴50元，两项缴100元，不缴参赛费，稿件无进入评审程序。
2、（推荐）微信扫描二维码，进入2019年许渊冲翻译大赛报名系统，填写相关信息。报名费转账至支付宝账户13393521012（添加备注：姓名+电话+参赛类型）。
3、邮件主题：姓名+英译汉（或汉译英），以附件（word格式）发送译文和个人信息（姓名、性别、单位/学校、地址、邮编、Email、电话）；邮局汇款：山西省大同市兴云街1号山西大同大学许渊冲翻译与比较文化研究院（邮编037009），联系人：吕红周，电话：13393521012（附言写明姓名+电话+参赛类型）参赛译文发送至：xycfyds@163.com，
五、投稿规范
1、邮件主题为：姓名+英译汉（或汉译英），同时以附件发送个人信息（姓名、性别、年龄、单位/学校、地址、邮编、Email、电话）。参赛译文发送至电子邮箱：xycfyds@163.com （参加两项比赛，请发送两封邮件，各带附件）。
2、译文格式：宋体（英译汉）/Times New Roman（汉译英），黑色，小四号，1.5 倍行距，两端对齐（译文中请勿留个人信息）。
六、大赛组委会
为保证赛事的公平、公正、透明，特成立大赛组委会，负责大赛的组织、实施和评审工作，地点设在山西大同大学。
顾问委员会
党争胜、董洪川、黄友义、李锡胤、李亚舒、许钧、杨俊峰、许渊冲、严 明、祝朝伟
评审委员会主任
李亚舒
评委
白丽梅、薄振杰、卞建华、曹 进、陈国兴、
常 乐、常 青、邓晓宇、董广才、董 君、
段满福、方 红、冯正斌、龚晓斌、 桂清扬、
韩红梅、胡安江、胡富茂、黄立波、黄焰结、
李林波、贾洪伟、蒋世强、寇福明、孔令翠、
李春姬、李丽华、李玉良、李占喜、李正栓、
廖正刚、林正军、鹿 彬、马 军、马士奎、
潘智丹、彭 萍、秦洪武、仇云龙、桑仲刚、
沈鞠明、 宋 宏、苏 鹏、孙 颖、 邵 璐、
陶友兰、王和平、王金波、王 军、王秋生、
王维波、武恩义、巫和雄、徐志英、张晓华、
张 政、周 杰、闫怡恂、杨元刚、杨增成、
余 丽、于国栋、张德让、张生庭、张思洁、
赵 刚、朱义华、朱 跃
七、联系方式
联系人：贾洪伟（手机：18600941401），吕红周（手机：13393521012）
传真： 0532-7563538
地址：山西省大同市南郊区大同大学外国语学院许渊冲翻译与比较文化研究院（037001）
大同大学许渊冲翻译与比较文化研究院
《外语学刊》编辑部
辽宁省翻译学会
西安外国语大学英文学院
《语言文化研究》编辑部
附大赛原文：
第三届许渊冲翻译大赛英译汉原文
[1] The question to be considered in this and adjacent paragraphs is, How the scientific pursuit of the truth, in its various argumentational configurations, realized in the thought of structuralist thinkers engaged in textual studies. An account of the way in which these scholars tend to (in Peirce’s terminology) settle their beliefs and create thinking habits will, it is hoped, provide a deeper insight into the semiological approach to the text-phenomenon, that is, into its procedure, assumptions, and conclusions. Beyond this immediate purpose, it is also hoped that the disccusion here will bring some additional clarity to the problematic and, indeed, controversial division between linguistic semiotics and general semiotics, as roughly embodied in the Saussurean and the Peircean traditions of semiotics, respectively. It will be argued that these semiotic theories are anchored in different types of reasoning which determine their conclusions and, particularly, the extent to which those conclusions reflect the objective truth - that is, the extent to which they can rightly be called scientific inquiries.
[2] Modern European structuralist scholarship pursues a mainly deductive course of reasoning; and the same is, a fortiori, true for text-grammatical research - entirely based, as it is, on formal methods approaching those of mathematics. Text-grammar differs from structuralism in that its reliance upon a deductive argumentation is professed overtly and without disguise; whereas structuralism proceeds in a more insidiously deductive manner. Both discursive procedures present themselves, however, as necessary reasoning; to each particular case (such as text data) a general rule is applied which is assumed to provide the exclusive key to its meaning. The rule to which structuralism applies - and, indeed, seeks almost to enfore as the only possible option - suggests that all semiotic objects, such as texts, are optimally and exhaustively categorized into binary oppositions. On the assumption that this is a true premiss corresponding to a valid abstraction from the facts, the conclusions drawn from it would necessarily be true. On the other hand, a falsification of the rule would, according to this line of thought, automatically invalidate the conclusions drawn from it. The whole procedure would thereby have to be regarded as a simple calculation error - a blunder requiring swift correction.
[3] First, let us consider the scope of the rule. Rules applied in any form of argumentation are not God-given laws but man-made principles. They are of conventional or experiential origin, based upon pure agreement, on a product of previous experience and the lessions drawn from it, or on a mixture of both. In the case of a strictly conventional rule - the case of pure deduction- the agreement may be ad hoc decision and/or a long-standing habit, sanctified through long years of practice during which time the memory of the original ruling act has gradually faded into oblivion. The sacrosanct rule-as-such having then become ossified, it is symbolized - which is to say that it is merely enacted and re-enacted in its applications. Although the rule is therein (iconically) exhibited and (indxically) pointed toward, its validity is itself never again explicitly brought into question. A preestablished rule is therefore not tested out on random cases; because, if it were, an exception could be found, which would contradict the rule and thereby jeopardize the unfailing and definitive nature of the procedure.
[4] The leading principle of structuralism - binarism - has acquired the character of a conventional rule. The rule of binary oppositions constitutes the rigidly fixed a priori which has been elevated to the status of universal rule. But it has not been verified statistically, on the basis of random examples, prior to its having achieved this sophisticated status. The experiential rule is more flexible than its conventional counterpart, and it results from some form of practical experimentation that has led inductively to its adoption. Whenever it is used for reasoning of a formal nature, this strictly hoc tempore rule, based on experience, makes for a symbolic reasoning procedure with strong indexical overtones. By the same token, Peirce stated that induction "is justifiable as long as one keeps on the alert for the first exception", for if and when this case occurs, the experiment requires revision or even rejection of the rule (not the case!), whereupon a new experiment can be carried out, and so forth. Each experiment can, of course, also confirm the existing rule and thereby strengthen its validity. In short, the rule is, in scientifically valid reasoning, the standard or norm resulting from an ongoing process of learning and growth. In Peirce's pragmaticist view, this is the right kind of rule: one which is experimentally concluded from the premisses and not one which is presupposed by them, as is the rule in deduction - and hence in structuralist policy.
[5] According to Peirce, only if knowledge is improved, challenged, and continually increased, and only if in the process new insights are allowed to be developed and tried out, does Ransdell's "communal hunt" stand a chance of being a living pursuit that will approximate to its purpose and goal. All scientifically valid reasoning owes its "efficiency" to the fact that it must involve a blend of both the empirical (induction) and the law-like (deduction), both being preceded by the hypothetical (abduction). Such a threefold, mixed scenario first infers from an actual fact, event, or phenomenon a hypothetical "maybe," followed by a "would be"; the latter is the inductive conclusion, which, as Peirce stated, "can be (usually) but indefinite, and can never be certain". To this Peirce hastened to add what seems to be a correction: "But in ordinary cases an induction would become both precise and certain". It is clear that in Peirce's evolutionary concept of pragmatism, the two last-quoted statements do not contradict but reciprocally support, each other.
[6] In Peirce's variety of pragmatism, the conditional futurity of "would be" is required in order for reasoning to conform to the essence of reality and truth; it proposes a law which is the product of human reason in all its virtues and limitations, which is not infallible but ultimately inspired by reasonableness. Only after an infinite series of cases has been closely studied can true answer be given. In contradistinction to the conditional mood of "would be", structuralism advances absolute "must be"s. The latter policy is falsely assumed to lead directly to the truth, what it does is to undercut the creative dialogue between rule and experience. This concept of "law" takes a shortcut to the "truth" by taking the preestablished rule and creating absolute uniformity with it. It is, however, a bare uniformity among faits accomplis, and its futurity is a merely self-fulfilling prophecy.
第三届许渊冲翻译大赛汉译英原文
中国之殤！
[1]美国华裔作家张纯如因《南京暴行：被遗忘的大屠杀》一书获名，然随着南京大屠杀研究的深入，其困惑越来越深，最后竟以自杀结束生命。自杀前她与身边亲友说：“在访问南京大屠杀的时候，我发现不仅仅是日本人的问题，还有中国人的奴性，中国人有一种极其恶歹的心理，在世界民族中也罕见！从来没有一种人，因为不同的主子，可以作践自己的同类，到了极其残忍的地步，我原本想拿大刀砍向鬼子，可是发现需要砍的，还有自己的同胞。”何以要砍向自己的同胞，自己同胞的所作所为当砍。
[2]扬州十日时，江南居民只要遇见一个满洲兵，“南人不论多寡，皆垂首匍伏，引颈受刀，无一敢逃者”。一个清兵，遇见近五十名青壮年，清兵横刀一呼：“蛮子来！蛮子来！”这些人便战战兢兢，无一敢动。此清兵便押着这些人青壮年赴屠场，其间无一人反抗，一人敢跑。至刑场后，清兵喝令：“跪！”呼啦啦全部跪倒，任其屠杀。
[3]南京大屠杀时，如此情形再度上演。日本人抓住国军后，进行甄别，在押的上万人中潜有换了兵装的师长团长。日本人喝道：“谁是当官的？站出来！”顿时众手齐指那些师长团长们。但结局却无异，指人者与被指者统统一死。有人说南人文弱，故由着清兵造次，其实北人也扯淡，抗战时的山西农村，经常是一个鬼子撵着全村人团团转，让跪下就跪下，说趴下就趴下。
[4]梁实秋《排队》一文中道：抗战以前，人们在车站购票不排队。但日本人占领北平前门火车站后，秩序从此改良许多。何以然？因为有个日本兵拿着鞭子，来回巡视，看有插队者，上去就是狠狠一鞭，那人便一声不响排在了队尾。为此，梁先生悲然诘问：“难道中国人真需要那一条鞭子才行么？”有人不解何以每至夷狄更姓，自发或被迫的汉奸便多如牛毛，正如失望是绝望的前提，奴性实则汉奸的基础，奴性越深，汉奸越多。
[5]读史的周作人说过一话，意味深长：“积多年的思索经验，从学理说来人的前途显有光明，而从史事看来中国的前途还是黑暗未了。”读史令人心碎，少年读史，义愤填膺，成年读史，便有周作人话里的滋味了。
[6]崇祯挽残局，无奈六下罪己诏，“罪非朕躬，谁任其责”，此话甚是，问题在下层，根源在上面，“朕为民父母，民为朕赤子”，既如此，子不教，父之过矣。其实也不在一君一朝，在制度。黑格尔说：“中国历史从本质上看是没有历史的，它只是君主覆灭的一再重复而已，任何进步都不可能从中产生。几千年的中国，其实是一个大赌场，恶棍们轮流坐庄，混蛋们换班执政，炮灰们总是做祭品，这才是中国历史的本来面目。事实上，中国任何一次革命都没能使这个历史改变。”鸦片战争前夕，中国GDP世界第一，却不堪一击。何以然？
[7]费正清认为，制度落后和官场腐败是中国失败的根本原因：“从康熙、雍正到乾隆，他们做了一件事，就是把中国的官僚体制变成了一个合法的、有组织的贪污集体。”后来有人将国人状况描述为一盘散沙，以为有了铁腕领袖，有了铁幕制度，一切都会迎刃而解，焕然一新，果真如此？
[8]鲁迅说“中国是世界上国耻纪念最多的国家”。历史上，除夷狄对华夏的荼毒，多数时候是自己人戕害自己人，自己人屠戮自己人，其残忍程度绝不亚于外人，只是家丑不可外扬，史料中难免遮遮掩掩。
转载声明：本文转载自「典籍英译研究」，搜索「ClassicsTranslation」即可关注。
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