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朝鲜2013年底推出的跟踪观察器,在默认情况下会自动安装到朝鲜手机上,并能在用户设备上随意截屏。只需更新一次,就能使未经授权的媒体文件无法读取。另外还有一些软件能够扫描文件中可疑短语,然后进行删除。


朝鲜是如何监控手机的?



译者:王妍 & 倪婷

校对:曾擎禹

策划:周树人


What North Koreans learn from their smartphones

朝鲜从智能手机中学到了什么?


本文选自 The Economist | 取经号原创翻译

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THE world may think of North Korea as a “hermit kingdom”, but its 25m citizens are surprisingly wired. Perhaps half of all urban households now own a Chinese-made “notel”, a portable media player. Over 3m have mobile-phone subscriptions, with Northern-branded smartphones like the Pyongyang and the Arirang. South Korean NGOs that smuggle foreign films and TV shows into the North on USBs receive text messages from their contacts there with requests for specific titles (South Korean soaps and Hollywood dramas are popular).

可能全世界都认为朝鲜是个“神秘之国”,但出乎意料的是,朝鲜2500万人民却并不对外面的世界陌生。目前可能在一半的朝鲜城市家庭中拥有一部中国制造的“notel”便携式播放器。朝鲜超过300万的手机用户都使用着诸如“平壤”和“阿里郎”这样朝鲜国产品牌的智能手机,而来自韩国的非政府组织在收到他们联系人相应需求的短信时,则会将外国电影和电视节目通过u盘偷偷送入朝鲜境内。(韩国肥皂剧和好莱坞戏剧的人气很高)


The North Korean government, which has long relied on isolation to keep its wretched people in servitude, has nonetheless abetted this revolution. In 2008 it invited Orascom, an Egyptian telecoms firm, to develop a 3G network in a joint venture with a state-owned enterprise. There are now many more sanctioned North Korean mobile phones than illegal Chinese ones (which can pick up a signal near the border); many use them to conduct business on the black market, to which the state turns a blind eye, by checking prices elsewhere in the country. Notels, which can be bought for around $50 on the black market, are also sold in state-run shops and appear to have been legalised in 2014. 

长期以来朝鲜政府一直通过闭关锁国来维持对其可怜的人民的奴役,但在某种程度上,朝鲜政府本身也助涨了这种变革。在2008年的时候,政府曾邀请埃及Orascom电信公司和朝鲜国企合作建立3G网络。如今,经授权认证的朝鲜手机在数量上要比非法中国手机多(这种手机在边界附近也能收到信号)。因为能用来对比全国各地的价格,这种手机经常被用于黑市交易,而国家对这种情况现在也是睁一只眼闭一只眼。Notels在黑市的交易价格约在50美元,也可在国营商店出售,并且这种销售渠道似乎于2014年得到合法化。


If North Koreans are more easily able to trade information within their country, attempts to expunge information from elsewhere have never been so fierce. Since Kim Jong Un came to power in 2011, signal jammers for mobile phones have been set up along the border with China. These are so powerful that they have affected Chinese living on the other side. (North Koreans are banned from calling abroad.) CCTV cameras have also been installed to catch illicit callers.

对于朝鲜人来说,现在他们在国内的交流变的更加容易了,但是于此同时,政府清除外来信息的想法也会变的异常强烈。临近中国边境地带的手机信号屏蔽器于2011年金正日上台后设立,且其干扰能力强到能影响到生活在边境另一边的中国人。(来自境外的电话是无法打入朝鲜境内的。)而为了捕捉非法来电者,朝鲜还为此安装了闭路电视摄像机。


Group 109, a new squad created by Mr Kim, frequently raids homes to crack down on foreign content, Chinese mobiles and short-wave radios. Of some 300 North Korean refugees surveyed in 2015 by America’s Broadcasting Board of Governors, almost two-thirds said that it had become more dangerous to watch foreign dramas under the young, Swiss-educated Mr Kim; none said it had become less so. Most North Koreans do not have access to the internet, and the few who are allowed to go online are limited to a state-run intranet with 28 tedious websites.

由金正日创建的新团队109组经常会突袭家庭住宅,查收进口产品、中国手机和短波无线电接收机。在2015年经美国广播理事会调查的300名朝鲜难民中,近三分之二的人表示在受过瑞士教育的青年金正日治下,观看外国节目这事变得越来越危险。没人说危险性有减低。大多数朝鲜人都没接触过互联网,少数经允许上网的人也仅限于登录国营内部网中28个无趣的网站。


Nat Kretchun, one of the authors of “Compromising Connectivity”, a recent report on North Korea’s digitisation, says that the state is arming itself with censorship methods that “go beyond what is observed even in other authoritarian states”. The toolkit he describes is sobering. The new 3G network allows the regime to automate surveillance through a home-grown operating system called Red Star. One update, rolled out in late 2013, made unsanctioned media files unreadable. TraceViewer, installed by default on North Korean phones, takes random screenshots of users’ devices. Yet another bit of software scans files for suspicious phrases and deletes them. Red Star also allows authorities to trace forbidden content from device to device, as it is copied from one friend to the next. New rules require North Koreans to register their notels, allowing the authorities to monitor them, too. Mr Kretchun thinks that, as it brings more North Koreans on to its own “clean” network of devices, the state may eventually ban notels altogether.

“中程连通”创始人之一奈特克莱琛在最近一份有关朝鲜数字化的报道中表示,朝鲜采用了不同于其他独裁国家现已知的审查制度。据他描述,朝鲜所使用的设备令人脊背发凉。这种新的3G网络允许当局通过名为“红星”的由朝鲜自主开发的操作系统自动进行监视。2013年底推出的跟踪观察器,在默认情况下自动安装到朝鲜手机上并能在用户设备上随意截屏。只需更新一次,就能使未经授权的媒体文件无法读取。另外还有一些软件能够扫描文件中可疑短语,然后进行删除。当禁止内容从一个用户的设备中被复制发到其朋友的设备中时,红星还会允许当局对这一设备到下一设备进行跟踪。新规要求朝鲜公民登记notel的使用者,并允许当局监督他们。克莱琛认为,由于朝鲜愈加频繁的净化本土内的设备网络,当局最终很有可能会完全禁止使用notel。


Many watchers believe that, if North Koreans had enough mobile phones, received enough outside news and saw enough soaps depicting the South’s freedoms and riches, the regime would founder. The example of East Germany is tantalising. Thae Yong Ho, a North Korean diplomat who defected to South Korea last year, says that the regime will “collapse on its own when enough external information introduced through drones or USBs reveals the truth of the Kim regime”. In a recent poll of defectors, 98% said they had used USBs to store illegal content.

许多观察家认为,一旦朝鲜有足够数量的手机,朝鲜人民接触到更多外界信息,看到肥皂剧中描绘的韩国过着自由和富足的生活,朝鲜政权或许会崩塌。东德就是活生生的例证。去年叛逃到韩国的朝鲜前外交官太勇浩(Thae Yong-Ho)认为:“当足够多的外部信息通过无人机或U盘传入朝鲜,揭露金氏政权的统治真相,朝鲜政权便会自行瓦解。”最近一项关于脱北者的调查显示,98%的脱北者承认他们曾使用U盘存储违禁内容。

founder:1.(especially of a boat) to fill with water and sink (尤指船)沉没;2. to be unsuccessful 失败;破产


Yet the jump from watching smuggled soaps to rising up against the government is a long one. Entertainment brings colour to dreary North Korean lives; rebellion brings death. And the work of activists ferreting content into North Korea is devilishly hard. Their methods are low-tech: floating sealed bags of USBs across the Yalu river on the Chinese border; sending balloons carrying DVDs over the heavily militarised border with the South. Some radio stations play content to recently arrived defectors to check that it is relevant. But few know what gets picked up. Some groups continue to promote ideological or incendiary content—such as clips of “The Interview”, a boorish comedy about an assassination attempt on Mr Kim—which may be more of a turn-off.

但是从看偷偷带进来的国外电视剧到起来反抗政府是一个漫长的过程。娱乐活动给朝鲜人民单调的生活带来了一抹色彩,但反抗则会带来死亡。并且向朝鲜偷运这些内容极其困难,方法也比较低级:将U盘密封到袋子里,通过鸭绿江从中国边境漂流到朝鲜;通过气球携带DVD光盘飘过重兵把守的朝韩边境。一些广播电台向刚刚叛逃的脱北者播放这些内容,验证这些方法是否管用。但究竟多少内容被朝鲜人拾获则难以得知。一些组织不间断的进行意识形态宣传或播放具有煽动性的内容,比如播放电影《刺杀金正恩》的片段,这是一部描写刺杀金正恩的黑色喜剧电影,这可不仅仅是令朝鲜政府倒胃口。

ferret:1. to search for something by moving things around with your hands, especially in a drawer, bag or other closed space (尤指在抽屉、袋子等中)搜寻,翻找;2. to search for something or someone, by looking in many places or asking many questions 四处搜寻;探查


All the same, even sanctioned devices are allowing North Koreans to experiment with what they watch and say. As they continue to communicate about shared economic interests, they could one day form fledgling lobbies, perhaps first of traders, says Mr Kretchun. If the currency revaluation of 2009, which wiped out people’s savings, were to happen today, these new networks would be abuzz in an instant.

但尽管如此,即便是官方许可的设备也能让朝鲜人民尝试自己的所见所言。克莱琛认为,随着人们就共同经济利益不断进行沟通,他们最终会形成游说团体的雏形,也许商人的游说团体会率先发起。2009年的朝鲜货币改革让普通老百姓的积蓄一夕之间倘然无存,如果这事发生在今天,朝鲜这些新建的网络会让这事瞬间众说纷纭。


Soap operation

肥皂行动


The state’s calculation is that technology will allow it to gain more control than it gives up. It can still dictate which kinds of handsets North Koreans use; it can terrorise its people with the threat of execution or the gulag; it can shut off the mobile network altogether. In 2004 it banned all mobiles after it concluded that one had been used to ignite a bomb at a railway station soon after a train carrying Kim Jong Il, Mr Kim’s father, had left. But part of the appeal of this new network to the regime is that it knows it can no longer keep all the information out, or its people from exchanging ideas. Better to monitor them.

朝鲜政府打的如意算盘是技术会加强而非削弱政府的控制力。朝鲜政府仍可以规定人民只可以使用哪几种手机,也可以用处决或劳改营恐吓人民,或者干脆完全切断移动网络。2004年朝鲜政府下令禁止使用一切手机,因为他们断定当金正恩的父亲金正日搭乘火车刚启程之时,有人利用手机引爆了安置在火车站的炸弹。开放手机网络的原因之一是朝鲜政权认识到既然不能将完全封锁国外的信息,同时民众之间信息交流也难以阻止,那就不如对其进行监控。


In the meantime, foreign media will continue to fuel what young North Koreans have begun to call their “awakening”. There is a quiet defiance in enjoying foreign media and sharing it with a small group of friends, or complaining about the government’s attempts to block it. And defiance is rare in North Korea.

同时,外媒将持续在朝鲜年轻人所称的“觉醒”上推波助澜。浏览外媒并在朋友圈子中分享,或者指责政府的信息封锁行为,这些都是“无声的反抗”。而反抗在朝鲜非常罕见。

defiance:when you refuse to obey someone or something 对抗;对立;违抗


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<原文链接:https://www.economist.com/news/asia/21726102-and-what-regime-learns-about-its-subjects-what-north-koreans-learn-their-smartphones>

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