【译文】美国FTC对美国国际贸易委员会337-TA-1240号调查发表公众利益意见书
美国联邦贸易委员会对美国国际贸易委员会（ITC）337-TA-1240号调查发表公众利益意见书
翻译人：李旭仪 暨南大学法学院/知识产权学院 2022级研究生
指导与校对：仲春 暨南大学知识产权研究院副教授
2021年1月19日，美国国际贸易委员会（ITC）决定对UMTS和LTE蜂窝通信模块及其产品（Certain UMTS and LTE Celluar Communication Modules and Products Containing the Same）发起337调查。该调查由荷兰皇家飞利浦有限公司和飞利浦北美公司于2020年12月17日依据《美国1930年关税法》第337节规定向ITC提出申请，指控对美出口、在美进口或在美销售的UMTS和LTE蜂窝通信模块及其产品侵犯其专利权，请求发起337调查，并发布普遍排除令、有限排除令和禁止令。涉诉企业所属国家分别为美国、德国、法国、英国等国，其中中国大陆企业（上海移远通信技术股份有限公司）一家。
2022年5月16日，美国联邦贸易委员会（FTC）向ITC提交一份公共利益意见书，以回应ITC关于对特定UMTS和LTE蜂窝通信模块及其产品的调查（调查编码为337-TA-1240）。
美国国际贸易委员会华盛顿特区
某些umts和lte蜂窝
通信模块和含有相同成分的产品
关于公众利益的意见书
联邦贸易委员会主席lina m. khan和
丽贝卡·凯利·斯劳特局长
作为美国联邦贸易委员会（"FTC"）主席和专员，我们提交本声明，以回应美国国际贸易委员会（ITC）关于要求就第337-TA-1240号调查的公众利益提交材料的通知1。
美国专利受到侵犯的专利权人可根据1930年关税法第337条向美国国际贸易委员会( ITC )寻求专利侵权的补救。第337条授权ITC除其他事项外，对侵犯美国一项有效且可强制执行的专利的美国产品进行调查和禁止进入。ITC作为一个至关重要的裁决地，为受害专利所有者提供救济。然而，我们越来越担心的是，那些承诺以公平、合理和非歧视性( FRAND )条款对SEP进行许可的SEP持有人，正在寻求禁止产品进入市场的排他性命令，以获得对现有或潜在被许可方的影响力。我们认为，如果申诉人寻求进行许可，并且可以在不同的美国法庭通过补救措施得到补偿，那么，一个禁止标准化产品进入美国的禁令将损害消费者和其他市场参与者，且未提供相称利益。
这一调查为ITC提供了一个解决一个重要问题的机会：在美国地方法院被要求确定公平、合理、非歧视( FRAND )许可条款的情况下2，基于标准必要专利( SEP )发布ITC禁令是否符合公共利益? ITC发布的包含FRAND承诺的SEPs的禁令，侵权是基于标准化技术的实施，有可能对美国的竞争、消费者和创新造成实质性损害。我们敦促ITC遵循第337 ( d ) ( 1 )和( f ) ( 1 )条的要求，考虑对自愿实施标准的被许可方发出排除令对美国竞争和消费者的影响3。
互操作性标准可以提供重要价值，因为它们为行业参与者创造了一个公共平台，可以增加竞争、创新、产品质量和选择。它们还通过促进采用有利于消费者和其他市场参与者的方式的有价值技术，在支持和激励专利权人的创新方面发挥关键作用4。但是，私人标准的制定也涉及竞争对手之间的协议，其制定过程如果不通过“防止标准制定过程受到具有经济利益成员的偏见，从而抑制产品竞争的程序”，可能会取代市场竞争和消费者的选择，从而引发“严重的反竞争损害可能性”。Allied Tube & Conduit Corp . V印度总公司，486美国，492，500-01 ( 1988 )。
由于互操作性标准是在全行业范围内实施的，因此在这方面的反竞争行为可能特别有害。如果标准要求使用特定的专利技术，它将提高该技术的重要性。在标准制定机构（SSO）和实施者投入大量资源开发标准和实施标准的产品之后，修订标准或转向新标准的成本可能会变得非常昂贵。一旦一个行业被“锁定”在一个标准上，实施者（包括帮助开发标准的人）就不能再围绕标准化技术进行设计，需要SEP许可才能留在市场上5。因此，标准化可以使“SEP持有者处于一种地位，要求获得比专利技术（如果它没有被SSO采用）更高的许可价值6。” 除了更高的价格和其他经济危害，在以标准为基础的行业中，SEP所有者的这种“阻碍”可能会阻碍标准制定活动和协作，从而延误创新7。
许多SSO要求SEP所有者提供FRAND许可承诺，以限制潜在损害竞争的机会主义8。FRAND承诺通过确保选择作出这种承诺的SEP所有者不会阻碍标准的使用，从而鼓励标准的广泛采用。FRAND许可承诺保证了SEP许可证的可获得性，并保证了选择此类承诺的SEP所有者不会利用锁定机制以不合理的特许权使用费来拖延实施者9。FRAND许可承诺还通过确保许可条款与SEP的价值挂钩来防止劫持10。从长远来看，由于制定和实施标准需要大量资源，如果SEP所有者有重大风险会机会主义地扣留许可，阻止他们将符合标准的产品商业化，那么企业投资的可能性要小得多。FRAND许可解决了这些问题，并支持标准设置促进竞争的方面。
在对违反第337条的行为（包括专利侵权行为）提出补救措施之前，委员会必须考虑补救措施对法定公共利益因素的影响：（1）公共卫生与福利，（2）美国经济的竞争条件，（3）美国同类或直接竞争产品的生产，（4）美国消费者11。我们认识到，ITC一贯强调，对于侵犯知识产权337条的行为，为申诉人提供有效补救措施的重要性，以及保护知识产权对美国竞争环境的益处12。适当授予的禁令保留了专利制度激励创新基础的排他性，而禁令的威胁则对侵权具有重要的威慑作用13。然而，正如联邦贸易委员会以前所指出的那样，FRAND承诺的SEPs所带来的问题与其他专利有很大的不同14。自愿的FRAND承诺证明，SEP所有者计划通过合理条款的广泛许可，而不是通过独家使用来实现其知识产权的货币化15。在禁令威胁下进行的特许权使用费谈判，可能会在某种程度上与FRAND承诺相抵触，从而严重有利于专利权人，因为被许可人可能同意支付超FRAND许可费，以避免被排除在标准化产品市场之外。避免允许机会主义行为的补救措施符合公共利益，包括将自愿被许可方排除在市场外，收取超FRAND许可费16。
实施奖励这种行为的补救措施，破坏了FRAND承诺的目的。如果即使是愿意并能够获得FRAND许可的公司也被排除在市场之外，这种不确定性会阻碍对符合标准的产品和互补技术的投资。将符合标准的产品排除在市场之外，会减少其他SEP持有人和生产补充技术的创新者的回报，他们生产的互补技术被纳入了被禁止的产品中，因此他们可能会收到较少的许可费17。不恰当的禁令在短期内损害了消费者利益，因为他们被剥夺了想要的产品。从长远来看，如果企业选择减少对标准化产品的投资，它还会通过减少创新、竞争、质量和选择来伤害消费者。
特别是在标准实施者是善意许可人的情况下--包括实施者承诺受双方自己确定为FRAND的条款或将由中立的裁决/法院程序确定的条款的约束—禁令将违背公共利益。至少，委员会应该要求SEP持有人证明实施者不愿意或不能接受FRAND许可，作为其公共利益分析的一部分，然后再发布禁令。考虑到潜在被许可人获得许可的意愿和能力，将支持ITC补救措施的平衡方法，遏制SEP持有人和潜在被许可人的机会主义，同时承认SEP持有人和标准实施者都有义务真诚地进行谈判，以有意义地解决FRAND问题。
一般来说，当法院被要求解决FRAND条款并能使SEP持有人得到补偿时，排除性救济是不协调的，也是违反公共利益的。我们鼓励委员会在其公共利益评估中考虑目前的事实是否呈现出排除性救济不符合公共利益的情况，至少对某些被告而言19。
在这种情况下，ALJ发现飞利浦已经将其SEP授权给众多被许可方，并且愿意授权被许可方，并且被许可方与飞利浦进行了许可谈判20。在特拉华州地区有几个针对不同被诉人的未决案件，其中一方正在寻求法院为许可设定FRAND条款。当地区法院可以通过预付利息和确定未来的使用费率来补偿投诉人，即使是有限的排除令也不符合公共利益。
我们恳请ITC在考虑公共利益时，在决定如何对待作为美国地方法院对FRAND许可条款的裁决方的自愿SEP被许可人时，考虑上述内容，并且在任何情况下，337条款的补救措施都不应在该法院有机会作出裁决之前生效。
附原文：
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C.
In the Matter of
Inv. No. 337-TA-1240
CERTAIN UMTS AND LTE CELLULAR
COMMUNICATION MODULES AND
PRODUCTS CONTAINING THE SAME
WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON THE PUBLIC INTEREST OF
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION CHAIR LINA M. KHAN AND
COMMISSIONER REBECCA KELLY SLAUGHTER
As Chair of the United States Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and a Commissioner of the FTC, we submit this Statement in response to the United States International Trade Commission’s Notice of Request for Submissions on the Public Interest in Investigation No. 337-TA-1240.
A patent holder whose U.S. patents have been infringed may seek redress for patent infringement from the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. Section 337 authorizes the ITC, among other things, to investigate and bar from entry into the United States products that infringe a valid and enforceable U.S. patent. The ITC serves as a crucial adjudication forum that provides redress to harmed patent owners. However, we are increasingly concerned that SEP holders who have committed to license SEPs on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms are seeking exclusionary orders to ban products from the marketplace for the purpose of gaining leverage over existing or potential licensees. In our view, where a complainant seeks to license and can be made whole through remedies in a different U.S. forum, an exclusion order barring standardized products from the United States will harm consumers and other market participants without providing commensurate benefits.
This investigation presents the ITC with an opportunity to address an important issue: Is it in the public interest to issue an ITC exclusion order based on a standard essential patent (SEP) where a United States district court has been asked to determine fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) licensing terms? An ITC-issued exclusion order involving FRAND-committed SEPs, where infringement is based on implementation of standardized technology, has the potential to cause substantial harm to U.S. competition, consumers, and innovation. We urge the ITC to follow the requirements of Sections 337(d)(l) and (f)(1) and consider the impact that issuing an exclusion order against a willing licensee implementing a standard would have on competition and consumers in the United Sates.
Interoperability standards can provide significant value, because they create a common platform for industry participants, which can increase competition, innovation, product quality, and choice. They also play a key role in supporting and incentivizing innovation by patent-holders by promoting the adoption of valuable technologies in ways that benefit consumers and other market participants. However, private standard setting also involves an agreement among competitors that can displace marketplace competition and consumer choice, and thus raise “serious potential for anticompetitive harm,” if not developed “through procedures that prevent the standard-setting process from being biased by members with economic interests in stifling product competition.” Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500-01 (1988).
Because interoperability standards are implemented on an industry-wide basis, anticompetitive conduct in this context has the potential to be particularly harmful. If the standard requires use of a particular patented technology, it elevates the importance of that technology over the alternatives. After standard setting organizations (SSOs) and implementers have invested substantial resources into developing the standard and products that implement the standard, it can become very expensive to either revise the standard or switch to a new standard. Once an industry is “locked in” to a standard, implementers (including those who helped develop the standard) can no longer design around standardized technologies and need SEP licenses to remain in the market. Standardization can thus put “SEP holders [] in a position to demand more for a license than the patented technology, had it not been adopted by the SSO, would be worth.” In addition to higher prices and other economic harms, such SEP owner “hold-up” in standards-based industries may discourage standard setting activities and collaboration, which can delay innovation.
Many SSOs require FRAND licensing commitments from SEP owners to limit the potential for competition-harming opportunism. FRAND commitments encourage widespread adoption of standards by ensuring that SEP owners that have chosen to make such commitments will not block use of the standard. FRAND licensing commitments provide assurance that SEP licenses will be available and that SEP owners that have chosen to make such commitments will not take advantage of lock-in to hold up implementers for unreasonable royalties. FRAND licensing commitments also prevent hold-up by ensuring that licensing terms are tied to the value of the SEP. In the long run, because developing and implementing a standard requires significant resources, firms would be much less likely to invest in either if there were a significant risk that SEP owners would opportunistically withhold licenses to block them from commercializing standard compliant products. FRAND licensing solves for these problems and supports the pro-competitive aspects of standard setting.
Before issuing a remedy for a violation of Section 337, including a remedy for patent infringement, the Commission must consider the effect of the remedy on the statutory public interest factors: (1) the public health and welfare, (2) competitive conditions in the United States economy, (3) production of like or directly competitive articles in the United States, and (4) United States consumers. We recognize that the ITC has consistently emphasized the importance of providing complainants with an effective remedy for intellectual property-based Section 337 violations and the benefit to competitive conditions in the United States of enforcing intellectual property rights. An appropriately granted exclusion order preserves the exclusivity that serves as the foundation of the patent system’s incentives to innovate, and the threat of an exclusion order provides a significant deterrent to infringement. As the FTC has previously noted, however, FRAND committed SEPs present considerably different issues than other patents. A voluntary FRAND commitment provides evidence that the SEP owner planned to monetize its IP though broad licensing on reasonable terms rather than through exclusive use. A royalty negotiation that occurs under threat of an exclusion order may be weighted heavily in favor of the patentee in a way that is in tension with the FRAND commitment because a licensee may agree to pay supra-FRAND royalties to avoid being excluded from the market for standardized products. There is a public interest in avoiding remedies that allow for opportunistic behavior, including excluding willing licensees from the market to extract supra-FRAND royalties.
Implementing remedies that reward such behavior undermines the purpose of the FRAND commitment. If even firms that are willing and able to take FRAND licenses can be excluded from the market, this uncertainty can discourage investment in standard-compliant products and complementary technologies. Excluding standard-compliant products from the market also reduces the returns to other SEP holders and innovators producing complementary technologies that are otherwise incorporated into the excluded products, who may thus receive reduced royalty streams. An inappropriate exclusion order harms consumers in the short term by depriving them of desired products. It also harms consumers in the longer run through reduced innovation, competition, quality, and choice if firms choose to reduce investments in standardized products.
Particularly where the standard implementer is a willing licensee—including cases where the implementer commits to be bound by terms that either the parties themselves will determine are FRAND or that will be determined by a neutral adjudication/in a court proceeding—an exclusion order would be contrary to the public interest. At a minimum, the Commission should require a SEP holder to prove that the implementer is unwilling or unable to take a FRAND license as part of its public interest analysis before issuing an exclusion order. Considering the willingness and ability of the potential licensee to take a license would support a balanced approach to ITC remedies by curbing opportunism by both SEP holders and potential licensees while recognizing that both the SEP holder and the standards implementer have a duty to negotiate in good faith towards a meaningful resolution of FRAND issues.
As a general matter, exclusionary relief is incongruent and against the public interest where a court has been asked to resolve FRAND terms and can make the SEP holder whole. We encourage the Commission to consider in its public interest assessment whether the facts at hand present a case where exclusionary relief would not be in the public interest, at least with respect to certain Respondents.
In this case, the ALJ found that Philips has licensed its SEPs to numerous licensees and is willing to license Respondents, and that Respondents were engaged in licensing negotiations with Phillips. There are several pending cases in the District of Delaware against various Respondents in which a party is seeking to have the court set FRAND terms for a license. When a District Court can make a complainant whole, both for past royalties with prejudgment interest and by establishing a future royalty rate, even a limited exclusion order is not in public interest.
We respectfully urge the ITC, in its consideration of the public interest, to take into account the foregoing when deciding how to treat willing SEP licensees who are parties to a U.S. District Court’s determination of FRAND licensing terms and under no circumstances should Section 337 remedies should take effect before the that Court has had the opportunity to render a decision.
Dated: May 16, 2022
Respectfully Submitted.
1.https://www.usitc.gov/secretary/fed_reg_notices/337/337_1240_notice_01192021sgl.pdf.
2.中华人民共和国商务部—中国贸易救济信息网，特定UMTS和LTE蜂窝通信模块及其产品美国337调查案件分析报告。http://www.cacs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/flfwpt/zscqjbl/aqfx/202103/168326.html
3.We take no position on the facts of Investigation No. 1240. This Statement also does not address whether seeking an exclusion order for FRAND-encumbered SEPs would violate Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, or Sections 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2. See, e.g., Compl., In re Motorola Mobility LLC and Google Inc., FTC File No. 121-0120 (Jan. 3, 2013), 我们对第1240号调查的事实不采取任何立场。本声明也不涉及为受FRAND约束的SEP寻求排除令是否会违反《联邦贸易委员会法》第5条，15 U.S.C.§45，或《谢尔曼法》第1或2条，15 U.S.C.§45。《委员会法》第5条，15 U.S.C. §45，或《谢尔曼法》第1或2条，15 U.S.C. §§1-2。见，例如，起诉书。关于摩托罗拉移动有限责任公司和谷歌公司，FTC文件编号121-0120（2013年1月3日）。https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/01/130103googlemotorolacmpt.pdf (alleging violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act).
4.This statement uses the terms FRAND and RAND interchangeably to denote the same substantive type of commitment. The specific RAND or FRAND obligations will vary by standard setting organization. 这一表述用FRAND和RAND两个术语互换表示同一实质性类型的承诺。具体的RAND或FRAND义务会因标准设定组织而异。
5.Before issuing a remedy for a violation of Section 337, the Commission must consider the effect of the remedy on the statutory public interest factors: (1) the public health and welfare, (2) competitive conditions in the United States economy, (3) production of like or directly competitive articles in the United States, and (4) United States consumers. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1337(d)(1), (f)(1). 在对违反第337条的行为发出补救措施之前，委员会必须考虑补救措施对法定公共利益因素的影响：( 1 )公共卫生与福利，( 2 )美国经济中的竞争条件，( 3 )在美国生产类似或直接竞争的物品，( 4 )美国消费者。19 U.C. § 1337 ( D ) ( 1 )，( f ) ( 1 ) .
6.See, e.g., Standard Essential Patent Disputes and Antitrust Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy & Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary (July 30, 2013), 见，E . G .，标准基本专利纠纷和反垄断法：在小组委员会审理反垄断问题，美国司法委员会的竞争政策和消费者权利（2013年7月30日）https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/7-30-13MunckTestimony.pdf (prepared statement of Fed. Trade Comm’n at 3-8).
7.See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition at 34 n. 8 (Apr. 2007), 见，E.G.，美国司法部和美联储贸易C委员会，反垄断执法与知识产权权利：促进创新和竞争。34n.8 ( 2007年4月)https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/antitrust-enforcement-and-intellectual-propertyrights-promoting-innovation-and-competition-report.s.department-justice-and-federal-tradecommission/p040101promotinginnovationandcompetitionrpt0704.pdf (SEP owner “may have significant market power” if “it can enforce its patent rights to prevent others from making products that conform to the standard.”). ( SEP所有者'如果'能够实施其专利权，防止他人生产符合标准的产品'，则可能具有显著的市场势力' )
8.Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1031 (9th Cir. 2015). See also Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Patent hold-up exists when the holder of a SEP demands excessive royalties after companies are locked into using a standard.”). 微软公司诉摩托罗拉公司，795 F.3d 1024，1031（第九巡回法庭，2015）。另见爱立信公司诉D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“当SEP的持有人在公司被锁定使用一个标准后要求过高的专利费时，就会出现专利滞留。当公司被锁定使用一个标准后，专利持有者要求过高的专利费。”）。
9.Fed. Trade Comm’n, The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies With Competition at 234 (Mar. 2011), 联邦贸易委员会，不断变化的知识产权市场：将专利通知和补救措施与竞争统一起来，234（2011年3月），https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/evolving-ip-marketplacealigning-patent-notice-and-remedies-competition-report-federal-trade/110307patentreport.pdf.
10.See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1030-31 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that “development of standards . . . creates an opportunity for companies to engage in anti-competitive behavior” such as hold-up, and that RAND commitments “mitigate the risk that a SEP holder” will engage in such conduct); Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 314 (3d Cir. 2007) (“FRAND commitments become important safeguards against monopoly power.”). We recognize that standardization may allow both SEP holders and implementers to engage in opportunism. 例如参见，微软公司V 摩托罗拉公司，795F.3D 1024，1030-31 (第9次CIR ) 2015年) (注意到"标准的制定. . . . .为企业从事诸如'挂牌'等反竞争行为创造了机会，而RAND承诺'缓解了SEP持有者从事此类行为的风险' )；Broadcom Corp . V高通公司，501F . 3D297，314 ( 3D CIR )。2007年) ( " FRAND承诺成为反对垄断权力的重要保障。" )我们认识到标准化可以使SEP持有者和实施者都参与机会主义行为。
11.U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition, supra note 5. at 35 n.11 (“hold up may cause firms to sink less investment in developing and implementing standards.”). 美国司法部和美联储贸易委员会，反垄断执法与知识产权：促进创新与竞争，上注5 .在35 n . 11（“搁置可能导致企业在制定和实施标准方面的投资减少。投资于制定和实施标准”。）
12.See, e.g., Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1231-33 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 例如，见爱立信公司诉D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1231-33（联邦巡回法院，2014）。
13.19 U.S.C. §§1337(d)(1), (f)(1).
14.Comm’n Op., In re Certain Digital Television Products and Certain Products Containing Same and Methods of Using Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-617 (Apr. 2009) at 16 (The ITC has consistently held that the benefit of lower prices to consumers does not outweigh the benefit of providing complainants with an effective remedy for an intellectual property-based Section 337 violation.”) (“Concerns that the issuance of remedial orders will harm American business are outweighed by the benefit to competitive conditions in the United States gained by enforcing valid intellectual property rights.”). Comm‘n Op .，in re某些数字电视产品和某些包含相同的产品及使用相同的方法，Inv。第337 - TA-617号( 2009年4月) 16 (‘ITC一贯认为，降价给消费者带来的好处并不超过为申诉人提供基于知识产权的第337条违法行为的有效补救的好处.’) (‘担心补救令的发布会损害美国企业，而被强制执行有效知识产权所获得的对美国竞争条件的好处所抵消’)。
15.In such circumstances, short run price increases may benefit consumers in the long run by providing incentives for innovation, consistent with the proper role of the patent system. 在这种情况下，短期内的价格上涨可能会通过提供创新激励而使消费者长期受益，这与专利制度应有的作用相一致。
16.Statement on the Public Interest, Fed. Trade Comm’n, In re Certain Wireless Communication Devices, Portable Music and Data Processing Devices, Computers and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-745 (June 6, 2012), 关于公共利益的声明，联邦贸易委员会，关于某些无线通信设备、便携式音乐和数据处理设备、计算机及其部件，Inv. No. 337-TA-745（2012年6月6日）。https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-comment-unitedstates-international-trade-commission-concerning-certain-wireless-communication/1206ftcwirelesscom.pdf; Statement on the Public Interest, Fed. Trade Comm’n, In re Certain Gaming and Entertainment Consoles, Related Software, and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-752 (June 6, 2012), 关于公共利益的声明，联邦贸易委员会，关于某些游戏和娱乐游戏机。337-TA-752号文件（2012年6月6日）。https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-comment-united-statesinternational-trade-commission-concerning-certain-gaming-and-entertaining/1206ftcgamingconsole.pdf.
17.Fed. Trade Comm’n, The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies With Competition at 235 (Mar. 2011), 联邦贸易委员会，不断发展的知识产权市场：使专利通知和补救措施与竞争保持一致 235（2011年3月），https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/evolving-ip-marketplacealigning-patent-notice-and-remedies-competition-report-federal-trade/110307patentreport.pdf (“A prior RAND commitment can provide strong evidence that denial of the injunction and ongoing royalties will not irreparably harm the patentee.”); Cf. Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014), overruled on other grounds by Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015). （“先前的RAND承诺可以提供强有力的证据，证明拒绝禁令和持续的使用费不会对专利权人造成不可挽回的伤害。”） 参考苹果公司诉摩托罗拉公司，757 F.3d 1286, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014)，被Williamson诉Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 以其他理由推翻。
18.The Federal Circuit has also recognized that “the public has an interest in encouraging participation in standard-setting organizations but also in ensuring that SEPs are not overvalued.” Apple, 757 F.3d at 1332. 联邦巡回法院也承认，“公众对鼓励参与标准制定组织有兴趣，但也要确保SEP不被高估标准制定组织，但也要确保SEPs不被高估”。苹果公司，757 F.3d at 1332.
19.See, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, Patent Injunctions and the Problem of Uniformity of Cost, 13 Mich. Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev. 421, 437 (2007) (“From the perspective of the patent system, an injunction in favor of the small-component patentee may well be robbing Peter to pay Paul.”). 参见，例如，Michael W. Carroll, Patent Injunctions and the Problem of Uniformity of Cost, 13 Mich. Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev. 421, 437 (2007) （“从专利制度的角度来看，有利于小部件专利权人的禁令很可能是在抢劫彼得。从专利制度的角度来看，有利于小部件专利权人的禁令很可能是劫富济贫。”）。
20.Statement on the Public Interest, Fed. Trade Comm’n Chairwoman Edith Ramirez, In re Certain 3G Mobile Handsets and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-613 (July 10, 2015), 关于公共利益的声明，联邦贸易委员会主席伊迪丝-拉米雷斯，关于某些3G移动电话及其组件，Inv No. Handsets and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-613 (July 10, 2015),https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/682011/150714publicinterestftc1.pdf
21.We take no position on whether the Respondents are similarly situated with respect to the relief requested in the district court. 对于被告人是否与区法院所要求的救济有类似的情况，我们不采取任何立场。
22.See, e.g., Final Initial Determination, In re Certain UMTs and LTE Cellular Communications Modules and Products Containing the Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-1240 (Apr. 1, 2022) at 286; Recommended Determination on Remedy and Bonding, In re Certain UMTs and LTE Cellular Communications Modules and Products Containing the Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-1240 (Apr. 15, 2022) at 17, 23-28; See Recommended Determination on Remedy and Bonding, In re Certain UMTs and LTE Cellular Communications Modules and Products Containing the Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-1240 (Apr. 15, 2022) at 23-28 (noting that downstream licensees had not been approached about licensing until shortly before the complaint in this investigation was filed and thus there was not enough time for negotiations to meaningfully develop). At least one Respondent has affirmed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware that it will take a license on the FRAND terms set by the court, including payment for any past use. RX-0139C (1st Antonitsch Decl.) at 2 ?? 5, 6; RX-0147C (2d Antonitsch Decl.) at 2 ?? 5, 6. 例如见，最终初步裁定，关于某些UMTs和LTE蜂窝通信模块和包含相同的产品，Inv No. No. 337-TA-1240 (Apr. 1, 2022) at 286; Recommended Determination on Remedy and Bonding. 补救措施和担保，关于某些UMT和LTE蜂窝通信模块和产品，Inv. No. 337-TA-1240 (Apr. 15, 2022) at 17, 23-28；见建议的决定补救措施和担保，关于某些UMTs和LTE蜂窝通信模块和产品，Inv No. 337-TA-1240（2022年4月15日），第23-28页。直到本调查中的投诉提出前不久，才与下游被许可人接触，因此谈判没有足够的时间来进行有意义的发展）。至少有一个答辩人向特拉华州地区的美国地方法院确认了美国特拉华州地区法院确认，它将按照法院规定的FRAND条款获得许可。包括为任何过去的使用付费。
（本文仅代表作者个人观点，不代表知产财经立场）
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