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黄裕舜
Brian Wong Yueshun
·香港大学哲学系助理教授与当代中国与世界研究中心研究员
·Assistant Professor in Philosophy, and Fellow at the Centre on Contemporary China and the World, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
Introduction
The diverse strengths and perspectives within the BRICS+ framework position it as a unique force for driving tangible climate action. The multilateral approach championed by BRICS+ enables countries to retain strategic autonomy in addressing climate change, encouraging the emergence of a multi-aligned energy future.
"BRICS" refers to an intergovernmental organization first founded in 2009, then comprising five members: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. The conception of the bloc drew heavily upon a 2001 report by Goldman Sachs, authored by economist Jim O'Neill. This multilateral forum-cum-coordinative mechanism expanded into a nine-member bloc by 2024, with four new formally admitted members - Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Additionally, Saudi Arabia, which had expressed strong and consistent interest, received an open invitation to join. For the purpose of this article and future discussion, the pre-2024 expansion five members are best referred to as "BRICS countries," whilst the post-2024 expansion bloc should be denoted as "BRICS+ countries."
Understanding Climate Change as a Polycrisis Climate change is amongst the most acute international "polycrises" that afflict our world today. The "poly" nature of this crisis stems from several key facts. Firstly, it intersects a number of other systemic risks about which we ought to be concerned. For instance, surging surface temperatures affect agricultural crop yield, which in turn spurs civil unrest and military flare-ups in states with weak governmental institutions. Melting permafrost and icecaps could release dangerous toxins and lethal bacteria into the atmosphere, thereby triggering prospective pandemics. Rising sea levels in flooding-prone areas could also amplify public infrastructural and health concerns, and precipitate heated debates over the obligations toward climate refugees. We should not conceptualize crises in isolation - and certainly not the ones that occur on a scale as large and a level of interconnectivity as complex as climate change. Secondly, the race for clean and renewable energy, and toward net-zero emissions has fed into and reified large-scale strategic competition between states, especially in terms of national strength and tactical wherewithal in rhetorically constructed zero-sum games. The overt politicization of electric vehicles by select powers in the West, alongside vested industrial interests within them, speaks to the inherently political and increasingly politicized nature of the renewable transition. The framing of climate change as a subject of guilt and blame gives rise to invidious and fraught debates over causal and moral responsibility - questions like "Who is at fault for emissions?" and "Who is emitting the most?" - that are not, in fact, conducive toward pragmatic amelioration of the problems at hand. Thirdly, the distribution of benefits and harms of climate change is deeply uneven across the world, mapping onto the proverbial Global North/South divide. Some have conjectured that warming temperatures and longer growing seasons are beneficial to select countries in the Global North by enabling their farmers to grow warmer-weather crops and raise productivity. Others would be correct in suggesting that various wealthy economies possess both the technology and infrastructural resilience to offset the worst effects of climate change on their populations. The same could not be said of vast swathes of the Global South population, who must grapple with the difficult balancing act between advancing economic growth, transitioning toward a carbon-neutral and net-zero model of sustainable development, and mitigating and adapting to increasingly hostile climate and environmental conditions. BRICS+ as a Key Platform for Climate Action? Given the above context, we should thus recognize the potential of BRICS+ as a key platform in facilitating climate action. Its value should not be viewed as mutually exclusive to the efforts undertaken by mature markets and developed economies in tackling this global challenge. Indeed, BRICS+ and G7 countries can and should work hand-in-hand in bringing coordinated and systematic responses to the climate calamity. Most members of BRICS+ are affected by climate change to a significant extent, albeit in different ways. For instance, China, Brazil, and India are estimated to have respectively 8.7, 3.2, and 1.5 working-life years lost per person per year during the period 2008-2015 given the adverse effects of climate change. In South Africa, since 1990, the national average temperature has increased twice as fast as the global average. As the world shifts toward renewable energy - e.g., wind, solar, biomass, and even nuclear - traditional oil powers such as Russia, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Iran have found themselves increasingly drawn to diversifying their revenue streams and moving beyond a strict dependence upon their long-standing economic models. There is clear interest and incentive to engage and work with partners across the board in enabling these countries not just to catch up, but potentially leapfrog developments in renewable energy in the West. Similarly, as access to the Nile's water supply remains hugely contentious between Egypt and Ethiopia, both states are keen on exploring alternative solutions to the water scarcity problem, thereby reducing regional and strategic tensions whilst ensuring viability in the face of increasing droughts and shifting precipitation patterns. The policy appetite for constructive change is eminently present. Under President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, Brazil has set a more ambitious target for reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 53.1% by 2030, from 2005 levels. India had committed to reducing emissions intensity of its GDP by 45% by 2030 and achieving net-zero emissions by 2070. Meanwhile, China's consistent and vocal championing of the notion of "ecological civilization," committed development of renewable technology and advanced manufacturing, and consistent emphasis upon China's role to play a role in "global climate governance" speak to not only its intention to position the country as a critical strategic leader and provider of global public goods, but also the urgency with which it perceives the issue of climate change. Indeed, the share of non-fossil fuels in the BRICS+ power mix could exceed 50% for the first time, from only 30% 17 years ago. Fundamentally, BRICS+ countries exhibit a high level of complementarity, especially in view of the various prospective members that are leading economic powerhouses in Southeast Asia, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. It may take a while before BRICS+ opts to expand once again and admit new members, but the theoretical synergy is unmistakable: China serves as a key bastion of renewable and green technological innovation, with cutting-edge knowledge, manpower, and expertise advantage in nascent sectors such as new energy vehicles, photovoltaics, and lithium-ion batteries (what select official discourses have termed the "new trio"). Traditional oil-producing states, especially Russia and Iran, would need these technologies to expedite the diversification of their energy portfolios; the Gulf states, in turn, are best positioned to provide the intense and sizeable capital to fund the research and development efforts. Latin American and African members of BRICS+ possess sizeable and young populations that would indubitably benefit from - as consumers, sole producers, or collaborative joint-venture partners - this renewable transition. To complete the picture, should leading ASEAN states be admitted into the bloc, the abundant presence of critical raw materials (e.g., nickel, copper, cobalt, tin, and gold in Indonesia) would provide a further boost to the attractiveness and appeal of BRICS+. However, the above synergies are not a given: they do not occur by default. Intentional and focused coordination, multilateral negotiation frameworks (in lieu of disjointed bilateral dialogues), and frank and robust discussions of the strengths and weaknesses of each individual member state are very much needed to ensure the bloc can successfully cater to the competing demands and complex interests guiding the leaderships of its constituent members. Three Key Prongs of BRICS+ Climate Advocacy, and Future Directions Given the theoretical foundation set out above, what are the concrete ways in which BRICS+ genuinely brings value-added to its members? After all, if these actions could be undertaken independent of the multilateral bloc, it would be foolish to attribute them to the existence of BRICS+. For instance, the long-standing defense and military ties between Russia and India did not arise due to BRICS+; if anything, the strategic trust and mutual interdependence between the two are net contributors toward the tenacity and strength of inter-BRICS+ bonds. There are three primary areas of particular interest and significance here. The first pillar concerns intergovernmental coordination and high-level commitments, which play a significant role in aligning domestic goal setting and policymaking. During the 9th BRICS Summit in 2017, the pre-expansion bloc announced the BRICS Leaders Xiamen Declaration, formalizing their commitment to "take concrete actions to advance result-oriented cooperation in such areas as prevention of air and water pollution, waste management, and biodiversity conservation." At a time when climate change skepticism was rearing its head in parts of the industrial West - epitomized by then-President Donald Trump's decision to unilaterally withdraw America from the Paris Agreement - BRICS nations pledged their commitment to the agreement, as well as advocating collectively that developed nations should provide financial and technological support to developing countries seeking to bolster their climate resilience and mitigation efforts. To ensure that such conceptually robust and vigorous dialogues are translated into actions, however, it is imperative that BRICS+ countries look toward setting up more specialized and compartmentalized task forces and research units focused on advancing particular objectives within the remit of mitigating, adapting to, and harnessing climate change, whether it be managing rising sea levels, cutting down on grazing-induced and agriculturally generated emissions, or sustainable urban design and architecture. Knowledge and data sharing would go a long way in ensuring heightened inter-bureaucratic trust and synergy. As Beijing seeks to recalibrate its Belt and Road Initiative and flesh out the details of the hitherto largely high-level discussion under the Global Development and Civilization Initiatives, it would be in the country and the bloc's interests for more substantive integration of sustainability and renewable considerations into China's developmental aid strategies, which would not only prove instrumental in building up green infrastructure across the board, but also ensuring that awareness and understanding of renewable energy can be shared with populations in its various partner nations. The second pillar revolves around climate financing, an integral dimension for keeping the renewable transition profitable and financially self-sustaining. There is much room for optimism on the front of standard-setting and benchmarking, especially in relation to the set-up of carbon markets, effective emission tracking, and transportation and infrastructural design. In 2024, the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the BRICS Carbon Markets Partnership signaled a serious commitment to advancing cross-border trading of carbon credit. With the largest carbon market in the world, China is well poised to make a significant impact on institution-building and reforms across the bloc. The New Development Bank (NDB), established in 2015, stipulated in its General Strategy for 2022-2026 that it would direct 40% of total approved financing to projects addressing climate change during the second strategy period. Rapid and prompt response to climate change can only be undertaken with a sufficiently inclusive and flexible financing framework. With a more egalitarian and emerging economies-driven governance structure than the World Bank, the NDB presents a viable and complementary alternative to multilateral financing for a large number of small and medium-sized states in the Global South. The third pillar concerns the generation and pooling of renewable technologies. Whilst substantive evidence of the dividends and fruits of BRICS+ on this front remains to be seen, there is clearly strategic thinking aligned in this direction. The BRICS Energy Report 2021 pledged the "development and deployment of energy-saving technologies throughout the entire energy supply chain," as well as the construction and maintenance of "smart energy infrastructure." With increasing cross-investment and trade flows over the past two decades - trade amongst BRICS has grown at a pace that considerably outstripped the growth in trade between BRICS and G7 nations - there is fertile ground for cross-pollination and collaboration across private and state-owned enterprises in advancing innovative solutions to pressing energy and environmental challenges. The question that remains, of course, is how the four new entrants into BRICS+ can play a role amidst this all. The UAE has positioned itself as a distinctive leading player in digital transformation, as evidenced by the ambitious initiatives outlined in its Digital Government Strategy 2025. Cloud computing and artificial intelligence - despite their energy intensity - are likely to play a prominent role in propelling the development of a new generation of climate solutions. Could the UAE step up to spearhead with China in the digital transformations within BRICS+? We shall find out in due course. Toward a Multi-Aligned Energy Future There is a tempting tendency on the part of some commentators to posit that the world is becoming increasingly divided into two clear-cut blocs of trade, energy, technology, and beyond. Yet, as evidenced by the many members of BRICS+, who find themselves deepening ties with countries in the West and beyond, most strategically minded world leaders are not willing to align themselves strictly with any singular power. In particular, on the energy front, we could well see an increasingly multi-aligned future - one where countries opt to maximize strategic autonomy by working with partners across BRICS+, G7, the EU, ASEAN, and RCEP, in pursuit of their own people's interests, in face of the ongoing climate crisis.
The above contents only represent the views of the authors, and do not necessarily represent the views or positions of Taihe Institute.
TI Observer (TIO) is an online monthly English publication produced by Taihe Institute. TIO is dedicated to promoting transnational interaction and mutual understanding, thus bridging the gap of misunderstanding and bringing China and the world closer to each other.