达利欧新文：我们正在重复1935-45年的危险周期（中英文）
10月1日的时候，达利欧在linkedin上发表了新的文章，与最近老美发生的两件大事有关。
读完之后，相信对最近的形势会有深一步的理解。
全文如下：
The Threat to Limit Capital Flows to China and Pending Impeachment Conflict: Next Logical Steps in a Classic Dangerous Journey? The 1935-45 Analogue
限制资本流入中国的威胁与弹劾冲突：典型危险之旅的下一步逻辑步骤？类似1935-45年。
Regarding that classic dangerous journey, you have heard me describe it many times but, at the risk of boring you, I will repeat it. I believe that we are on a classic journey that we haven’t seen in our lifetimes but has happened many times before, most recently in the late 1930s. It is being driven by the same big forces that drove the dynamics in the late 1930s. In particular, now, like in the late 1930s and unlike any period since, these three big forces are converging. They are:
关于那次经典的危险之旅，你听过我多次描述，但冒着让你厌烦的风险，我会重复一遍。我相信，我们正在经历一个我们有生之年没有经历过的典型之旅，但之前已经发生过很多次，最近一次发生在上世纪30年代末，那时由一股力量推动。而现在，就像上世纪30年代末，与此后的任何时期不同，这三个大力量正在汇聚。他们是：
1. The largest wealth and political gaps since the late 1930s exist, which is leading to the emergence of and conflicts between populists of the left and populists of the right. If history and logic are to be our guides, it seems reasonable to worry that the gaps between the rich and the poor and the populists of the left and the populists of the right will become more war-like and that the consequences of their fighting could undermine the efficient operation of the economy as well as the efficient running of government. History has shown, logic suggests, and what seems to be happening is that the greater conflict leads to a) the reduced respect for both law and the art of compromise by our political leaders, and b) the increased testing of relative powers and the increased use of “emergency powers” to gain and use more power than these acts were intended for. It is likely that the upcoming US elections will be the greatest ideological clash that we have seen in our lifetimes, approaching the extreme fascist-communist clashes of the 1930s. It is likely that after the election there will be many more conflicts, tax law changes, and wealth redistributions that will have big implications for markets and economies.
1.自20世纪30年代末以来，存在着最大的财富和政治差距，这导致了左翼民粹主义者和右翼民粹主义者的出现和冲突。如果要以历史和逻辑为指导，我们似乎有理由担心，贫富差距、左翼民粹主义者和右翼民粹主义者之间的差距会变得更像战争，他们的斗争后果可能会损害经济的有效运行和政府的有效运行。逻辑表明，历史已经表明，似乎正在发生的是，（a) 更大的冲突（意识形态）导致我们的政治领导人对法律和妥协艺术的尊重减少，（b）增加对相对权力的测试，增加使用“紧急权力”以获得和使用比这些行为预期更多的权力。很可能即将到来的美国大选将是我们有生之年所看到的最大的意识形态冲突，接近20世纪30年代的极端法西斯-共产主义冲突。很可能在大选之后还会有更多的冲突、税法的变化，以及对市场和经济产生重大影响的财富再分配。
（第一段就说得很清楚了，老美内部、整个世界都在撕裂冲突，其实就是经济不行了，逆周期也没效果了）
2. There is limited ability of the world’s reserve currency central banks to stimulate the economy in the event of an economic downturn. When I imagine what the next economic downturn will be like with the social and political polarity that now exists, I expect it will be socially and politically ugly and that some form of “Monetary Policy 3” (see this May 2019 article) will have to happen or the economic depression won’t be rectified. To implement MP3-type monetary policy will require very large fiscal spending and large budget deficits that will have to be funded by a) substantially increased taxes on companies and the rich, and b) the printing of money by central banks and the buying of the debts that are coming from the deficits. Typically, this has led to capital flight as investors seek to escape these things, which has quite often led to capital controls that are intended to keep capital in the country and the currency so that it can more easily be taxed and/or devalued. So, naturally, I can’t help but wonder whether this extraordinary (i.e., nothing like this has happened in my lifetime) deviation from convention to restrict capital flows to China could be followed by these other steps when/if the circumstances that I’m describing unfold.
2、世界储备货币央行在经济低迷时期刺激经济的能力有限。当我想象下一次经济衰退将与现在存在的社会和政治极性一样，我预计它将在社会和政治上丑陋，并且某种形式的“货币政策3”（见2019年5月的文章）将不得不发生，或者经济萧条不会得到纠正。实施货币政策3型货币政策将需要巨额财政支出和巨额预算赤字，这些支出和赤字必须由a）大幅增加对公司和富人的税收，b）中央银行印钞和购买赤字产生的债务来提供资金。通常情况下，这导致了资本外逃，因为投资者试图逃避这些事情，这往往导致资本管制，目的是为了保持大量资本留在国家以便它可以更容易地征税和/或贬值。因此，自然而然地，我不禁想知道，当我描述的情况发生时，这种不寻常的现象（即，在我有生之年没有发生过这样的事情）是否偏离惯例，限制资本流向中国。
（资本没有国籍属性，为利益流动，寅吃卯粮，却不想为明天买单。达佬曾经说过，像他们这样的资本集团，赚的钱实在太多了，非常不安）
3. There is a rising power (China) challenging the existing world power (the US), which will probably lead to more conflicts between them about many different issues. History has shown that this situation has led to the increased risk of wars that typically come in four forms: trade wars, capital wars, technology wars, and geopolitical wars. As far as the trade wars go, you can see them for yourself (so I won’t delve into them) and probably have yourself drawn comparisons with the Smoot-Hawley Tariffs in 1930 and with various tariffs in several countries during the 1930s. Regarding the capital and currency wars, the ability of the US president to unilaterally cut off capital flows to China and also freeze payments on the debts owed to China and also use sanctions to inhibit non-American financial transactions with China must be considered as possibilities. That’s why the proposed step of limiting American portfolio investments in China makes me both think about the implications of this step and wonder if it is an inching toward bigger moves.
3、有一个正在崛起的大国（中国）挑战现存的世界强国（美国），这可能会导致他们在许多不同问题上发生更多的冲突（修昔底德）。历史证明，这种情况导致战争风险增加，通常有四种形式：贸易战、资本战、技术战和地缘政治战。就贸易战而言，你可以自己去看（所以我不会深究），你可能会把自己与1930世纪的Smoot Hawley关税和30年代的几个国家的各种关税进行比较，美国总统单方面切断对中国的资本流动以及冻结中国欠下的债务，并利用制裁来抑制非美国与中国的金融交易的能力必须被视为可能性。这就是为什么限制美国在华投资组合的提议让我既想到了这一步的含义，又想知道这是否只是朝着更大的举措迈出的一小步。
（达佬前面的铺垫想说明，内部问题外部解决，按照进程，将会依次发生这四种冲突。现在金融脱钩，只是资本战的前哨）
For perspective about what can be done and how it would be done, one can look at the US freezing of Japanese assets and embargoing of oil to Japan in the late 1930s to early ‘40s; they show how the use of special emergency powers gives the president the ability to do these things. Emergency powers today are most accessible to the president under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA). It empowers the president to unilaterally impose capital and FX controls, freeze assets and/or payments on assets (coupons), and force asset divestures to “deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat” from outside the US to “the national security…economy of the United States.” Just the realization that these moves can be used has important implications for capital flows. For example, how would you feel if you were an adversarial foreign investor holding US bonds given this situation, given where US bond interest rates are and the impending deficits and monetizations of them? Of course, China dumping US bonds would have its own terrible consequences too. In any case, from not having to worry about such things in the past, now all market participants need to worry about them.
从可以做什么和如何做的角度来看，人们可以看到美国在20世纪30年代末至40年代初冻结日本资产和向日本禁运石油，它们展示了如何使用特殊的紧急权力给总统做这些事情的能力。今天的紧急权力是总统在1977国际紧急经济权力法案（IEEPA）下最容易获得的权力。它授权总统单方面实行资本和外汇管制，冻结资产和/或支付资产（息票），并迫使资产剥离“从美国以外的地方处理任何异常和特殊的威胁”到“美国的国家安全……经济”。例如，在这种情况下，如果你是持有美国债券的敌对外国投资者，考虑到美国债券的利率以及即将出现的赤字和货币化，你会有什么感觉？当然，中国抛售美国债券也会有自己可怕的后果。在任何情况下，过去不必担心这些事情，现在所有市场参与者都需要担心它们。
（事实也是事情一直在升级，没有什么不可能）
Regarding the technology war, we have seen the tip of the spear with Huawei, and we (Bridgewater) have given you an extensive look at the moves we can imagine could be done by both sides, so I won’t embellish more on them. As far as the geopolitical war is concerned, it’s a war of influence that is being fought in the classic Chinese way of quietly gaining strength and showing that strength to one’s opponent so that they realize that it is better to retreat than to fight. That is certainly happening in Asia and, to a lesser extent, in other parts of the world. Countries are increasingly having to choose whether they are aligned with the US or China. When presented with this choice, they typically answer it based on both economic and military calculations. Almost without exception, they say that the economics favors being aligned with China because China is more important to them economically (because China is bigger in trade and bigger in capital inflows) and that the military support favors the US if the US is willing to use it to support them, which is highly doubtful. At the same time, China’s own military capabilities (including cyber) are rising relative to the US’s, especially in Asia. As a result, China is for the most part quietly winning the geopolitical war, particular in Asia. As for what is likely to happen next, the big thing is the 2020 elections because that will determine who the players are; until then, actions and agreements are more for theater to play to the crowd than the real deal. After the elections, the real picture will emerge. Longer term, barring any big shocks, time is on China’s side as it is improving at a faster rate than the US, and the big question is whether the world will a) peacefully evolve toward two different spheres of influence, with China the dominant force in the East and the US the dominant force in West, or b) have more painful wars of their various types.
关于技术战，我们已经看到了华为，我们（布里奇沃特）给了你一个粗略的看，我们可以想象双方可以做的动作，所以我不会美化更多。就地缘政治战争而言，这是一场影响力的战争，它是以中国人的方式，默默地获得力量，向对手展示实力，使他们意识到撤退胜过战斗。这当然发生在亚洲，在较小程度上，也发生在世界其他地区。各国越来越不得不选择是与美国结盟还是与中国结盟。当提出这个选择时，他们通常根据经济和军事计算来回答。几乎没有例外，他们说，经济倾向于与中国结盟，因为中国在经济上对他们更重要（因为中国在贸易上更大，资本流入更大），如果美国愿意用它来支持美国，那么军事支持对美国有利，这是非常值得怀疑的。与此同时，中国自身的军事能力（包括网络）相对于美国，尤其是亚洲，正在上升。因此，中国在很大程度上悄悄赢得了地缘政治战争的胜利，特别是在亚洲。至于接下来可能发生的事情，最重要的是2020次选举，因为这将决定谁是球员；在那之前，行动和协议更多的是剧院对观众的影响而不是真正的交易。选举之后，真实的情况就会出现。从长远来看，除非有任何大的冲击，时间在中国这边，因为它正在以比美国更快的速度改进，而且最大的问题是A) 世界是否会和平地发展成两个不同的势力范围，中国是东方的主导力量，美国是西方的主导力量，或者B）有更多痛苦的冲突模式。
（在美华尔街和硅谷的精英们一直给出这种论调，就是极有可能中国熬过这一关，就能和美国平分世界，坐稳G2。这个论调的前提是，美国的意识形态发生转变，或者天平向事实屈服。又或者中方在改革方面更加迅速且果断。）
Under each of these three broad categories of influences, I have imagined a detailed sequence of events for how these dynamics will progress, based on how sequences of events have classically played out in the past and how it is logical they will play out nowadays. I do this so I can compare how events transpire relative to expectations. If they’re largely the same, I assume the sequence will continue as imagined, and if they’re different, I abandon my theory and recalibrate. To me, last week’s developments seemed like the most recent logical steps in this classic dangerous journey that is analogous with that which occurred in the 1935-45 period.
在这三种影响范围中的每一种情况下，我都设想了一系列事件的细节，这些事件是如何根据过去的事件顺序进行的，以及它们现在的逻辑是如何发展的。我这样做是为了比较事件如何与预期相比较。如果它们大体上是相同的，我猜想这个序列将继续想象，如果它们不同，我放弃我的理论并重新校准。在我看来，上周的事态发展似乎是这段经典的危险旅程中最新的合乎逻辑的步骤，与1935-45年间发生的类似。
Four Appendices
What follows are four appendices. Appendix 1 provides a more detailed account of what actually happened, what can happen, and how it can happen pertaining to threats to curtail capital flows to China. Appendix 2 recounts the path to war in the late 1930s via excerpts from my book “Principles for Navigating Big Debt Crises” (available in pdf form here for free). Appendix 3 recounts various times monetary policies didn’t work because there was “pushing on a string” and provides the various Monetary Policy 3-type fiscal/monetary coordinations that occurred in the past. Appendix 4 provides the legal basis for capital controls and capturing the assets of foreign entities.
以下是四个附录。附录1更详细地说明了实际发生的情况、可能发生的情况以及如何应对减少资本流入中国的威胁。
附录2通过我的书《应对重大债务危机的原则》（pdf格式，免费提供）的摘录，讲述了20世纪30年代末的战争之路。
附录3叙述了不同时期的货币政策不起作用，因为有“推动一串”，并提供了各种货币政策3种类型的财政/货币协调发生在过去。
附录4为资本控制和捕获外国实体的资产提供了法律依据。
Appendix 1: A More Precise Account of What Happened, Why, and What Is Likely to Happen
To be precise, two narrow measures are being examined by the administration.
附录1：对所发生的事情、原因和可能发生的事情的更精确的描述
确切地说，政府正在研究两个狭隘的措施。
白宫正在考虑的第一个步骤是支持马尔科·卢比奥参议员的公平法案。公平法概述了如果不完全遵守美国会计和监管规定（例如审计要求），将中国公司从美国证券交易所摘牌的过程。参议员Rubio指出，中国政府长期以来一直不愿让海外监管机构检查当地的会计师事务所，包括四大国际会计网络的成员公司，以国家安全为关注点。2013协议允许美国监管者要求中国的审计工作文件没有得到有效实施。结果，在2018年12月，SEC和上市公司会计监督委员会（PCAOB）标志着美国监管机构在审查中国上市公司审计事务所的审计工作和实践中所面临的困难。
讨论中的第二个措施是可能的禁令（或限制），禁止联邦退休储蓄投资委员会在2020年将摩根士丹利资本国际（MSCI）全美世界（不含美国）指数纳入约500亿美元的联邦雇员退休基金（FERF，政府主要的退休储蓄基金）。支持这一禁令的参议员鲁比奥和其他国会议员认为，包括美国武装部队成员在内的联邦政府雇员的退休资产将面临与摩根士丹利资本国际指数（msci）所列许多中国公司相关的“严重且未披露的重大风险”。
Why Are These Things Happening?
The motivations and objectives driving these discussions appear varied: from wanting to enforce US accounting and oversight regulations in order to engender reciprocity (Senator Rubio’s Equitable Act bill), to curtailing access to US capital by certain Chinese firms implicated by national security concerns (restricting FERF’s planned MSCI offering), and ultimately to decoupling US and China capital markets so as to undermine China’s rise. There are officials (Peter Navarro) who seek to limit China’s access to US capital, as they think such access strengthens the Communist Party in China—an economic rival and rising geostrategic competitor with different values antithetical from the US/West. Recently, Steve Bannon characterized the goal this way: “The Frankenstein monster that we have to destroy is created by the West. It’s created by our capital.” There are other officials trying to circumscribe these measures and keep them separated from trade negotiations so as not to inflame tensions, sink markets, and weaken the real economy. Some officials, on the other hand, reportedly see these measures as giving the US increased leverage in the trade negotiations with China at a critical juncture. All these US officials appear to share concerns about US capital enabling Chinese firms when the lines of demarcation between state-owned and private firms are further eroding. They are concerned with the unusual influence the Chinese government has over private firms, including placing restrictions on the release of financial information of Chinese firms. And, importantly, they want to counter industrial policies such as President Xi’s new “military-civil fusion” directed at enhancing cooperation between China’s technology firms and the military and Made in China 2025.
为什么会发生这些事？
推动这些讨论的动机和目标似乎各不相同：从希望执行美国的会计和监督条例，以促成互惠（参议员鲁比奥的《公平法案》），限制受到国家安全担忧牵连的某些中国公司获得美国资本（限制FERF计划的摩根士丹利资本国际（MSCI）发行），最终使中美资本市场脱钩，从而削弱中国的崛起。一些官员（彼得纳瓦罗）试图限制中国进入美国资本，因为他们认为，这种进入加强了中国共产党作为经济竞争对手和不断上升的地缘战略竞争对手的地位，其价值观不同于美国/西方。最近，史蒂夫·班农这样描述这个目标：“我们必须摧毁的弗兰肯斯坦怪兽是西方创造的。“这是我们的资本创造的。”还有其他官员试图限制这些措施，并将它们与贸易谈判分开，以免加剧紧张局势，削弱市场，削弱实体经济。另一方面，据报道，一些官员认为，这些措施使美国在关键时刻增加了与中国贸易谈判的筹码。所有这些美国官员似乎都担心，当国有企业和私营企业之间的界限进一步缩小时，美国资本将使中国企业受益。他们担心中国政府对私营企业的不寻常影响，包括限制中国企业发布财务信息。而且，重要的是，他们希望对抗中方提出的旨在加强中国科技企业与军方合作的新“军民融合”和“中国制造2025”等产业政策。
These discussions, in turn, are taking place days before Vice Premier Liu He’s expected visit to Washington for high stakes talks on October 10-11. These talks importantly will play out in the shadow of scheduled US tariff increases, a potential Xi-Trump meeting, and the pending expiration of Huawei licenses. In particular, i) on October 15 tariffs are scheduled to increase to 30% from 25% on $200 billion in imports from China; ii) there is a scheduled meeting on November 16-17 between Xi and Trump at the APEC Summit; iii) on November 19 Huawei’s general temporary license is due to expire, and iv) on December 15 tariffs are scheduled to be imposed on $160 billion of the most politically sensitive Chinese imports (consumer products of high value to US consumers with no readily available substitutes (~87% sourced from China)).
这些讨论又是在LIU预计10月10日至11日访问华盛顿进行高风险会谈前几天进行的。重要的是，这些谈判将在美国计划提高关税、可能举行的双方会议以及华为许可证即将到期的阴影下展开。特别是，i）10月15日，中国2000亿美元进口关税将从25%提高到30%；ii）11月16日至17日，双方将在亚太经合组织峰会上举行会晤；iii）11月19日，华为的通用临时许可证将到期；iv）12月15日，将对在最具政治敏感性的中国进口商品中，有1600亿美元（对美国消费者来说价值很高的消费品，没有现成的替代品（约87%来自中国）。
Appendix 2: The 1930s Path to War (Excerpted from Part 2 of “Principles for Navigating Big Debt Crises,” Which Was about the 1930 - 1941 Period)
While the purpose of this chapter has been to examine the debt and economic circumstances in the United States during the 1930s, the linkages between economic conditions and political conditions, both within the United States and between the United States and other countries—most importantly Germany and Japan—cannot be ignored because economics and geopolitics were very intertwined at the time. Most importantly, Germany and Japan had internal conflicts between the haves (the Right) and the have-nots (the Left), which led to more populist, autocratic, nationalistic, and militaristic leaders who were given special autocratic powers by their democracies to bring order to their badly managed economies. They also faced external economic and military conflicts arising as these countries became rival economic and military powers to existing world powers.
附录2：20世纪30年代的战争之路（摘自1930-1941年间“应对重大债务危机的原则”第2部分）
本章的目的是考察20世纪30年代美国的债务和经济情况，经济条件和政治条件之间的联系，在美国和美国和其他国家之间，最重要的是德国和日本不可忽视，因为当时的经济和地缘政治关系非常密切。最重要的是，德国和日本在人权（右翼）和左翼势力（左翼）之间存在着内部冲突，这导致了更多的平民主义、专制主义、民族主义和军国主义领导人，他们的民主国家赋予了他们专制的权力，给他们管理不善的经济体带来了秩序。他们也面临着外部经济和军事冲突，因为这些国家与现有的世界强国成为经济和军事力量的竞争对手。
To help to convey the picture in the 1930s, I will quickly run though the geopolitical highlights of what happened from 1930 until the official start of the war in Europe in 1939 and the bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941. While 1939 and 1941 are known as the official start of the wars in Europe and the Pacific, the wars really started about 10 years before that, as economic conflicts that were at first limited progressively grew into World War II. As Germany and Japan became more expansionist economic and military powers, they increasingly competed with the UK, US, and France for both resources and influence over territories. That eventually led to the war, which culminated in it being clear which country (the United States) had the power to dictate the new world order. This has led to a period of peace under that world order and will continue until the same process happens again.
为了有助于传达1930年代的画面，我将快速浏览1930年至1939年欧洲战争正式开始和1941年珍珠港爆炸事件的地缘政治亮点。虽然1939年和1941年被称为欧洲和太平洋战争的正式开始，但战争实际上是在大约10年前开始的，因为最初有限的经济冲突逐渐发展成为第二次世界大战。随着德国和日本成为更具扩张性的经济和军事大国，它们在资源和领土影响力方面与英国、美国和法国的竞争日益激烈。这最终导致了战争，战争的高潮是明确哪个国家（美国）有权支配新的世界秩序。这导致了该世界秩序下的一段和平时期，并将继续下去，直到同样的进程再次发生。
1930年，斯穆特-霍利关税开始了一场贸易战。
1931，日本的资源不足，农村贫困严重，因此入侵满洲里、中国以获取自然资源。美国希望使中国摆脱日本的控制，并从南洋争夺天然资源，特别是石油、橡胶和锡，同时日本和美国也有着可观的贸易往来。
1931年，日本的大萧条非常严重，导致日本脱离了金本位，导致日元的浮动（大幅贬值）和大规模的财政和货币扩张，导致日本成为第一个经历复苏和强劲增长的国家（持续到1937年）。
1932年，日本国内发生了大量冲突，导致政变失败，右翼民族主义和军国主义大规模高涨。从1931年到1937年，军队接管了政府，加强了对经济的自上而下的指挥。
在1933，希特勒作为一个民粹主义者在德国掌权，承诺控制不良经济，为当时的民主政治混乱带来秩序，并与共产党战斗。在被任命为总理的短短两个月内，他就可以采取完全的独裁统治，利用国家安全的借口，他使议会通过了授权法案，这给了他几乎无限的权力（部分地通过锁定政治对手，也说服了一些温和派，这是必要的）。他立即拒绝支付赔偿金，退出国际联盟，并控制了媒体。为了创造一个强大的经济，并试图给人民带来繁荣，他创造了一个自上而下的命令经济。例如，希特勒参与建立大众，以建造一辆更经济的汽车，并指导德国国家公路系统的建设。他认为，德国的潜力受到地理边界的限制，没有足够的原材料养活工业军事综合体，德国人民应该在种族上团结一致。
与此同时，日本自上而下的指挥经济越来越强大，建立了一个军工综合体，军方打算保护其在东亚和中国北部的基地，并扩大对其他领土的控制。
德国还通过建设军工综合体，并寻求扩张和征用邻近土地而变得更加强大。
1934，日本部分地区发生了严重的饥荒，造成了更多的政治动荡，加强了右翼、军国主义和民族主义运动。因为自由市场不为人民服务，这导致了指挥经济的加强。
1936年，德国军事夺回莱茵兰，1938年吞并奥地利。
1936年，日本与德国签署了一项条约。
在1936—37年间，美联储收紧，导致脆弱的经济衰退，其他主要经济体也随之衰弱。
1937年，日本占领中国，第二次中日战争开始。日本人占领了上海和南京，杀死了大约200000名中国平民和缴械的战斗人员。美国为中国的Chiang Kai shek政府提供战斗机和飞行员来打击日本，从而在战争中处于领先地位。
1939年，德国入侵波兰，欧洲第二次世界大战正式开始。
1940年，德国占领了丹麦、挪威、荷兰、比利时、卢森堡和法国。
在这段时间里，德国和日本的大多数公司仍然是国有企业，但他们的生产是由各自政府控制的，以支持战争。
1940年，亨利·史汀森成为美国战争部长。他越来越多地对日本采取激进的经济制裁，最终于1940年7月2日通过了出口管制法。今年10月，他加大了禁运力度，将“所有钢铁都限制在英国和西半球国家以外的目的地”。
从1940年9月开始，为了获取更多的资源，利用欧洲对其大陆的战争的关注，日本入侵了南洋的几个殖民地，从法国印度支那开始。1941，日本通过夺取荷属东印度群岛的石油储备，将“南部资源带”加到其“东亚大共融圈”中，扩大了它的势力范围。“南部资源区”是欧洲大部分殖民地在南洋的集合，其征服将使日本获得关键的自然资源（最重要的是石油、橡胶和大米）。后者是“大东亚共荣圈”，是由日本控制的亚洲国家集团，而不是（如前所述）西方强国。
日本随后占领了菲律宾首都马尼拉附近的一个海军基地。这威胁到对菲律宾的袭击，当时菲律宾是美国的保护国。
1941年，为了在不全面参战的情况下援助盟国，美国开始实行租借政策。根据这项政策，美国免费向盟国输送石油、粮食和武器。以今天的美元计算，这项援助总额超过6500亿美元。租借政策虽然不是一个彻底的战争宣言，却结束了美国的中立。
1941年夏天，美国总统罗斯福下令冻结日本在美国的所有资产，并禁止向日本出口所有石油和天然气。日本计算出两年内将没有石油。
1941年12月，日本袭击了珍珠港以及亚洲的英国和荷兰殖民地。虽然它没有赢得战争的计划，但它想摧毁威胁日本的太平洋舰队。据推测，日本还认为，美国将被两条战线（欧洲和亚洲）的战争和其政治制度削弱；日本认为，其国家和德国的极权主义和军工联合指挥方式优于美国的个人主义/资本主义方式。
These events led to the “war economy” conditions, explained at the end of Part 1.
这些事件导致了“战争经济”的状况，在第一部分的最后解释。
Appendix 3: Past Needs for and Ways of Executing Monetary Policy 3
Monetary Policy 3 puts money more directly into the hands of spenders instead of investors/savers and incentivizes them to spend it. Because wealthy people have fewer incentives to spend the incremental money and credit they get compared to less wealthy people, when the wealth gap is large and the economy is weak, directing spending opportunities at less wealthy people is more productive. Logic and history show us that there is a continuum of actions to stimulate spending that have varying degrees of control to them. At one end are coordinated fiscal and monetary actions, in which fiscal policy makers provide stimulus directly through government spending or indirectly by providing incentives for nongovernment entities to spend. At the other end, the central bank can provide “helicopter money” by sending cash directly to citizens without coordination with fiscal policy makers. Typically, though not always, there is a coordination of monetary policy and fiscal policy in a way that creates incentives for people to spend on goods and services. Central banks can also exert influence through macroprudential policies that help to shape things in ways that are similar to how fiscal policies might. For simplicity, I have organized that continuum and provided references to specific prior cases of each below.
附件三：过去实施货币政策的需要和方式3
货币政策3把钱更直接地交到消费者手中，而不是投资者/储户手中，并激励他们消费。因为与较不富裕的人相比，在贫富差距较大、经济疲弱的情况下，富人有较少的动机去消费他们获得的增量货币和信贷，因此将消费机会导向较不富裕的人更有效率。逻辑和历史告诉我们，刺激支出的行动是一个连续统一体，对支出有不同程度的控制。一方面是协调的财政和货币行动，其中财政政策制定者直接通过政府支出提供刺激，或间接通过为非政府实体提供支出激励。另一方面，央行可以提供“直升机货币”，直接向公民发送现金，而不必与财政政策制定者协调。通常情况下，货币政策和财政政策之间的协调，虽然并不总是这样，但会激励人们在商品和服务上的消费。各国央行也可以通过宏观审慎政策发挥影响力，这些政策有助于以类似于财政政策的方式塑造事物。为了简单起见，我组织了这个连续体，并提供了下面每一个具体的先前案例的参考。
Fiscal/Monetary Coordination can take three basic forms:
财政/货币协调可采取三种基本形式：
Increase in debt-financed fiscal spending, paired with QE that buys most of the new issuance (e.g., Japan in the 1930s, US during WWII, US and UK in the 2000s).
债务融资的财政支出增加，加上购买大部分新发行债券的量化宽松（例如，1930年代的日本、二战期间的美国、2000年代的美国和英国）。
Increase in debt-financed fiscal spending, where the Treasury isn’t on the hook for the debt, because:
增加由债务融资的财政支出，因为：
a) The spending is paired with QE where the central bank retires the debt or commits to rolling the debt forever,
b) The central bank promises to print money to cover debt payments (e.g., Germany in the 1930s), or
c) Where the central bank directly lends to entities other than the government that will use it for stimulus projects (e.g., lending to development banks in China in 2008).
（a）支出与量化宽松相结合，在量化宽松中，中央银行收回债务或承诺永远滚动债务，
（b）中央银行承诺印刷货币以支付债务（例如，1930年代的德国），或
（c）中央银行直接向将用于刺激项目的政府以外的实体放贷（例如，2008年向中国的开发银行放贷）。
Directly giving newly printed money to the government to spend, not bothering to go through issuing debt. Past cases have included printing fiat currency (e.g., Imperial China, the American Revolution, the US Civil War, Germany in the 1930s, UK during WWI) or debasing hard currency (Ancient Rome, Imperial China, 16th-century England).
直接向政府发放新印钞票，而不是费心去发行债务。过去的案例包括印刷法定货币（例如，中国帝国、美国革命、美国内战、1930年代的德国、一战期间的英国）或降低硬通货（古罗马、中国帝国、16世纪的英国）。
Printing money and doing direct cash transfers to households (i.e., helicopter money). When we refer to “helicopter money,” we mean directing money into the hands of spenders of money to get them to spend (e.g., the US veterans’ bonus during the Great Depression, Imperial China).
印钞和直接向家庭汇款（即直升机汇款）。当我们提到“直升机钱”时，我们指的是将钱引导到花钱的人手中，让他们消费（例如，大萧条时期的美国退伍军人奖金、帝国时期的中国）。
How that money is directed could take different forms—the basic variants are a) to either direct the same amounts to everyone, or to aim for some degree of helping one or more groups over others (e.g., to the poorer more than to the rich), and b) to provide this money either as one-offs or over time (perhaps as a universal basic income). These variants could be paired with an incentive to spend it—like the money disappearing if not spent within a year.
如何引导资金可以采取不同的形式，基本变量是A），要么直接向每个人指示相同的金额，要么瞄准某种程度上帮助另一个或多个群体（例如，比富人更穷），和B提供一次性或随时间提供的这笔钱（也许作为普遍的基本收入）。这些变量可以配对，如果不花一年的时间，就可以像钱一样消失。
The money could be directed to specific investment accounts (like retirement, education, or accounts earmarked for small business investments) to target it toward socially desirable spending/investment.
资金可以用于特定的投资账户（如退休、教育或专门用于小企业投资的账户），以将其瞄准社会期望的支出/投资。
One potential way to craft the policy is to distribute returns/holdings from QE to households instead of to the government.
制定该政策的一个潜在方法是将qe的回报/持有量分配给家庭，而不是政府。
Big debt write-down accompanied by big money creation (the “year of Jubilee”). (e.g., Ancient Rome, the Great Depression, Iceland).
巨额债务减记伴随着巨额资金的创造（“禧年”）。（如古罗马、大萧条、冰岛）。
While I won’t offer opinions on each of these, I will say that the most effective approaches involve fiscal/monetary coordination, because that ensures that both the providing and the spending of money will occur. If central banks just give people money (helicopter money), that’s typically less adequate than giving them that money with incentives to spend it. However, sometimes it is difficult for those who set monetary policy to coordinate with those who set fiscal policy, in which case other approaches are used.
虽然我不会就这些问题发表意见，但我会说，最有效的方法涉及财政/货币协调，因为这确保了货币的提供和支出都会发生。如果央行只是给人们钱（直升飞机的钱），那通常比给他们提供奖励的钱不够。然而，有时设定货币政策的人很难与那些制定财政政策的人协调，在这种情况下使用其他方法。
Also, keep in mind that sometimes the policies don’t fall exactly into these categories, as they have elements of more than one of them. For example, if the government gives a tax break, that’s probably not helicopter money, but it depends on how it’s financed. The government can also spend money directly without a loan financed by the central bank—that is helicopter money through fiscal channels.
此外，请记住，有时政策并没有完全落入这些类别，因为它们有不止一个的元素。例如，如果政府提供减税政策，这可能不是直升机资金，而是取决于它的资金来源。政府也可以直接花钱，而不用中央银行资助的贷款，这是通过财政渠道的直升机资金。
While central banks influence the costs and availabilities of credit for the economy as whole, they also have powers to influence the costs and availabilities of credit for targeted parts of the financial system through their regulatory authorities. These policies, which are called macroprudential policies, are especially important when it’s desirable to differentiate entities—e.g., when it is desirable to restrict credit to an overly indebted area while simultaneously stimulating the rest of the economy, or when it’s desirable to provide credit to some targeted entities but not provide it broadly. Macroprudential policies take numerous forms that are valuable in different ways in all seven stages of the big debt cycle. Because explaining them here would require too much of a digression, they are explained in some depth in the appendix of my book “Principles for Navigating Big Debt Crises.” If you want to dig deeper, please review that appendix.
在中央银行影响整个经济的信贷成本和可用性的同时，它们也有权通过其监管当局影响金融系统目标部分的信贷成本和可用性。这些被称为宏观审慎政策的政策，在需要区分实体时尤其重要，例如，当需要限制对过度负债地区的信贷，同时刺激其他经济体时，或者当需要向某些目标实体提供信贷，但不提供时广义上说。宏观审慎政策采取多种形式，在大债务周期的所有七个阶段都有不同的价值。因为在这里解释它们需要太多的离题，所以在我的书《应对重大债务危机的原则》的附录中对它们进行了深入的解释。如果你想更深入地挖掘，请查阅附录。
Appendix 4: The Legal Authorities of the President to Curtail Capital Flows
附录4：总统限制资本流动的法律权限
总统拥有广泛、强大、且大多是单方面的权力，根据成文法中规定并经法院重申的行政紧急权力，管理与外国的商业（贸易和金融）（法院对总统在外交和国家安全问题上的判决表现出极大的尊重）。其中最关键的一项是，特朗普总统已经并可能会采取任何有意义的资本流动削减措施（如外汇管制），1977年的《国际紧急经济权力法》（ieepa）。IEEPA第1701条授权总统宣布国家紧急状态，以“应对任何不寻常和非常的威胁，这些威胁来源于……美国以外的国家安全、外交政策或经济。”IEEPA赋予总统“调查”、“阻止”、“监管”的自由裁量权，“强制”或“禁止”对“任何外国或其国民拥有任何利益的财产”的“进口”、“转让”或“获取”。《国际环境保护法》第1702（a）（1）（b）条授权总统对“受美国管辖的”任何人采取行动。
自颁布以来的42年里，总统宣布IEEEPA下的54个国家紧急事件，其中29个正在进行中。各国总统利用国际环境保护署来限制范围广泛的国际交易，同时扩大了紧急情况的理由和限制的目标，例如，最初，目标是外国政府，后来国际环境保护署被用来针对个人和非国家行为者（恐怖组织）。历史（司法判例和国会不作为）表明，TrPunp可以在很大程度上影响IEEPA，例如，在美国证交所撤销中国公司，阻止所有美国交易或冻结任何外国公司或个人的美国资产，实施外汇管制或限制某些或全部外国投资者的外汇购买。国民，迫使美国资产撤资，阻止外国公司的快速支付系统，禁止美国公司外包给中国。特朗普总统援引IEEPA作为法律权威，使他的公司“立即开始寻找替代中国”。除非成功的法院挑战，唯一的检查特朗普的IEPA权威是国会，它还没有试图使国家的紧急情况无效。根据ieepa，国会采取行动的政治门槛很高，国会可以通过联合决议宣布紧急状态无效。不过，最高法院认为，联合决议是不够的。国会必须通过这方面的立法，例如，修改ieepa以限制总统的紧急权力。然后特朗普可以否决这项立法。推翻否决权要求两院占多数的三分之二。
历史先例
总统在ieepa之前使用紧急权力有很多先例。在1977年ieepa颁布之前，总统的紧急权力使得商业（贸易和金融）得到了广泛的监管，其基础是1917年的《敌国贸易法》（twea）。它是在美国进入第一次世界大战后颁布的。TWEA的第5部分是总统对战争期间的所有形式的国际商业和金融流动，并在战争期间冻结或攫取外国资产。1917法案要求宣战，随后于1933修正，允许总统宣布和平时期的国家紧急情况。该宣言赋予总统在国内和国际事务上具有广泛的权力（该修正案是由于大萧条而来的），罗斯福总统援引修改后的TWEA第5（b）条来宣布国家紧急状态并下令银行假日。具体来说，1933年的修正案授权总统：“通过许可证或其他方式调查、管理或禁止……任何外汇交易、银行机构之间的信贷转移或付款……以及出口、囤积、融化，或由德国境内的任何人或其管辖的任何地方指定金币或银币或金块或货币。“例如，为了否认美国获得丹麦和挪威在美国的资产，罗斯福总统根据TWEA赋予的权力发布了行政命令8389。于1933修订，冻结丹麦和挪威人涉及的所有金融交易（和资产）。1941年6月，罗斯福总统在twea的支持下，根据第8785号行政命令，将冻结资产的范围扩大到整个欧洲大陆。
达佬的话，似乎给了勇气，昨天彭博的报道，我们对于这周即将谈判的内容非常强硬，具体拭目以待。
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