海外之声 | 荷兰央行原行长：欧洲货币政策——退出问题（中英双语）
观点速递
本文作者是IMI国际顾问委员、荷兰央行原行长努特·韦林克。
作者对欧洲央行的货币政策进行讨论，其中尤为具体地指出了欧洲央行的退出机制在当前的经济条件下存在的不合理性。他认为，欧洲央行应该调整自设的不理性退出策略，从更广阔的风险管理角度来看，除了改变其政策和沟通战略别无他法。现实情况是当经济蓬勃发展时，央行必须收紧其政策，即使通胀率没有达到目标值，或者承诺过在净资产购买结束较长时间后再进一步收紧。如果经济脱离轨道，无论是由何种原因引发，过晚启动紧缩周期将使欧洲央行的货币政策工具箱空空如也。
中文译文如下：
欧洲货币政策：退出问题
努特·韦林克
2017年11月30日
翻译：蔡越 审校：陆可凡
在2007/2008年，各家央行出手救市。他们起初使用常规工具，但逐步也推出了所谓的非常规政策：前瞻性指导和量化宽松政策。启动这样的政策相对容易，结束却更加复杂。欧洲央行以平衡、充分沟通、足够灵活的方式退出当前的超宽松货币政策是金融市场平稳运行的关键。下面我想重点谈谈欧洲央行目前的退出策略，在我看来他们的策略问题重重。
一次鸽派的会议
在最近一次会议（10月25日-26日）上，欧洲央行显得十分鸽派。虽然其将2018年前9个月的月度购债规模从600亿欧元缩减至300亿欧元，但马里奥·德拉吉在新闻发布会上多次强调，会议决定购债计划不设固定结束日期，并补充说：“这一计划当然不会突然停止。它是开放式的，并且大多数委员表示希望保持这种开放性状态。”因此，德拉吉明确宣布在2018年9月以后再次延长购债计划，尽管可能是小规模购债和/或很短时间的延期，比如只延长三个月，但他承诺一定会延期。该声明是在新闻发布会而非在新闻公报中做出的，所以其他委员是否支持还有待观察。但如果德拉吉不履行承诺，他的信誉就将岌岌可危。他在新闻发布会上想尽办法强调该计划的灵活性，间接为再度延长购债计划铺路。有些委员担心可用资产不足或自设的发行者/发行限额被超出，他对此明确表示反对。
保持开放的重要性
为什么保持购债计划的开放性如此重要？首先，因为这保证了2018年9月之后仍有充分的选择余地。此点不言而喻。其次，德拉吉说“这一计划当然不会突然停止”，他的话使主要政策性利率的上涨得以推迟。为什么这么说？多年来，欧洲央行的口头禅是他们预计欧洲央行主要利率将“在很长一段时间里维持在目前水平，并远远超过净资产购买计划的结束期限”。德拉吉认为“远远超过”这个词很关键，称它“对稳定利率预期非常、非常重要”（华盛顿，10月12日）。所以如果你推迟净购买的结束期限，那么政策利率上涨的时刻也将延后。
结束净购买不光涉及未来欧洲央行主要利率上调，也涉及到期证券再投资：“欧洲央行还决定在净资产购买计划结束后一段时间里，将APP项下到期证券的本金进行再投资，在任何情况下，如有必要都会持续更长时间”。因此他们已经明确承诺，净资产购买结束很长一段时间后，欧洲央行才会开始缩减其资产负债表并借此收紧政策。
在11月20日的欧洲议会委员会会议上，德拉吉又反复强调了这两个承诺。但是请注意，这两个承诺没有考虑到欧洲经济已经连续增长四年多，目前增长率达到2.5%，而且失业率处在2009年1月以来的最低水平。
为什么坚持超宽松货币政策
为什么德拉吉如此坚定要继续欧洲央行的超宽松货币政策，而且得到了管理委员会绝对多数的支持？前段时间，德拉吉提出了三P原则：耐心（patience）、审慎（prudence）和坚持（persistence）。他认为，如果要“遵照欧洲央行接近但低于2%的通胀目标持续调整通胀路径”，就必须坚持三P原则。几年前，他称实现该通胀目标是“道德和法律义务”。欧洲央行表示需要在充分确信通胀率将以可持续的方式达到（接近）2%后才会结束购买净资产。如果净资产购买结束的时刻真的到来，那我认为欧洲央行就陷入、至少可能会陷入严重的沟通和信誉问题。直到今天，它一直明确且无条件地承诺并且现在仍然承诺，下一步的政策措施（缩减资产负债表、上调主要政策利率）只有在净资产购买结束很久之后才会实施。所以，目前官方传出的退出政策是在通胀率可持续调整至接近2%很久后才收紧货币政策。
欧洲央行罔顾经济状况（明知我们现在已经处于2.5%的增长轨道上），仍然近乎盲目坚持过去的承诺，这毫无意义。欧洲央行这么做正在将自己逼入困境，并有可能成为自己措辞的囚徒。除非管理委员会准备在多年没达成目标后冒通胀率超过2%的风险，否则我无法理解他们目前的做法。但那样的话，他们应该保证这一政策透明。
通胀之谜
现在我们来思考一下，如果未来一段时间内通胀率不能以可持续方式快速到达（接近）2%，那么会发生什么呢？另外，在这种情况下，沟通/退出问题也在不断加剧。主要经济体的通胀率依然出奇疲软。各央行行长的最佳猜测是消费价格很快会加速上涨，但是对于目前又一轮令人失望的通胀数据，他们拿不出很好的解释。
如果不能很好解释通胀率低的原因，又冒着当前低通胀环境持续的风险，带着“不惜一切代价”的态度去实现（接近）2%的目标是非常危险的。这种做法可能导致彻底不平衡的货币政策。最终央行可以制造几乎任何程度的通货膨胀，但过了特定时间后，微调再也行不通，还会面临严重的负面影响。
在我看来，已经长期存在的低通胀要归因于全球化、互联网的使用等技术发展以及人口发展。这并不是说通胀率不会在某个时刻回升，而是意味着各央行不该着迷于一个十分精确的通胀目标，否则就会冒过久奉行过宽松货币政策的风险。
正在酝酿的危险
目前，世界经济的各个方面看起来都十全十美。当前来看，至少在未来几年里，这种情况还会持续。欧洲央行口头表示要延长“货币政策正常化时期”，那如果在此期间全球经济增速放缓呢？如果欧洲央行还没能及时开始缩减资产负债表和提高政策利率，情况将非常不容乐观。正常化不足意味着当下一次危机袭来时，无论是由何种原因引发，欧洲央行都几乎没有货币工具来应对。
结论
欧洲央行应该调整自设的不理性退出策略，这种策略是由于过长时间地坚持某种特定的退出承诺。从更广阔的风险管理角度来看，除了改变其政策和沟通战略别无他法。考虑到管理委员会大多数成员最近所持的强硬意见，这并不容易。到最后，无论过去说过什么，现实情况是当经济蓬勃发展时，央行必须收紧其政策，即使通胀率没有达到目标值而且/或者承诺过在净资产购买结束较长时间后再进一步收紧。如果经济脱离轨道，无论是由何种原因引发，过晚启动紧缩周期将使欧洲央行的货币政策工具箱空空如也。
英文原文如下：
Monetary Policy in Europe: Exit Problems
Nout Wellink
30 November 2017
In 2007/2008 central banks came to the rescue of the system. Initially they used their traditional instruments, but step by step they also introduced so-called unconvential policies: forward guidance and quantitative easing. Starting such a policy is relatively easy, ending is more complex. A balanced, well-communicated, flexible enough exit from the present, ultra 45 38359 45 17293 0 0 2122 0 0:00:18 0:00:08 0:00:10 3500loose monetary policy by the ECB is key to a smooth functioning of financial markets. In the following I want to focus on the present, to my mind problematic exit-strategy of the ECB.
A dovish meeting
The ECB was remarkably dovish at its last (25/26 October) meeting. Although it halved its monthly bond buying program for the first 9 months of 2018 from 60 to 30 bln., Mario Draghi stressed several times during the press conference that the decision was for an open-ended programme, adding to it :“certainly it’s not going to stop suddenly. It’s open-ended and the large majority expressed its preference for keeping it open-ended”. So, Draghi clearly announced some further extension of the programme after September 2018. It might be an extension for small amounts and/or a very short period, three months for example, but an extension he promised. This announcement was done during the press conference and not in the press communique. Therefore it remains to be seen whether other governors feel committed. However, if Draghi does not deliver his credibility is at stake. He indirectly paved the road for a further extension by going out of his way in the press conference to stress the flexibility of the programme. He also made it clear that he does not agree with those who fear a scarcity of available assets or an overrun of the self-imposed issuer/issuance limits.
The importance of open-endedness
Why is it so important that the programme is still open-ended? First and foremost, because it keeps all options open for the period after september 2018. That is self-evident. Secondly, Draghi’s remark that “certainly it is not going to stop suddenly” delays the moment that key policy rates will go up. Why? For several years in a row the ECB-mantra is that it continues to expect the key ECB interest rates “ to remain at their present levels for an extended period of time, and well past the horizon of our net asset purchases”. Draghi sees the phrase “well past”as crucial, as “very, very important in anchoring rate expectations” (12 October, Washington). So, if you move the horizon of ending the net purchases backwards, you also move backwards the moment that policy rates will go up.
Not only a future increase in key ECB rates is linked to the termination of net purchases but also the reinvestments from maturing securities are: “The ECB also decided to reinvest the principal payments from maturing securities purchased under the APP for an extended period of time after the end of its net asset purchases, and in any case as long as necessary”. So, there is a clear commitment that it will take an extended period after the horizon of net asset purchases before the ECB will start shrinking its balance sheet and tightening via this channel its policy.
Mind you, these two pledges - repeated by Draghi in a Committee meeting of the European Parliament on 20 November - are regardless the fact that the European economy is already growing for more than four years in a row and at present on a 2.5% growth path, with unemployment at its lowest level since January 2009).
Why this ultra loose monetary policy
Why is Mr Draghi so adamant to continue the ECB’s ultra-loose monetary policy, supported by a clear Governing Council majority. Some time ago Draghi introduced the three p’s: patience, prudence and persistence. Sticking to the three p’s is in his view necessary to realize “a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation consistent with the ECB’s inflation aim of close to but below 2%”.A few years ago he called the latter “a moral and legal obligation”. The ECB says it needs to be sufficiently convinced that inflation is on a sustainable path to (close to) 2% before ending net asset purchases. If that moment, the moment of the ending of the net asset purchases, would arrive, the ECB runs to my mind, potentially at least, into serious communication and credibility problems. It has committed and is still committing itself, as of today, in clear, unconditional terms that the next policy steps ( the shrinking of its balance sheet and the increase in key policy rates) will only take place after an extended period/ well past the horizon of the ending of net asset purchases. So, the officially communicated exit-policy at this very moment is to only tighten monetary policy well past the moment that inflation is at a sustainable path close to 2%.
It makes no sense that, regardless the economic situation (knowing that we are now already on a 2.5% growth path) the ECB is still sticking, almost blindfold, to its earlier promises. By this approach the ECB is painting itself into a corner and threatens to become the prisoner of its own wordings. I can only understand the present approach if the Governing Council is prepared to take the risk of a higher inflation than 2%, after so many years of falling short of the target. But then they should be transparant about this policy.
The inflation mystery
Let’s now reflect on what would happen if inflation in the coming period does not go, in a sustainable way, fast enough into the direction of (close to) 2%. Also in that case there is a growing communication/exit problem. Inflation in the major economic blocs remains surprisingly soft. Central bankers best guess is that consumer prices will soon accelerate, but they don’t have a good explanation for the time and again disappointing inflation figures.
In the absence of a good explanation for the low inflation rate, while running the risk of a continuation of the present low inflation environment, it is dangerous to have a “Whatever it takes” attitude to realize the (close to)2% goal. Such an approach might result in a completely unbalanced monetary policy. Eventually a central bank is capable of generating nearly any amount of inflation, but after a certain moment finetuning is not possible anymore and serious negative side-effects set in.
To my mind the already long period of low inflation is due to globalisation, technological developments, including the use of the internet, and demographic developments. That is not to say that inflation will not pick up at a certain moment, but it implies that central banks should be less obsessed by a very precise inflation target. Otherwise they run the risk of pursuing too loose a monetary policy for too long a period.
A looming danger
Everything looks fine and dandy in the world economy at the moment.For the time being the assumption is that this will remain so for at least the next few years. But what if, within the “monetary policy normalization period”, verbally so much extended by the ECB, the world is hit by a slowdown in growth? If the ECB has not started in time with reducing its balance sheet and increasing its policy rates, a very unpleasant picture emerges. Insufficient normalization means that when the next crisis will hit us, for whatever reasons, the monetary toolbox of the ECB is almost empty.
In conclusion
The ECB should adjust its self-imposed, irrational exit strategy, caused by sticking too long to certain exit phrases. There seems, from a broader risk management point of view, no alternative to changing its policy and communication strategy. That will not be easy, taking into account the strong views which, until very recently have been taken by the majority of the Governing Concil. At the end of the day, and regardless what has been said in the past, the reality is that in a booming economy central banks have to tighten their policies, even if inflation is not at the targeted value and/or even if they have promised to wait with further tightening for an extended period of time after ending net asset purchases. And if - for whatever reasons -the economy does not remain on track, too delayed a start of the tightening cycle will leave the ECB with an empty monetary toolbox.
观点整理 叶祎然
图文编辑 叶祎然
监制 朱霜霜 李欣怡
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