海外之声 | 英脱欧将损害该国服务出口 “后地缘贸易”的想法只是一厢情愿（中英双语）

观点速递

本文作者是欧洲改革中心副主任约翰·斯普林福德和欧洲改革中心研究员山姆·罗威，原文最先由欧洲改革中心（CER）发布，后摘自2018年2月15日的国际货币金融机构官方论坛评论（OMFIF Commentary），OMFIF是一家总部位于伦敦的全球金融智库。

作者指出，英国将近一半的出口是服务业，这意味着在市场中它所依赖的地缘因素正在减少，因为与传统的商品出口相比，服务业的出口并不会受到地缘和时间的约束，这使得英国人坚信其服务业并不会因为脱欧而受到损害，从而进入一个“后地缘贸易”时代。然而现实证明，这个想法并不那么容易实现，其后地缘贸易的想法也可能只是一厢情愿……

中文译文如下：

英脱欧将损害该国服务出口

“后地缘贸易”的想法只是一厢情愿

约翰·斯普林福德、山姆·罗威

翻译：周护杏

审校：肖柏高

2018年2月15日

距离和经济规模是决定两国贸易水平的最重要因素。这支撑地心引力模型的说法已经十分成熟。将此模型套用在英国，可以发现欧盟是该国的天然贸易伙伴；单一市场在提高服务贸易方面比自由贸易协定效率更多；而由于英国退出欧盟而出现的障碍将很难通过与世界其他地方的较低贸易壁垒而抵消。

英国近一半的出口是服务业——对于中等规模的经济体而言，这个比例非常高。 2月14日，英国外交大臣鲍里斯·约翰逊表示：“英国脱欧不一定是出于民族主义，但可以是国际主义。”国际贸易国务大臣利亚姆·福克斯（Liam Fox）暗示了英国退出后的“后地缘贸易世界”机会。这意味着英国在服务方面的实力让距离变得无关紧要。

简单来看，相比于商品，距离对服务的影响更少。英国确实与同种语言的国家进行了更多的贸易，超出了其经济规模和距离本身应有的情形。随着金融交易，广告模型以及建筑蓝图可以通过互联网发送给客户，服务更加可以通过电子方式交付。航空旅行成本也有所下降。然而，上述说法并没有在数据中显示出来。距离对服务贸易的影响与其对货物的影响类似：国家间距离增加10%使服务贸易减少7％。

美国是迄今为止英国最大的个人市场，这要归功于纽约市和纽约其他银行中心之间的大量金融服务。但欧盟是一个更大的市场。尽管日本的经济规模是意大利的2.5倍，意大利也购的英国服务买与日本购买的数量差不多。

欧盟是英国一个丰富的大市场，其单一市场证明在减少服务贸易壁垒方面比双边自由贸易协定更有效。欧盟的规定推动了成员国之间的服务贸易，估计增长幅度达到60％，而自由贸易协定没有造成明显的影响。

服务主要由人们推动。虽然技术确实使距离更远的贸易更容易，但这些贸易仍然需要双方处于同一地点。

货物也不再仅仅是货物。产品和服务日益捆绑在一起。因此，诸如咨询和设计等服务投入占制造产品的大部分价值——所有部门的预测值在20％至47％之间。忽视嵌入式服务对英国商品出口的贡献可能会有掩盖英国服务业依赖泛欧制造业供应链的程度的风险。

贸易政策发挥了作用。为了符合自由贸易协议的条件，出口商必须证明他们销售的产品的价值是在协议成员国的领土内实现了。例如，欧盟汽车出口商有资格根据欧盟——韩国自由贸易协议享受免关税待遇，则必须证明该汽车价值的55％以上来自欧盟。这可能很复杂。考虑到服务的增值投入使其更加如此。

世界贸易组织关于海关估价的规定在技术上已经过时。随着规则的现代化，它们可能在地理上会更受限制。这意味着，当依靠国内服务投入符合贸易协议的条件时，就服务投入的来源而言，没有多少模棱两可的余地。

英国脱欧后，英国将发现打开服务出口商的新市场非常困难。多边服务自由化一直在努力超过1995年世贸组织服务贸易总协定所作的承诺。在双边和地区层面上，情况略好一些。监管壁垒比比皆是，而且正如欧盟在与印度谈判贸易协定时发现的那样，服务贸易自由化的谈判很快就会与对人员和商务签证流动的政治挑战性要求紧密联系在一起。

全球化已不再受地理的限制——因而英国即将迎来丰收——这个想法是一厢情愿。英脱欧将损害英国的王牌服务业，而非解放。 

约翰·斯普林福德，欧洲改革中心副主任；山姆·罗威，欧洲改革中心研究员。

英文原文如下：

Brexit will damage UK services exports

Wishful thinking on 'post-geography trade'

John Springford、Sam Lowe 

Thu 15 Feb 2018

Distance and economy size are the most important factors determining the level of trade between two countries. This observation, underpinning the 'gravity' model of trade, has proven remarkably robust. Applying this model to the UK shows the EU is the country's natural trading partner; that the single market has done more to raise trade in services than free trade agreements; and that barriers thrown up as a consequence of the UK leaving the European Union will be hard to offset through lower trade barriers with the rest of the world.

Nearly half of the UK's exports are in services – an unusually high proportion for a medium-sized economy. On 14 February, Boris Johnson, the UK's foreign secretary, stated, 'Brexit need not be nationalist but can be internationalist.' Liam Fox, the secretary of state for international trade, has heralded the post-Brexit opportunities on offer in a 'post-geography trading world'. The implication is that the UK's prowess in services means distance will become irrelevant.

It is intuitive that distance should matter less in services than in goods. Britain does conduct more trade with countries with which it shares a language than economic size and distance would predict. And services are increasingly delivered electronically, with financial transactions, advertisement mock-ups and architectural blueprints sent to clients over the internet. The cost of air travel has fallen. However, this intuition does not show up in the data. The effect of distance on trade in services is similar to its effect on goods: a 10% increase in distance between countries reduces services trade by 7%.

The US is by far the UK's biggest individual market, thanks to large flows of financial services between the City, New York and other US banking centres. But the EU is a far bigger market. Italy buys a similar amount of Britain's services as Japan, despite Japan's economy being 2.5 times larger.

The EU is a rich, large market on the UK's doorstep, and its single market has proved more effective at reducing barriers to services trade than bilateral free trade agreements. The EU's rules have boosted services trade between member states by an estimated 60%, while FTAs have had no discernible effect.

Services are largely delivered by people. While technology has certainly made interactions at a distance easier, these interactions still often require both parties to be in the same place.

Goods are also no longer just goods. Products and services are increasingly bundled together. As such, services inputs, such as consultation and design, account for a significant amount of the value embodied in a manufactured product – estimates range from 20% to 47% across all sectors. Ignoring the contribution of embedded services to UK goods exports risks underplaying the degree to which the UK services sector is dependent on pan-European manufacturing supply chains.

Trade policy plays its part. To qualify for a free trade agreement, an exporter must demonstrate that a sufficient amount of the value of the product they are selling was realised within the territory of a party to the agreement. For example, for a European car exporter to qualify for tariff-free treatment under the EU-South Korea free trade agreement, it must show that 55% or more of the car's value originates within the EU. This can be complicated. Accounting for the value-added input of services makes it more so.

World Trade Organisation rules on customs valuations are technologically outdated. As the rules are modernised, they will probably become more geographically restrictive. This means that, when relying on domestic services inputs to qualify for a trade agreement, there is little room for ambiguity as to where the services inputs are from.

Post-Brexit, the UK will find opening up new markets for its services exporters difficult. Multilateral services liberalisation has struggled to progress beyond the commitments made during the 1995 WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services. At a bilateral and regional level it has fared little better. Regulatory barriers abound, and, as the EU discovered when negotiating a trade agreement with India, talks of services liberalisation quickly become tied to politically challenging demands on the movement of people and business visas.

The idea that globalisation has become unmoored from geography – and Britain is about to reap the rewards – is wishful thinking. Brexit will damage the UK's flagship services sector, rather than liberating it.

John Springford is Deputy Director and Sam Lowe a Research Fellow at the Centre for European Reform. This is an edited version of an article first published by the CER.

内容整理 叶祎然

图文编辑 叶祎然

审校  田雯

监制  商倩

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