海外之声丨货币政策和财政政策的十字路口：新常态还是新路径？
导读
货币政策和财政政策之间的关系问题一直存在。全球金融危机后，货币政策开始被视为“唯一的游戏”，但从历史角度出发，各国央行都在呼吁采取更多财政刺激措施以支持宏观稳定。这两项政策在疫情期间利用各自的比较优势密切合作，取得了显著的成效——货币政策发挥其创造和分配流动性的力量；财政政策具有转移资源和支出的权力。它们共同阻止了更深层次的收缩，并为经济复苏奠定了基础。疫情危机凸显了安全边际的重要性。那些具有更大财政和货币政策回旋空间的国家能够做出更迅速有效的反应。
鉴于有史以来最低的利率和最高的债务与GDP比率，货币与财政政策将在中长期面临严峻挑战，必须中期内在条件允许的情况下正常化，重新建立安全边际，保持在“稳定走廊”内运行。
自全球金融危机以来，尤其是自疫情开始以来，这种极低利率和高公共部门债务的情况经常被描述为“新常态”。即使在最近通胀上升之后，利率仍然维持在极低的水平。而且，市场认为该阶段内，如此低的利率水平正常应该伴随较高的债务。但是，从长远的历史角度来看，现在的情况很难用“正常”来形容。历史上没有哪个阶段的名义利率像现在这样低。即使在特殊的大通胀时期，实际利率也从未如此长时间为负。
在这种新常态政策背景下，最具破坏性的“不稳定陷阱”暗藏其中。随着时间推移，财政和货币政策的空间减少，经济更容易受到未来不确定因素（如疫情）的影响。
因此，有效降低风险的唯一选择是通过有利于增长的财政政策支持的适当结构性改革来促进长期增长，必须重申货币政策和财政政策之间的明确界限。也就是放弃所谓的“新常态”，走新路。
作者 | 克劳迪奥·博里奥，国际清算银行货币与经济部主管
英文原文如下：
Monetary and Fiscal Policies at a Crossroads: New Normal or New Path?
Claudio Borio
Head of the BIS Monetary and Economic Department
Panel remarks, Latvijas Banka Economic Conference 2021, virtual 20 September 2021
I would like to thank the organizers for the kind invitation. I am pleased to be on this distinguished panel to discuss the nexus between monetary and fiscal policies in the years ahead.
The issue of the nexus between the two policies is a perennial one. But it has risen to renewed prominence post-Great Financial Crisis (GFC) and, especially, post-Covid. Post-GFC, because monetary policy came to be regarded as the “only game in town”. Central banks, rather unusually from a historical perspective, were calling for more fiscal stimulus to support macro stabilization. Post-Covid, because monetary and fiscal policies worked in close concert to stabilize the financial system and the economy. And they succeeded.
In my remarks today, I will not focus on the short-term policy mix, which is often the issue that attracts most attention. Rather, I would like to explore the nexus in the medium to long term, which is more important. In so doing, I will be drawing on the latest BIS Annual Economic Report, which explores these issues in detail and which I would strongly encourage you to read for further elaboration.
I would like to highlight three key policy tasks ahead.
First, the need for monetary and fiscal policies to renormalize over the medium term starting when conditions allow. The objective would be to re-establish safety margins or buffers in the form of room for policy manoeuvre. As in any other walk of life, safety margins are essential to overcome the inevitable hazards ahead.
Second, as a longer-term guideline, the need for the two policies to maintain those margins, so as to remain within a kind of “corridor of stability”–a concept that Axel Leijonhufvud coined some 40 years ago and applied to the economy as a whole. This is essential for the economy to evolve along a sustainable path.
Finally, the imperative of raising long-term growth through structural and growth-friendly policies. This is essential to better manage the tough challenges involved and for longer-term prosperity.
Think of this as abandoning the so-called “New Normal” and taking a New Path. Let me explore the journey, the destination, and the challenges along the way.The starting point: the New Normal
Where does the journey begin? What are the initial conditions? Monetary and fiscal policies are indelicate position.
But the policy headroom has narrowed substantially.
As regards monetary policy, in key advanced economies policy rates are at zero or thereabouts. And balance sheets have risen further (Graph 1, left-hand panel). In the four largest jurisdictions, central banks now hold between one fourth and close to half of the total government debt outstanding (right-hand panel). And only a few emerging market economy (EME) central banks have raised policy rates again, given concerns with inflation and capital outflows.
As regards fiscal policy, government debt in relation to GDP has soared around the globe, so far by around 10 percentage points. And in EMEs, even if debt ratios may be lower than in advanced economies, the policy headroom is generally smaller: financial markets are far less tolerant of high debt– although, so far, the search for yield has muted the markets’ pressure.
Since the GFC – and even more so since the pandemic began – this picture of very low interest rates and high public sector debt has often been described as “the new normal”. Even on the heels of the recent rise in inflationary pressures, financial markets and most economists see low interest rates as far as the eye can see. And, with interest rates so low, higher debt levels are often regarded as par for the course.
But, from a long-term historical perspective, it is hard to see how the picture can be described as “normal”.
In no phase in history have nominal interest rates been as low as they are now. Real interest rates have never been negative for as long, even during the exceptional Great Inflation era – I suspect, therefore, ever since records began. Central bank balance sheets have been as high only during wars. After a relentless rising trend since the mid-1980s, government debt has, globally, reached levels not seen since World War II – surely a historical peak, too (Graph 2, left-hand panel). And despite this, service costs have fallen to a trough (right-hand panel). The debt burden has never felt so light.
It does not seem either prudent or desirable to assume that we are in a new normal. Not prudent, because conditions at some point might change, catching policymakers wrong-footed. Not desirable, because we should strive to live in a world in which fiscal policy is able to operate comfortably with interest rates well above zero – with both nominal and real interest rates firmly in positive territory. This would re-establish policy headroom for monetary policy. And no doubt a well-functioning economy cannot operate for very long and allocate capital efficiently when real interest rates languish below zero.
Hazards ahead
What are the hazards along the journey ahead?
The ultimate, most damaging, hazard would be a kind of “instability trap”. In this scenario, rather than taking advantage of low rates to adjust, governments take the opportunity to raise debt further – a risk underlined by the belief that borrowing costs will remain structurally low. In turn, higher government debt (alongside higher private debt) makes it harder to raise interest rates, as the economy becomes less able to bear them. Indeed, after such a long time with such low rates, the economy has adapted to them. This process can be self-reinforcing and reduce both fiscal and monetary policy headroom overtime. As a result, the economy becomes more vulnerable to future recessions, which will necessarily come at some point. And what about unexpected events, such as Covid?
Here is some idea of the orders of magnitude involved. Imagine interest rates went back to theirmid-1990s levels. This was after inflation had been conquered, so that rates had declined to a kind of average level by historical standards. With rates at those levels, government service costs in relation to GDP would be higher than during World War II – no doubt yet another historical peak(Graph2, right-hand panel, dotted line).
In addition, one should factor in a consideration which is often overlooked (Graph 3). Central bank purchases of long-term government debt financed with bank reserves (QE) raise the sensitivity of fiscal positions to higher interest rates. From the perspective of the consolidated public sector balance sheet – aggregating the balance sheets of the central bank and the government – the purchases amount to a large-scale debt management operation: the public sector retires long-term debt and replaces it with overnight debt (bank reserves). Higher interest on reserves cut central bank profits(or raise losses) and hence depress remittances to the government.
Government debt may appear long-term, but in fact it is not. Given the size of central bank purchases of long-term government debt, in the largest advanced economy jurisdictions, as muchassome30–50% of it is already de facto overnight.
Policies for the right destination: the New Path
What is the final destination?
The journey’s destination is not predetermined. It is policy that chooses the path ahead. We do not want to go down the one that leads to an instability trap. Where should we go, then? Which path should we take?
The previous analysis suggests that we would like monetary and fiscal policies to operate within a “corridor of stability”. That is, we would like them to travel along a sustainable path, with sufficient safety margins to deal not just with “garden variety” recessions, but also with the unexpected.
Economies that operate without safety margins are vulnerable and exposed.
The Covid-19 crisis has highlighted the importance of safety margins. Those countries with greater fiscal and monetary room for policy manoeuvre were able to respond more strongly. And the post-GFC prudential policy-induced increase in their capital strength allowed banks to be part of the solution, rather than of the problem, in sharp contrast to what happened during the GFC.
编译 张颖
编辑 刘嘉璐
来源 BIS
责编 李锦璇、蒋旭
监制 朱霜霜、董熙君
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