斯坦福哲学百科全书词条:感受质(中英文对照)一
Qualia
感受质
(一)
宋璐瑶 译
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https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/
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哲学园鸣谢
First published Wed Aug 20, 1997; substantive revision Mon Dec 18, 2017
首发于1997年8月20日星期三;修改于2017年12月18日星期四
Feelings and experiences vary widely. For example, I run my fingers over sandpaper, smell a skunk, feel a sharp pain in my finger, seem to see bright purple, become extremely angry. In each of these cases, I am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character. There is something it is like for me to undergo each state, some phenomenology that it has. Philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’ (singular ‘quale’) to refer to the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives. In this broad sense of the term, it is difficult to deny that there are qualia. Disagreement typically centers on which mental states have qualia, whether qualia are intrinsic qualities of their bearers, and how qualia relate to the physical world both inside and outside the head. The status of qualia is hotly debated in philosophy largely because it is central to a proper understanding of the nature of consciousness. Qualia are at the very heart of the mind-body problem.
感觉和经验之间往往具有较大差异。例如,我用手指抚过砂纸、闻到臭鼬的味道、感到指头上一阵锐痛袭来、恍然看到一抹亮丽的紫色、抑或是突然间变得极度生气,在这些情境中,我是一种心理状态的主体,这种心理状态具有非常独特的主观特性。经历每一状态的时候,存在某种在我看来像什么的东西,某种它所具有的现象学。哲学家们常用“qualia”(单数“quale”)一词来指称我们心理世界中的这些内省可达的、现象学的方面。就这个词的宽泛意义而言,我们很难去否认感受质的存在。因此,异见主要集中在:哪些心理状态具有感受质,感受质是不是其所有者的内在特征,以及感受质是如何与大脑发生联系,又是如何与外部世界相关联的。感受质的情况在哲学中争论激烈,很大程度上是因为它对于恰当地理解意识的本质至关重要。感受质是心身问题的核心所在。
The entry that follows is divided into ten sections. The first distinguishes various uses of the term ‘qualia’. The second addresses the question of which mental states have qualia. The third section brings out some of the main arguments for the view that qualia are irreducible and non-physical. The remaining sections focus on functionalism and qualia, the explanatory gap, qualia and introspection, representational theories of qualia, qualia as intrinsic, nonrepresentational properties, relational theories of qualia and finally the issue of qualia and simple minds.
下面的目录共分为十个部分。第一部分区分了对“感受质”一词的不同用法。第二部分处理“哪些心理状态具有感受质”的问题。第三部分提出了一些对“感受质是不可还原的和非物理的”这一观点所做的主要论证。其余部分则集中讨论“功能主义与感受质”、“解释空缺”、“感受质与内省”、“感受质的表征理论”、“感受质作为内在的、非表征的属性”、“感受质的关系理论”以及最后“感受质和简单心灵”的问题。
1. Uses of the Term ‘Qualia’
“感受质”的用法
2. Which Mental States Possess Qualia?
哪些心理状态有感受质
3. Are Qualia Irreducible, Non-Physical Entities
感受质是不可还原的、非物理的实体吗?
4. Functionalism and Qualia
功能主义和感受质
5. Qualia and the Explanatory Gap
感受质和解释空缺
6. Qualia and Introspection
感受质和内省
7. Representational Theories of Qualia
感受质的表征理论
8. Qualia as Intrinsic, Nonrepresentational Properties
作为内在的、非表征的属性的感受质
9. Relational Theories of Qualia
感受质的关系理论
10. Which Creatures Undergo States with Qualia?
哪些生物会经历有感受质的状态?
1. Uses of the Term ‘Qualia’ “感受质”的用法
(1) Qualia as phenomenal character. Consider your visual experience as you stare at a bright turquoise color patch in a paint store. There is something it is like for you subjectively to undergo that experience. What it is like to undergo the experience is very different from what it is like for you to experience a dull brown color patch. This difference is a difference in what is often called ‘phenomenal character’. The phenomenal character of an experience is what it is like subjectively to undergo the experience. If you are told to focus your attention upon the phenomenal character of your experience, you will find that in doing so you are aware of certain qualities. These qualities — ones that are accessible to you when you introspect and that together make up the phenomenal character of the experience are sometimes called ‘qualia’. C.S. Peirce seems to have had something like this in mind when he introduced the term ‘quale’ into philosophy in 1866 (1866/1982, para 223). There are more restricted uses of the term ‘qualia’, however.
(1)作为现象特性的感受质。试想当你在油漆店里看到亮青色时的视觉经验。从你的主观方面来看,经历这个经验的时候,会有某种看上去像什么的东西。而经历这一经验看上去像是怎样的,不同于经验一块暗棕色的颜色看上去像是怎样的,这种差别就是通常所谓的现象特性的差别。一个经验的现象特性就是经历该经验时主观上看起来像是怎样的。如果你被告之把注意力集中在自己经验的现象特性上,你会发现,那么做时你会意识到某种质性。这些质性有时就被称作“感受质”,它们会在你进行内省时被感受到,而且它们共同构成了经验的现象特性。1866/1982,当C.S.珀斯(皮尔士)将 “quale”这个词引入哲学中时,他的头脑中似乎就已经有了类似的东西。不过,还有更多关于“感受质”一词的狭义用法。
(2) Qualia as properties of sense data. Consider a painting of a dalmatian. Viewers of the painting can apprehend not only its content (i.e., its representing a dalmatian) but also the colors, shapes, and spatial relations obtaining among the blobs of paint on the canvas. It has sometimes been supposed that being aware or conscious of a visual experience is like viewing an inner, non-physical picture or sense-datum. So, for example, on this conception, if I see a dalmatian, I am subject to a mental picture-like representation of a dalmatian (a sense-datum), introspection of which reveals to me both its content and its intrinsic, non-representationational features (counterparts to the visual features of the blobs of paint on the canvas). These intrinsic, non-representational features have been taken by advocates of the sense-datum theory to be the sole determinants of what it is like for me to have the experience. In a second, more restricted sense of the term ‘qualia’, then, qualia are intrinsic, consciously accessible, non-representational features of sense-data and other non-physical phenomenal objects that are responsible for their phenomenal character. Historically, the term ‘qualia’ was first used in connection with the sense-datum theory by C.I. Lewis in 1929. As Lewis used the term, qualia were properties of sense-data themselves.
(2)作为感觉材料的属性的感受质。设想一幅画着一个达尔马提亚人的油画。从画布上的油彩中,画作的观看者不仅可以理解其内容(即,它表征了一个达尔马提亚人),而且还可以理解其颜色、形状以及空间关系。有时,意识到一种视觉经验会被认为是像看到一种内在的、非物理的画面或感觉予料。所以,打个比方来讲,按照此概念,如果我看到了一个达尔马提亚人,我就会有一副表征这个达尔马提亚人的心理图景(一种感觉予料),对这一点的内省不仅向我揭示了它的内容,而且还揭示了它的内在的、非表征的特性(对应于看到画布上的油彩时的视觉特征)。这些内在的、非表征的特性,被感觉予料论的支持者们当作我有这一经验是什么样子的唯一决定因素。从“感受质”这个词的次一级的、更受限的意义上来看,感受质指的是内在的、意识可通达的、非表征的特性,这些特性属于感觉材料以及其他非物理的现象的东西,并导致了这些东西的现象特性。从历史上来看,“感受质”这个词的使用首次与感觉予料联系起来是由于C.I.刘易斯,按照刘易斯对这个词的使用,感受质就是感觉材料本身的属性。
(3) Qualia as intrinsic non-representational properties. There is another established sense of the term ‘qualia’, which is similar to the one just given but which does not demand of qualia advocates that they endorse the sense-datum theory. However sensory experiences are ultimately analyzed — whether, for example, they are taken to involve relations to sensory objects or they are identified with neural events or they are held to be physically irreducible events — many philosophers suppose that they have intrinsic, consciously accessible features that are non-representational and that are solely responsible for their phenomenal character. These features, whatever their ultimate nature, physical or non-physical, are often dubbed ‘qualia’.
(3)作为内在的、非表征的属性的感受质。“感受质”还有另外一种含义,和刚刚给出的那个较为相似,但它不要求感受质的支持者们认可感觉予料论。然而,感官经验最终还是被分析了——例如,它们或被用以与感官对象相联系,或被等同于神经活动,再或者被认为是物理地不可还原的事件——很多哲学家认为他们有内在的、意识可通达的特性,这些特性是非表征的,而且是决定其现象特性的唯一因素。这些特性,不管其根本性质是物理的抑或非物理的,常被称为“感受质”。
In the case of visual experiences, for example, it is frequently supposed that there is a range of visual qualia, where these are taken to be intrinsic features of visual experiences that (a) are accessible to introspection, (b) can vary without any variation in the representational contents of the experiences,(c) are mental counterparts to some directly visible properties of objects (e.g., color), and (d) are the sole determinants of the phenomenal character of the experiences. This usage of ‘qualia’ has become perhaps the most common one in recent years. Philosophers who hold or have held that there are qualia, in this sense of the term, include, for example, Nagel (1974), Peacocke (1983) and Block (1990).
例如,在视觉经验的情况中,通常认为存在一个视觉感受质的范围,在其中这些被当作是视觉经验的内在特征的东西(a)是内省可达的,(b)其改变完全不受经验表征内容的影响,(c)相对于一些物体直接可见的属性而言是心理的(例如颜色),并且(d)是经验的现象特性的唯一决定因素。“感受质”的这个用法,可能已经成为近年来最主要的一种用法。认为或曾认为存在上述意义的感受质的哲学家们包括如下几人:内格尔(1974),皮科克(1983)以及布洛克(1990)。
(4) Qualia as intrinsic, nonphysical, ineffable properties. Some philosophers (e.g, Dennett 1987, 1991) use the term ‘qualia’ in a still more restricted way so that qualia are intrinsic properties of experiences that are also ineffable, nonphysical, and ‘given’ to their subjects incorrigibly (without the possibility of error). Philosophers who deny that there are qualia sometimes have in mind qualia as the term is used in this more restricted sense (or a similar one). It is also worth mentioning that sometimes the term ‘qualia’ is restricted to sensory experiences by definition, while on other occasions it is allowed that if thoughts and other such cognitive states have phenomenal character, then they also have qualia. Thus, announcements by philosophers who declare themselves opposed to qualia need to be treated with some caution. One can agree that there are no qualia in the last three senses I have explained, while still endorsing qualia in the standard first sense.
(4)作为内在的、非物理的、不可言说的属性的感受质。一些哲学家(例如,丹尼特1987,1991)在一种更狭义的方式上使用“感受质”一词,将“感受质”当作是不可言说的、非物理的而且是不可错地“被给予”其主体的(不会有出错的可能性)经验的内在属性。否认感受质存在的哲学家有时会认为“感受质”就是在这种更受限的意义(或是相似的意义)上而被使用的术语。同样值得提及的是,有时“感受质”一词会被定义为感官经验,而在别的情况下,如果思维和其他类似的认知状态有现象特性,那么说它们也有感受质是被允许的。因此,有必要谨慎地来看待那些宣称自己反对感受质的哲学家们的观点。有人可能认为不存在我已经解释过的后三种意义上的感受质,而仍然同意第一种标准意义上的感受质的存在。
In the rest of this entry, we use the term ‘qualia’ in the very broad way I did at the beginning of the entry. So, we take it for granted that there are qualia. Later on, in section 8, we discuss specifically the view of qualia as intrinsic, nonrepresentational properties.
在之后的这些条目中,我们会以一种非常宽泛的方式,也就是我在这一部分最开始所用的那种意义上来使用“感受质”一词。所以,我们当然承认感受质的存在。之后,在第八部分,我们会专门讨论作为内在的、非表征的属性的感受质这一观点。
2. Which Mental States Possess Qualia? 哪些心理状态具有感受质
The following would certainly be included on my own list. (1) Perceptual experiences, for example, experiences of the sort involved in seeing green, hearing loud trumpets, tasting liquorice, smelling the sea air, handling a piece of fur. (2) Bodily sensations, for example, feeling a twinge of pain, feeling an itch, feeling hungry, having a stomach ache, feeling hot, feeling dizzy. Think here also of experiences such as those present during orgasm or while running flat-out. (3) Felt reactions or passions or emotions, for example, feeling delight, lust, fear, love, feeling grief, jealousy, regret. (4) Felt moods, for example, feeling elated, depressed, calm, bored, tense, miserable. (For more here, see Haugeland 1985, pp. 230–235).
以下(几个方面)无疑将会被包含在我的列表里。(1)知觉经验,例如,包括看到绿色、听到响亮的喇叭声、尝到甘草的味道以及摸到一块毛皮时的感觉。(2)身体感觉,例如,感觉到一阵疼痛,感觉痒、饿、胃痛、热以及头晕目眩,在此还可以想一下性高潮抑或是浑身赤裸时的那种经验。(3)对反应、激情或情绪的感受,例如,感觉高兴、渴望、恐惧、热爱以及感觉悲痛、妒忌、后悔。(4)对情绪的感受,例如,感觉兴高采烈、萎靡不振、心平气和、无聊、紧张、痛苦等。(更多可参见霍格兰德1985,230页至235页。)
Should we include any other mental states on the list? Galen Strawson has claimed (1994) that there are such things as the experience of understanding a sentence, the experience of suddenly thinking of something, of suddenly remembering something, and so on. Moreover, in his view, experiences of these sorts are not reducible to associated sensory experiences and/or images. Strawson's position here seems to be that thought-experience is a distinctive experience in its own right. He says, for example: “Each sensory modality is an experiential modality, and thought experience (in which understanding-experience may be included) is an experiential modality to be reckoned alongside the other experiential modalities” (p. 196). On Strawson's view, then, some thoughts have qualia. (This is also the position of Horgan and Tienson (2002).)
我们是否应该把其它心理状态包括在内?盖伦·斯特劳森声称(1994)诸如理解了一个句子、突然想到某事或是突然记起某事等经验亦可算在其中。而且,在他看来,这类经验都不能还原成相关的感官经验和/或影像。而斯特劳森在此的立场似乎是思维经验本身就是一种独特的经验。例如,他说:“每一种感官形式都是一种经验形式,思维经验(理解的经验也可被包括在内)就像其他经验形式一样,也被认为是某种经验形式。”因此,在斯特劳森看来,某些思维也有感受质。(这也是霍根和泰恩森的立场2002)
This view is controversial. One response is to claim that the phenomenal aspects of understanding derive largely from linguistic (or verbal) images, which have the phonological and syntactic structure of items in the subject's native language. These images frequently even come complete with details of stress and intonation. As we read, it is sometimes phenomenally as if we are speaking to ourselves. (Likewise when we consciously think about something without reading). We often “hear” an inner voice. Depending upon the content of the passage, we may also undergo a variety of emotions and feelings. We may feel tense, bored, excited, uneasy, angry. Once all these reactions are removed, together with the images of an inner voice and the visual sensations produced by reading, some would say (myself included) that no phenomenology remains.
这种观点是有争议的。有回应称,理解的现象方面很大程度上源于语言的(或言语的)影像,它们在主体的母语中会有语音和句法结构。这些影像常常甚至伴有重音和语调的细节。当我们在阅读时,有时在现象上好像我们是在和自己对话一样(当我们没有阅读而有意识地想到某事时也是如此)。我们经常“听到”一种内在的声音;依赖于文章的内容,我们可能还会经历各种情绪和感受,也许会感到紧张、无聊、激动、不安或是生气。一旦所有的这些反应被消除,连同内部声音的影像和通过阅读产生的视觉感觉,一些人就会说(包括我自己)没有什么现象学存在了。
In any event, images and sensations of the above sorts are not always present in thought. They are not essential to thought. Consider, for example, the thoughts involved in everyday visual recognition (or the thoughts of creatures without a natural language).
在任何情况下,上述的影像和感觉并不总是出现在思维中,它们对于思维而言并不是必需的。例如,试想涉及日常视觉识别的思维(或者没有自然语言的生物的思维)
What about desires, for example, my desire for a week's holiday in Venice? It is certainly true that in some cases, there is an associated phenomenal character. Often when we strongly desire something, we experience a feeling of being “pulled” or “tugged”. There may also be accompanying images in various modalities.
那么欲望呢?例如,我想在威尼斯度假一周的欲望?确实,在有些情况下,也会有相关的现象学的东西。经常是当我们非常渴望某事时,会经验到一种被“拉”或“拖”的感觉。这也可能会伴随着各种式样的图像。
Should we include such propositional attitudes as feeling angry that the house has been burgled or seeing that the computer is missing on the list? These seem best treated as hybrid or complex states, one component of which is essentially a phenomenal state and the other (a judgment or belief) is not. Thus, in both cases, there is a constituent experience that is the real bearer of the relevant quale or qualia.
我们是否应该把诸如发现家里被盗时或是看到电脑丢了时而感到生气的这些命题态度也包括在内? 这些情况似乎最好被视为混合状态或者复杂状态,其中一部分实质上是一种现象状态,而另一部分(一个判断或信念)则不是。因此,在这两种情况下,存在一种构成的经验,这种经验是真正的相关感受质的所有者。
3. Are Qualia Irreducible, Non-Physical Entities? 感受质是不可还原的、非物理的事物吗?
The literature on qualia is filled with thought-experiments of one sort or another. Perhaps the most famous of these is the case of Mary, the brilliant color scientist. Mary, so the story goes (Jackson 1982), is imprisoned in a black and white room. Never having been permitted to leave it, she acquires information about the world outside from the black and white books her captors have made available to her, from the black and white television sets attached to external cameras, and from the black and white monitor screens hooked up to banks of computers. As time passes, Mary acquires more and more information about the physical aspects of color and color vision. (For a real life case of a visual scientist (Knut Nordby) who is an achromotope, see Sacks 1996, Chapter 1.) Eventually, Mary becomes the world's leading authority on these matters. Indeed she comes to know all the physical facts pertinent to everyday colors and color vision.
有关感受质的文献资料充斥着各种各样的思想实验。其中最著名的要数玛丽——那个精通颜色研究的科学家的例子。据描述(杰克逊1982),玛丽被关在一个黑白的房间中,她从来不被允许离开那里,只能通过俘获她的人所给予的黑白书籍、连接有外部摄像机的电视、以及连着一排排电脑的黑白显示器中获得关于外界的信息。随着时间流逝,玛丽获得了越来越多的关于颜色和色觉的物理方面的信息【要找一个是色盲的视觉科学家的实例(纳特·诺德白),可参见塞克斯1996,第一章】。最终,玛丽变成了这方面的世界权威。事实上,她了解与日常颜色和色觉相关的所有物理事实。
Still, she wonders to herself: What do people in the outside world experience when they see the various colors? What is it like for them to see red or green? One day her captors release her. She is free at last to see things with their real colors (and free too to scrub off the awful black and white paint that covers her body). She steps outside her room into a garden full of flowers. “So, that is what it is like to experience red,” she exclaims, as she sees a red rose. “And that,” she adds, looking down at the grass, “is what it is like to experience green.”
不过,她仍然会疑惑:当外界的人们看到各种颜色时,他们究竟会经验到什么?他们看到红色或者绿色时的现象特性是什么?而有一天,俘获她的人释放了她,她终于可以自由地看到各种带着真实颜色的事物(而且也可以擦掉涂在她身上的可怖的黑白油漆)。玛丽从她的房间迈进了一个满是鲜花的花园中,当她看到一朵红色的玫瑰花时,她说:“原来,那就是经验到红色的现象特性。”当看到地上的青草时,她又加了一句:“那就是经验到绿色时的现象特性。”
Mary here seems to make some important discoveries. She seems to find out things she did not know before. How can that be, if, as seems possible, at least in principle, she has all the physical information there is to have about color and color vision — if she knows all the pertinent physical facts?
在此,玛丽似乎有了一些重要的发现,她好像发现了自己之前不知道的事情。如果她拥有一切关于颜色和色觉所应该知道的物理信息(至少在原则上似乎有可能)——即如果她知道所有相关的物理事实,她又是怎么获得新发现的呢?
One possible explanation is that that there is a realm of subjective, phenomenal qualities associated with color, qualities the intrinsic nature of which Mary comes to discover upon her release, as she herself undergoes the various new color experiences. Before she left her room, she only knew the objective, physical basis of those subjective qualities, their causes and effects, and various relations of similarity and difference. She had no knowledge of the subjective qualities in themselves.
一种可能的解释是,存在一个关于颜色的主观的、现象的质的领域,玛丽在被释放之后,由于亲身经历了各种新鲜的颜色经验,发现了这种质的内在本质。而在她离开她的房间之前,她只知道那些主观特性的客观物理基础、它们的因果关系以及各种相似性和差异性的关系,而对主观特性本身则一无所知。
This explanation is not available to the physicalist. If what it is like for someone to experience red is one and the same as some physical quality, then Mary already knows that while in her room. Likewise, for experiences of the other colors. For Mary knows all the pertinent physical facts. What, then, can the physicalist say?
这个解释对于物理主义者而言是行不通的。如果某人经验到红色时的现象特性同一于某种物理质性,那么玛丽早在房间中就已经知道那些质性了。同样的,对于其他颜色经验也是如此,因为玛丽已经知道了所有相关的物理事实。那么,物理主义者还会说什么呢?
Some physicalists respond that knowing what it is like is know-how and nothing more. Mary acquires certain abilities, specifically in the case of red, the ability to recognize red things by sight alone, the ability to imagine a red expanse, the ability to remember the experience of red. She does not come to know any new information, any new facts about color, any new qualities. This is the view of David Lewis (1990) and Lawrence Nemirow (1990).
有些物理主义者回应称,知道现象特性就是能力之知而别无其它。玛丽在有关红色的经验中获得了某些能力,具体在红色的例子中,也就是仅靠视觉来识别红色事物的能力、想象一片红色区域的能力以及记住红色经验的能力。她并未知道任何新的信息、任何有关颜色的新事实以及任何新的质性。这是大卫·刘易斯(1990)和劳伦斯·尼米罗(1990)的观点。
The Ability Hypothesis, as it is often called, is more resilient than many philosophers suppose (see Tye 2000, Chapter One). But it has difficulty in properly accounting for our knowledge of what it is like to undergo experiences of determinate hues while we are undergoing them. For example, I can know what it is like to experience red-17, as I stare at a rose of that color. Of course, I don't know the hue as red-17. My conception of it is likely just that shade of red. But I certainly know what it is like to experience the hue while it is present. Unfortunately, I lack the abilities Lewis cites and so does Mary even after she leaves her cell. She is not able to recognize things that are red-17 as red-17 by sight. Given the way human memory works and the limitations on it, she lacks the concept red-17. She has no mental template that is sufficiently fine-grained to permit her to identify the experience of red-17 when it comes again. Presented with two items, one red-17 and the other red-18, in a series of tests, she cannot say with any accuracy which experience her earlier experience of the rose matches. Sometimes she picks one; at other times she picks the other. Nor is she able afterwards to imagine things as having hue, red-17, or as having that very shade of red the rose had; and for precisely the same reason.
能力假说,如我们经常所称的那样,比很多哲学家所认为的要更具适应性(参见泰2000,第一章),但是它很难为我们的这样一种知识提供恰当解释,即当我们经历特定的颜色经验时,所经历到的这种经验的现象特性是什么。例如,当我盯着一朵红17色的玫瑰花看时,我就会知道经验到红17色时的现象特性。当然,我并不知道这颜色是红17,我对它的概念可能仅仅只是红色的某种色度而已,但是当那种颜色出现时,我肯定知道那种经验的现象特性。不幸的是,我缺少刘易斯所言的那种能力,甚至是离开小屋后的玛丽也一样。她不可能只依据视觉就认出红17就是红17。鉴于人类记忆的运行方式及其局限性,她缺乏红17的概念。而且她也没有足够精细的心理样板(作为参考),以允许她在红17再次出现时能够识别出那种经验。如果在一系列测验中,给出两类东西,一类是红17色的,另一类是红18色的,她并不能准确无误地说出哪一种经验和她此前的玫瑰色经验相同。有时她会挑出这种,而有时又会挑出另一种。并且出于完全相同的理由,她之后也不能想像有着红17色的或者说是那种玫瑰色的东西。
The Ability Hypothesis appears to be in trouble. An alternative physicalist proposal is that Mary in her room lacks certain phenomenal concepts, certain ways of thinking about or mentally representing color experiences and colors. Once she leaves the room, she acquires these new modes of thought as she experiences the various colors. Even so, the qualities the new concepts pick out are ones she knew in a different way in her room, for they are physical or functional qualities like all others.
能力假说似乎陷入了麻烦之中。另一种物理主义的主张是,在房间中的玛丽缺少某些现象概念,某些想象或是在心理上表征颜色经验和颜色的方式。一旦离开房间,她就会获得这些新的思维模式,因为她会经验到各种各样的颜色。但即便如此,新概念所辨认出的质性不过是她以另一种方式知道了在房间里所已知的东西,因为它们就像其他质性一样是物理的或功能的质性。
One problem this approach faces is that it seems to imply that Mary does not really make a new discovery when she says, “So, that is what it is like to experience red.” Upon reflection, however, it is far from obvious that this is really a consequence. For it is widely accepted that concepts or modes of presentation are involved in the individuation of thought-contents, given one sense of the term ‘content’ — the sense in which thought-content is whatever information that-clauses provide that suffices for the purposes of even the most demanding rationalizing explanation. In this sense, what I think, when I think that Cicero was an orator, is not what I think when I think that Tully was an orator. This is precisely why it is possible to discover that Cicero is Tully. The thought that Cicero was an orator differs from the thought that Tully was an orator not at the level of truth-conditions — the same singular proposition is partly constitutive of the content of both — but at the level of concepts or mode of presentation. The one thought exercises the concept Cicero; the other the concept Tully. The concepts have the same reference, but they present the referent in different ways and thus the two thoughts can play different roles in rationalizing explanation.
这种方法所面临的一个难题在于它似乎暗示了,玛丽在说“原来,那就是经验到红色的现象特性”时并非真的有新的发现。然而,再次思考后就会发现,这显然不是一个真正意义的结论。因为大家都接受这样一种观点,即按照“内容”这个词的某种涵义,呈现模式或概念涉及思想内容的个别化,在这种涵义下,“思维内容”就是that从句所能提供的任何信息,这种信息要满足哪怕是最复杂的合理性解释的目的。在此意义上,当我认为西塞罗是一个演说家的时候,和我认为图利是一个演说家的时候,我所想的东西是不一样的。这正是为什么的确可能发现西塞罗其实就是图利。西塞罗是一个演说家的想法与图利是一个演说家的想法之间的不同在于概念或呈现模式(因为同一单称命题部分构成了这两个想法的内容),而非真值条件。一个想法激活了概念“西塞罗”,而另一个想法激活的概念则是“图利”。这两个概念的指称虽然相同,但它们却是以不同的方式呈现这种指称的,因此这两个想法可以在合理解释方面发挥不同的作用。
It appears then that there is no difficulty in holding both that Mary comes to know some new things upon her release, while already knowing all the pertinent real-world physical facts, even though the new experiences she undergoes and their introspectible qualities are wholly physical. In an ordinary, everyday sense, Mary's knowledge increases. And that, it may be contended, is all the physicalist needs to answer the Knowledge Argument. (The term ‘fact’, it should be mentioned, is itself ambiguous. Sometimes it is used to pick out real-world states of affairs alone; sometimes it is used for such states of affairs under certain conceptualizations. When we speak of the physical facts above, we should be taken to refer either to physical states of affairs alone or to those states of affairs under purely physical conceptualizations. For more on ‘fact’, see Tye 1995.)
如此看来,同时认可以下两点就没什么困难了,当已经知道所有相关的真实世界的物理事实后,玛丽在被释放后还是会知道一些新的东西,即使她所经历的新的经验及其可内省的质都完全是物理的。就普通的、日常的意义而言,玛丽的知识增加了。而且,那就是物理主义者所需要回答知识论证的全部了,当然,这可能是有争议的。(还须提到的是,“事实”一词本身也是模棱两可的。有时它仅被用来挑出真实世界的事态;而有时它又被用于某种概念化之下的事态。当我们说到以上的物理事实时,应该只用它来指物理事态,或只用它来指那些在纯粹物理概念之下的事态。要了解更多有关“事实”的内容,参见泰1995。)
Some philosophers insist that the difference between the old and the new concepts in this case is such that there must be a difference in the world between the properties these concepts stand for or denote (Jackson 1993, Chalmers 1996). Some of these properties Mary knew in her cell; others she becomes cognizant of only upon her release. This is necessary for Mary to make a real discovery: she must come to associate with the experience of red new qualities she did not associate with it in her room. The physicalist is committed to denying this claim; for the new qualities would have to be non-physical.
有的哲学家坚持认为,此例中旧概念和新概念之间的差异,就是这些概念所代表或指称的属性之间的差异(杰克逊1993,查尔默斯1996)。其中的有些属性玛丽在她的小屋中就已知道;而其余的只有在被释放之后她才会认识到。对于玛丽而言,要真的有所发现,下面这点就是必要的:她必须要把她在房间里没有与红色经验联系起来的新质性,与那红色的经验联系到一起。但物理主义者极力否认此说法,因为这样的新质性必将是非物理的。
The issues here are complex. What the physicalist really needs to settle the issue is a theory of phenomenal concepts (a theory, that is, of the allegedly special concepts that are deployed from the first person point of view when we recognize our experiences as being of such-and-such subjective types) which is itself compatible with physicalism. There are proposals on offer (see, for example, Hill 1991, Loar 1990, Levine 2000, Sturgeon 2000, Perry 2001, Papineau 2002, Tye, 2003), but there is as yet no agreement as to the form such a theory should take, and some philosophers contend that a proper theory of phenomenal concepts shows that no satisfactory answer can be given by the physicalist to the example of Mary's Room (Chalmers 1999). Another possibility is that the very idea of a phenomenal concept, conceived of as a concept very different in how it functions from concepts applied elsewhere, is itself confused. On this view, physicalists who have appealed to phenomenal concepts to handle the example of Mary's Room have been barking up the wrong tree (Tye 2009).
此处的情况十分复杂。要解决这一问题,物理主义者真正需要的是一种其本身能够与物理主义相容的现象概念理论(这种理论是关于所宣称的一类特殊概念,即当我们把经验看成是如此这般的主观的类型时,从第一人称视角提出的概念)。确实有这样的建议被提出(可参见,希尔1991,罗耶1990,莱文2000,斯特金2000,佩里2001,帕皮诺2002,泰2003),但是对于这样一个理论应该采取什么形式,哲学家们仍然没有一致的意见,有的哲学家认为,一个恰当的现象概念理论表明物理主义者不能就“玛丽屋”这一例子给出令人满意的答案。另一种可能性是,“现象概念”这个观念本身是模糊的,与用于其它地方的概念相比,它起作用的方式被认为是非常不同的。在这种观点看来,主张用现象概念去处理玛丽屋的例子的物理主义者一直攻击错了对象。
Another famous anti-reductionist thought-experiment concerning qualia appeals to the possibility of zombies. A philosophical zombie is a molecule by molecule duplicate of a sentient creature, a normal human-being, for example, but who differs from that creature in lacking any phenomenal consciousness. For me, as I lie on the beach, happily drinking some wine and watching the waves, I undergo a variety of visual, olfactory, and gustatory experiences. But my zombie twin experiences nothing at all. He has no phenomenal consciousness. Since my twin is an exact physical duplicate of me, his inner psychological states will be functionally isomorphic with my own (assuming he is located in an identical environment). Whatever physical stimulus is applied, he will process the stimulus in the same way as I do, and produce exactly the same behavioral responses. Indeed, on the assumption that non-phenomenal psychological states are functional states (that is, states definable in terms of their role or function in mediating between stimuli and behavior), my zombie twin has just the same beliefs, thoughts, and desires as I do. He differs from me only with respect to experience. For him, there is nothing it is like to stare at the waves or to sip wine.
关于感受质的另一个著名的反还原论的思想实验诉诸于怪人的可能性。一个哲学怪人是一个有意识的生物(例如一个正常人)的分子对分子的复制品,但他不同于那个生物,因为他缺乏各种现象意识。以我为例,当我躺在沙滩上,惬意地喝着酒、看着海浪时,我会经历各种视觉、嗅觉以及味觉的体验。但是我的怪人双胞胎什么也没有经验到。他没有现象意识。由于我的怪人双胞胎是一个精确的关于我的物理复制品,他的内在状态与我自己的是功能同构的(假设他处在与我完全相同的环境中)。不管遇到什么物理刺激,他将以与我同样的方式应对刺激并产生完全相同的行为反应。的确,假设非现象的心理状态是功能状态(也就是说,这种状态是可以通过它们在刺激和行为之间充当媒介物的作用或功能来定义的),我的怪人双胞胎就像我一样,有着相同的信念、思想和欲望。他和我唯一的不同就在于经验,对他而言,看海浪或喝酒时并没有什么现象特性。
未完待续
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