阅读|股权激励计划，投资者保护与公司业绩：来自中国的实证数据
Equity incentive schemes, investor protection and corporate performance: Evidence from China
股权激励计划，投资者保护与公司业绩：来自中国的实证数据
Zili Su
Department of Finance, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands and Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing, China
Constantinos Alexiou
Cranfield University, Cranfield, UK
Citation:
Su, Z. and Alexiou, C. (2019), "Equity incentive schemes, investor protection and corporate performance: Evidence from China", China Finance Review International, Vol. 10 No. 3, pp. 297-322. https://doi.org/10.1108/CFRI-07-2019-0091
摘要
我们探讨了股权激励和区域投资者保护对公司分红政策和公司绩效的影响。尽管经理人通过增加股息派发滥用了股权激励，但我们提供的证据表明，区域投资者保护可能会抑制这种行为。约束作用很可能取决于公司的增长机会，在这种增长机会的基础上，我们发现高增长公司对现金（股票）股利的影响较弱（更强）。进一步的证据表明，通过股权激励鼓励区域投资者保护对自私的股利相关行为的抑制作用，利用这些激励措施在提高公司绩效方面也是有价值的。
Purpose
On the basis of corporate governance and agency cost theory, using the fifth sub-indicator of Fan et al. China Marketization Index as the regional investor protection index (IPI), the purpose of this paper is to explore the impact of equity incentives and regional investor protection on corporate payout policies and corporate performance.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper establishes ordinary least squares regression model to examine interactions between the effects of equity incentives and regional investor protection upon firms’ dividend payouts. In addition, the authors also explore whether the joint effects on payouts are altered in the presence of growth opportunities, and investigate the effects of interactions between equity incentives and regional investor protection on corporate performance.
Findings
The authors observe that firm managers appear to abuse equity incentives by increasing dividend payouts. However, regional investor protection can potentially restrain such behavior. The restraining effect depends on the firms’ growth opportunities, on the basis of which the effect on cash (stock) dividends is found to be weaker (stronger) in high-growth firms – and stronger (weaker) in low-growth firms. Further evidence indicates that the restraining effect of regional investor protection on selfish dividendrelated behavior encouraged by equity incentives may also prove valuable in encouraging exploitation of these incentives so as to enhance corporate performance.
Practical implications
Since reforming investor protection laws and improving judicial quality are difficult and lengthy at a country level. Improving regional levels of investor protection, however, seems more feasible and effective. Through measures encouraging the development of intermediaries, increases in the number of lawyers – all of which seem likely to constrain behavior harmful to the interests of investors – the provincial administrations can reasonably expect to contribute toward improvements in the performance of firms and the development of the economy in their region. This paper provides encouragement to regional policy makers in China and in other developing countries.
Originality/value
This paper uses a regional index of investor protection to study the impact on corporate dividends and performance, in contrast with most previous studies, which have examined these issues at country or individual firm levels. The use of a regional-level investor IPI in this paper therefore fills a gap by coming in between the country- and firm-level indicators typically used in previous research, thus providing a new perspective on investor protection issues.
文章结构
Introduction
Brief literature review
2.1 Equity incentives, payouts and corporate performance
2.2 Investor protection, payouts and corporate performance
Research question development
3.1 Equity incentives, regional investor protection and payouts
3.2 Equity incentives, regional investor protection and growth opportunities
3.3 Stock options, restricted stock and regional investor protection
3.4 Equity incentives, regional investor protection and corporate performance
Empirical investigation
4.1 Variables and descriptive statistics
4.2 Descriptive statistics
Empirical results
5.1 Evidence of interaction between equity incentives’ and regional investor protection’s effects on payouts
5.2 Dividends, regional investor protection and growth opportunities
5.3 Stock options, restricted stock and regional investor protection
5.4 Equity incentives, regional investor protection and corporate performance
5.5 Robustness
Conclusion
研究成果
Variable definitions
Geographical distribution of observations
Regional IPI distribution (2006–2017)
Characteristics ofpayouts and incentives
Analysis of firm characteristics
Equity incentives subsample: proportion of firms using stock options and restricted stock (2006–2017)
Analysis of cash and stock dividend payouts
Analysis of dividends, regional investor protection and growth opportunities
Analysis of stockoptions and restricted stock
Analysis of jointeffects of incentives and regional investor protection on corporate performance
主要结论
This paper uses the fifth component from Fan et al.’s (2015) China Marketization Index – legal intermediaries and law enforcement environment – as an index of regional investor protection, in combination with panel data on Chinese firms for 2006–2017, to explore the joint effect of equity incentives and regional investor protection on corporate dividend policy and corporate performance in China, where equity incentives are generally dividend protected. The results suggest that the managers of firms adopting equity incentives tend to act in their own interests, increasing their cash receipts by increasing dividend distributions, as measured by cash dividend payout ratios. This conclusion is consistent with previous findings in the classic literature on American, European and Chinese firms. By analyzing the interaction between equity incentives and regional investor protection, we find that regional investor protection has a significant restraining effect on this self-interested behavior. The stronger the degree of regional investor protection, the greater this effect.
Incorporating factors reflecting growth in the model equations, we find that the restraining effect is different depending on firms’ growth opportunities. The restraining effect on cash dividends is significant for low-growth firms. Conversely, the restraining effect on stock dividends is significant in high-growth firms. In firms adopting restricted stock equity incentives, cash dividends tend to be higher than in firms adopting stock options – a disparity not apparent for stock dividends. The results suggest that regional investor protection could also restrain this tendency, reducing the difference between cash dividend payouts in restricted stock vs stock option firms. Finally, our results suggest that this restraining effect can have a positive effect on corporate growth and performance.
These results have important policy implications. The task of reforming investor protection laws and improving judicial quality can be difficult and lengthy, and require support from politicians and other interest groups. Compared with the reform of legal CFRI 31610,3 mechanisms at the country level, improving regional levels of investor protection would seem to be more feasible and effective. Our paper therefore suggests that, in countries where investor protection is weak overall, policies designed to improve regional investor protection, via improvements in regional legal environments, could be adopted, and that improving the efficiency of legal systems should remain a priority item on regional policy makers’ agendas – both in China and elsewhere.
作者简介
苏自力教授是全国会计领军人才，曾经供职过中国石油、中国石化、中国通用等大型国有企业，担任过CAERI （SH， 601965）的CFO。对能源行业和高科技企业的财务管理、风险管控、战略绩效管理和国际合作等有着丰富经验，出版专著2部（2011年，2015年），并在国内外经济管理类核心期刊发表论文30余篇。曾担任过上海证券交易所和深圳证券交易所的财务总监培训师，受到广泛好评，并为多家上市公司提供过管理咨询服务。
Constantinos Alexiou博士是克兰菲尔德管理学院（Cranfield School of Management）的教授，他在该学院的研究生课程和经验丰富的行政管理课程中提供与业务相关的课程。2014年，他制定了享誉国际的《知识产权保护和执行索引》，该索引评估了49个国家/地区与保护知识产权相关的风险。他在学术期刊上发表了100多种出版物，例如《国际财经期刊》，《世界商业杂志》，《国际商业评论》等。他经常参加许多国际会议。
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