Vol.553 域外法学 | 《伦理学》（Ethics）第130卷（2020）第2期
《伦理学》
Ethics
Volume 130, Number 2 | January 2020
《伦理学》（Ethics）创办于1890年，刊载来自社会和政治理论、法律、经济学等不同学术视角的道德、政治与法律哲学作品。除主体论文以外，《伦理学》也刊载批判性讨论、专题论文、评述文章和书评。
编辑部欢迎交叉学科以及美国域外的稿件。在不影响清晰性和严谨性的前提下，文章应当避免使用不必要的技术性语言，尽可能使广泛的受众易于接受。《伦理学》关注当下道德议题的理论及其实践。历史性的文章如果对当代理论有重大意义，同样欢迎投搞。
《伦理学》第130卷（2020）第2期共刊载2篇论文、3篇讨论与8篇书评。以下为论文、讨论与书评信息：
一、论文
01
侧写证据、公平以及错误定罪的风险
Profile Evidence, Fairness, and the Risks of Mistaken Convictions
Marcello Di Bello and Collin O’Neil
许多人反对在审判中使用针对被告的侧写证据（profile evidence），即使数据相关性是可靠的并且陪审团没有偏见。既有文献一直在努力为这种反对意见辩护。我们认为，认可侧写证据是值得反对的，因为它违反了我们所谓的“平等保护”，即与其他面临类似指控的无辜被告相比，清白的被告享有的不遭受更高的事前错误定罪风险的权利。我们还说明了为什么接受其他形式的证据，如目击证人，踪迹和动机证据，并不违反平等保护。
Many oppose the use of profile evidence against defendants at trial, even when the statistical correlations are reliable and the jury is free from prejudice. The literature has struggled to justify this opposition. We argue that admitting profile evidence is objectionable because it violates what we call “equal protection”—that is, a right of innocent defendants not to be exposed to higher ex ante risks of mistaken conviction compared to other innocent defendants facing similar charges. We also show why admitting other forms of evidence, such as eyewitness, trace, and motive evidence, does not violate equal protection.
02
先到先得？
First Come, First Served?
Tyler M. John and Joseph Millum
在卫生和社会政策领域，等待时间（waiting time）被广泛用于资源配置决策中，但尚没有关于等待时间之道德意义的一般理由。我们提供如是解释。我们认为，等待时间并不具有内在的道德意义，但它的使用在一系列前理论的令人信服的情景中是合理的。首先，有一项公平义务，禁止在存在充分公正的队列的情况下进行划线界分。其次，候选人处于相似的相关情境时，通过等待时间来分配是有效的，相对于其它帕累托有效分配来说能够最大化分配平等，并接近于等概率彩票抽奖的公平。
Waiting time is widely used in health and social policy to make resource allocation decisions, yet no general account of the moral significance of waiting time exists. We provide such an account. We argue that waiting time is not intrinsically morally significant, but its use is justified across a range of pretheoretically compelling scenarios. First, there is a duty of fairness prohibiting line cutting where a sufficiently just queue exists. Second, where candidates are in relevantly similar circumstances, allocating by waiting time is efficient, maximizes distribution equality relative to other Pareto efficient distributions, and approaches the fairness of an equiprobable lottery.
二、讨论
01
没有（良好）推理的规范理由
Normative Reasons without (Good) Reasoning
Artūrs Logins
根据规范理由的良好推理观点，仅当p是良好推理模式的前提，p是F的理由。本文展示了关于良好推理观点的最先进版本的两个反例。
According to the good reasoning view of normative reasons, p is a reason to F, just in case p is a premise of a good pattern of reasoning. This article presents two counterexamples to the most promising version of the good reasoning view.
02
无知的问题
The Problem of Ignorance
Chad Lee-Stronach
霍利·史密斯认为，主观道义论（认为我们的道德义务对我们关于所处情境的信念是敏感的）无法正确地决定一个人在采取行动之前是否应该收集更多的信息。与此相反，我主张道义论可以使用决策论的方式来评估信息的道德重要性。然后，我认为这种方式与菲利普·斯文森提出的替代方式相比是更适切的。
Holly Smith contends that subjective deontological theories—those that hold that our moral duties are sensitive to our beliefs about our situation—cannot correctly determine whether one ought to gather more information before acting. Against this contention, I argue that deontological theories can use a decision-theoretic approach to evaluating the moral importance of information. I then argue that this approach compares favorably with an alternative approach proposed by Philip Swenson.
03
病态的道德教化：道德判断是一种承诺机制吗？
Pathological Moralizing: Is Moral Judgment a Commitment Device?
Michael Prinzing
埃里克·坎贝尔（Eric Campbell）主张我们应当废除道德讨论（moral discourse），理由在于作出道德判断会导致“可能的严重实践病态（potentially severe practical pathologies）”，包括伪善与自我欺骗。然而，他关于道德判断的解释只是看似合理地描述了规则遵守或道义判断。因此，他的论证只能支持部分的道德讨论的废除。这种观点确实有趣，但它不像整体的（wholesale）道德废除主义那样极端。此外，我主张当坎贝尔的解释被重构为道义废除主义的论证时，它只能发挥一种非常有限的辩证作用。
Eric Campbell has argued that we should abolish moral discourse on the grounds that making moral judgments leads to “potentially severe practical pathologies,” including hypocrisy and self-delusion. However, his account of moral judgments only plausibly describes rule-following or deontological judgments. Thus, his argument only supports a partial abolition of moral discourse. This view is certainly interesting, but it is not as extreme as wholesale moral abolitionism. Moreover, I argue that Campbell’s account, when reconstructed as an argument for deontological abolitionism, can play only a very limited dialectical role.
三、书评
1. Danny Underwood II评Kwame Anthony Appiah的《犹如：理想化与理想》（As If: Idealization and Ideals）。
2. Rebecca Stangl评Nicolas Bommarito的《内在美德》（Inner Virtue）。
3. Paul Formosa评Diane Jeske的《内在的邪恶：为什么我们需要道德哲学》（The Evil Within: Why We Need Moral Philosophy）。
4. Robin Zheng评Martha C. Nussbaum的《恐惧君主制：哲学家审视我们的政治危机》（The Monarchy of Fear: A Philosopher Looks at Our Political Crisis）。
5. Jussi Suikkanen评Richard Rowland的《规范性与评价性：价值推诿》（The Normative and the Evaluative: The Buck-Passing Account of Value）。
6. Daniel Viehoff评T. M. Scanlon的《为什么不平等至关重要？》（Why Does Inequality Matter?）。
7. Jordan MacKenzie评Krista K. Thomason的《赤裸：羞耻的黑暗面与道德生活》（Naked: The Dark Side of Shame and Moral Life）。
8. Craig K. Agule评Gideon Yaffe的《责任年龄：儿童与刑事责任的本质》（The Age of Culpability: Children and the Nature of Criminal Responsibility）。
法律思想 | 中国政法大学法理学研究所