Vol.579 域外 | Legal Theory，Volume 25, Issue 1-2
Legal Theory
《法律理论》
Volume 25, Issue 1-2
《法律理论》不只从法学，也从哲学、政治学、经济学、历史学和社会学等广泛的人文社会科学中吸取研究成果。《法律理论》刊文的主题广泛，包括但不限于分析法理学、规范法理学、法律制度和学说的政策分析、法社会学和法文化学，以及关于法律和法律制度的批判观点。期刊现任编辑为Mitchell N. Berman、Scott Hershovitz、Connie Rosati和Scott J. Shapiro.
文摘
01
程序性权利的基础
Grounding Procedural Rights
N. P. Adams
人们普遍认为，如果我们不首先经由一个足够公平和可靠的程序来确定某人是否有罪，就惩罚他，那我们就错了。对这种错误的最好解释是先于制度的、道德的程序权利。近来，克里斯托弗.希思.韦尔曼提出了一个质疑的结论，即不存在这样的权利，这对一种广为人们所接受的正统观念提出了挑战。我提出了两个新的先于制度的道德程序权利的基础，借此回答韦尔曼的质疑。首先，我们有权不受不包括具体可靠程序的惩罚性制度的约束，否则我们将面临遭受不应有惩罚的不合理风险。其次，我们不仅享有免于受到他人侵害或遭受他人不合理侵害风险的权利，也有权要求他人控制其行为以避免在有密切关联可能性的世界中错误地伤害我们。
It is commonly held that we wrong someone if we punish them without first determining whether they are guilty through the process of a sufficiently fair and reliable procedure. This wrong is best explained by pre-institutional moral procedural rights. Recently, Christopher Heath Wellman has argued for the skeptical conclusion that there are no such rights, challenging a widely held orthodoxy. I propose two novel grounds for pre-institutional moral procedural rights and so answer Wellman's skepticism. First, we have rights not to be subject to punitive systems that do not include specific sorts of reliable procedures because otherwise we are subject to unreasonable risks of undeserved punishment. Second, not only do we have rights that others not harm us or unreasonably risk harming us, we have rights that they control for avoiding wrongfully harming us across relevant close possible worlds.
02
模糊比较和比例量刑
Vague Comparisons and Proportional Sentencing
Jacob Bronsther
当在比较中没有最佳选择，并且诸选择似乎也不相等时，将应用“小改进问题（small improvement problem）”（“问题”），因为对一个选择的小改进不能使它成为更好的选择。我认为模糊性导致了问题，使得选择模糊地相等或模糊地“相关”。然后，我将展开这个问题的一个重要实例，即犯罪和刑罚之间的比较，这是罪有应得的刑罚理念的基础。我认为这种比较不仅模棱两可，而且非常含糊不清，导致出现了大量“并非不相称”（not undeserved）的量刑。但是，我得出的结论是，报应主义（retributivism）只能证明危害性最小的“并非不相称”的量刑是合理的。
The “small improvement problem” (“the Problem”) applies when no option in a comparison is best nor, it seems, are the options equal, because a small improvement to one would fail to make it the better choice. I argue that vagueness causes the Problem, such that the options are vaguely equal or vaguely “related.” I then unpack an important instance of the Problem, the comparison between a crime and a punishment upon which the ideal of a retributively deserved sentence is based. I argue that this comparison is not only vague, but remarkably vague, leading to an expansive array of “not undeserved” sentences. I conclude, however, that retributivism can only justify the least harmful “not undeserved” sentence.
03
法律-决定作为基础：一种关于法理学的共同基础框架
Law-Determination as Grounding:
A Common Grounding Framework for Jurisprudence
Samuele Chilovi,
George Pavlakos
法律是现实的派生物，其存在依赖于更为基础的事物。这引起的问题是，法律和它更为基础的决定因素之间的依赖关系是什么。本文的主要目标是论证基础（grounding）就是这种关系。我们首先提出这种主张的肯定理由，然后在可能的反对中为之辩护，后者认为相关关系是相当理性的决定。面对这种挑战，我们论证这种表面上的反对意见并非真正的反对，因为就其最适切的理解而言，理性的决定实际上不外乎是基础。最后，我们阐明由接受我们的观点而产生的法律-决定理论的框架。通过图示的方式，我们提供了一种关于哈特式实证主义的基础-理论的解释，并展示其如何能够消解一种针对法律的简易实证主义的重要挑战。
Law being a derivative feature of reality, it exists in virtue of more fundamental things, upon which it depends. This raises the question of what is the relation of dependence that holds between law and its more basic determinants. The primary aim of this paper is to argue that grounding is that relation. We first make a positive case for this claim, and then we defend it from the potential objection that the relevant relation is rather rational determination. Against this challenge, we argue that the apparent objection is really no objection, for on its best understanding, rational determination turns out to actually be grounding. Finally, we clarify the framework for theories on law-determination that results from embracing our view; by way of illustration, we offer a ground-theoretic interpretation of Hartian positivism and show how it can defuse an influential challenge to simple positivist accounts of law.
04
多重合理行为案件：侵权行为法中的因果不确定问题
Multiple Reasonable Behaviors Cases:
The Problem of Causal Underdetermination in Tort Law
Maytal Gilboa
本文介绍了侵权法中一个重要但又常被忽视的问题：因果（关系）不确定。一旦依“要是没有”检验法（but-for test）来开展的因果调查得到的是两个相互矛盾的结果，而非唯一一个结果，就会出现这个问题。根据前者，过失侵权之被告是造成原告损害的可能原因，而后者则认为不是。本文解释了为何因果不确定问题长期为侵权法学者所忽视，并为法庭上“缺乏因果”之解答所搪塞。本文表明当前的实践在因果不确定的情况下可能导致错误的决定，即使证据表明过失侵权之被告实际上是造成原告损害的可能原因，亦有为被告开脱其责任之可能。此种实践不仅使对潜在被告的威慑缺位，而且还会鼓励策略层面的诉讼操纵行为以助其逃避责任。最后，本文提出了解决方案以应对因果不确定问题，并试图解决目前的做法所带来的困难。
This article introduces a significant yet largely overlooked problem in the law of torts: causal underdetermination. This problem occurs when the causal inquiry of a but-for test produces not one but two results, which are contradictory. According to the first, the negligent defendant is the likely cause of the plaintiff's injury, whereas according to the second, she is not. The article explains why causal underdetermination has escaped the radar of tort scholars and is perceived by courts as lack of causation. It demonstrates that the current practice in cases of causal underdetermination might lead to erroneous decisions, absolving negligent defendants of tort liability even when the evidence suggests that they are in fact the likely cause of the plaintiff's injury. This, in turn, the article asserts, may not only lead to underdeterrence among potential defendants, but also encourage manipulative litigation strategy to escape liability in retrospect. The article then proposes solutions that contend with causal underdetermination and resolve the difficulties that the current practice entails.
05
难以捉摸的惩罚对象
The Elusive Object of Punishment
Gabriel S. Mendlow
当聚焦于我们的法律制度之时，观察者皆知刑事法律可能是复杂且晦涩的。但是制定法的模糊性往往以一种大多数观察者都忽略的特定形式出现：制定法旨在惩罚的不法行为的同一性（identity）的不确定性。尽管各方当事人对制定法的要素达成一致意见，但在潜在的不法行为的同一性认定上出现分歧的情况并不少见。这些未经检验的分歧隐藏在显而易见的情景中，构成各种常见争端的基础或者加剧了争端——比如关于地点、模糊性和犯意；关于酒后驾驶和法定强奸；关于仇恨犯罪、儿童色情和反恐怖主义法；关于惩罚的相称性；以及刑法的适当界限。这其中每一个争议都可能取决于对制定法旨在惩罚的不法行为之同一性的更深层次的分歧，而这些更深层次的分歧出乎意料地难以解决，因为我们刑法复杂的内部结构和行政管理的自由裁量机制助长了这些分歧。
All observers of our legal system recognize that criminal statutes can be complex and obscure. But statutory obscurity often takes a particular form that most observers have overlooked: uncertainty about the identity of the wrong a statute aims to punish. It is not uncommon for parties to disagree about the identity of the underlying wrong even as they agree on the statute's elements. Hidden in plain sight, these unexamined disagreements underlie or exacerbate an assortment of familiar disputes—about venue, vagueness, and mens rea; about DUI and statutory rape; about hate crimes, child pornography, and counterterrorism laws; about proportionality in punishment; and about the proper ambit of the criminal law. Each of these disputes may hinge on deeper disagreements about the identity of the wrong a statute aims to punish, and these deeper disagreements can be surprisingly hard to resolve, fueled as they are by the complex inner structure of our penal laws and the discretionary mechanisms of their administration.
06
模糊理论与法律理论
Theories of Vagueness and Theories of Law
Alex Silk
人们普遍认为，界定何为正确的语言模糊性理论，影响着法哲学领域的争论。对此我持反对态度。我认为，特定的模糊性理论对法理学的实质性问题及实践所产生的影响并非通常被认为的那样深远。本文着重讨论了相关文献中所涉及到的四个假设性的含义：（一）法律模糊性的价值；（二）法律不确定性的可能性及价值；（三）法治的可能性；以及（四）强自由裁量权。最后，本文也谈及一些有关方法论的问题。对于传统意义、法律内容的确定、法律解释的规范以及司法实践等有关问题的阐释，可以促使人们对模糊性、解释和法律的整体理论空间有更清晰的回答和更精准的理解。
It is common to think that what theory of linguistic vagueness is correct has implications for debates in philosophy of law. I disagree. I argue that the implications of particular theories of vagueness on substantive issues of legal theory and practice are less far-reaching than often thought. I focus on four putative implications discussed in the literature concerning (i) the value of vagueness in the law, (ii) the possibility and value of legal indeterminacy, (iii) the possibility of the rule of law, and (iv) strong discretion. I conclude with some methodological remarks. Delineating questions about conventional meaning, legal content determination, and norms of legal interpretation and judicial practice can motivate clearer answers and a more refined understanding of the space of overall theories of vagueness, interpretation, and law.
法律思想 | 中国政法大学法理学研究所