Vol.582 域外法学 | 《法哲学与社会哲学论丛》（ARSP) 第106卷（2020）第1期

Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosphie

《法哲学与社会哲学论丛》  

Volume 106, Number 1, January 2020

《法哲学与社会哲学论丛》（Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie）由国际法哲学与社会哲学协会（IVR）出版发行。自1907年创刊以来，期刊注目于社会生活、法律文化及其交互作用的智识基础，进而开展法哲学基础研究。期刊接纳所有的当下思想学派，并尤为注重国际视野。同侪评审的程序保证了刊文的高学术水准。

《法哲学与社会哲学论丛》现任主编为乌尔弗里德·诺依曼（Ulfrid Neumann），德国法兰克福大学法哲学、法社会学、刑法和刑事诉讼法学教授，国际法哲学与社会哲学协会前主席（2011-2015），拉德布鲁赫基金会主席。

文摘

01

难民的迫害条件之替代

Replacing the Persecution Condition for Refugeehood

Eilidh Beaton

根据1951年《难民公约》（Refugee Convention），为了符合获得难民资格的条件，个人必须提供充分理由说明其对出于种族、宗教、国籍、特定社会组织成员资格或政治观点而受到迫害的恐惧。这种难民资格条件的一个主要问题是其遗留了重要的保护空白，因为人们普遍同意，个人对无差别的暴力或普遍的伤害的逃离并不满足这些条件。在本文，我将评价捍卫和批判迫害条件的既有论证，然后概述我自己对应当取代这一条件的标准的解释。我将论证，我的观点相较于既有文献提供的替代方案更为可取，因为它满足了三个关键要求：（1）它消除了保护空白；（2）在像我们这样的世界里，它是可行的；（3）它保留了难民制度的重要政治性质。

In order to be eligible for refugee status under the 1951 Refugee Convention, an individual must have a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. A major problem with this condition for refugee status is that it leaves significant protection gaps, for it is generally agreed that individuals fleeing indiscriminate violence or generalized harm do not satisfy this requirement. In this paper, I evaluate existing arguments both defending and critiquing the persecution condition, and then outline my own account of the criteria that should replace it. I argue that my view is preferable to alternatives suggested in the literature because it satisfies three key desiderata: 1) it eliminates protection gaps; 2) it is feasible to implement in a world like ours; and 3) it preserves the importantly political nature of the institution of refugeehood.

02

自由与法律：汉娜·阿伦特的未解之谜？

Freedom and Law: Hannah Arendt's Unsolved Puzzle?

Alfonso Ballesteros

在汉娜·阿伦特的思想中，自由与法律并非自然而然地兼容，有人或许认为它们几乎不可能同时存在。由于自由和法律兼具重要性，这可以被看作是阿伦特的首要难题。许多学者已经解决了这个问题，但很少有人关注她对于该难题在政治事件中的解答以及最终结果，即公民不服从现象。本文旨在填补这一空白。

Freedom and law in Hannah Arendt's thought are not spontaneously compatible and one might think they are almost impossible to occur together. Due to the importance of both freedom and law this might be considered Arendt's greatest puzzle. Many scholars have addressed this problem but few have paid attention to the answers to this difficulty she found in political events and to the eventual solution to this puzzle, the phenomenon of civil disobedience. This paper aims to address this gap.

03

罗尔斯与德沃金的反基础主义

Anti-foundationalism in Rawls and Dworkin

Sophie Papaefthymiou

本文对比了罗尔斯和德沃金的认识论，两者通常呈现为康德主义或实用主义。本文着重考虑了他们的作品所蕴含的主要实用主义命题，即反形而上学、反怀疑论、可误论与实践条件下的客观性，以及他们对真理的解释。随后，本文对将罗尔斯的认识论视为“反基础主义”的进路进行了检验，并认为就这种资质（qualification）与协商民主的联系程度而言，它不应当被毫无保留地接受为对任一哲学家的观点的充分解释。

This paper compares and contrasts the epistemologies of Rawls and Dworkin, both usually presented as either Kantian or pragmatist. It considers in particular the main pragmatist theses underlying their work, namely anti-metaphysics, anti-skepticism, fallibilism and objectivity as conditioned by practice, as well as their account of truth. It then examines an approach which takes Rawls' epistemology as "anti-foundationalist" and argues that, to the extent that this qualification is connected to deliberative democracy, it should not be accepted without reservation as an adequate account of the views of either philosopher.

04

法律现在会衰亡吗？：

法律的唯物主义批判之展现

Can Law Wither Away Today?: Displaying the Materialistic Critique of Law

Daria Bayer

通过授予平等的权利以确保个人自由是法治的核心成就。然而，差距仍然横亘于权利的平等和经济资源的不平等之间。苏联法学家叶夫根尼·B·帕舒卡尼斯于1924年指出，正是法律通过其语言和制度的抽象性，允许那些权力和财产的富有之人掩饰其物质利益。在他看来，资本主义向共产主义的转型不可避免地要求所有法律的消亡。这一隐喻让步于对法律抽象性的来源以及它们影响我们日常关系的批判性反思。本文认为，这更是一种邀请，以促使人们思考如何让更多的公众得见此种反思。

To secure individual freedom by granting equal rights is a central achievement of the Rule of Law. A gap does, however, remain between the equality of rights and the inequality of economic resources. Soviet lawyer Evgeny B. Pashukanis formulated in 1924 that it is the law which, through the abstractness of its language and institutions, allows those rich in power and possession to disguise their material interests. In his opinion, the transformation from capitalism to communism would inevitably require all law to wither away. The metaphor gives way to a critical reflection about where the legal abstractions come from and what they do to our everyday relations. This text argues that it is even more an invitation to think about how this reflection can be made accessible to a greater public.

05

权利的意志理论与刑法：

一个关于保护个人权利的规则与限制的规范性解释

The Will Theory of Rights and Criminal Law:

A Normative Account on Rules and Restrictions that Protect Individual Entitlements

Elias Moser

迄今为止，权利的意志理论一直被认为是无法解释刑法中的个人权利的。因此，该理论的支持者为“刑法不赋予个人权利”的主张辩护。在本文中，我认为刑法事实上的确赋予了个人以权利，而权利的意志理论可以增进我们对这些权利的理解。我承认，如果这一理论被理解为一种描述性的解释，它就不能涵盖刑法所赋予的权利。但是，如果该理论被理解为一种规范性理论，它就可以用于分析和评价刑事法律中的规则与限制。

这篇文章的目的是——首先，概述关于这一理论的规范性解释是如何可适用于个人权利的刑事法律保护的证成；其次，概述该规范性解释的主要含义。一方面，规范性意志理论包含了“自愿不成立侵害”（volenti non fit iniuria）原则。另一方面，它为“将惩罚作为赔偿（restitution）”的观点提供了支持。

The will theory of rights has so far been considered incapable of accounting for individual rights in criminal law. Adherents of the theory, therefore, defend the claim that criminal law does not assign rights to individuals. In this article I argue that criminal law in fact does assign rights to individuals and that the will theory of rights may enhance our understanding of these rights. I admit that if the theory is understood as a descriptive account, it cannot encompass rights conferred by criminal law. If the theory, however, is understood as a normative theory, it can be applied to an analysis and assessment of criminal legal rules and restrictions. The aim of this article is first, to outline how a normative account of the theory is applicable for a justification of the criminal legal protection of individual entitlements. Second, the major implications of the approach are outlined. The normative will theory on the one hand includes a volenti non fit iniuria principle. On the other hand, it provides support for an idea of punishment as restitution.

06

法律推理中的论据与故事：证据法案例

Arguments and Stories in Legal Reasoning: The Case of Evidence Law

Gianluca Andresani

我们认为，法律论证作为论证研究的主要内容及其特殊的子领域，必须通过熟练地利用诸如论证与故事组合（story schemes）之类的全套工具来加以检验，后者是当前论证研究的前沿工作。在回顾既有文献时，我们明晰了自己的方法论选择（特别是有关在实践推理中规范性思考的地位），然后通过对英国证据法中一个案例研究的分析来说明这种方法的含义。我们主张必须在实践论证和故事之间做出明确区分。由于在普通法陪审团审判中，法律判决和事实认定存在制度上的分离，我们主张将论据与基于故事的分析相结合。

We argue that legal argumentation, as the subject matter as well as a special subfield of Argumentation Studies (AS), has to be examined by making skilled use of the full panoply of tools such as argumentation and story schemes which are at the forefront of current work in AS. In reviewing the literature, we make explicit our own methodological choices (particularly regarding the place of normative deliberation in practical reasoning) and then illustrate the implications of such an approach through the analysis of a case study in the English law of evidence. We argue that a clear distinction must be drawn between practical argumentation and stories. Because of the institutional separation between legal judgment and fact-finding in common-law jury trials, we argue for the combination of argument and story-based analysis.

07

Jürgen Rödig的法律逻辑：仍然相关吗？

Jürgen Rödigs Legal Logic: Still Relevant?

Michael Mauer

本文对Jürgen Rödig（1942-1975）关于法律逻辑的著作进行了研究，旨在确定那些对法律理论仍有重要贡献的成果。与之特别相关的是（一）经典形式的命题逻辑和谓词逻辑应被视为充分的且大体上足以刻画形式法律推理的理由。本文讨论的其他主题是（二）Rödig关于逻辑论证的具体法律变种（legal variants）的观点；（三）法律理论中的公理方法；（四）作为法律三段论核心步骤的一般规范的证明方法；（五）解释成文法的正确方法；（六）一般规范是否具有形式特征的问题；以及（七）法律定义和类似立法起草工具的结构性特征。

This paper looks into the writings of Jürgen Rödig (1942–1975) on legal logic with the aim of identifying those results which still appear to be essential contributions to legal theory. Of particular relevance are (i) the reasons why propositional and predicate logic in its classsical form should be considered adequate and by and large sufficient to represent formal legal reasoning. Other issues discussed in this paper are (ii) Rödig's views concerning specifically legal variants of logical arguments, (iii) the axiomatic method in legal theory, (iv) ways of substantiating general norms as a central step in what constitutes the legal syllogism, (v) the correct method of interpreting written law, (vi) the question as to whether there are formal characteristics of general norms, and (vii) structural properties of legal definitions and of similar legislative drafting tools.

法律思想 | 中国政法大学法理学研究所