Vol.641 域外 | Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence，Volume 33

   Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence

Volume 33, Issue 2 | August 2020

01

气候变化时代的分配正义

Distributive Justice in the Age of Climate Change

Elkanah O. Babatunde

法律和政治思想家总是在正义问题上争论不休，特别是在社会中对权利和责任的公平公正分配。然而，这一问题不仅与地方或国家的组织有关，它也越来越与国际法律体系有关。在过去的三十年，这一问题最为流行的领域是关于气候变化的国际法。

Legal and political thinkers have always battled with the question of justice and, especially within a society, about the fair and just distribution of rights and responsibilities. This question is, however, not only relevant for the organization of municipal or domestic society; it has become increasingly relevant within the international legal system. An area where this has been most rife in the last three decades is the international law on climate change.

02

权利利益理论评价的不可避免性

The Unavoidability of Evaluation for Interest Theories of Rights

Mark McBride

在关于权利的论辩中，与在任何哲学论辩一样，或者可能比在任何哲学论辩中都更重要的是见微知著（see the wood from the trees）。不久前，随着一种与现存选择相抗衡的新理论出现，关于权利的论辩被注入了新的活力。具体而言，与意志理论和利益理论相抗衡，Gopal Sreenivasan的（请求）权利混合理论应运而生。这种新的混合理论与利益理论发生了一系列冲突。从整体来看，争论发生的一个主要理由就是所谓的第三方受益人问题。并且具体来看，在前述第三方受益人论辩中，一个特别的问题集中在我称之为“戈帕尔的奶奶（Gopal’s Granny）”的案例上，它为Gopal Sreenivasan所运用、尤其用以反对利益理论最重要的捍卫者之一：Matthew Kramer。

In debates over rights, as much as, or perhaps more than, in any philosophical debate, it is important to see the wood from the trees. A little while ago, new life was breathed into debates over rights, as a new candidate theory emerged to rival the extant options. More specifically, Gopal Sreenivasan’s hybrid theory of (claim-) rights emerged to rival both will theory and interest theory. This new hybrid theory underwent a series of skirmishes with the interest theory. Moving from the wood, one principal ground over which battle ensued is the so-called third party beneficiary issue. And, more specifically still, descending into the trees, a particular problem within the foregoing third party beneficiary debate centred on what I shall dub Gopal’s Granny, a case wielded by Gopal Sreenivasan, particularly against one of the foremost defenders of the interest theory, Matthew Kramer.

03

国际税收制度解释两则

Two Accounts of International Tax Justice

Ivan Ozai

多年来，当下的国际税收制度越来越多地受到多方面的批评，尤其是它对发展中国家造成的不公平。一些评论者认为，由于发展中国家没有平等地参与决策进程，所以它是不公平的。其他人认为，国际税收制度是富裕国家为满足自身利益而设计的。有的人指出，目前它的制度设计为税收竞争和避税创造了机会，这对发展中经济体造成更加严重的影响，因为它们相对依赖于企业所得税，而且更容易受到资本流动的影响。还有的人对征税权（即各国对跨境交易征税的权利）专门进行批判，批评它们目前在母国和东道国之间分配的方式，以及它们如何不利于资本进口型发展中国家。

The contemporary international tax regime has been increasingly criticized over the years from varied perspectives, particularly as to the unfairness it produces for developing countries. Some commentators argue it is unjust due to the lack of participation of developing countries in the policymaking process on an equal footing. Others suggest the international tax regime was designed by affluent countries to respond to self-interested goals. Some note that its current institutional design creates opportunities for tax competition and avoidance, which more seriously affect developing economies due to their relative dependence on corporate income tax and their greater vulnerability to capital mobility. Others specifically criticize how taxing rights, that is, the entitlement of countries to tax cross-border transactions, are currently allocated between home and host countries and how they disfavour capital-importing, developing countries.

04

政府资助的宗教协会与非歧视规则：豁免权与公共资助

Governmental-Funded Religious Associations and Non-Discrimination Rules: On Immunity and Public Funding

Nahshon Perez

许多宗教协会展示出不同于自由规则的内部规范。这些规范往往直接违背了非歧视规则，而后者是这些协会开展活动所在的自由民主国家的重要组成部分。在法律和学术著作中，宗教协会往往被认为至少可以不受某些这种规则的约束。社会普遍的非歧视规则与特定宗教协会规范之间的这种紧张关系赢得了学者和法院的关注。在许多这样的辩论中，预设的背景是，这些宗教团体是在政教分离模式下运作的自愿协会；也就是说，这些协会通过其成员的自由选择来运作，个人可以像成立协会那样自由地离开协会。虽然非歧视规则的理论化以及它们可否适用于通过成员捐款资助的宗教协会显然具有重要性，但是本文研究的是一个不同的问题：民主政府直接支持的宗教协会内部的歧视。最近关于宗教与国家关系的研究指出，在许多民主国家中，宗教协会在相当程度上由政府资助。然而，文献中却忽视了非歧视规则与国家资助的宗教协会所假定享有的不受这种规则约束的权利之间的紧张关系。这或许是因为，最为突出的这类法律案件是在欧洲人权法院和英国最高法院审理，而不是在更为显眼的美国最高法院。本文提出以下问题：政府资助的接受以何种方式（如果有的话）改变了宗教协会免于非歧视规则的假定权利？“豁免权命题”——宗教协会享有不受非歧视规则约束的权利——在此并没有受到质疑：本文认为，如果存在这种豁免权，接受政府资助并不必然会消解掉它。在很大程度上，这取决于如何在每个案件中平衡宗教协会的自治和保护公民个人免受影响其重要公民利益（如获得工作或高质量教育）的歧视。在为测试这种平衡而确定的变量中，有三个是协会结构的内部变量：潜在的非自由规范在受资助宗教协会的中心地位；违反非歧视规则的种类（无论是内部歧视还是外部歧视，见下文）；以及宗教协会内化歧视成本的意愿。另外两个可以用来检验相互竞争的社会价值之平衡的变量是外在于协会的，取决于协会运作的政治法律环境：政府提供给协会的资助数量，以及潜在竞争的宗教协会获得认可和资助资格的程序。需要一个多变量的“测试”，以确定由政府资助的宗教协会在实行歧视性规范时是否以及如何仍然可以要求豁免权。

Many religious associations exhibit internal norms that differ from liberal norms and rules. Such norms often directly contradict the non-discrimination norms and rules that are part and parcel of the liberal democracies in which these associations operate. Religious associations often are considered, in both legal and scholarly writings, exempt from at least some of these norms and rules. This tension between broad societal non-discrimination rules and the norms of specific religious associations has won the attention of scholars and courts. In many such debates, the background assumption is that these religious groups are voluntary associations functioning within a model of separation between religion and state; that is, such associations operate through the free choices of their members and individuals are as free to leave the associations as they were to form them. While theorizing about non-discrimination rules and whether they apply to religious associations that are funded via the contributions of their members is of obvious importance, this article examines a distinct problem: that of discrimination within religious associations that are directly supported by democratic governments. Recent research on religion-state relations has pointed out that, in many democratic countries, religious associations are funded by the government to a considerable extent. The tension between non-discrimination norms and the presumed rights of the state-funded religious associations to be exempted from such rules, however, is neglected in the literature. Perhaps this is because the most prominent legal cases of this kind were tried at the European Court of Human Rights and the U.K. Supreme Court, rather than the more conspicuous U.S. Supreme Court. This article asks the following question: in what way, if at all, does receiving governmental funding change the presumed right of religious associations to be exempted from non-discrimination rules? The ‘immunity thesis’—the idea that religious associations enjoy the right to be exempted from non-discrimination rules—is not challenged here: this article argues that if there is such a right to immunity, receiving governmental funding does not necessarily eliminate it. Much depends on how each case maintains the balance between the autonomy of religious associations and the protection of individual citizens from discrimination that impacts important civil interests such as access to jobs or high-quality education. Of the suggested variables identified to test this balance, three are internal to the associations’ structure: the centrality of the potentially illiberal norm to the funded religious association; the kind of violation of non-discrimination rules (either internal or external discrimination, see below); and the willingness of the religious association to internalize the cost of the discrimination. Two additional variables that can be used to test the balance of competing social values are external to the association and depend on the political-legal environment in which the association functions: the quantity of funding that the government makes available to the association, and the process by which potentially competing religious associations can become eligible for recognized and funded status. A multivariable ‘test’ is required in order to determine whether and how governmental funded religious associations can still claim immunity when practicing discriminatory norms.

05

作为体系不确定性之结果的法官自由裁量权

Judicial Discretion as a Result of Systemic Indeterminacy

Sebastián A. Reyes Molina

“法官自由裁量权”一直是法哲学中法律解释的争论焦点。在一般意义上，“自由裁量权”是指决策者因缺乏影响其裁决案件之能力的法律约束而作出判断的实践。这一主题中最为基本的问题是“法官在解释法律时有自由裁量权吗？”对此有三种回答。一种回答是法官从来没有自由裁量权；另一种回答是法官在解释时总是有自由裁量权；第三种回答认为法官在解释法律时，有时拥有自由裁量权，有时则没有。

The topic of ‘judicial discretion’ has been at the center of the debate on legal interpretation in the philosophy of law. In a general sense, ‘discretion’ here refers to the exercise of a judgment by a decision-maker due to the lack of legal constraints affecting one’s ability to decide a case. The most fundamental question on this topic is ‘do judges have discretion when interpreting the law?’ There are three kinds of answers to this query. One kind of answer states that judges never have discretion. Another kind of answer states that judges always have discretion in interpretation. The third kind of answer states that judges sometimes have discretion when interpreting the law, and sometimes they do not.

06

父母责任分配的公平性和法律限制

Fairness in Allocations of Parental Responsibilities, and the Limits of Law

Ram Rivlin

我们真情实感地爱我们的孩子。然而，当他们终于入睡或者暑假过后重返学校时，我们也会感到高兴。我们真心实意地希望我们可以花更多的时间陪伴孩子。然而，我们也希望追求自己在职业上和私人上的成就。这种矛盾情绪暗示着抚育孩子的基本特征，它是每个有孩子的人所周知的：它既造成负担也带来好处。

We love our children. We really do. Yet we also find ourselves happy when they finally fall asleep, or when they go back to school at the end of their summer vacation. We wish we could spend more time with our children, we really do. Yet we also wish to pursue our own projects, both professionally and personally. This ambivalence hints at a basic characteristic of caring for one’s own child, which is known to every person who ever had a child: it involves both a burden and a benefit.

07

范畴、衡平和虚假新闻：欧洲人权法院的法理学

Categories, Balancing, and Fake News: The Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights

Alessio Sardo

人们经常将言论自由描述为民主和有效实施人权制度的必要先决条件。如果未授予公民免于审查的表达观点和批评政府的基本权利，那么协商民主将无法发挥作用。如果法律不保护公正、独立的司法裁判，那么法治将变成一个空洞的观念。

Freedom of expression has been often described as a necessary precondition for democracy and for the implementation of an effective system of human rights. A deliberative democracy cannot function if citizens are not granted the fundamental right to express their views and to criticize the government without being censored. The rule of law becomes an empty notion if legal orders do not protect the impartial, autonomous judgments of the judiciary.

08

私法的同床异梦者：为什么Pashukanis应该让当代形式主义者担心？

Private Law’s Estranged Bedfellows: Why Pashukanis Should Worry Contemporary Formalists

Igor Shoikhedbrod

摘要略。