国际顶刊 | 《比较政治研究》2020年第9期（特辑：威权体制下的立法）

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本期国际化部为大家带来了《比较政治研究》2020年第9期文章编译。

编译属国际化部译者志愿提供，如有不妥欢迎指正；如对我们的工作有什么建议，欢迎到后台留言；如有转载请注明出处。学术公益是一条很长的路，我们诚邀您同行，欢迎留言您希望编译的政治学期刊，感谢您的支持。

PART 2

期刊简介

Comparative Political Studies（比较政治研究）是美国SAGE出版社旗下学术期刊，创刊于1968年，期刊每月出版一次，主要探讨比较政治学相关内容，期刊现任主编为明尼苏达大学教授David Samuels。过去五年的影响因子为4.262，在176个政治科学类期刊中排名第12。

期刊研究领域和收录范围包括：比较政治学理论研究、全球比较政治学研究、国内比较政治学研究等。

PART 2

期刊目录

1. Legislatures and Legislative Politics Without Democracy
   

   非民主的立法机关和立法政治

2. Policy Coalition Building in an Authoritarian Legislature: Evidence From China’s National Assemblies (1983-2007)

   威权立法机构中的政策联盟建设：来自1983年至2007年间人民代表大会及政治协商会议的证据

3. Authoritarian Amendments: Legislative Institutions as Intraexecutive Constraints in Post-Soviet Russia

   威权式修正案：立法机构作为苏联解体后的行政机构间的制约因素

4. Authoritarian Gridlock? Understanding Delay in the Chinese Legislative System

   威权的僵局？理解中国立法体制中的拖延现象

5. Position Taking or Position Ducking? A Theory of Public Debate in Single-Party Legislatures

   表态或回避？关于一党制立法机构公开辩论的理论

6. Legislatures and Policy Making in Authoritarian Regimes

   威权政权下的立法与政策制定

PART 3

精选译文

01 非民主的立法机关和立法政治                              

【题目】

Legislatures and Legislative Politics Without Democracy

【作者】

Jennifer Gandhi, Ben Noble, and Milan Svolik

【摘要】

在威权体制内，立法机构和立法者的作用是什么？缺少立法机构或人员的专政又将产生怎样的不同效果？专制政府为什么设有立法机构？以上为威权政治和体制研究中的核心问题。作为导言，本文将围绕本期特刊的主题“非民主制度下的立法机构”展开讨论，包括以下内容：我们对威权体制和立法机构已有的了解、对知识体系的补充以及未来研究重点的展望。本特刊旨在对进一步拓展对威权体制及立法制度的研究议程。

What do authoritarian legislatures and legislators do? Would outcomes in dictatorships be different if they were absent? Why do dictatorships have legislatures in the first place? These questions represent central puzzles in the study of authoritarian politics and institutions. The introductory article to this special issue on legislatures in nondemocracies discusses what we now know about these assemblies; what the issue’s articles contribute to this body of knowledge; and what future work might fruitfully look at. The special issue as a whole aims to advance the research agendas of both authoritarian institutions and legislative studies.

02 威权立法机构中的政策联盟建设：来自1983年至2007年间人民代表大会及政治协商会议的证据         

【题目】

Policy Coalition Building in an Authoritarian Legislature: Evidence From China’s National Assemblies (1983-2007)

【作者】

Xiaobo Lü, Mingxing Liu, and Feiyue Li

【摘要】

近期针对威权立法机构的研究强调了制度对于推举代表与信息收集的重要性，但仍有许多人认为威权体制下的立法机构仅仅是个用于制定政策的橡皮图章。

本文认为，威权体制下的立法机构（而非投票结果）是代表们提出的法案与议案之间重要的角斗场。比如，政府机关为了推进自身的政策议程，借用威权立法机构建立政策联盟。代表们充当了政策偏好不同的党派与政府精英的代理人，为其争夺选票。本文使用1983年至2007年间教育相关的人大代表议案与政协委员提案的原始资料进行论证。我们发现存在政策联盟，且该现象在教育相关的法律颁布之前加剧。我们运用网络分析方法解释政策联盟网络背后的渠道。

Recent studies of authoritarian legislatures underscore the importance of institutions for cooptation and information collection, but many still consider authoritarian legislatures rubber stamps in policy making. We argue that authoritarian legislatures could be important arenas of the contestation reflected in delegates’ bills and proposals instead of their voting outcomes. Specifically, government agencies use authoritarian legislatures to build policy coalitions to advance their policy agendas. Delegates serve as proxy fighters for key party and government elites with different policy preferences. We provide evidence based on an original dataset containing education-related bills and policy proposals submitted to both Chinese national assemblies between 1983 and 2007. We identify the existence of the policy coalitions, and find coalition building is more intensified prior to the promulgation of education-related laws. We then employ network analysis to illustrate the channels behind policy coalition network.

03 威权式修正案：立法机构作为苏联解体后的行政机构间的制约因素                           

【题目】

Authoritarian Amendments: Legislative Institutions as Intraexecutive Constraints in Post-Soviet Russia

【作者】

Ben Noble

【摘要】

为什么威权立法机构有时会对行政法案进行大幅度修正？该举动似乎与非民主政体中议会作为“橡皮图章”的传统形象不符。近期研究针对将立法机构视为“橡皮图章”这一观点提出质疑，并认为法案的修正确实受到立法者的影响。本文则提出另一种观点：修正法案可能为行政部门内部决策过程的结果，并且在立法前的内阁阶段未能得到解决。派系化的行政部门可以利用立法机构来帮助解决信息不对称及集体决策中涉及的承诺和监督的问题。本文结合统计和案例研究的方法，分析了当代俄罗斯的跨国数据和细粒度数据，对观点进行了说明。本文研究结果有助于我们进一步了解威权立法机构、非民主国家的政策制定过程以及俄罗斯政治。

Why are executive bills sometimes amended significantly in authoritarian legislatures? Bill change clashes with the conventional picture of parliaments in nondemocracies as “rubber stamp” bodies. Recent work challenging the “rubber stamp” model suggests that cases of amendment are the result of legislator influence. This article proposes an alternative argument: Amendment can result from intraexecutive policy-making processes, unresolved in the prelegislative, cabinet-level stage. Factionalised executives can use legislative institutions to help overcome information asymmetries, as well as the commitment and monitoring problems involved in collective decision making. The article evaluates this alternative account using a combination of statistical and case-study analyses, drawing on both cross-national and fine-grained data from contemporary Russia. The findings contribute to our knowledge of authoritarian legislatures, policy-making processes in nondemocracies, and Russian politics.

04 威权的僵局？理解中国立法体制中的拖延现象     

【题目】

Authoritarian Gridlock? Understanding Delay in the Chinese Legislative System

【作者】

Rory Truex

【摘要】

立法僵局通常被视作一种民主制度中独有的现象。由于威权体系中不存在引发僵局的制度制衡，所以导致许多学者将“威权的效率”和政策力度理想化。中国案例中一组独特的数据表明，威权政权下难以通过法律和改变政策——48%的法律未能在立法计划提出的期限内如期通过，而约12%的法律甚至需要10年以上的时间才可以通过。本文提出的理论将立法结果的差异与执政联盟内部缺乏分歧和公民所受注意力冲击联系了起来：执政联盟内部分歧和民意在威权体制立法过程中起到了决定性的作用。通过对中国《食品安全法》进行定性分析及对另外两部法律的相关案例进行研究，本文说明了该项理论机制的合理性。

Legislative gridlock is often viewed as a uniquely democratic phenomenon. The institutional checks and balances that produce gridlock are absent from authoritarian systems, leading many observers to romanticize “authoritarian efficiency” and policy dynamism. A unique data set from the Chinese case demonstrates that authoritarian regimes can have trouble passing laws and changing policies—48% of laws are not passed within the period specified in legislative plans, and about 12% of laws take more than 10 years to pass. This article develops a theory that relates variation in legislative outcomes to the absence of division within the ruling coalition and citizen attention shocks. Qualitative analysis of China’s Food Safety Law, coupled with shadow case studies of two other laws, illustrates the plausibility of the theoretical mechanisms. Division and public opinion play decisive roles in authoritarian legislative processes.

05 表态或回避？关于一党制立法机构公开辩论的理论

【题目】

Position Taking or Position Ducking? A Theory of Public Debate in Single-Party Legislatures

【作者】

Paul Schuler

【摘要】

威权体制下立法机构的代表是否被鼓励在重大问题上表态？更广泛来说，为何一些专制政体允许针对热点问题展开公开辩论？就理论而言，威权体系下的立法机构在维持政权合法性和信息提供方面发挥着一定的作用，而理解公开立法辩论的变化机制（dynamics）对解释该作用非常重要。我认为，是否允许公开辩论，取决于专制体系下用于调动公众对官僚机构的情绪态度的刺激机制。虽然对重大问题展开辩论可能会引发民众对政权的不满，但通过动员公众舆论来反对政府官员不作为，亦可改善绩效或转移矛盾。因此我预测，独裁者只会允许在他们授权给政府的问题上展开公开辩论。我运用自动内容分析的技术研究了越南国会辩论来检验该观点。结果显示，有证据表明代表们会在重大问题上表态，但仅限于由党授权给国家政府的问题上。

Are representatives in authoritarian legislatures encouraged to take positions on salient issues? More generally, why do some autocracies allow public debate on hot topics at all? Understanding the dynamics of public legislative debate is important for the roles authoritarian legislatures are theorized to play in regime legitimation and information provision. I argue that the decision to allow public debate depends on autocratic incentives to mobilize public sentiment against the bureaucracy. While allowing debate on salient issues risks galvanizing antiregime sentiment, doing so may also mobilize public opinion against wayward government officials to improve performance and deflect blame. Therefore, I predict that autocrats will only allow public debate on issues they have delegated to the government. I test this using an automated content analysis of debate in the Vietnam National Assembly, with results showing evidence of position taking on salient issues, but only on issues the party delegates to the state.

06 威权政权下的立法与政策制定 

【题目】

Legislatures and Policy Making in Authoritarian Regimes

【作者】

Scott Williamson & Beatriz Magaloni

【摘要】

本特刊中收录的文章表明，威权体制的立法机构往往以各式各样的方式影响对国家的政策过程，尽管这些影响依然受限于威权政治的性质。本期四篇文章的作者们运用了新颖的、关于某些具体国家的数据，详细地分析了立法机构在威权政策过程中扮演的角色。首先，Noble (2020) 对俄罗斯的研究及Lü等人 (2020)对中国的研究表明，立法者通过与行政部门官员的互动或参与精英联盟，影响重大政策的决策过程；即使立法者的影响仍然相对薄弱、产生的更广泛的结果也很少受到怀疑。第二， 如Noble（2020）、Lü等人（2020）及Truex（2020）研究所示，与有关威权体制的普遍观念不同，政策制定的过程通常由偏好不同的政权竞争者共同参与，因此混乱而低效。第三，Schuler（2020）通过对越南的研究证明，立法机构被允许就已经授权的政策问题进行公开辩论；其目的是让政府官员承担责任，让公众因绩效不佳向官员追责。

This special issue demonstrates that authoritarian legislatures often matter for their countries’ policy processes in myriad ways, despite the fact that their influence is constrained by the nature of authoritarian politics. In all four of the special issue’s articles, the authors use novel, country-specific data to provide detailed analysis of legislature activity in authoritarian policy processes. First, as illustrated by Noble’s (2020) writing on Russia and Lü et al.’s (2020) writing on China, legislators may shape major policy decisions through their interactions with executive branch officials or their participation in elite coalitions, even when they remain relatively weak and broader outcomes are rarely in doubt. Second, as shown by Noble (2020), Lü et al. (2020), and Truex (2020), policy processes in these institutions are often defined by competing regime actors who hold divergent preferences, and as such, these processes can be messy and inefficient, contrary to popular notions of authoritarian policy making. And third, as demonstrated by Schuler (2020) through his study of Vietnam, legislatures may be permitted to engage in open debate on delegated policy issues, with the goal of holding government officials accountable and shaping the public’s attributions of blame for poor performance.

编  译：宋文佳 欧阳博雅

审  校：宋文佳 欧阳博雅

相关阅读：

编辑：王泽萍

一审：刘博涵

二审：袁    丁

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